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INTRODUCTION
The Swedish town of Karlsudd, one of the various small centers of the 
Stockholm archipelago, can be considered as a place of great symbolic relevance 
for the recent European labour law. 
Sitting in the Vaxholm municipality, it is less than five kilometers distant from 
the grounds of the now infamous Söderfjärd school where the dispute that gave 
origin to the Laval case first erupted; from its easternmost point, furthermore, it is 
possible to spot the transiting Viking Line ferries as they cruise the waterways 
between the multitude of islands and islets in their way towards the Baltic Sea.
While nothing physically highlights its importance, this nondescript town 
came to represent the epicenter of an earthquake that has shook the European 
labour law and industrial relations framework to the core in the context of the 
enlargement processes of the European Union, characterized by an increasing legal 
and economic diversities and by a even greater relevance of labour and services 
mobility in the internal market, which have highlighted the underlying tensions in the 
reconciliation of the social and economic dimensions of the Union.
The balancing by the European Court of Justice in the rulings of what has 
become known as the “Laval quartet” referred to one of the most sensitive and 
relevant matters for any system of labour law and industrial relations, id est the 
ability for workers and trade unions to undertake collective bargaining and action 
with a view of ensuring workers’ protection and social standards, and represented a 
deep innovation with respect to the previous European “neglect” on collective 
action, as well as a significant interference with the generally accepted regulatory 
autonomy of the Member States in the field, testified by the exclusion of these key 
areas of labour law from the EU competences, which ultimately left a high 
discretionary power to the European Court of Justice in reconstructing the features 
of the rights in question.
The decisions taken by the ECJ in these cases undoubtedly represent a 
fundamental landmark in the debate on collective action in a trans-national setting, 
1
giving rise to a wide debate and extremely abundant analyses and responses both in 
the academic community and in the political arena: alongside the strict and almost 
unprecedented scrutiny carried out by the Luxembourg Court on the aims and the 
concrete unfolding and effects of the collective action when rights and freedoms 
recognized at European Union level are involved in the dispute, the solutions 
adopted by the Court in balancing the economic demands and the protection from 
social dumping have also triggered a whole series of largely unpredicted 
consequences in national legal systems and in the reasoning of several domestic 
courts.
Furthermore, the developments occurred up to the present time do not 
appear adequate to provide social partners and economic actors with a sufficiently 
complete framework to which refer for an EU-compatible exercise of collective 
labour rights, nor to reduce the fragmentation of the right to strike in the various 
national settings and the uncertainties deriving from the epiphenomenic indications 
deriving from the Luxembourg Court, whose rulings, while proceeding in a seemingly 
definite direction, are inextricably linked with the specific circumstances of the cases 
and the specific features of the national system considered, and lack the necessary 
degree of detail to constitute the basis for the adoption of sound and clear policy 
options and shared regulatory trends by the Member States in this field.
The work carried out is the result of the consideration of the political, 
economic and legal context and occurrences linked in particular with the latest 
rounds of the European enlargement process, which represent the inevitable 
background to the emersion of the  balancing carried out by the ECJ, and the most 
relevant elements which have lead to the issuing by the ECJ of the rulings at hand.
The main features and developments of the reconstruction of collective action 
elaborated in different national systems was analyzed with specific regard to the 
Italian, German and British situations, which were chosen as examples of the high 
degree of variance in the domestic labour and industrial relation legal frameworks 
and cultures. Alongside this reconstruction, a description of the features of the right 
to strike in international instruments is provided, as well as it is considered the 
progressive emergence of the right to collective action in the European Community 
and Union law, from the first partial acknowledgement by the Community Charter of 
2
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, to the cautious approach of the Monti 
Regulation of the late Nineties and its positive recognition in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union which, on the other hand, has not the 
solved the inadequacy of the provisions of EU labour law instruments in relation to 
national implementation and transnational aspects of collective trade union rights.
Having closely followed the adjudicating process by the European Court of 
Justice and the following political and academic debate, it appeared of fundamental 
importance to conduct a deep analysis in particular of the consequences of the 
rulings both at national and EU level, and specifically of the developments occurring 
in the various domestic settings considered, in order to assess the impact of the 
main elements deriving from Viking and Laval in the single Member States, by 
inducing changes in the domestic frameworks directly involved by the rulings, and in 
particular the Swedish autonomous collective bargaining system, or being applied in 
Courts, such as the British ones, which have appeared to be rapidly absorbing the 
principles issued by the ECJ, as well as the potential interactions of this restrictive 
judicial course with the Italian and German systems.
The developments occurred since the first half of 2008 in the area of 
European fundamental rights, furthermore, have highlighted a certain ambiguity for 
what it refers to the right to collective action which also needed to be analyzed and 
assessed, with particular reference to the responses conceived in order to prevent 
further negative consequences for social rights and to readdress the judicial options 
undertaken by the ECJ in order to provide a more detailed balancing, more attentive 
in particular to the renewed relevance of the of the social rights in the new EU 
architecture deriving from the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which has attributed to 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights the same legal value as the Treaties, as well as 
the planned accession to the European Convention of Human Rights, capable of 
producing significant effects upon the EU’s institutional and judicial system as a 
whole, in particular for the possibility for the European Court of Human Rights to 
become a competent forum to review EU law and ECJ judgments.
The resurgence of the importance of social right in the EU framework has also 
been testified by political initiatives such as the “Monti Report” and the Single 
Market Act by the Commission which explicitly underlined the need to rebalance 
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economic freedoms and fundamental social rights, including collective action and 
strike, in a de iure condendo perspective whose first result should soon see the light 
with particular reference to a proposal for a regulation clarifying the extent to which 
trade unions can use the right to strike in the case of trans-national activities.
In recent cases before the ECJ, and in particular in the AGs’ legal reasonings, 
a larger scope and importance was given to the promotion of social rights, although 
the solutions ultimately adopted by the Court did not significantly differ from 
previous case-law; however, in the field of collective labour rights the developments 
in the ECtHR jurisprudence in cases such as Demir and Baykara and Enerji, in which 
the Strasbourg Court granted protection to the right to collective bargaining and 
right to strike under European human rights law, need to be taken into account, 
since the European Court of Justice and the national courts need to recognize the 
fundamental principles guaranteed by the Convention as general principles of 
European law.
However, notwithstanding the wide recognition and the comprehensive multi-
source reconstruction of the right to collective action undertaken by the ECtHR, it 
appears difficult to hypothesize a marked shift in jurisprudence by the European 
Court of Justice on the basis of such indications, or deriving from the reasonings of 
other supranational bodies such as the ILO Committee of Experts or the European 
Committee for Social Rights, whose conclusions significantly differ from those 
reached by the ECJ, in particular because of the peculiar role and political relevance 
of the latter in the current Union framework; furthermore, it must be considered that 
national adjudicating bodies have appeared reluctant to establish an institutional 
dialogue with the Luxembourg Court or to take into account supranational human 
rights jurisprudence in this field.
In absence of significant amendments to the constitutional structure of the 
Union,  and of a clear political will oriented towards dialogue and cooperation in 
such matters, a balanced reconciliation of economic freedoms and collective labour 
rights, capable of accommodating the tensions underlying the promotion of the 
internal market and the protection of social rights, remains therefore an unresolved 
legal and political optative.
4
1. THE EVOLUTION OF THE “EUROPEAN” RIGHT TO 
STRIKE: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
1.1 – Domestic developments, international protection, European neglect
The history and development of labour law and industrial relations show an 
indissoluble link with the rise and the evolution of organized movements by workers; 
the sound changes in the world of labour taking place across the end of the XIX and 
the beginning of the XX Century, in particular, can be traced back to actions 
undertaken collectively by workers in order to promote their interests and pursue 
changes in the laws and policies by governments: the main and most prominent 
instruments utilized in this pursuit by workers and trade unions has been strike 
action, usually taken to consist the combined and co-ordinated withdrawal of 
labour1, originally used to obtain union recognition and therefore create the 
condition to proceed in collective bargaining or to influence the working conditions 
when claims and demands had remained unresolved or unanswered, but also to 
foster social progress and present demand for political change in general as part of 
broader social movements.
In their historical unfolding collective actions, notwithstanding the risks often 
taken by the workers carrying them out, have continued to be at the centre of the 
major social, political and juridical transformations concerning labour and underwent 
a parallel evolution in their various practical expressions, in the aims pursued 
5
1 The term “strike” is  mostly used to refer to the total cessation of work by part of the workforce, but 
may also encompass partial stoppages or other activities, organized either by trade unions or by 
informal groups of workers  outside an institutional framework, hindering the productivity of an 
employer’s business. See also Novitz 2003, p. 6.
through their exercise and, most importantly, in their legal qualification in the various 
European (especially Western European) countries.
The initial regulatory trends were in fact characterized in terms of a general 
prohibition for strike action, primarily caused by the management’s opposition to the 
workers organizing, through its qualification as a tort and the provision of criminal 
sanctions. The earliest examples of law removing the criminal ban2 still did not grant 
full status of right to the collective action, whose effective use was prevented also 
by restrictive judicial courses and which was in any case still considered a breach of 
contract, and could therefore justify dismissals by the employer and intervention by 
public force and law enforcement officials.
Among the ways in which the opposition to organized forms of collective 
action by employees were the use of strikebreakers, the substitution of striking 
workers and the possibility to impose lock-outs – the deliberate exclusion of 
workers from the workplace and the refusal by the employer to pay them for the 
availability of their labour, used either as an “offensive” strategy to impose terms and 
condition to the workers, or as a “defensive” response to a strike being carried out - 
with the deriving concept of “equality of arms” for the case of industrial disputes, 
implying that strike and lock-outs would be equally legitimate since they both 
represented the ultimate piece of “industrial weaponry” respectively for trade unions 
and employers.
These various orientations (both in binding legislation, case-law and juridical 
doctrine) have been gradually substituted by an accommodation in the legal 
systems of a “right to strike” as a key element of the labour relations, in particular as 
part of the democratic transitions that have involved several European countries 
over the course of 50 years since the ending of World War II, through the fall of the 
fascist regimes in Spain and Portugal, and to the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc in 
Eastern Europe; however, the legal form in which this entitlement is enshrined, its 
explicit or implicit recognition, its positioning in the hierarchy of the sources vary 
greatly between States, in accordance with the different equilibria shown by the 
6
2 Specifically, France’s  Loi Olliver of 1864 and the Prussian Trade Act (Preußische Gewerbeordnung) 
of 1869.
particular industrial relation system, which not seldom the very exercise of the right 
in question has contributed to shape.
In the current European context it is possible to identify four main types of 
legal basis for collective action3: national constitution, the most common one, 
legislation and case law, often specifying and/or complementing the constitutional 
provisions and, more rarely, collective agreements4.
While some common regulatory trends have possibly appeared in specific 
sectors, for instance the strike the public/essential services, the national systems 
still present extreme differences with regards to virtually all the aspects of the right 
(or freedom) to strike and the way in which they are practically combined: of 
particular relevance are the provisions regarding the entitlement to the right itself 
and the different types of collective action that can be used, but also the procedural 
requirements for the proclamation of a strike, the possible restrictions5  to and 
exclusions from the right to take collective action, the allowed responses by the 
employer and the potential consequences for the workers deriving both from a 
legitimate or an unlawful withdrawal of labour.
1.1.1 – Three models in comparison: Italy, Germany, United Kingdom
In the drawing of a general background for the evaluation of the Viking and 
Laval judicial course, it can be useful to carry out a juxtaposed analysis of three 
models illustrating the wide differences in the regulation of strike among EU Member 
States: the Italian system, the German ultima ratio model and the “limited” right to 
strike as defined in British industrial relations are therefore considered: the main 
focus will be on the titularity of the strike, its legal qualification, and the main 
possibilities for restrictions for certain categories of workers or sectors of activity.
7
3 Stewart & Bell 2008, p. 5.
4  The regulation of this field of labour law by the social partners  themselves, by means of collective 
agreements, is a feature highly specific to Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Ireland. See Warneck 
2007, p. 8
5  Such as the widespread peace obligation, prohibiting strikes for the duration of a collective 
agreement, the respect of dispute settlement procedures (and possibly the obligation to strive for 
peaceful settlement) before collective action can be taken.
Apart from the legal technicalities and the possibility for comparison, the 
responses of the systems to the challenges posed by Viking and Laval are strictly 
connected with the nature and the technical specificities of the single systems, and 
therefore to define the main features of the right or freedom to strike in this Country 
is essential in determining the reasons behind certain developments, in particular for 
the German case, directly affected by one of the ECJ rulings, and the British judicial 
evolution in the wake of the European rulings, and the possible criticalities in a 
system such as the Italian one which is yet untouched by the most evident 
consequences of the judicial course in object.
Italy
The Sardinian Code, extended to the whole Italian territory after its unification 
in 1860, gave relevance to the strike as a criminal offense; with the introduction of 
the Criminal Code of 1889, the strike as non-violent withdrawal of labour ceased to 
be a crime and came to be considered as a breach of contractual duties, and 
therefore could imply  the dismissal of the worker.
However in 1926, with the inception of the fascist “corporative” framework6, 
strike (included the political and solidarity ones) would be once more criminally 
repressed7, alongside with other actions linked to industrial disputes such as lock-
outs, boycott, occupation of undertaking, interruption of public service and 
sabotage.
With the promulgation of the republican Constitution the strike came to 
represent one of the cornerstones of the renewed democratic arrangement; already 
in the drafting stages it appeared clear that the treatment and qualification of strike 
action should have reflected (and tested) the capacity of the system to assimilate 
the reality of the world of labour, granting it full expressive capacity. Furthermore, the 
8
6 An economic and social doctrine central to the Italian Fascist regime, corporativism was presented 
as a model providing responses to the limitations of both the capitalist and the communist doctrines 
by reducing the marginalization of singular interests, and fostering the harmony between classes in a 
“superior synthesis”. While the 1926 Labour Charter formally provided for trade union freedom, 
Fascist corporation were associations comprising both employers  and employees, not directly 
formed by their constituency but created by the political power in the context of a state-directed 
control of the economy: instrumental in reducing the chances for opposition to the regime while 
rewarding political loyalty, with 1934 their de facto dependence from the political power was 
sanctioned in a law granting the State the right to approve their statues  and budget, to confirm or 
revoke their officials and, in general, to closely monitor and direct their activity.
7 Articles 502-508 Criminal Code
concretization of the “social program” that should have been a prominent feature of 
the Fundamental Law8, should have been delegated to the initiative and pressing 
ability of the workers and of their organizations: capacities that couldn’t be 
envisioned without the main tool that had historically ensured the effectivity of the 
claims for socio-economic emancipation of the working class, for which any 
proposed regulative framework for the exercise of the right to strike was felt as a 
potential decommission of the right itself, and subordinated the acceptance of the 
social in the social and political relationships, to the dismissal to self-government of 
the unfolding of the collective action9.
The outcome of the constitutional debate was the fundamental norm for the 
matter of labour disputes - art. 40 -  stating that
 
“The right to strike shall be exercised in compliance with the law”10
The provision can be considered as a “transaction” between the party 
opposing any interference on the right to strike and those pressing for the direct 
provision in the Constitution of limitative criteria for the exercise of the right to 
9
8 The debated crucial importance of labour and social progress as key features of democracy in the 
drafting of the Constitution would then find a clear enshrinement in articles  1 (“Italy is a democratic 
Republic founded on labour”), 3.2 (It is  the duty of the Republic to remove those obstacles of an 
economic or social nature which constrain the freedom and equality of citizens, thereby impeding the 
full development of the human person and the effective participation of all workers in the political, 
economic and social organization of the country) and 4 (The Republic recognizes  the right of all 
citizens  to work and promotes  those conditions which render this  right effective), fundamental 
principles of the Constitution.
9 Nania 1995, p. 10
10 “Il diritto di sciopero si esercita nell’ambito delle leggi che lo regolano”, translation by Senato della 
Repubblica 2007. It should be noted that this  “hybrid” solution (see infra), for which a more literal 
translation would read “the right to strike shall be exercised within the laws regulating it”, giving 
relevance to the possibility a future regulatory option for the right to collective action, intentionally 
reproduces  the wording contained in the Preamble of the contemporary (27 October 1946) French 
Constitution, where it is stated that "Le droit de grève s’exerce dans le cadre des lois  qui le 
réglementent”. The  constitutional recognition of the right to strike in Italy, as also occurring in France 
and Spain, cannot be dissociated from an historical momentum to redraft their Constitutions (lacking 
in countries  such as Belgium and the Netherlands, which favored a legislative reconstruction of the 
right in question). The recognition of the right to strike constitutes an antithesis set against the 
preceding era which did not refrain from penalizing collective action, and also trascends the 
approach defining the right to strike as a factor of disorder (such as the one undertaken in the early 
German experience by BAG, see infra). The ability to take collective action is deemed to be an 
essential element of a democratic legal order. See Dorssemont in Dorssemont, Jaspers  & van Hoek 
2007, p. 247 
strike11, and while delegating the legislator to issue a legal framework for the right to 
strike, it did not provide for guidelines to be followed in defining the regulation12.
Article 40 intended to strike at the root the corporative standpoint 
suppressing the conflictual dimension of the industrial relations, and elevated the 
professional interest (theoretically to be exercised even in contrast with the general 
interest)  to the rank of the other fundamental rights whose protection, even if they 
are structured as individual rights, is considered essential for the existence of the 
State.
The exercise of the right to strike is therefore directly linked to art. 3.2 of the 
Constitution, collective action being is one of the means granted to workers to 
remove obstacles which hinder their effective equality and their full participation in 
the economic, social and political life of the country and furthermore grants 
effectiveness to the trade union freedom principle stated by art. 39 of the 
Constitution, acting as a guarantee of the freedom itself.
The focus of the doctrinal debate in the wake of the approval of the 
Constitution concerned in particular the titularity of the right to strike: among the 
earliest reconstructions are to be underlined those promoting, with different tones, 
the idea of a collective titularity of the right in question, subordinating the exercise of 
the right to strike to a declaration or proclamation, notwithstanding the subjective 
right to strike pending on the single worker, defining the proclamation of the strike as 
only available to trade unions and representative association -while the single 
workers had the right to adhere to a strike that had been called - or referring the 
power to call a strike only to the trade unions that had signed collective agreements, 
being the only ones capable of evaluating its opportunity. In the following years, 
these positions would result minority, while it would regain importance the 
10
11Such as  “free and democratic” proclamation, previous conciliatory procedures, maintaining of 
services essential for the collective living. 
12  However, their persisting non-compliance with the Constitution, created a situation in which any 
regulatory hypothesis through law brought forward was  seen not as reception of the indications by 
the Fundamental Law, but rather as to further attempt to offset the potential for pressure of the right, 
or at least to give priority to the containment and limitation of the right to strike instead that to the 
autonomous management of the process by the social partners. See Nania 1995 and also Treu 2000, 
underlining how the various reasons for the absence of a regulatory framework are substantially to be 
ascribed to the opposition by the trade unions, afraid that the regulatory “reins” could have 
constrained the much yearned right to collective action. 
promotion of the individual dimension of the phenomenon, linking the exercise to the 
right to strike to the abstention from conferring the due performance identified by 
the individual contract. Progressively, the thesis limiting to the implementation phase 
the collective value of the right strike found irrevocable room in the doctrinal debate: 
therefore the right to strike came to be defined as “an individual right with a 
collective exercise” or as a “unitary act of collective nature”, in which a common aim 
and an unanimous withdrawal of labour are identified13.
It is generally known that a law defining the “framework” in which the 
Constitutional right to strike would be exercised has never been issued, so much 
that the observation according to which the italian trade union law remains still for 
great part, a “law without norms”14 holds, to this day, true; therefore, in the absence 
of a general regulation, the actual features of the right to strike were determined by 
means of interpretation by the courts, which have not only operated in a “normative” 
fashion through the elaboration of orientation and principles, but have also governed 
the evolutions of the industrial conflict.
While the prominent positioning of the right to strike would mean that the 
State should have not only avoided to restrict the recourse to collective action, but 
to promote its use, the italian legal framework still provided for various prohibitions 
deriving from the Fascist criminal code, relating in particular to political and 
solidarity strikes which, furthermore, were not as clearly linked with the equality 
principle as the “economic strike” directed at improving the working conditions or 
raising the wages15.
The Constitutional Court has, however, recognized the principle of political 
strikes, declaring the illegitimacy of article 503-504 of the criminal code because 
11
13 The debate on the titularity of the right to strike will regain pace with the emergence of the issues 
relating to the regulation of the strike in the essential public services (see infra): article 2 of the law 
146/90, in fact, by imposing a written declarative act, and a series  of procedural obligations and 
possible sanctions for the collective subject calling the action, has been seen as configuring the right 
to strike as a collective right (see also Tiraboschi 2008). This reconstruction, however, does not 
necessarily reverts the traditional thesis and configure the right to strike as  a  collective right exercised 
individually: instead, it is  possible to juxtapose to the collective titularity an individual right to abstain 
from work in the occurrence of a strike. Furthermore, the resolution of the interpretative doubts on the 
titularity of the strike in the essential services does  not seem decisive for the good performance of 
the system. See D’Elia, Perna & Viola 2011, pp. 3-4
14“Un diritto senza norme”. See Persiani 1992, p. 13
15 Decision n. 29/1960
contrasting with articles 39 and 40 of the Constitution16. Similarly, article 505 
sanctioned solidarity strikes and lock-outs: in relation to this form of strike the 
Constitutional Court17, linked their legitimacy (and consequent immunity from 
criminal sanctions) to a genuine community of interest between the workers or 
groups of workers involved by the action18, to be defined and verified by the judge 
of the trial.
The qualification of the recourse to strike action as a right implies the 
exclusion of the breach of contract, does not expose the worker to disciplinary 
liability, provokes what has been defined as a mere suspension of the contractual 
relationship between employer and worker19: on the employers’ side, the lock-out is 
not mentioned, being protected only the workers’ right to industrial conflict20.
With particular reference to the individual consequences for the exercise of 
the right to strike, the major evolution is constituted by article 4 of the law n. 
604/1966, which declared null and void the dismissal caused by the participation to 
trade union activities21, such as collective action, a protection that was further 
enlarged with articles 15-16 and in particular, 28 of the Workers Statute of 197022. 
12
16 Decision No. 141/1967 and 290/1974
17 Decision No. 123/1962
18Since the right to strike is considered an individual right of the worker (although to be exercised 
collectively, see supra), also secondary strikes  can be called by any group of workers, as well as  by 
trade union or company works councils. In an early link with the trans-national dimension analyzed it 
has also to be noted that solidarity strikes  in support of workers  abroad are to be considered 
legitimate on the same basis of the community of interest between the Italian workers  and the foreign 
workers  involved by the dispute, and provided that the Italian action is in other respects lawful (Cass., 
Sez. Lav.  3rd of October 1979, no. 5053). See also Warneck 2007, p. 43
19While the suspension operates  without doubt, on the workers’ side, with regards  to the 
remuneration, a point on which a judicial agreement is not still met is  the possibility for the employer 
to reduce the additional installments (such as  the so-called “tredicesima”, retirement pay, or holidays) 
in proportion to the workdays missed by the employee in occasion of a collective action.
20  Titularity of the right to strike is granted to dependent employees in both the private and public 
sector. The withdrawal of labour by “autonomous” workers gave origin to contrasting interpretations: 
some judicial courses  have considered the one to strike as a right exclusively linked to the 
employment relationship, others  have ruled in favor of the protection of the interests  of workers  that 
present a certain degree of autonomy in their contractual situation, but are still working at the 
dependence of an employer, such as workers/partners in social co-operatives, business agents, 
insurance salesmen, etc. Naturally, it cannot be considered strike the abstention from work of the 
self-employed.
21As well as  dismissal caused, “whatever the reason given by the employer”, by reasons of political 
orientation, religious faith or trade union membership. “Il licenziamento determinato da ragioni di 
credo politico o fede religiosa, dell’appartenenza ad un sindacato e dalla partecipazione ad attività 
sindacabili è nullo, indipendentemente dalla motivazione adottata”.
22 Statuto dei Lavoratori, Legge no. 300 of the 20th May 1970
This comprehensive normative instrument did not specifically address the protection 
and regulation of the right to strike; however, in the framework of the rights granted 
to the worker in the workplace and during the employment relationship, the law 
guaranteed the enforcement of the trade union freedom and activity rights through 
art. 28, a norm that sanctions any kind of anti-trade union activity23 by the employer, 
included the hindering of the exercise of the right to strike and/or any retaliatory 
behaviour against those who legitimately exercised such a right.
As the jurisprudence worked out the actual content of the constitutional 
provision on the right to strike, a detailed regulation on the legitimate exercise of the 
right emerged. A strike, therefore, must protect the direct and legitimate common 
interests of the participants, be aimed at the conclusion of a collective agreement 
and cannot violate the rights and interests of others, such as private property rights 
or the right to work.
The employers’ right to profit from its economic activity has been therefore 
deemed incapable of overruling the more fundamental demands for better working 
conditions coming from the workers’ side, that justify the damage to production.
While art. 41 of the Constitution protects the freedom of economic 
undertaking, it has to be interpreted, along with art. 4 of the Constitution as 
defending the employer’s core right to economic initiative, that is its productivity, 
from an irreparable prejudice: to be kept safe from negative consequences are 
therefore the productive capability of the undertaking and the consequent 
employer’s ability to keep on carrying out its economic initiative24. 
A collective action has be decided upon freely and voluntarily by the 
employees as a group, acting on their own behalf or through a trade union or a woks 
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23The debate on the art. 28 SL obviously escapes the scope of the current analysis, therefore it will 
suffice to clarify its  main features: the anti-union activity is not analytically defined, while its  ability to 
prejudice the trade union rights (therefore even if the activity has ceased but continue to produce its 
effects), and the intentionality of the conduct (which may include juridical acts, or factual behaviors) 
are evaluated. The subjects  legitimated to take legal action against the employer are “the local bodies 
of the concerned national trade unions”: therefore, the single workers (directly or indirectly) involved 
and the trade unions  which are not representative at national level are excluded from entitlement to 
action ex art. 28. It  also has to be underlined that with Decree n. 165/2001 the provisions of the 
Workers’ Statute were extended to the public employees.
24 Decision n. 711/1980. The damage to the production, therefore, remains covered by the legitimate 
exercise of the right to strike. In several undertakings  working nonstop, on the basis  of agreements 
between trade union and employers, a minimum staff has  to keep on working in case of strike, in 
order to allow the damage to the production deriving from the slowdown of the productive cycle, but 
to avoid any damage to the productivity (and the consequent liability for damages).
council, and does not need any previous communication to the employer, except the 
case in which a suspension of work could cause damages to people and plant 
structures and equipments25: wildcat strikes26 are therefore completely legitimate.
The recognition of the right to strike implies also the recognition of all those 
behaviors instrumental in promoting the adhesion to the action to all the 
components of the group, association or trade union involved by the collective 
action: such conducts can include, for instance, advertising and canvassing, 
promoting demonstrations also on the employers’ premises. 
The residual hypothesis of criminal relevance of the strike concern a strike 
aimed at subverting the constitutional framework, and a political strike that would 
convert itself in an instrument capable of preventing or hindering the free exercise of 
rights and powers through which the popular sovereignty is directly or indirectly 
expressed27.
The legitimacy of the articulated strike28 is generally recognized, although only 
for the workers of the private sector, the jurisprudence until 1980 ruled against the 
“checkerboard” and start-and-stop strikes29, used to produce the maximum 
damage to the employee and the minimum wage loss for striking workers in chain 
productions where the work of the various groups of employees was interdependent 
in the productive organization.
While the legitimacies of such collective action has been ultimately 
determined by the Italian Supreme Court30, the predominant judicial orientation 
admits the possibility for the employer to suspend the work (and the remuneration) 
in those division where the strike is not occurring but that are impeded in their 
functioning.
14
25 Traffic air controllers were bound by notice regulation even before the law regulating the strike in 
the essential public services sector (see infra in this paragraph) by L. n. 242/1980.
26 Defined in the Italian context by the milder expression “spontaneous strike”. 
27 Constitutional Court, Decision n. 290/1974
28 An abstention from work during less than a working day or spread over the course of a working 
week.
29 The first of these two typologies of collective action is  characterized by short-timed suspensions  of 
work in single departments or floors of the undertaking, which can cause the stoppage of the whole 
production. Similarly, the start-and-stop hinders  especially the more complex productive processes 
through a series of frequent and very short stoppages.
30 With the aforementioned Decision 711/1980
Lastly, picketing is usually considered a typical form of the exercise of the 
right to strike, and therefore a legitimate act, as long as it remains a peaceful 
demonstration aimed only at persuading the other workers to participate to the 
strike; any kind of psychological constriction or physical violence are prohibited. 
As noted before, the jurisprudence has indicated as the only substantial 
boundary to the right to strike (trespassing which the entire system is called to 
intervene) its jeopardizing or breaching other rights protected at constitutional level: 
therefore the only restrictions to the right to strike are those deriving from its 
balancing with other constitutionally guaranteed interests; furthermore, through this 
perspective the jurisprudence provided a fundamental contribution to the juridical 
culture, paving the way for the emergence of the relevance and need for protection 
of the interests by third parties extraneous to the industrial conflict31. 
When the damaged interest is not simply the employers’ one to the profit, but 
the one of the users of the interrupted activities and services, the need for 
reconciliation and balancing between constitutionally protected rights is much more 
sensed, even if the judicial substitute regulatory and governing activity is not 
appropriate to predeterminate rules controlling the right to strike, nor can make use 
of specific and adequate sanctions, since the judicial evaluation of the modalities of 
the exercise of the right to strike does not take place ex ante, but only intervenes ex 
post, and solely in order to define the legitimacy of the passed action.
The absence of a law in the field, which delegated for long time the concrete 
regulation of several aspects of the exercise of the right to strike to trade unions and 
judicial intervention, and has been only recently and partly supplemented by actual 
regulation for the strike in the field of essential public services, with a view of 
balancing the protection of the right to strike and that of other rights of 
15
31 Persiani 1992, p. 16
Constitutional stature which may be jeopardized by the exercise of the right of 
strike32.
The regulatory option chosen aims at regulating the strike through a complex 
procedure through a network made up by a wide plurality of sources, both of a 
public and social-private nature33 . The Act itself sets out some basic rules, 
delegating the actual management of the dispute to the social partners and an ad 
hoc Committee, and proceeds to identify the rights protected34, and the services to 
which the procedure applies, by using a teleological standard, qualifying as essential 
those services, publicly or privately delivered, aimed at guaranteeing the 
implementation fundamental rights35; the wide-ranging list includes, but is not 
limited to sectors such as: health, public hygiene, civil protection, urban waste 
management, energy and basic necessities supply, administration of justice, 
transportation, public education, mail service and public TV and radio 
16
32 Law n. 146/1990, amended by law n. 83/2000, “Norms on the exercise of the right to strike in the 
essential public services  and on the safeguarding of the human rights  protected by the Constitution. 
Establishment of the Commission guaranteeing the implementation of the law”. Before this  item the 
matter was regulated by articles 330 and 333 of the criminal code defining the offenses  of individual 
and collective neglect of public service. A specific discipline limiting the right to strike had 
furthermore been introduced for certain categories of workers  in some sectors, such as  the 
employees  working in nuclear plants  (Decree no. 185/1964). traffic air controllers  (with the 
aforementioned Law no. 242/1980) and policemen, for which the right to strike was banned by Law 
No. 121 of 1981 that, in order to offset such restriction, also provided for conciliatory bodies and 
procedures. Traditional trade union freedoms, included the right to strike, are generally denied to 
military personnel (which can associate in representative bodies), in order no the jeopardize national 
safety or the physical welfare and property of citizens.
33 See Treu 1994, p. 461. The subtended ratio to this peculiar public policy choice is connected to the 
intention of allowing the largest possible participation by the actors of the dispute in the setting up of 
the rules to be respected for the cases  of collective action in the sector considered. The social 
partners, in fact, are involved in every step of the regulatory procedure for the matter at hand, in order 
to ensure, through a high degree of consensus about the actual norms applied to the individual 
disputes, effectiveness to a law intervening in such a “sensitive” field. The participation of trade 
unions  and employers’ associations to the regulation of the right to strike dates at the drafting stages 
of law 146/90, which the aforementioned organizations have contributed to define (See Loffredo 
2005, p. 567)
34The fundamental rights  protected by the act in question are: the right to life, health, freedom, 
security, freedom of movement, social prevention and assistance, education and communication.
It must be noted that he use of a wording associated with fundamental human rights  (“diritti della 
persona”) excludes  the possibility that the rights with an economic-proprietary content can be 
considered or utilized as  limitations for the right to strike: the balancing does not concern the 
interests of the employers See Persiani 1992, p. 18.
35 It has been noted (ibid.) that the “essentiality” of the service has to be referred to the interests of 
the users and to the degree of prejudice that can derive to them by the suspension or reduction of 
the service.
broadcasting36. 
The 1990 text did not affect the abstentions by autonomous workers, self-
employed and small entrepreneurs, able to influence the functionality of essential 
public services; this relevant juridical gap was filled with Law no. 83/2000. The 
scope of application of the regulation was therefore extended to all the forms of 
withdrawal of labour, regardless of the dependent or autonomous nature of the 
work: further expansions of the scope of application, this time with reference to the 
object of the regulation, came to include in the notion of essential public services 
the activities instrumental to the effective enjoyment of the core fundamental rights 
protected by the law, because of their objective link with the delivering of the final 
service37, that has to be evaluated on the basis of the incidence of the exercise of 
the right to strike (taking into account its actual modalities and its duration)  on the 
functioning of the service and on the delivering of the indispensable levels38.
The initial framework of the structure provided for a duty for the workers to 
provide the employer39 an advance notice of 10 days; such a notice has to be in 
written form and has to provide information regarding the duration and the terms of 
the strike, and the guarantee of a minimum of presence in order not to interrupt the 
supply of an essential service.
The law provides for intervals between the proclamation of subsequent 
strikes, in order to offset the chance that strikes called by different trade unions can 
17
36The reason for the illustrative character of the list can be found in the fact that “essentiality” of the 
services  is  an ever-changing concept that has to be adapted to the evolution of social structures and 
needs. In any case, integrations of the list should not take place necessarily by intervention of the 
legislator; instead, they should be carried out by also by the social partners, on the basis  of potential 
indications coming from the competent Authority. See Persiani 1992, p. 19.
37 Ferrari 2005, p. 19
38The instrumentality of the service (or at least the objective identifying criteria) should gain relevance 
only if provided for by a collective agreement or a deliberation by the Committee evaluating the 
suitability of the indispensable levels  of services, or regulating temporarily. It has to be considered 
also if the instrumental services  must be identified by an ad hoc agreement or can be determined in 
the agreement regulating the main service.Lastly, the context in which the instrumental services  are 
carried out must be considered: a situation in which the instrumental services are managed by the 
same undertaking delivering the final services presents  far less complexities  than a more dynamic 
organizative context, characterized by outsourcing procedures, where segments of the essential and 
instrumental services are provided for by contractors. Santoro Passarelli 2005, p. 10
39  While the employer is  the formal recipient of the document, the ultimate aim of the notice is to 
provide the users  with the necessary information concerning the strike; the duty of communication to 
the users resides on the employer.
compromise the continuos provision of the essential public service; furthermore, 
with the evident intent to reduce the conflictuality and the recourse to collective 
action, the law was amended integrating a provision binding the partners to include 
in the collective agreements mandatory conciliatory procedures to be carried out 
before the calling of a strike40, which can also be replaced by the intervention of the 
Minister of Labour, the Prefect’s offices and the local administration, whether the 
dispute has national, provincial or local reach.
According to the same Act, the indispensable levels of services41  to be 
performed by the workers, whose delivering produces the effective balancing 
between the exercise of the right to strike and the other constitutional rights, have to 
be established through collective agreements, because only the latter can grant 
effective room and relevance to the technical experience concerning the 
peculiarities of the services and the sectors involved by the dispute needed to 
identify the essential levels of services42.
The individuation of the essential services and their actual delivering 
constitute the main factor from which depends the effectiveness of the protection of 
the constitutional rights of the users: therefore, the duty to provide the essential 
services falls without doubt on the workers, bound in performing their work 
notwithstanding the dispute, but also on the employers, which have to exercise their 
organizative powers and prepare what is needed for the effective provision of the 
essential services.
In order to evaluate the suitability of the balancing measures provided for by 
the collective agreements, the Strike Regulatory Authority was established: this 
body is composed by 9 members chosen by the Speakers of the Chambers of 
Parliament and appointed by the President of the Republic, and carries out its 
18
40 Effectively defining the strike as  a means last resort in the sector of the essential public services, 
and introducing in the Italian legal system the concept of ultima ratio through the imposition of the 
exhaustion of the conciliatory procedures as requisite for a legitimate exercise of the right to strike, 
the mandatory inclusion in the collective agreements, and their binding force for the parties, once 
established. See amplius Ales 2003
41 It has  to be underlined how the notion of “indispensable” service does not correspond to the one 
of “minimum” service; the latter, in fact, does note necessarily guarantee the effective enjoyment of 
the rights involved, providing only a “limited” protection, and therefore, in the perspective of the aims 
of the regulation, an absence of protection. The level of services for the case of strikes can obviously 
present reduced performances  or temporary stoppages, but cannot compromise the full enjoyment 
of the rights of the users.
42 The suitability of the provisions deriving from the agreement is  then the object of an evaluation by 
the competent Committee, see infra.
attribution in an impartial way, executing a monitoring role on the entire legal 
framework but also of institutional support to the regulation by consent of the 
industrial conflict43, deliberating on the conformity to the legal standards set out in 
the law and on the suitability to serve the purpose of the agreements in a para-
normative role.
The involvement in the regulation of the strike of the parties involved in the 
dispute is, however, derogated in at least two important hypothesis: in primis  for the 
case of autonomous workers, when the indispensable services are defined by self-
regulation codes, and therefore the negotiating counter-party is absent, the Authority 
has to provide its confirmatory opinion44.
Perhaps more importantly, the Commission intervenes also when the parties 
were not able to conclude an agreement, or in the aftermath of a declaration of 
unsuitability by the same Commission: while it is duty of the parties to resume the 
negotiations in order to reach a new agreement, the Commission, in order to avoid a 
temporary regulatory void, can provide a proposal of regulation on which the parties 
have to give their opinion in 15 days, and subsequently provide a temporary 
regulation identifying the indispensable services, which will remain into force until 
the approval of the new collective agreement in the meantime negotiated and 
reached.
The enforcing role of the Commission is embodied in the possibility for this 
authority to evaluate the behavior of the parties in conflict according to the 
established rules, and to preemptively intervene communicating, in a persuasive 
rather than repressive role, potential violations of the rules for the case of the calling 
of strikes, notwithstanding the reinforcement of the centrality of the sanctionatory 
framework operated by the l. 83/200045.
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43The collective agreements on the essential services  could not by themselves  regulate a 
phenomenon involving subjects  extraneous to their stipulation, if the law had not explicitly assigned 
them this  specific function: the further reinforcement of the competences of the Authority carried out 
with the 2000 amendments, however, means that the confirmatory acts  by the Commission represent 
the true legal sources for the regulation of the strike in the essential public services, notwithstanding 
the peculiar position of the Authority which does  not represent any of the parties involved by the 
dispute, not even the users (Loffredo 2004). The legal value of the collective agreements  is  the one of 
indirect source of individuation of the essential services and only in the case in which the typical 
procedure has been successfully carried out with the issuing of an administrative act, therefore they 
have no self-standing efficacy as the regulatory source of the strike, even if they are a very important 
part of a complex legal instrument.
44 Art. 2.1 of the law 83/2000, introducing art. 2bis in law 146/1990.
45 See Loffredo 2004, p. 186
For the case of verified non-compliance, at the end of a para-judicial 
procedure, the Commission can issue sanctions against the striking workers46, their 
organizations47, the managers or the legal representatives of the service providers48; 
however the sanctioning role of the Commission in decreasing stage, in particular 
because of the high level of compliance to the agreements reached by the parties 
and to the communications and temporary regulations by the Authority.
Germany	
Strikes, lock-outs and other possible forms of collective action are not 
explicitly guaranteed as a “right” or a “fundamental right” in the wording of the 
German Grundgesetz49, which in turn protects collective bargaining as the legal 
heart of German industrial relations50; recognition and protection of the right to strike 
are therefore to be derived from the interpretation of the constitutional freedom of 
association (Art. 9 §3 GG), fully recognized51  as the leading principle of collective 
20
46 The sanctions provided for workers are effectively carried out by the employer. Dismissal, however, 
is not contemplated.
47  For the trade unions the sanctions provided for by law 146/1990 are: the suspension of leave 
periods  for trade union representatives, the loss  of the trade union contributions and the exclusion 
from negotiations.
48 On the employers’/provider’s side the sanctions are mainly of economic nature.
49  See Däubler in Dorssemont, Jaspers & van Hoek 2007, p. 138
50  It guarantees  the “right to form associations  to safeguard and improve working and economic 
conditions.” See also Kocher 2008, p. 389
51  It has to be noted that the recognition of this  freedom that went through an evolution similar to 
those of other European countries: in a initial period, until 1869, freedom of association was not 
legally recognized but instead subject to criminal sanctions. Between 1869 and 1918 freedom of 
association it was  semi-legalized, meaning that it was  recognized in principle but at the same time 
prevented from being used effectively. Since the inception of the first German republic, freedom of 
association has been therefore recognized, with the major exception of the Nazi period, when trade 
unions  and employers’ associations were dissolved and recombined in the so-called German Labour 
Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront), based on the idea of harmony between all actors on the industrial 
scene.
labour law52.
Therefore, even if in Germany virtually no statutory provisions refer to 
industrial action, this matter is nevertheless regulated in detail, since the legal 
regulation of industrial action is fundamental for the structure and functioning of the 
German system of collective bargaining53; however, because of the mentioned 
absence of a constitutional recognition of the right to strike, the complex of German 
labour dispute regulations has almost entirely materialized on the basis of case law 
of the Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht - BAG) and of the Constitutional 
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht - BVerfG), which have been characterized by an 
high degree of discretionary power exercised by the judges54.
The basic leading principles elaborated by the jurisprudence on the right to 
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52The analysis  of the German situation presents the major complexity of its  partition as  a fundamental 
issue of its  post-war developments, evidently also concerning labour law. In fact, while the Nazi 
structures  regarding collective labour law were abolished, and trade unions were reorganized as 
“unified” organizations, the way in which they were shaped greatly differed in the zones under Allied 
or Soviet control and, since 1949, in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic. In particular, trade unions in the GDR were not primarily considered associations  to 
represent employees’ interest versus  employers, but their main task was to guarantee the 
performance of the economic plan and thereby to execute the Socialist Party’s  and the government’s 
intentions, to which they were closely linked, by means of an ideological community of interests; 
employers’ association did not exist. Similarly, in the FRG the possibility for collective bargaining and 
industrial action was  re-established, while in the GDR so-called collective agreements were a sort of 
additional legislation linked to the economic planning by party and government, rather than to the 
composition of collective conflicts and the setting of minimum conditions for workers.
With specific reference to collective action, since the idea of conflict between collective actors  was 
eliminated, mechanisms of conflict resolution never were developed; strikes and lock-outs  were 
considered to be incompatible with such a system. With the 1990 Unification, the GDR program for 
the development of a structure of social standards  “by way of a mutual reform of both systems  of 
social protection in the two German states, integrating their positive elements” met strong opposition 
in the FRG, interested in transferring its  system to the territory of the GDR. Apart from few temporary 
exceptions, all law of the FRG – including individual labour law – was, in fact, extended to the former 
GDR; the socialist trade unions were dissolved and the FRG organizations – including those 
representing the employers’ side - extended their scope of activity, effectively exporting the West 
German legal and institutional framework for labour law and industrial relations, which is  therefore the 
only one analyzed with regards to the issues of freedom of association and strike. See amplius  Weiss 
and Schmidt 2008
53 Warneck 2007, p. 32
54  One important legislative evolution on the matters regards the so-called Emergency Acts 
(Notstandsgesetze) of 1968. Article 9 Para. 3 GG has been in fact amended to include a provision 
according to which certain emergency measures may not be directed against industrial action 
(Arbeitskämpfe) undertaken to safeguard and to improve working and economic conditions. This 
amendment, while not defining the legal boundaries of industrial action, grants  industrial action 
constitutional protection against measures  of emergency. Therefore, industrial action must be 
considered to be legal, at least to a certain extent and when called with a certain objective. See 
Weiss and Schmidt 2008
strike strictly connects the latter with collective bargaining55; industrial action has to 
be understood as being exclusively complementary to collective bargaining, and 
therefore is allowed in so far as its purpose is the achievement of a collective 
agreement, and the achievement of aims that can be regulated in a collective 
agreement56.
A major implication of the proposed framework is that industrial action may 
legally only be carried out by parties competent to conclude a collective agreement 
(i.e., for the employees’ side, trade unions); therefore, the individual or non-unionized 
worker, while individually entitled to the decision to engage in the conflict, can only 
exercise the right to strike in a collective context, by adhering to a strike legitimately 
called by a trade union, which can be considered the only subject effectively granted 
with a full entitlement with reference to the right in question57.
The Federal Labour Court has established further requirements in order for a 
strike to be legal: the “social adequacy” principle was substituted in 1971 by 
proportionality58 as the governing principle for strike law, according to which the use 
of industrial action shall be suitable and necessary to reach the intended purpose, 
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55A strike is defined as  the jointly planned and executed stoppage of work by a substantial number of 
employees  in an industry or plant, with the aim of achieving settlement of a  collective labour dispute. 
Such action is the means of coercion necessary to the conclusion of a collective agreement; if it were 
not available, the collective bargaining autonomy provided under constitutional law would be 
meaningless. The right to bargain collectively presupposes  that the social partners  can establish and 
maintain a balance of bargaining power (see Kraemer 2009, p 3). The groundbreaking ruling on the 
matter was  the one by the BAG on the 28 of January 1955. Grand Senate, 28 January 1955 – GS 
1/54.
56  The BAG described the strike as having an auxiliary function for collective bargaining; Collective 
action serves to guarantee the “material correctness” of collective agreements.
57  A collective exercise of rights  is not to be considered as  a “collective action”, and the potential 
pressure of this  kind of behavior on an employee does not emerge as  a legally relevant aspect. 
Important examples of such a situation are: the case of an employer not fulfilling its contractual 
duties, where the employees have the right to refuse performance until counter-performance is 
effected; the veto power exercised by an employee on the transfer of his labour contract to another 
employer, on the basis  of the Acquired Rights Directive (77/187/EEC), if not expressed collectively to 
improve working condition or hider (or make impossible) the transfer. More importantly, and with a 
closer reference to the matters in question, on the basis of the conception that there can be no 
obligation to break solidarity, employees called by an employer (directly in substitution or through a 
contract with another undertaking) to take up the concrete tasks of striking workers (the case is  the 
one of Direkte Streikarbeit) can refuse to perform the work of strikers. It has  to be noted that this last 
principle was accepted by BAG even in cases where the strike as such was unlawful. See Däubler in 
Dorssemont, Jaspers & van Hoek, 2007, p. 137-141
58  BAG, Grand Senate, 21 April 1971 – GS 1/68. The previously used Sozialadaequanz referred to 
what is generally accepted as legal in the society.
and may not be inappropriate to reach the intended purpose59. 
Notwithstanding its apparent vagueness, has been used to determine specific 
prerequisites for the industrial action and in particular the respect of peace 
obligations60, the fairness of the action, the use of the strike as a mean of last 
resort61, and the carrying out of a ballot between the union members62. 
With reference to the other types of collective action that can be undertaken, 
political strikes, putting pressure on the state administration or on the legislator are 
regarded as unlawful63: also solidarity strikes are, generally speaking, unlawful, safe 
for very exceptional cases and circumstances, under which they can be legitimized.  
In order to be legitimately carried out a secondary action has to be lawful with 
reference to the general criteria of labour law and must refer to a lawful primary 
action; furthermore it has to benefit the workers supported rather than aiming at 
promoting the participants’ own interests64, also by affecting a party in the primary 
dispute.
The guiding principle remains, however, the one of proportionality which 
implies that the strike has to be suitable in supporting the main action, that it has to 
be necessary for the resolution of the primary dispute and that the fundamental 
rights of the trade unions have to be balanced with the equally constitutional 
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59  See infra par. 3.1.2 for a more detailed comparison with the indication deriving from the ECJ 
jurisprudence on the matter. 
60  In many sectors, trade unions and employer organizations  have concluded a joint dispute 
resolution agreement. Such resolution agreements usually define when the peace obligation expires 
and therefore when a trade union can call an official strike. Kraemer 2009, p. 7
61 A major evolution on the matter is  constituted by the legalization of the so-called “warning strikes”, 
conducted for short periods  of times during ongoing negotiations. Also in this case see infra par. 
3.1.2 with regards to the possible interactions with the ECJ judicial course.
62 In practical terms, the importance of the ballot has  very much diminished from a legal standpoint; 
however, the reasons  for the continuing use and regulation of this instrument by the unions can be 
found in its efficiency in limiting the strike frequency.
63 The opinions on the matter vary from considering the political strike unlawful simply because not 
connected to the achievement of a collective agreement or the resolution of a dispute to regarding 
the political action as trying to put an undue pressure on the legislators, and therefore 
unconstitutional; recently, divergent opinions have emerged, particularly admitting (only to a certain 
extent) political strikes on the basis that collective bargaining is only one mechanism among others, 
which is  becoming less  important compared to state regulation on employment, working and 
economic conditions. Ibid.
64 A condition which would violate the respect of peace obligations, which represents, as  previously 
mentioned, one of the main restrictions to the right to strike. Industrial action, in fact, is prohibited 
over issues which are subject of an agreement in force. On the other hand, issues  not dealt with in 
the agreement, or concerning which the collectively agreed provisions have expired, may be the 
subject of action.
employer’s rights.
Further conditions that have to be taken into account and were found by the 
Federal Labour Court as making secondary action lawful are that the employer of 
the secondary dispute has not remained neutral in relation to the primary dispute or 
that the employers of the primary and secondary disputes constitute an economic 
entity65; solidarity strike, therefore, remains illegal if there is no link between the 
strikers and the main conflict.
The proportionality principle should also serve in order to define the 
lawfulness of industrial action in essential services: notwithstanding a general 
consensus on the absence of a prohibition and on some possible regulatory aspects 
relating to this type of strike, the interpretative efforts of the Courts on the matter 
have been unable to provide for specific criteria to be applied in individual cases, 
only clarifying that emergency services for a variety of sectors of public interest66 
may not be defined and shaped by the employer alone, but in cooperation with 
trade unions.
 
On the employers’ side, the German framework on industrial action 
developed by courts presented the so-called “equality of arms” approach: trade 
unions and employers’ associations should be treated equally, and should 
consequently have equally powerful means in order to defend their interests in the 
case of industrial action67: furthermore, until 1971, lock-outs were intended to 
provoke a termination of the employment contract, rather than a simple suspension 
as for the case of strike.
The formalistic reading of the equal treatment of strikes and lock-outs was 
then abandoned in favor a balancing of bargaining power, recognizing the strike as 
an indispensable lever in collective bargaining68, and strongly limiting the legal 
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65 As for the case of company groups, or highly close cooperation with subcontractors. See Dec. of 
19 June 2007 - 1 AZR 396/06, in which the the BAG found that the solidarity strike was not unlawful 
because both employees - one publishing house, one printing company - belonged to the same 
group. The argument behind this  is that the employer of the secondary dispute shall have the 
possibility to influence the employer of the primary dispute. See also Warneck 2007, p. 32
66  Such as medical services, police, fire, military, water, power etc. This requirement was  also 
extended to the operation of the Parliament, Government and the Federal Constitutional Court.
67 BAG, Grand Senate, 28 January 1955 – GS 1/54.
68  Without the right to strike at trade union’s disposal, collective bargaining would simply result in 
“collective begging”. See Decision of 10 June 1980 – 1 AZR 168/79 and 1 AZR 822/79.
scope of lock-outs which remain permissible inside the limits of a complex 
framework established by the Court and based on to the proportion of employees 
covered by collective agreements and affected by strikes in a determined region and 
the possible negative consequences on competition. 
As previously mentioned, during strikes and lock-out the employment 
contract of the workers legally participating in the strike is considered to be 
suspended, with the consequent loss of their right to remuneration for the duration 
of the strike or lock-out respectively, while the employment relationship and the 
consequent duties continues. The Workers which do not take part in a strike and 
who continue to work obviously maintain their right to remuneration; however, for 
the hypothesis of the impossibility for them to work on account of the strike, they 
can be no longer paid.
One of the predominant features of the German system with reference to the 
effects of strikes and lock-out certainly is constituted by the payment by the trade 
unions of strike compensation to the union members, and in certain cases also to 
non-union members. The actual amount of strike pay received is generally governed 
by the level of union subscription paid and the duration of union membership; a 
family supplement is often granted, while the basis of strike pay usually amounts to 
two-thirds of net wages.
The qualification of a strike as legal or illegal is a focal point in the industrial 
dispute regulatory framework, since the potential consequences are extremely far-
reaching, both for workers and for trade unions; in fact, if the employer has 
dismissed an employee for participation in a legal strike, the employee may file an 
action for reinstatement on the job and for subsequent payment for the time 
between dismissal and reinstatement.
On the other hand, since the participation to an illegal strike constitutes a 
contravention of the employment contract, the worker may have to pay damages 
and/or may be exposed to dismissal by the employer. The possibility of sanctions is 
an effective threat in the German system, even if the dismissal is almost certainly 
excluded for the case of participation to strike which had been unlawfully called by a 
union and even in the case of an unofficial action, at least for those only 
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participating to the latter, without holding any specific position69.
Provided that a strike is illegal, trade unions can face unlimited liability for the 
damages caused by the collective action, even for the case in which the damages 
were caused by local branches or organizers, through excessive activities not 
covered by the right to strike; in some cases agreement are reached between trade 
unions and employers’ associations in order to provide limited liability for damages 
resulting from unlawful actions.
United Kingdom
The British system is characterized by the absence of a written constitution, 
therefore no positive fundamental right to strike can be found in the legal framework, 
since the law regulating workers’ collective industrial action was initially shaped by 
common law perspectives, under which it was typically unlawful.
Furthermore, under UK law, the provisions which allow for the organization of 
industrial action and participation in such action are framed in terms of “statutory 
immunities” from the tortious and criminal liability that would otherwise attach70: the 
organizers of and participants in industrial action can therefore be made liable for 
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69 BAG, 14 February 1978 - 1 AZR 103/76. The employee liability is based on the understanding of 
the unlawful nature of the strike called by the trade union. While the unlawful nature of the action is 
evident for the case of non-union strikes, the judicial interpretation limits liability on those employees 
which are considered to have held an organizing and “representative” role in the strike, against which 
the employer will take legal action.
70As highlighted by Dukes 2010, p. 82, the wording of this peculiar legislation came to be considered 
as reflecting the fact that industrial action is  an interference with the employer’s  ‘natural’ right to 
manage. As Lord Denning famously stated in 1979, “Parliament granted immunities to the leaders of 
trade unions, it did not give them any rights. It did not give them the right to break the law or to do 
wrong by inducing people to break contracts. It only gave them immunity if they did”. The immunities 
provided for by the Trade Disputes Act 1906 did not survive the new liabilities  in tort created by the 
courts beginning in the 1950s. Attempts to combat these developments were made by extension of 
immunities in the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974. But these immunities were reduced by 
legislation of 1982 which repealed some of them and their scope was further restricted by narrowing 
the meaning of “trade dispute”. At the other end of the doctrinal spectrum are the views maintaining 
a substantial equivalence between the negative protection afforded by the statutory immunities  and 
the positive protection of the right to strike found in other jurisdictions, relating the different kind of 
protection for the right to strike to an issue of legal drafting techniques. It may however be argued 
against this opinion that the limited extent to which the right to strike has been recognised and 
supported in the UK experience by unnecessarily convoluted legislation and intolerant court practice 
does not seem to confirm what seem an overly optimistic view: the right to strike in the UK is without 
doubt subject to very relevant restraints, such as the unions’ liability for economic torts of inducing 
breach of contract, or trade or business  intimation and conspiracy, the Government emergency 
powers (see infra with reference to the essential services) and the residual criminal liability, which is 
mainly concerned with conspiracy and control of picketing.
damages71 if the action is not protected by statutory immunities. Industrial action will 
also amount to a breach of the employment contract or of the contract for services, 
allowing the employer to dismiss the worker once the period of statutory protection 
has expired72.
Some circumscribed definitions for collective action can be determined from 
the Trade Union and Labour Relation (Consolidation) Act of 1992 (TULRCA), defining 
a strike as “any concerted stoppage of work”73 or from the Employment Rights Act 
1996, stating that strike means the cessation of work by a body of employed 
persons acting in combination, or a concerted refusal, or a refusal under a common 
understanding, of any number of employed persons to continue to work for an 
employer in consequence of a dispute, done as a means of compelling their 
employer or any employed person or body of employed persons to accept or not to 
accept terms or conditions of or affecting employment74.
The main legal issue arising in the course of a strike or other industrial action 
relates to trade union liability: the general principles75 regulating collective action in 
the British system is that the statutory immunities will apply, and trade union or 
individuals will not be liable in tort for industrial action taken “in contemplation or 
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71  By employers and others  (such as customers and suppliers) who are damager or likely to be 
damaged. See BIS 2010b, p. 6
72 The existence of a right to strike in this country has  sometimes  been disputed, and indeed even a 
superficial analysis of these very basic features already may induce to define the proctection 
accorded to collective action as  a freedom, rather than a right to strike. Illuminating in order to 
comprehend the legal positioning of the strike in relation with other workers’ rights and freedoms is 
the statement that must be contained in each voting paper: “If you take part in a strike or other 
industrial action, you may be in breach of your contract of employment. However, if you are 
dismissed for taking part in a strike or other industrial action which is called officially and is otherwise 
lawful, the dismissal will be unfair if it takes place fewer than twelve weeks after you started taking 
part in the action, and depending on the circumstances may be unfair if it takes place later." That 
statement must not be qualified or commented upon by anything else appearing on the voting paper. 
See BIS 2010a, p. 13
73 TULRCA 1992, s. 246
74 ERA 1996, s. 235.5
75 The leading principles on the matter were established in a series of rulings  already in the late years 
of the XIX Century. Since 1906 the Parliament has intervened with legislation granting immunity to 
trade unions  and their offices  for otherwise tortious conducts, in order to ensure that trade union may 
lawfully engage in industrial action; the current set of rules regarding trade union immunities  is to be 
found in the TULRCA 1992 (as amended). It has to be noted that in 1906 trade unions  only were give 
immunity from liability on tort, therefore proceedings could still be brought against officials: as noted 
before, the immunity was re-enacted in 1974, but eventually repealed in 1982; this  explains why 
pre-1982 cases are against individuals (generally trade union officials), while post-1982 cases are 
typically against the union itself. See Ewing in Dorssemont, Jaspers & van Hoek 2007, p. 219
furtherance of a trade dispute”, and provided that certain procedural steps have 
been taken.
The term “trade dispute”, in relation to which immunity may be granted, has a 
statutory definition provided by the TULRCA, and relates only to a dispute between 
the workers and their employer, or between workers, relating wholly or mainly to 
specific issues at the workplace, and in particular terms & conditions of 
employment, health & safety issues, engagement or non-engagement, termination 
or suspension of employment, allocation of employment, disciplinary matters, 
worker’s membership or non-membership of a trade union, facilities for officials of 
unions and Recognition of an independent trade union by the employer for the 
above matters and provision of negotiating facilities76.
Any action by a trade union, which does not come within the definition of a 
trade dispute will be non-protected77; the accepted motivation for the collective 
action tends to be restricted to economic reasons. Therefore political strikes, 
unconnected with the terms and conditions of employment78, have been often 
struck down by the courts which have considered them as not fulfilling the term of 
being a trade dispute between an employer and its workers, and therefore not 
attracting the immunity from tort for the union or the participants. 
Similarly, all kinds of secondary industrial action are to be considered non-
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76  Mercury Communications Ltd v Scott-Garner [1984] ICR 74 CA., and also TULRCA 1992, which 
provides definitions for “trade dispute” in s. 218 (a wide definition which applies applies for general 
industrial relations purposes.) and particularly in s. 244 (narrower definition, specifically linked with 
immunity from civil action for acts  done "in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute"). Lastly 
to be considered, for purposes of the Jobseekers Act, is  the definition of a trade dispute as  "any 
dispute between employers  and employees, or between employees and employees, which is 
connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or the conditions  of 
employment of any persons, whether employees  in the employment of the employer with whom the 
dispute arises, or not" (see Jobseeker Act, s. 35) .
77  For instance, actions intended to promote union closed-shop practices, or to prevent employers 
using non-union firms as suppliers (TULRCA 1992 s 222 and 224). See BIS 2010a
78 In the case of BBC v Hearn, the Association of Broadcasting Staff (ABS) threatened to prevent the 
transmission of the FA Cup Final to the rest of the world unless  the BBC agreed not to broadcast to 
South Africa. The BBC sought an injunction against ABS and this  was  granted by the Court of Appeal 
(the controversial decision was then endorsed by the House of Lords). The threat was not found as 
amounting to action in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute; it was  a politically motivated 
threat and thus did not fall under the necessary category, but rather was configured as  a “coercive 
influence” by the trade union. BBC v Hearn (1977) ICR 686 (CA), see Stewart & Bell 2008 and Ewing 
in Dorssemont, Jaspers & van Hoek 2007, p. 222
protected industrial action79; this would include secondary picketing and 
inducement to others to break or interfere with their contracts of employment, and 
interference with an employee’s contract of employment where the employer in 
question is not involved in the dispute.
Strikes organized by either individuals or by non-independent trade unions 
without the support of a ballot and an endorsement by an independent trade union 
are also not recognized in the UK as being a protected industrial action80; 
furthermore, a union which fails to repudiate unofficial industrial action will be 
vicariously liable for damages flowing form the tort committed by the group or 
individuals81, also implying that no action can be undertaken in support of any 
employee dismissed while taking unofficial industrial action.
There is no guarantee of any minimum public services in the event of a strike 
under English law. However, there are certain measures in place which make it 
unlikely for public services to be completely absent: individuals have the right to 
work through a strike, and this right is protected by law. 
In the event of a strike by, for example, an emergency service, the State may 
intervene using police powers or emergency measure: the Emergency Powers Act 
1964 states that the government may use troops for “urgent work of national 
importance” without emergency regulations82.
The procedural requirements relating to the industrial action involve two sets 
29
79 Except for lawful picketing, done near the place of work of the striking workers, for the purpose of 
peacefully obtaining or communicating information or peacefully persuading another person to 
abstain from working. As an example, striking workers manning a picket line outside their employer’s 
premises  may use peaceful means to attempt to persuade, drivers working for a supplier not to 
deliver goods to their employer. But if they succeed in turning drivers  (or use violent or intimidatory 
tactics), they (or their union) may be sued for damages by the supplier whose commercial and 
employment contracts have been interfered with (TULRCA 1992, s.224).
80  Any employees  taking part in such unofficial action are likely to lose their right to claim unfair 
dismissal if dismissed for taking part and may be held personally liable for any losses  incurred by the 
employer.
81 A committee or any other person, such as a shop steward, will be prima facie liable for their action: 
however, the only way for the union to avoid liability for the actions  of its officials is to publicly 
disavow those actions, through a forma written communication to the victim of the unlawful action 
and to each member of the group or to the official concerned, stating the repudiation of the action 
and the withdrawal of support (TULRCA 1992, s. 21.3).
82 Stewart & Bell 2008, p. 101
of obligations83: in primis, if a trade union decides to call on its members to take or 
continue industrial action, there will be no loss of immunity only if the action has the 
support of the members under a properly-conducted secret ballot84: furthermore, 
the action will not be  called unless the union has provided the required notice of 
official industrial action to employers likely to be affected, in advance85  and in the 
aftermath86 of the ballot.
With specific reference to the ballot, it must be conducted by post, and it 
must include all the “relevant workers”, that is all the union members who – it is 
reasonable for the trade union to believe – will be called upon to participate in the 
action87: the planned action must be supported by a majority of those workers in 
order to be legitimate.
As mentioned, the union must provide the employers of the relevant workers 
with specified information and notice relating to the ballot and to the pursuant 
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83  The first set of provisions, relating to the obligation to ballot, was introduced in 1984 by Trade 
Union Act 1984, Part II: Democracy in Trade Unions with the stated aim of strengthening the 
democratic right of union members not to be called upon to take industrial action without having had 
the opportunity to vote on whether such action was  desirable. The second set, relating to the 
provision of information and notice was introduced under the 1993 Trade Union Reform and 
Employment Rights  Act. The aim in that case was  to assist the employers’ side in the dispute, by 
requiring the union to provide such information as was necessary to allow the employer to influence 
the members’ votes, and thereafter to take action to reduce the effect of any pursuant industrial 
action.
84  The ballot, in fact, has to have been held before the trade union asked its members to take, or 
continue taking, industrial action.
85 TULRCA 1992, s. 226A, in writing and at least seven days in advance to the ballot.
86 ibid., ss. 231A and 234A. The union must communicate the outcome and it must provide certain 
information prior to the commencement of industrial action. In particular, the employer must receive, 
at least 7 days  before the start of the industrial action, written notice stating which categories of 
workers  will be involved, where they work, whether the action will be continuous or discontinuous, 
the starting date or dates, and whether the action is strike action or action short of a strike, e.g. 
overtime ban. See Dukes 2010 and Warneck 2007
87  Further requirement to be met by a properly conducted ballot are: scrutiny by a qualified 
independent person appointed by the trade union, voting paper includes information about the voting 
process, as  soon as the trade union can, after holding the ballot, it tells  everyone entitled to vote how 
many votes were cast and the number of 'yes' votes, 'no' votes and spoiled voting papers.
industrial action88; if the union fails to comply with any or all these obligations, 
statutory protection from liability in tort is excluded, and protection against unfair 
dismissal is lost for the employees taking industrial action89.
To summarize the current UK regulation regarding the right to strike, which 
present itself as a fragmented set of norms loosely connected rather than as a 
unitary legal corpus, the best point of view is the one concerning the rules 
surrounding unfair dismissal of a worker.
The protection granted to anyone organizing a lawful strike or action short of 
a strike under the 1992 Act is restricted to what would otherwise be the following 
civil offenses, or torts, such as inducing another person to break a contract or 
interfering with its performance, threatening a breach of contract, interfering with the 
trade or business or employment of another and conspiracy90.
Following the reforms introduced by the Employment Relations Act 1999, a 
dismissal of employees who take part in a "protected” industrial action may be 
automatically unfair if the reason or principal reason for dismissal is that the 
employee took part in the action, unless the industrial action has lasted for more 
than twelve weeks91  and the employer has taken such procedural steps as are 
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88  To date, the provisions regulating the obligations to inform and give notice have been amended 
twice, in 1999 and 2004 (Employment Relations Act 1999, s 4, Schedule 3; Employment Relations 
Act 2004, ss. 22, 25). On both occasions, the aim of the amendments  was to simplify and clarify 
certain aspects of the law. Despite the amendments, however, the provisions remain very 
complicated, so that the exact nature of the steps  which trade unions must take is  not always clear. 
Among those, the specifications  on whether the union intends the industrial action to be "continuous" 
or "discontinuous" and the date on which any of the affected employees  will be called on to begin the 
action (where it is  continuous action), or the dates  on which any of them will be called on to take part 
(where it is  discontinuous action), or the provision of a list of the categories and workplaces  of the 
employees  that the union is going to ballot, figures on the numbers of employees in each category, 
figures on the numbers of employees at each workplace, the total numbers  of affected employees, 
together with an explanation of how the figures  provided were arrived at. Since 2004, the TUC has 
been in discussions  with the Government regarding the possibility of further reforming the relevant 
provision. See amplius BIS 2010b, and Dukes 2010, p. 84.
89  Where more than one employer is involved, the protection is excluded only in relation to the 
employers in respect of whom the default occurs, TULRCA 1992, s. 238A(1)
90 See Warneck 2007, p. 71
91 The protection from dismissal applies  if the employee is dismissed within 12 weeks  from the start 
of the protected industrial action or after 12 weeks, if the employee has ceased taking part in the 
industrial action within the protected period. It should also be noted that lock-out days, where an 
employer prevents striking employees  from returning to work, are disregarded when determining this 
twelve week period.
reasonable92 to try to resolve the dispute.
Outside of these exceptions the law prevents an employment tribunal from 
considering a claim of unfair dismissal on its merits if the employee was dismissed 
while taking part in industrial action93; this means that the employment tribunal 
cannot find the dismissal of the employee to be unfair, regardless of the cause of the 
strike94.
If the tribunal finds that an employee has been unfairly dismissed, it does not 
automatically follow that the worker will be reinstated in his post: the tribunal may, in 
fact, award compensation95 for the employee, which he has to accept, or order its 
re-instatement or re-engagement.
Contracts of employment are technically suspended during any periods of 
strike; therefore, although the employee remains at the service of the employer, the 
period of the strike does not count towards that employee’s continuity of 
employment.
Beside the the most serious consequence of the potential loss of the right to 
bring proceedings for unfair dismissal, participation in a strike or other industrial 
action is likely to have a highly detrimental effect impact on an employee's statutory 
employment rights96. 
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92 With reference to the reasonable steps taken by the employer to solve the dispute, the tribunal will 
not consider the merits of the dispute but will have regard to whether the employer and union had 
complied with the procedures  in any applicable collective or other agreement and whether, after the 
protected industrial action had begun, they had offered or agreed to start or restart negotiations; 
unreasonably refused a request to make use of conciliation services; unreasonably refused a request 
to make use of mediation services in relation to the procedures to be used to resolve the dispute; or 
where the parties have agreed to use the services of the mediator or conciliator, s.28 of the ERA 2004 
introduces new matters  which the tribunal is  to have particular regard to when assessing whether an 
employer has taken reasonable procedural steps to resolve the dispute with the union. See BIS 
2010a, pp. 5-6
93  The tribunal will only be able to consider the complaint on its merits if the employer has 
discriminated between the participants to the action by selectively dismissing or re-engaging them
94 For obvious practical reasons, however, dismissal is not always a possible response for employers 
in a trade union, though the incidence of dismissals in British industrial relations  appears to have 
grown in recent years, beginning with the decision by News International to dismiss and replace over 
5000 striking workers in 1986. See Ewing in Dorssemont, Jaspers & van Hoek 2007, p. 219
95  Such compensation comprises a fixed amount award based on the age and length of service 
(basic award) and a compensatory award for the loss  which the employee has suffered as a result of 
the dismissal (subject to a limit of £50,000). BIS 2010a, p. 4 
96  Employees who take industrial action will know that there may be damaging financial 
consequences for them, since they are unlikely to receive any pay if they withdraw their labour. They 
should also be aware that they are putting their jobs at risk. Ibid.
Lastly, the compliance or non-compliance with the legal requirements 
governing the organization of an industrial action implies extremely relevant 
consequences for the unions; an employer, in fact, can sue the union which has 
taken industrial action not in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute or 
otherwise unprotected. The damages that a union can be ordered to pay are limited 
according to the union’s size, ranging from £10,000 if the union has fewer than 15 
members, to £250,000 for 100,000 members or more97.
1.1.2 – International and European Sources on the right to strike
International Labour Organization
The right to strike is not directly governed by ILO Conventions and 
Recommendations; notwithstanding the absence of explicit international standards, 
the  right of strike has been recognized as one of the principal means by which 
workers and their associations may legitimately promote and defend their economic 
and social interests.
The basis for such recognition were Convention No. 87 on Freedom of 
Association and the Protection of the Right to Organise (1948), establishing the right 
of workers’ and employers’ organizations to “organize their administration and 
activities and to formulate their programmes”98 and the aims of such organizations 
as “furthering and defending the interests of workers or of employers”99, and 
Convention n. 98, concerning the right to organize and bargain collectively, which 
are now designated among the ILO’s “basic human rights Conventions”100; freedom 
of association is a fundamental human right and, together with collective bargaining 
rights, a core ILO value. The rights to organize and to bargain collectively are 
enabling rights that make it possible to promote democracy, sound labour market 
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97  See infra par. 3.2.2 with reference to the uncertainties linked to the existence of the cap for 
damages in EU-level disputes
98 ILC 87, Article 3
99 ibid., Article 10
100 Declaration adopted on 25 June 1970, on the occasion of the 54th session of the International 
Labour Conference.
governance and decent conditions at work101.
Since 1952, the relevant Committee has held that the right to strike is an 
"essential [element] of trade union rights”102 and not simply a social act, laying down 
the principle that collective action is a means for the promotion and defense of 
workers’ economic and social interests.
This position was reinforced not only through extensive analysis by the two 
bodies set up to supervise the application of ILO standards103, which defined a body 
of principles connected to the recognition of right of strike, but also through various 
Resolutions which, however focused in general on trade union rights, emphasized 
the recognition of the right to strike in member States104.
The evolution of the principles emanated from the interpretative activity of the 
two mentioned bodies has concerned almost all the main features of a legitimate 
strike, including its objectives, the subjects entitled to the right in question and the 
protection granted to them, the conditions for the exercise of the right (as well as 
sanctions for potential abuses) and the possible restrictions for certain types of 
actions or specific categories of workers, although no ILO Convention explicitly 
requires any Member States to ensure protection of the right to strike105.
The definition of a worker organizations as any organization “for furthering 
and defending the interests of workers” in particular, entails a series of 
considerations on the nature of the collective action that can be undertaken and its 
definition as an individual or collective right.
Through the exercise of the right to strike occupational, trade union and 
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101 ILO 2008
102 Second Report, 1952, Case No 28 (Jamaica), para 68
103  That is, the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions  and Recommendations. In particular, the latter consists of eminent judges 
and jurists appointed by the ILO Governing Body and meets once a year to consider the extent to 
which member states are in compliance with the Conventions they have ratified.
104 The “Resolution concerning the Abolition of Anti-Trade Union Legislation in the States  Members  of 
the International Labour Organisation”, adopted in 1957, called for the adoption of “laws ... ensuring 
the effective and unrestricted exercise of trade union rights, including the right to strike, by the 
workers” (ILO, 1957, p. 783). Similarly, the “Resolution concerning Trade Union Rights  and Their 
Relation to Civil Liberties”, adopted in 1970, invited the Governing Body to instruct the Director-
General to take action in a number of ways  “with a view to considering further action to ensure full 
and universal respect for trade union rights in their broadest sense”, with particular attention to be 
paid, inter alia, to the “right to strike”. See Gernigon, Odero & Guido 2000, p. 7
105 Novitz 2003, p. 110
political  demands can be pursued by the workers; while the former two have been 
considered legitimate by the Committee on Freedom of Association, political and 
sympathy strikes have presented more complexities in their recognition. Purely 
political strikes have been deemed as falling outside the scope of freedom of 
association, although it is often very difficult to determine a clear separation 
between the various aspects of a strike; as for sympathy strikes, which are called for 
motives not affecting directly the workers withdrawing their labour, the Committee of 
Experts, considered that no general prohibition for sympathy strikes should be set 
and that workers should be able to take such action, provided the initial strike they 
are supporting is itself lawful.
As for the titularity of the right to strike, provided that it is a collective right 
exercised by a group106, it should be extended beyond the trade union federations 
or confederations, which should not be the sole organizations authorized to call a 
strike; striking workers, furthermore, should be protected from dismissal, which is 
not an acceptable response to a call for strike.
The ILO bodies have recognized a number of restrictions on the right to strike 
as being compatible with ILO Conventions; for what it refers to essential services, 
the Committee has drawn two lists, one pertaining to essential services in a strict 
sense107, where the right to strike may be subject to major restrictions and 
prohibitions, and another, voluntarily non-exhaustive, for which an outright ban 
should not be imposed.
As for the conditions for exercising the right to strike, the prerequisites should 
be “reasonable and … not such as to place a substantial limitation on the means of 
action”, nor the legal procedures should for calling a strike should be so 
complicated as to make it “practically impossible to declare a legal strike”108; the 
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106  “Under Article 3(1) of Convention No. 87, the right to organize activities and to formulate 
programmes  is recognized for workers' and employers' organizations. In the view of the Committee, 
strike action is  part of these activities under the provisions of Article 3; it is a collective right 
exercised, in the case of workers, by a group of persons who decide not to work in order to have 
their demands met. The right to strike is  therefore considered as an activity of workers' organizations 
within the meaning of Article 3”, ILO General Survey 1994, 149. The same text, however, underlines 
that the protection provided for by the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 extends to 
individuals, and that the right to strike recognized by the various  international instruments referred to 
in the Survey (among those the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and 
the European Social Charter of 1961) also applies to workers as individuals.
107  The hospital sector; electricity services; water supply services; the telephone service; air traffic 
control.
108 ILO 2006, Para. 547 and 548
Committee has however accepted several prerequisites as not violating the freedom 
of association, among which stand the provision of (voluntary)  conciliation and 
arbitration in industrial disputes, notice to the employer, and the exhaustion of 
procedures for negotiation, conciliation and arbitration. With reference to ballots and 
their relative quorum, the obligation to take strike decision by ballot has been 
deemed acceptable; however, the provision of large majorities may severely hinder 
the exercise of the right to strike, especially when large numbers of workers are 
considered.
The right to strike and the European Social Charter
The European Social Charter of 1961109, concluded within the framework of 
the Council of Europe, was the first international treaty to explicitly recognize the 
right to strike: article 6(4) of both the 1961 and 1996 versions of the Social Charter 
impose a duty on those States which have ratified the Charter to recognize “the right 
of workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of interest, 
including the right to strike”, with a view of “ensuring the effective exercise of the 
right to bargain collectively”; the right in question, therefore, must be read in 
conjunction with Article 5, concerning the freedom to organise and stating that the 
Member States “undertake that national law shall not be such as to impair, nor shall 
it be so applied as to impair, this freedom”, and Article 31110, which circumscribes its 
scope.
While the right to take collective action clearly encompasses all forms111  of 
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109 The 1961 instrument was then supplemented by various Protocols  and, in particular by the issuing 
of the Revised Social Charter in 1996.
110 In the RevESC Article G - Restrictions: “The rights  and principles  set forth in Part I when effectively 
realised, and their effective exercise as provided for in Part II, shall not be subject to any restrictions or 
limitations not specified in those parts, except such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a 
democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms  of others or for the protection of public 
interest, national security, public health, or morals. The restrictions  permitted under this  Charter to the 
rights  and obligations set forth herein shall not be applied for any purpose other than that for which they 
have been prescribed.”
111 The ECSR considers that the form that domestic legal protection takes is unimportant; what is 
crucial is  that any limitations placed on the right to strike do not contravene with Articles 6 and G of 
the ESC. See Novitz 2003, p. 280
industrial action in cases of conflict of interest112, it does not protect political 
strikes113: however, because of its link with the right to bargain collectively, which is 
not confined to workers’ and employers’ organization, it must be considered as 
being conferred to an individual and not to a member of an union.
The concept of collective bargaining to which the strike must be directed in 
order to attract protection should not be restricted to claims relating to working 
conditions but, once interpreted extensively, should also cover strikes called in order 
to ensure compliance by the employers with safety regulations, in cases of conflicts 
of right - i.e. as to the existence, validity or interpretation of a collective labour 
agreement or its violation – but also to challenge any decision which can be subject 
of collective negotiation, including entrepreneurial decisions like rationalization, 
closing down of plants, decisions of investment, announcements of dismissals and 
demands for co-determination114. Any bargaining between one or more employers 
and a body of employees (whether de jure or de facto) aimed at solving a problem of 
common interest, whatever its nature may be, should be regarded as collective 
bargaining within the meaning of Article 6.
From this wide-ranging interpretation it follows that sympathy strikes and 
secondary action should be regarded as legitimate; furthermore, the concentration 
on “collective bargaining” in the construction of the right to strike may suggests that 
workers can, in fact, strike against government policies which affect either their 
terms and conditions of employment or their benefit and leave entitlements. Other 
policies that cannot so readily linked to collective bargaining, would fall outside of 
the permissible objectives of a strike, since their “political” nature would prevail. 
In any case, while the mentioned Article G seem to provide a potentially 
broad basis for restrictions to the right to strike, the European Committee of Social 
Rights has interpreted this notion restrictively; with reference to compulsory 
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112 The Governmental Committee of the Council of Europe has described Art.6(4) of the Charters  in 
the following terms: “... Art. 6(4) recognised those aspects  of the right to strike which were essentially 
common to the Western democracies, and the Committee's approach was to attempt a definition - 
albeit incomplete - of this  common denominator by clarifying the maximum restrictions  on the right to 
strike permitted by Art. 6(4), and to ascertain whether any particular feature of existing national rules 
would be liable to conflict with it.”
113 European Committee of Social Rights Conclusion II 27; Conclusions XIII-4.
114 Novitz 2003, pp. 287-288
arbitration procedures, it noted that “the absence of any limitation on the 
government’s power to intervene in strike action” is unacceptable, depriving the 
workers of any protection and ultimately causing a failure in recognizing the right as 
provided for by the ESC. On the other hand, with specific reference to the sector of 
essential services115, it is permissible for a collective agreement to contain 
considerable restrictions116, even if they would be unacceptable if imposed by law; 
this is because such restrictions are the product of a mutual consent aimed at 
protecting the interests of the community or the users of the services, by reducing 
the recourse to collective action117.
With reference to the possible responses by the employers, the ECSR has 
found that employers should not be able to dismiss workers on the basis of their 
organization of or participation to a collective action, irrespectively of the time at 
which the dismissal occurs; the Governmental Committee has also underlined that it 
would be difficult to reconcile recognition of the right to strike with termination of the 
work contract, therefore considering termination of the work contract as a result of 
strike - unlike the suspension of that contract - incompatible with the European 
Social Charter, especially when the dismissal can be based on strikes that are 
legitimate according to national regulation and included in the scope of article 6(4).
1.2 – European Community and Union developments
The European normative option regarding the collective labour rights seems 
one of non-interventionism: the article 137.6 EC Treaty, stating that “the provisions 
of this article shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the 
right to impose lock-outs”, excludes these aspects of labour law, and particular for 
the analysis at hand the organization and defense of interests by the workers, from 
the competences of the European Union.
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115 Where “simply banning strikes […] is  not deemed proportionate to the specific requirements  of 
each sector.” ECSR Conclusions I, Statement of Interpretation on Article 6(4)
116  To be applied only for the matters contained in the agreement and to the members of the 
organization covered by the agreement.
117 ECSR Conclusions VIII , Statement of Interpretation on Article 5
In more general terms, the establishment of a functioning common market 
was the main objective in the early process of European integration; by 
differentiating economic integration from the promotion of fundamental rights the 
ECSC and the ECC were able to prioritize market building while minimizing 
interference with well-established and jealously guarded systems of social 
protection, labour law and industrial relations118. Social standard setting was, 
therefore, limited: with reference to labour standards, the issue of their provision 
arose only in relation to regulation of the terms of “fair competition”, and that their 
scope was expected to be minimal119.
Until a concept of a politically integrated Europe providing transnational 
protection to social rights started to emerge120, the social dimension of the 
Community was mainly related to a wide network of diverse policies and 
programmes in the very restricted fields of employment and “workplace” interests, 
and to the commitment to the idea belief that economic integration would rapidly 
improve, and indeed harmonize, working and living conditions in the Member 
States, and would be supported by collateral developments in social standards at 
national level.
Furthermore, it wasn’t until the 70s that the ECJ adopted a protecting stance 
with regards to “social rights”, and while incapable of elaborating comprehensive set 
of rights, deemed them adequate to be recognized as fundamental rights, also 
making reference to international instruments such as the European Social Charter 
and the ILO Conventions121.
The marked choice against a regulation on the right to strike carried out by 
EU institutions can be considered as incoherent both with the structuring of a 
European and trans-national field of economic action in which, nonetheless, the 
exercise of rights regulated and developed through the specificities of the singles 
national systems will unfold their effect, but also with the increasing commitment of 
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118 See Kenner in Hervey and Kenner 2003, p.5
119  The key concession was Article 119, which provided for equal pay for men and women. See 
Novitz 2003, p.151
120  Providing effective citizenship to social rights through the issuing of the key directives on 
collective redundancies (Dir. 75/129) and on the trasfer of undertaking (77/187/EC)
121 Such as in Defrenne, paras. 26-28. Defrenne v Sabena (no. 3), C-149/77
the Community for social integration testified by marked developments occurred 
between the ‘70s and the ‘80s122, and in particular with the issuing, at EU level, of 
instruments making direct reference to collective action. 
The Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 1989, in 
fact, acknowledged the significance of freedom of association an the right to strike 
as fundamental social rights123; in the context of the adoption at Community level of 
protective standards for rights which should not be jeopardized by competitive 
pressure.
The right of strike was explicitly mentioned in defining the recourse to 
collective action in the event of a conflict of interests, linking it in particular to the 
collective bargaining procedures124: furthermore, given the promotion of the 
dialogue between management and labour by the Charter, the establishment and 
utilization of mediation and arbitration procedures was encouraged in order to 
“facilitate the settlement of industrial disputes”.
Two main problems can be underlined with reference to this recognition: in 
primis  the wording of article 13 provides that the right to strike is subject to the 
obligations arising under national regulation and collective agreements; therefore the 
right to take collective action would lack a legally binding effect.
Secondly, The Community Charter can be considered as only sketching the 
outline of a European “social constitution” - all references in the draft to “citizens”, 
and more significantly the title of the document, had been deleted and replaced with 
“workers” or “persons” - and was not granted the legal status of binding Community 
law, being only a “solemn declaration” whose implementation is left to the Member 
States: its effectiveness is furthermore restricted by article 28, which limits the 
adoption of legal instruments by the Commission to those coming “within the 
Community’s area of competence”.
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122The importance of these social developments  is  testified by the EC's first Social Action Programme 
which was proposed by the Commission and accepted by the Council in 1974, the 1985 White Paper, 
and the Single European Act adopted in 1986, introducing significant changes to speed up and 
facilitate the social policy-making process. The developments relating to the introduction of Articles 
118a and 118b, while can be regarded as promising from the perspective of European level 
bragaining, as well as  defining the beginning of a new phase in the Community action in the matter of 
social policy, offered nothing with regards to the protection of the right to strike
123 CCFSRW, Articles 11 and 13
124 Ibid., Art. 12 
While articles 27 and 28 can also be intended as promoting the 
implementation of the instrument125, and the Community Charter has been referred 
to in many legal instruments during the 1990s, the reluctant approach towards the 
right to take collective action has been confirmed in the Agreement on Social Policy 
and the Amsterdam Treaty, which on the other hand resulted in a renewed interest in 
the labour law field and, in particular, in the reconciliation of the economic objectives 
of the Union with the pursuit of improved social welfare. 
In both sources the competence of the EC to regulate the right of association 
and consequently the right to strike is expressis  verbis excluded despite the explicit 
reference made to the European Social Charter and the Community Charter of 1989, 
both recognizing the right to take collective action126.
This inactive position, justified by means of the recourse to subsidiarity and 
the attention to the national diversities127, has to be considered also from another 
point of view; par. 1 letter f of the same article 137 EC which limits the action with 
reference to the right to strike states the support and complementation by the 
Community to the activities of the Member States in the areas of “representation 
and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers”: therefore, while 
the EU has undoubtely promoted the information and consultation of employees, it 
has also reinforced – through the mismatch between recognition and competences 
referring to the right to strike – a legal framework in which some fundamental rights 
are recognized, promoted and regulated while others keep on being completely 
submitted to national regulations, as was also testified by the ECJ’s reticence on the 
subject; while making reference to other fundamental social rights as “protected 
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125  However, not with regards to collective bargaining and action. The Action Programme for the 
implementation of the Charter, in fact, provided that “the problems arising from the application of 
these principles must be settled directly by the two sides of the industry, or where appropriate, by the 
Member States”. See Novitz 2003, p. 159
126 Article 2.6 of the Agreement on Social Policy and Article 137.6 of the EC Treaty. See Jaspers 2007, 
p. 28
127  “Particular attention should be paid to existing systems, traditions  and practice in the Member 
States  ... specifically in Europe, the national identity of the Member States is particularly defined by 
their individual paths to solidarity within society and social balance”, Council Resolution of 6 
December 1994 on certain aspects for a European Union social policy: a contribution to economic 
under the Community legal order”128, the Court did not provide a statement about 
the right to strike as a fundamental social right, in a context where it was not only 
recognized by the aforementioned international instruments, but explicitly referred to 
by the Constitutions of several Member States of the Community129.
1.2.1 – First clashes, first solutions: Commission v France and the Monti 
Regulation
The main feature of the evolution of the right to strike in the boundaries of the 
European Union is that, from the point of view of the legal discipline to be applied to 
the industrial conflict unfolding at trans-national level, a general regulatory 
framework is not provided by Community sources, and therefore the right and its 
guarantees appear fragmented in the domestic systems of the various Member 
States in which the actions are carried out.
Furthermore, beside this regulatory delocalization, another decisive aspect for 
the definition of the right to strike at European level emerged, relating to the possible 
interactions and contradictions between the exercise of collective action with the 
respect of the economic and market freedom rules configuring the Union, stirring the 
attention to the strike as a relevant matter to be addressed in the realization of the 
European internal market, with particular reference to specific sectors - such as the 
transport one - whose continuos activity makes practically possible the unfolding of 
the economic freedoms provided for by the Treaty130, and in which more pressing 
was the question whether it could be possible to consider a set of restrictions or 
prohibitions for the collective action with a view of preserving these fundamental 
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128 In Bosman, freedom of association was  recognized as “enshrined in Article 11 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and resulting from the 
constitutional traditions  common to the Member States, is  one of the fundamental rights which, as 
the Court has  consistently held and as is reaffirmed in the preamble to the Single European Act and 
in Article F(2) of the Treaty on European Union, are protected in the Community legal order”. Case 
C-415/93 Union Royal Belge des Sociétés de Football Association v Bosman, para. 76
129 Namely France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. However (at the time, see infra for the 
developments on the ECtHR jurisprudence in Demir and Enerji) not recognized by the ECHR, the 
recognition of the right to strike (or at least, the centrality of the strike at the core of the industrial 
relation systems) seem widespread enough for it to be considered a common constitutional tradition 
between the Member States.
130 Baylos 2007a
principles of the Union131.
In November 1997, a French lorry drivers’ strike132, stemming from the failure 
of negotiations in a dispute relating to the enforcement of early retirement policy, 
quickly unfolded its effects on freedom of movement and on free circulation of 
goods133, within the country and even beyond the national dimension, disrupting 
road haulage in particular to and from Spain, UK and Ireland; concerns for the 
possible negative consequences of the French dispute on international circulation 
were also voiced by the Commission, in the person of its member responsible for 
transport – Neil Kinnock – who in the immediate eve of the strike urged its French 
national counterpart to inform foreign drivers about alternative routes provided to 
allow international traffic to pass unhindered in transit through France134  and, with 
the road-transport crisis still underway, asked the French Government to take all the 
measures to ensure freedom of movement within France, also not ruling out not 
ruling out the possibility of instituting legal proceedings against France for hindering 
freedom of movement if the blockade was not lifted quickly, although recognizing 
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131 See Orlandini 2003, pp. 245-. It has also to be noted, with regards to the prudent approach to the 
matter by the EU institutions, that the PWD Directive (96/71/EC) already contained an attempt by the 
European legislator to define the relationship between the right to take collective action and some 
free movement principles: recital 22 of the PWD, in fact, stated that the Directive is “without prejudice 
to the law of the Member States  concerning collective action to defend the interests of trades  and 
professions”. See in particular Dorssemont 2008, but also infra with reference to the use of a Monti-
style clause in the recitals of the AWD (2008/104/EC). 
Furthermore, with reference to an indirect protection of the exercise of the right to strike, it has  been 
underlined how the Directive on collective redundancies contains  the potential for legal tactics 
defending strikers against dismissal, since they should be considered as occurring on the employer’s 
initiative “for one or more reasons not related to the individual workers concerned” (art.2.1) and 
therefore assimilated to redundancies. See Bercusson 2008, p. 314.
132 The fourth since 1984 and the third in just five years; In 1984 and 1992 the actions (blocking of the 
main axes of circulation and access to fuel depots and warehouses) were undertaken by the entire 
category (workers and employers) in order to protest against a strike by custom operators  and the 
introduction of a point system for the driving license, while the two last conflicts were more closely 
linked with living and working conditions of the employees  and workers of the sector. See EIRO, 
Lorry drivers' strike raises  European issues, 28 November, 1997 available online at http://
www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1997/11/feature/fr9711177f.htm
133 Even if, in contrast to preceding strikes, the blockades  did not completely block the motorways 
but rather filtered down traffic, allowing through private vehicles  and stopping lorries, the 
demonstrations  still closed access  to fuel depot, heavily disrupting the entirety of circulation. Striking 
truckers furthermore quickly pinpointed key targets, blockading ports (among those Cherbourg and 
Le Havre, and entry points  into France from the UK such as  Dieppe and Calais, whose blockade was 
criticised by the Commission) and supermarket distribution warehouses.
134 See Europolitics, Transport: EU Warns France over fresh lorry drivers’ strike, 1st November 1997, 
available online at http://www.europolitics.info/transport-eu-warns-france-over-fresh-lorry-drivers-
strike-artr163676-20.html
that “this would be a very serious matter". Therefore, the duty of enforcing articles 
30 and 5 of the EC Treaty on free movement was carried out by the Commission 
without calling into question the right to strike; in any case the French Government 
while insisting that it upheld the right to strike, deployed police to dismantle the 
blockades that had been erected at French border crossings, and  was also keen 
not to let the situation "stagnate” calling back the UFT – the major employers’ 
association, which had walked away from negotiations - to the negotiating table with 
a view of concluding an agreement that was reached on the 8th of November, 
effectively excluding the possibility of a violation of the Treaty, having done what was 
necessary and feasible in order to reduce the disruption derived by the action and 
having promoted negotiation to solve the dispute originating it.
The clash between the right to collective action and the fundamental 
economic freedoms underlying the internal Market was also analysed by the ECJ in 
the Spanish Strawberries case135, concerning an infringement procedure initiated by 
the Commission against the Republic of France. 
To be contested by the Commission was “the passivity of the French 
authorities”136  in face of violent acts committed by private individuals and protest 
movements directed against products137 from other Member States; the omission to 
react against the collective actions of French farmers was deemed by the ECJ as 
amounting to State liability, since the provisions on free movement of goods not only 
imply that the Member State have to avoid restrictions or the creation of obstacles 
on the freedom itself, but have also to ensure respect of the latter in their territory by 
prevent offences and disruption stemming by actions undertaken by private 
individuals and actors138.
It has also been noted139  that the “collective action” in question could not 
have been covered by the constitutional and/or international recognition of the right 
to take collective action because the French farmers were not acting in the capacity 
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135 ECJ , 9 December 1997, C 265/95, Commission v Republic of France.
136 Ibid., par. 2.
137 Those acts consisted, inter alia, in the interception of lorries transporting such products in France 
and the destruction of their loads, violence against lorry drivers, threats  against French supermarkets 
selling agricultural products  originating in other Member States, and the damaging of those goods 
when on display in shops in France”, ibid.
138 ibid., par. 32
139 Dorssemont in De Vos 2009, p. 65
of workers or employers, to which is limited entitlement to such a right, and mainly 
because, the nature of their guerrilla actions was too violent to warrant the 
conclusion that the actions could be covered by the protection granted by the 
mentioned article 6.4 of the European Social Charter140. However, the analysis of 
article 28 EC carried out by the ECJ left unclear several aspects regarding the scope 
of the duty of the Member State to ensure free movement: the conducts analyzed in 
case 265/95 were criminal in nature, involved a physical threat to imports and were 
prolonged in duration141; nothing was said for actions potentially frustrating the 
single market by restricting the free movements of economic factors other than 
goods (namely, workers and services), on the effects of the lawful nature of the 
action on the duty to intervene, and on the temporal issues in the ensuring of free 
movement by the Member State142.
The following year, the interpretation of the obligations deriving from the 
Treaty provisions on free movement was codified in the Council Regulation No. 
2679/98143, which also introduced an ad hoc monitoring procedure involving the 
Member States and the Commission with regard to clear, unmistakable and 
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140 See supra, par. 1.1.2
141  As  early as 1985, French farmers began to take destructive actions  against Spanish products 
(particularly strawberries  and tomatoes) imported into France and the Commission had asked French 
authorities  to undertake measures  to combat the acts  of vandalism disrupting the common; however, 
tensions  continued to escalate for approximately ten years. In 1993, French farmers engaged in a 
“systematic campaign to restrict the supply of agricultural products  from other Member States” (see 
C-265/95, par. 3), threatening wholesalers  and retailers, attempting to coerce them into stocking only 
French agricultural products  and imposing minimum selling prices. One of the groups involved, 
Coordination Rurale, also instituted a system of checks  to ensure compliance with the imposed 
requirements. See Hinton 1998
142 See Ryan in Hervey & Kenner, 2003, p. 79
143 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2679/98, OJ L 337, 12.12.1998 emanated from a proposal by D-G XV 
(Internal Market), headed by then Commissioner Mario Monti, and often referred to as the Monti (or 
Strawberries) Regulation. When an obstacle (defined by art. 1 as leading to serious  disruption of the 
free movement of goods, causing serious individual loss, requiring immediate action and attributable 
to the Member State, whether involving action or inaction on its part) occurs  or when “there is a 
threat thereof”, any Member State concerned has in primis  an informative duty to the Commission 
and to other Member States, which will  in turn provide relevant responses regarding the potential 
obstacles and the proposed action. Beside this information exchange, the Member State in which an 
obstacle occurs shall adopt all necessary and proportionate measures  so that free movement of 
goods is  ensured against any disruptive action (that is, with the limitation provided for by art. 2) and 
inform the Commission of the action undertaken by its  authorities. Inaction is considered to be 
existing when a Member State, in the presence of actions taken by private individuals, fails to 
implement the measures  for safeguarding the free movement of goods  without adversely affecting 
the exercise of fundamental rights recognized under national law. See Reg. 2679/98, art. 3-4. 
unjustified obstacles to the free movement of goods144; after criticism during the 
drafting stages that an intervention mechanism would imply intervention by the 
Commission in national labour disputes, as well as granting the economic factors 
dominance over the social dimension145, the Council of Ministers included at the 
article 2 of the Regulation a provision that ultimately came to be referred to as the 
“Monti clause”, aiming to protect the exercise of fundamental rights in Member 
States;
This Regulation may not be interpreted as affecting in any way the exercise of 
fundamental rights as recognised in Member States, including the right or freedom to strike. 
These rights may also include the right or freedom to take other actions covered by the 
specific industrial relations systems in Member States.
Two aspects in particular stand out with reference to the wording chosen in 
the drafting of this article: the unambiguous aim of the normative instrument is the 
protection of the free movement of goods and not the regulation of the right to strike 
nor the composition of the potential contrast with the economic freedoms deriving 
from its exercise; this provisions furthermore, while granting immunity to domestic 
legislation regarding fundamental rights from instruments related to free movement, 
do not recognize collective action as a general principle of EU Law, even if it 
presuppose its interference with the exercise of economic freedoms. From an 
institutional point of view, this reluctance is consistent with the Community 
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144 The rapid intervention mechanism, built in order to ensure prompt and effective responses from 
the Member States by putting pressure to adopt measures aiming at removing potential obstacles to 
free movement, contemplates a specific procedure for a formal complaint by the Commission for the 
case of an obstacle occurring in a Member State, based on mutual informative duties (the Member 
States  has to respond in five days  from the receipt of the complaint) and the request by the EU 
institution to remove the identified obstacle within a period determined “with reference to the urgency 
of the case”. Reg. 2679/98, art. 5. See Orlandini 2003, pp. 284 ff.
145  For the purposes of this reasoning it is  necessary to recall the essential contents  of the draft 
Regulation, as  published by the Commission in January 1998. Namely, it first included a somewhat 
vague reference to fundamental rights  (Article 1). Then, notably, its draft Article 2 contained the right 
of the Commission to decide on the legality of strike action blocking the cross-border trade: “Where 
the Commission establishes the existence in a Member State of obstacles  within the meaning of 
Article 1, it shall address a decision to the Member State directing it to take the necessary and 
proportionate measures to remove the said obstacles, within a period which it shall fix”. OJ C10, 
15.1.1998. Even the name of the draft instrument was  telling: Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) 
creating a mechanism whereby the Commission can intervene in order to remove certain obstacles  to 
trade. See Hellman 2007, p. 51
legislator’s constitutional inability to intervene in a direct way146.
It appears evident that the Regulation cannot be used to affect the level of 
protection granted to collective actions by domestic law: the provision in question 
explicitly excludes from the notion of obstacle or disruption to the freedom of 
movement of goods, that the Member States have to prevent, the exercise of 
collective action, which must be preserved from any possible restriction from EU 
legislation and institutions147, a necessary exclusion148, consistent with the respect 
of the exercise of fundamental rights on which the EU legal framework has to be 
based; the potential setting and enforcement of restrictions and limitations to the 
exercise of the right to strike in a European context and in sectors involving the 
economic freedoms is therefore remitted to the various legal framework of each 
national system in which the collective action is carried out.
On the other hand this proof of prudent abstentionism149 makes it clear that it 
does not exist a trend in homogenizing the possible restrictions on the exercise of 
the right to strike at either, generally, at trans-national European level or in particular, 
for specific sectors and/or circumstances producing effects on the economic 
freedoms provided for by the Treaty; in a strict enforcement of the subsidiarity 
principle, the composition of the potential contrast emerging between fundamental 
rights and economic freedoms is realized in the disparity of the juridical solutions 
administered by  each domestic frameworks in settling it.
This latter element leads, to another set of considerations: it is to be positively 
underlined the very precise definition by article 2 of the strike in terms of “right” or 
“freedom”, and the reference to other types of collective actions which reflects the 
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146 The provisions do not state that the instruments will not apply. If they would not apply, no clause 
providing immunity would have been needed. Thus, the legislator gives the impression of broadening 
the scope of the exclusion laid down in Article 137.5 EC (153 TFEU) applicable to EC competences  in 
the field of Social Competences, acting as  if other Treaty provisions  conferring competences  (in the 
particular case, Article 308 EC, now 352 TFEU) also did not allow the legislator to impede the 
domestic recognition of the right to take collective action; a spillover effect is  thus  being prevented. 
See Dorssemont in De Vos 2009, p. 60
147According to art. 5 of the Reg. 2679/98, the Commission, in “reaching its conclusion” when 
evaluating the possibility of an obstacle to free movement occurring in a Member State, shall have 
regard to Article 2.
148An exclusion reprising the Resolution of 7 December 1998, in which the Council and the national 
representatives agreed that Member States shall “undertake to do all within their powers, taking into 
account the protection of fundamental rights, including the right or freedom to strike, to maintain the 
free movement of goods and to deal rapidly with actions  which seriously disrupt the free movement 
of goods, as defined in Regulation (EC) No 2679/98”.
149 Dorssemont in De Vos 2009, p. 60
extreme diversity still present today in the normative framework and industrial 
relations systems of the various Member States150.
At the same time, this highly detailed statement can also be considered as 
lacking clarity, in so far as it relates with industrial action151; the protection of the 
right to strike found in the first sentence, in fact, is based upon “fundamental rights 
as recognized by Member States”. Given the fact that there is no common standard 
at European level for the right to strike, and that its potential setting explicitly 
escapes the aims of the Regulation, the protection seems to be deriving from the 
framework present in the individual Member State or States involved by the dispute.
The uncertainties extend also to the second sentence, which highlights the 
possibility for specific types of industrial actions to be protected by the immunity 
under article 2; a more precise wording should have clearly linked the industrial 
actions with the national context in which they are exercised, given that is very 
difficult to imagine that specific types of industrial action other than the strike can be 
considered lawful across the Member States, even in countries in which they are 
not152.
In any case, the EU drew back from asserting that its regulatory power on free 
movements could prevail over national regulation of collective action, at least in so 
far as these took the form of the exercise of fundamental rights153: to be contested 
by the Commission for their effects on the economic freedoms would have been 
only the consequences  of strikes or other collective actions and demonstrations154, 
as the cases following the entry into force of the Regulation have shown155.
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150  A wording possibly conditioned also by suggestions coming by those systems (not least the 
French one, directly involved by the 1997 ECJ ruling) in which the right to strike encounters the higest 
recognition even in absence of a legislative definition of its  modalities of exercise and a broad 
concept of collective action tends to prevail on the exercise of all but the very core of economic 
freedoms by the employer.
151 See Ryan in Hervey & Kenner 2003, p. 80
152  And vice versa, lawful action in some Member States  could be excluded from an hypothetical 
common standard based on Reg. 2679/98
153 See Bercusson 2008, p. 18
154 Taking into account that EU citizens are entitled to the fundamental right to peaceful assembly
155 GHK and Technopolis  2007. A total of 90 “obstacles” were notified/reported by Member States 
and economic operators  to the Commission, or identified by the Commission from the beginning of 
1999 to the end of 2006.
1.2.2 – Art. 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the right to 
take collective action
Originated in a context characterized by the need to the reprise of the social 
dialogue and the promotion of social policy in order to more attentively address 
labour market concerns linked with the changing demography, unemployment and 
social exclusion, as well as issues such as the legitimacy of the EU institutions and 
the impending enlargement processes156, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union was proclaimed at the meeting of the European Council held in 
December 2000 at Nice157. This solemn political declaration should have 
represented an encompassing instrument providing the EU with an indivisible 
foundation of core economic and social rights, and was the outcome of a peculiar 
deliberative process, led by a self-nominated “Convention”158 composed by the EU 
Commission President, representatives from the Governments of the Member 
States, national parliaments and the European Parliament159; the Convention had a 
restrictive mandate in the drafting of the Charter, which prevented it from including 
substantial innovations for the competences and duties of the Union160  and, with 
specific reference to the matter of economic and social rights, the recourse to 
directions derived  from other acts of the Community161.
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156 In these period two reports  were published in 1996 (by the Comité des  Sages, presented at the 
first Social Policy Forum) and in 1999 (by an Expert Group established by the Commission) stressing 
the need to affirm at EU level the fundamental rights  contained in the aforementioned international 
instruments (cf. supra). The late 90s, furthermore, saw the adoption of the Revised ESC and the 
launch of ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.
157  It was left to the Nice European Council to define the integration of the Charter into the EU 
Treaties. However, at the Meeting the Council was unable to reach an agreement on inclusion of the 
text in question in the Nice Treaty.
158 Actually a working group appointed by the European Council at the 1999 Meeting in Cologne. See 
Cologne European Council, 3-4 June 1999, Presidency Conclusions, pp. 44-45 and Annex IV.
159  Representatives  of other EU institution such as  the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of Regions, as well as  representatives of the civil society (including trade unions) and 
applicant countries  did not participate in the final decision but were able to contribute their views at 
public hearing. See Novitz 2003, pp. 164 ff.
160 Cfr. Art. 51.2 : “This Charter does not establish any new power or task for the Community or the 
Union, or modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties.”
161  The Convention, contravening to the mandate, has transcribes  principles  enunciated in other 
international instruments, in large part acquired in the EU “legal asset” thanks to the interpretations 
by the ECJ and their inclusion in EU legislation. See Arrigo 2000. For a detailed reconstruction of the 
deliberative process, see also Guizzi 2003, pp. 389 ff.
The main aim of the Charter was (and still is) the organic definition of the 
indefeasible prerogatives of the European citizens deriving from appartenance to the 
Union162 and, beside some objectionable omissions, it can be affirmed that contains 
not only the the main civil rights and freedoms of the liberal tradition, but also the 
most important social and economic rights, along with “third generation” rights such 
as those regarding bioethics, information technologies and the protection of the 
environment, not seldom innovating even with respect to recent and wide-ranging 
national Constitutions163.
The right to strike was included in the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the 
Solidarity Chapter along with other core labour rights, such as the protection against 
unfair dismissal, fair and just working conditions, prohibition of child labour and 
protection of young workers, protection from dismissal connected to maternity and 
the right to maternity and paternity leave164.
With specific reference to collective labour rights, they include also the 
workers’ right to information and consultation within the undertaking (art. 27) and 
right of peaceful assembly and the freedom of association (art. 12), and, according 
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162 While not preventing Union law to provide more extensive protection (cfr. art. 52.3); the Charter, 
furthermore, places all its  enunciated rights  on the same legal level, and boldly affirms their 
indivisibility, even if it is  possible to distinguish, in ints provisions, between specific enforceable right) 
and freedoms (many of which are conditioned) and general unenforceable principles.
163 With reference to the Italian case, examples of the broader protection granted by the Charter can 
be considered the protection against unfair dismissal, the workers’ right to information and 
consultation and, with particular reference to the combat of social exclusion, “the right to social and 
housing assistance so as to ensure a decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources”. 
See CFREU, art. 34
164 CFREU Artt. 30-33 The labour rights  make up the main core of social rights stated by the Charter, 
alongside which are to be considered also the right of the family to legal, economic and social 
protection (art. 33), the entitlement to social security and services (art. 34), the right of access to a 
free placement service for job seekers  (art. 39), health care (art. 35), and a “high level” of 
environmental and consumer protection (artt. 37-38). However, as also noted before, it is apparent 
that the catalogue provided by the Charter is  a highly selective and less than comprehensive list; key 
omissions include the right to work and the right to fair remuneration. It is perhaps not coincidental 
that these rights  fall in areas that touch most closely upon national sovereignty and have significant 
resource implications. See Kenner in Hervey & Kenner 2003. 
to the Explanatory Document, find their origins in previous instruments such as the 
ECHR and the ESC, together with the Revised European Social Charter of 1996165.
According to art. 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, therefore:
Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accordance with 
Community law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and conclude 
collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of interests, to take 
collective action to defend their interests, including strike action.
As in other articles, the affirmed rights are also stated to be limited by 
reference to national laws and practices; nonetheless, in the formulation of this 
article the precise definition and the attention to national diversities of the “safety 
valve” constituted by Art. 2 of Reg. 2679/98, however possibly flawed, seem 
completely lost, diluted in the very general assertion that, despite earlier doubts 
regarding Community competence, the right to collective bargaining, collective 
action and strike are to be enjoyed “in accordance” not only with “national law and 
practices” but also with “Community law”166.
While going well beyond the rights which had previously been recognised in 
EU law and jurisprudence, the Charter appears also to be promoting a specific kind 
of collective action, linking it in particular with collective bargaining procedures (with 
the possible outcome of an agreement) between actors identified as workers, 
employers and their organizations, and conducted at the appropriate levels167.
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165 On the normative basis of art. 28 it has been underlined how “the account of Article 28 EUCFR 
given in the Explanatory Document is  remarkable for its inexactitude”, both with respect to article  6 
ESC, to which six MS have expressed reservations, and with reference to points 12 to 14 of the 
Community Social Charter (in particular, the possibility for limitation provided by the latter point does 
not appear in the face of the Charter), and lastly for the reference to art. 11 ECHR which (at least at 
the time of the proclamation of the Charter) ws interpreted in the sense that strike could be 
considered as one possible method used by trade unions to protect the interest of their members. 
See Ryan in Hervey & Kenner 2003, p. 74.
166 See Bercusson 2008a, p. 328
167 Two main issues  have to be underlined with reference to the highlighted link: in primis, the fact 
that art. 28, while seeking to strengthen the practice of collective bargaining deals only with some of 
the issues regarding this  fundamental rights: nothing is said with reference to coverage and scope of 
the agreements, different degrees of engagement by the actors, effects, form or type of bargaining 
structure. Secondly, the instruments referred to by the Explanatory Document (in particular the 
Community Social Charter and the ESC) present relevant differences with art. 28, since they contain 
provisions  encouraging and promoting conciliation, mediation and arbitration procedures and 
machinery for negotiations  with a view of the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by 
collective agreements. Ibid.
In particular, the reference to the actors involved confirms the instrumental 
conception of the right to industrial action provided for by the Charter168, which 
indicates workers or their respective organizations169  as the subjects granted 
titularity of the right, in the case of conflict of interests; this choice is consistent with 
the stated promotion of collective bargaining, but on the other hand it may be read 
as lacking the necessary strength to generally affirm the right of individual workers 
to engage in collective action, and protect them for example from retaliatory tactics 
by the employer.
Furthermore, it appears to be reprising the concept of “equality of arms” 
between workers and employers in industrial disputes, therefore possibly granting 
European coverage and protection to the right for the employers to impose lock-
outs170, even if the Explanatory Document underlines how the “modalities and limits 
for the exercise of collective action, including strike action, come under national 
laws and practices, including the question whether it may be carried out in parallel in 
several Member States”. 
Member States, however, were not the principal addressees of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights; the provision of the CFREU are mainly directed towards “the 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union”171, consistently with the 
application of the the principle of subsidiarity. However, even if they must act and 
legislate consistently with the Charter, the EU institutions, remained bound by the 
pre-defined sphere of powers competences provided under the Treaty, which could 
not be extended by the application of the Charter172.
Therefore, the combined provisions deriving from art. 137.5 EC and 52.2 
CFREU implies an exclusion of the possibility for the Commission to issue legislation 
on the matter of collective bargaining and action, possibly with a view of detailing 
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168 Hartzén 2009, p.86
169  It has to be noted that ESC art. 6 refers  to workers  and employers, without reference to their 
organizations  and under ILO Convention 87 the right to strike is a fundamental right of workers and 
their representatives  (and not necessarily their “respective organisations”). In all of the cases the 
emphasis is by the author).
170  Which, contrary to strike, is often implicitly excluded or referred to as a mere freedom in the 
majority of the Member States, and whose recognition would be a highly controversial issue.
171 CFREU Art. 51.1
172 Ibid., Art. 51, end of par.1 and par. 2
the provisions of art. 28 CFREU in connection with the freedom of association, and 
linking them with the various experiences deriving from the national systems of 
industrial relations173.
1.2.3 – Legal uncertainties in the application of the Charter
The fundamental rights as guaranteed in the Charter are a declared part of 
the construction of the Social Europe, and their enforcement and development is 
crucial for the European integration project174. Its objectives, as underlined, have to 
be secured through the rigorous exercise of the competences and powers allocated 
by the Treaties, in strict application of the proportionality principle, in certain ways 
denying the EU institutions with the capacity or the instruments to pursue the 
promotion of the fundamental rights that they have to protect in their activity.
The problems of defining a common set of trade union rights deriving from a 
single European text are highlighted specifically with reference to article 28 CFREU, 
which is probably the most prominent example of a Charter provision seeking to 
guarantee collective rights that may be very well regarded as falling outside EU 
competence, or at the very least, outside the social provisions175. 
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173 The fundamental issue of the exercise of the right to strike in relation to internal market freedoms 
is made more complicated due to the diversity of substantive national strike laws and practices. 
However, that situation is, regarding fundamental rights, not unique to strikes. In Omega (C-36/02 
Omega Spielhallen-und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn) 
the Court had to assess fundamental values, i.e. human dignity, enshrined in the German 
Constitution, in relation to the free provision of services. The referring court had asked whether the 
ability which Member States  have to restrict fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty, should 
be subject to the condition that that restriction be based on a legal conception that is  common to all 
MS (par. 23); the ECJ found that “It is not indispensable in that respect for the restrictive measure 
issued by the authorities of a Member State to correspond to a conception shared by all Member 
States  as regards the precise way in which the fundamental right or legitimate interest in question is 
to be protected”. (par. 37). See Hellsten 2007, p. 108
174 The social and economic rights  in the EU Charter go beyond trade unions to include others of a 
more programmatic nature. Implementation of the Charter aims to build a bridge between 
programmatic (social and economic rights) and justiciable (civil and political) rights. Justiciable rights 
equate to effective and enforceable rights. The challenge is  to establish clearly justiciable trade union 
rights: e.g. trade union freedom of association, information and consultation, collective bargaining 
and collective action, and, further, to develop implementation of programmatic social and economic 
rights: e.g. health, education, etc. See Bercusson in ETUI Expert Group 2009, p. 151
175 See Hervey & Kenner 2003. Furthermore, collective bargaining and collective action (Article 28), in 
some MS, these assumed to be fall within the right of “freedom of association”
Any attempt to legislate with a view of harmonizing national law and 
regulation on the right to strike at EU level would have conflicted not only with the 
aforementioned exclusion provided for by the Treaty, but also with article 52.2 
CFREU which, according to the Explanatory Document, aims at preserving the 
systems of rights and conditions conferred by Treaties and Community legislation176; 
the asserted European right to strike was therefore not provided with an actual 
regulatory content, nor was defined its relationship - or at the very least the guiding 
principles needed to identify it - with the economic freedoms provided by the Treaty, 
in order to clearly link, since its inception in the EU legal framework, the possible 
limits to its promotion with the most relevant issues deriving from its possible 
exercise at trans-national level. The recognition of the right to take collective action 
as a general principle of EC Labour Law, in the way in which has occurred, does 
therefore not clarify whether an clash between that right and the fundamental 
economic freedoms underlying the common market is conceivable and how this 
alleged conflict needs to be legally construed177.
Furthermore, the legal status of the Charter itself was uncertain178 during the 
troubled EU constitutionalization process, and the non binding nature of this act was 
substantially confirmed during the period stretching from its promulgation to the 
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty179, as the Charter did not come to represent the 
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176 Even if the proposal were to be based on the need to approximate the common market (Article 
94), in order to prevent social dumping, Article 51.2 might inhibit the Community from exercising its 
powers in this respect. By contrast it is  to be underlined how article 31.2, automatically and 
unconditionally granting “every worker” the right to limit their maximum working hours, to daily and 
weekly rest and an annual period of paid leave, is  not fettered by any reference to “national laws  or 
practices”. Each element contains a right that is per se justiciable.
177 Given the devolution of the regulation of the right to strike in the single domestic systems deriving 
from the Treaty and Charter provisions, potentially very relevant issues concerning the “selection” by 
private actors of specific legal frameworks  to be applied to industrial action in function of their own 
interest have to be considered. On the matter, beside the groundbreaking Viking, see the Weber case 
of 27 February 2002 (C-37/00 Herbert Weber v Universal Ogden Services  Ltd); while the ruling itself 
does not specifically concern the legitimacy of a strike action, the case already highlights  the 
possible use of national regulations  with a view of restricting the exercise of the right to collective 
action in the European space.
178 As it was its  potentially creative nature or its features of “restatement of law” with reference to 
fundamental rights.
179  Even in the current context in which the Charter has  been granted full legal status, it is the 
possible effect on national systems  of the rights listed that can be questioned (especially in 
consideration of the opt-outs  carried by various MS). Under the Lisbon Treaty, in fact, the Charter 
was not incorporated in the Treaty as happened in the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
but is conferred by art. 6 “the same legal value as the Treaties”
core of a new system of fundamental rights in the European Union; in fact, while the 
Charter was used by EU institutions to set self-established limits to their own action, 
the system of the protection of fundamental rights in the European legal framework 
remained based on art. 6 EC, as interpreted by the ECJ and the CFI, and the 
reference to constitutional traditions common to the member States as general 
principles180. 
The plurality of levels involved in the establishment of fundamental rights and 
the absence of a clear hierarchy between texts and sources of law can cause 
several interpretative problems; therefore the EC Courts were remitted with the 
definition of the borders and the interaction between different rights.
In this sense, albeit not enforceable in a trial by citizens181, the CFREU has 
been growingly used (either directly or, more often, as an interpretative aid, or 
referring to its political authority) as an authoritative guide to european rights in the 
proceedings before the CJEU, and in particular by Advocate Generals: the Charter, 
denied any creative feature, played a “confirmative role”182 in the above mentioned 
system of rights protection, reaffirming the rights as they result from the 
constitutional traditions and international obligations183; whenever the Charter has 
been quoted by the ECJ, it has been mentioned after and not before the 
fundamental rights inferred by the Court184.
It has to be noted, however, that the procedural asymmetry between rule and 
exception with relation to possible restrictions to Treaty-based freedoms still 
prevents a clear recognition of an equal status between economic freedoms and 
fundamental social rights; furthermore, the relevant differences in the degree of 
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180 As article 6.3 TEU clarifies, the drawing up of the Charter is not exhaustive.
181 See Gianfrancesco 2008, p. 3
182  In the early BECTU case, AG Tizzano commented on the legal status  of the CFREU. While 
underlining its not having “genuine legislative scope in the strict sense”, he considered that it 
contained statements  reaffirming rights enshrined in other instruments., and could act as a 
“substantive point of reference” for the EU institutions. On the basis of articl 31, therefore, he 
advocated the protection of paid annual leave under EU law, since “the Charter provides us with the 
most reliable and definitive confirmation of the fact that the right to paid annual leave constitute a 
fundamental rights” Case C-173/99 Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematographic and Theatre 
Union (BETCU) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, AG’s  Opinion, paras. 26-28. On the matter 
see Ryan in Hervey & Kenner 2003 and Novitz 2003, as well as Gianfrancesco 2008. 
183 ECJ Decision of 20 june 2006, C-540/03 European Parliament v Council
184 In a decision of 30 January 2002 in Max.mobil Telekommunikation Service GmbH v. Commission, 
the CFI twice referred to provisions of the EU Charter, first Article 41 (Right to good administration), 
and then Article 47 (Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial).
doctrinal and judicial evolution between the recent and still fragmentary assertion of 
social rights and the corresponding definition of the content and the functioning of 
economic freedoms, which represent the staple of European integration, may hinder 
the protection and promotion of the social dimension provided by the Charter.
If the fundamental rights of the workers are no more to be questioned from 
the point of view of principles and policy objectives, the problem shifts on the 
existence of concrete institutional mechanisms capable of preserving and enforcing 
the rights asserted by the fundamental texts and Treaties185.
 In this sense, the inadequacy of the current provisions of EU labour law 
instruments in relation to national implementation and transnational aspects of 
collective trade union rights provided by the Charter must be underlined, as well as 
the underdevelopment of common regulatory trends in the sector.
The continuing absence of competences, for instance, has meant that the EU 
institutions were only able to include oblique references to strike in “negative” 
provisions, such as recital 20 of the Temporary and Agency Workers Directive186, 
which states that the provisions of the AWD on restrictions or prohibitions on 
temporary work are to be considered “without prejudice to national legislation or 
practices prohibiting striking workers being replaced by temporary workers”187; the 
EU circumspection in mentioning the right to strike in a normative instrument is 
evidently confirmed when it is considered that, while the restriction in question is 
decidedly widespread among the Member States, this immunity was not construed 
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185 See Zoppoli in Andreoni and Veneziani 2009, p. 227
186 Dir. 2008/104/EC
187 The prohibition on the use of temporary agency workers as  substitute labour in the course of an 
industrial dispute is by far the most common form of restriction on agency work in the EU-27 legal 
systems, along with the the case both of present and past redundancies, and as noted in the main 
text, the provisions of the AWD are to be considered without prejudice to national prohibitions 
regarding the substitution of striking workers.
With specific reference to the way in which this legal restriction holds in the three systems more 
closely analyzed, in the UK a ban on supplying agency workers to do the work of those on strike, or 
to do the work of other employees transferred to cover the work of strikers, was introduced in the UK 
by the Conduct of Employment Agencies and Employment Business  Regulations 2003, and it applies 
only to “official” trade disputes. In Germany, it is  lawful to use temporary agency workers in the 
course of a strike; however, under the provisions of the AÜG, agency workers  are entitled to refuse to 
work at the user company directly affected by the strike, and the agency must inform its workers of 
this  right. For what it refers to the Italian situation, strikers cannot be replaced by other workers 
recruited from outside. Employers may not offer financial inducements  to employees not taking part 
in the strike. Even the temporary recruiting of strike-breakers from outside might be considered an 
illegal anti-union activity under Art. 28 of the Workers’ Statute.
as part of the relevant article188  in the body of the implemented Directive, which 
excludes from the review national requirements with regard to registration, licensing, 
certification, financial guarantees or monitoring of temporary work agencies. 
Another tentative recognition189  of the fundamental right to take collective 
action is represented by the Services Directives190 in which, however, the legislator 
opted for a more cautious statement respecting, in a redundant way, the primacy 
of the Treaty of the European Union over secondary legislation instruments. The 
European Parliament insisted that fundamental rights should not be affected, and 
article 1.7 states, in a wording similar to the “Monti clause”, that the Directive 
“does not affect the right to negotiate, conclude and enforce collective agreements 
and to take industrial action in accordance with national law and practices which 
respect Community law” 191, enriching the debate on the right to strike by bringing 
about the question of a possible uniformity on the application of the right to strike 
at EU-level; this statement, however is preceded by a more generic clause which 
states that the Directive “does not affect the exercise of fundamental rights as 
recognized in the Member States and by Community law”; such a differentiation 
highlights the right to strike as a fundamental right potentially not recognized by 
Community law, and whose exercise is an activity potentially in contrast, however 
recognized, with the latter.
On the other hand, in recital 14, the issue of “industrial action” is 
downgraded as an issue of ordinary labour standards, covered by the definition of 
industrial relations and it is repeated that it is part of the enumerative definition of 
labour law in Article 2.6.
1.2.4 – Schmidberger and the ECJ’s balancing through proportionality
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188 Art. 4 AWD, Review of restrictions or prohibitions
189 See Jaspers in Dorssemont, Jaspers & Van Hoek 2007, p. 56
190 Directive 2006/123/EC
191 The juxtaposition in the Services Directive of the formula “does not affect” opposite the formula 
“shall not apply” (comparing articles 1 and 2 of the Services Directive) also confirm the distinction 
between the “immunity” granted to the exercise of fundamental rights  and the “exclusion” from the 
sphere of application provided for certain sectors. See Dorssemont 2008
The decisive role played by the EC Courts in interpreting the actual meaning 
of the provision concerning fundamental rights, and in particular their interaction 
with the economic freedoms, assumed to be in a position of predominance in EC 
law, was confirmed in 2003, when the ECJ in the Schmidberger case192, although 
insisting that this kind of exception should be interpreted narrowly, allowed for 
restrictions to the economic freedoms stemming from the exercise of fundamental 
rights, albeit under specific conditions., giving precedence to the social dimension 
of the EU when contrasting with the economic one.
The Court had already ruled on cases concerning a collision between EC law 
and fundamental rights; in Albany193  and Van der Woude194, concerning European 
competition law, the Court had granted immunity to the collective labour agreement 
in so far they were pursuing social objectives.
In the particular situation concerned by the Schmidberger ruling, a 
demonstration by an ecologic action group had interfered with the free movement of 
goods, since Transitforum Austria Tirol when had blocked access to the Brenner 
Motorway for 30 hours; a transport company started a liability suit against the 
Austrian Government, objecting to the passive stance adopted by the Austrian 
Government with regard to the “collective action” undertaken, since it had decided 
to authorize the demonstration - which had been duly notified – instead of 
preventing the potential obstruction to the economic freedom in question.
The circumstances of the case were evidently very different from those of 
Commission v France195; only one route had been blocked, for a short period and in 
consequence of a lawful demonstration not involving any criminal activity nor 
directed to a specific restrictive aim.
Furthermore, the Austrian authorities had allowed the demonstration since the 
demonstrators were exercising their fundamental rights of freedom of expression 
and freedom of assembly provided by the Austrian constitution196, and which the 
Court recognised as general principles of EC Law which might justify, in principle, a 
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192 C-112/2000, Eugen Schmidberger v Republik Osterreich, Decision of 12 June 2003
193 C-67/96 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie
194 C-222/98 Van der Woude v Stichting Beatrixoord
195 Schmidberger, AG’s Opinion, par.78
196 Nonetheless, the freedom of expression is entirely absent in the preliminary questions.
restriction to the free movement of goods197; it is also to be underlined that, in its 
balancing the Court also acknowledged the recognition in the ECHR of the freedom 
of expression and association, referring once again to its fundamental rights 
doctrine where it has established that fundamental rights are a part of Community 
law and have to be respected.
In Schmidberger, in order to reconcile the contrasting requirements deriving 
from the freedom of movements and from the safeguarding of fundamental rights, 
the Court assessed the fairness of the balance struck by the Austrian 
Government198, instead of establishing a clear-cut hierarchy199; the basis for such an 
assessment was the proportionality test. 
While declaring that the specific aim of the demonstration was immaterial in 
such legal proceedings, the necessity to safeguard the freedom of expression and 
assembly was considered to constitute a legitimate aim, justifying the restriction to 
the free movement of goods200; the procedures and the relevant features of the 
demonstration were also taken into consideration, and the fulfillment of information 
duty towards economic operators, as well as the putting into place of measures 
limiting the disruption to the economic freedoms were acknowledged.
Other aspects considered in the assessment of proportionality were the 
possible alternative means at disposal for the demonstrator to express their 
views201, and the substantial damage produced by the exercise of the fundamental 
right to the free movement of goods202; once it was defined that the decision of the 
Austrian Government to allow the demonstration was justified, the economic 
damage suffered by the company was not taken into account.
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197 Schmidberger, par. 74 .
198 Ibid., par. 77 and 81. 
199 See Dorssemont in De Vos 2009, p. 66
200 The Court did not take a teleological approach in proportionality, and did not adjudicate on the 
purposes sought by Transit Forum when making use of the freedom of expression and assembly. 
Nevertheless, the Court took into consideration that the “purpose of that public demonstration was 
not to restrict trade in goods of a particular type or from a particular source”. Schmidberger, par. 86.
201 In this sense, the obstruction of the Brenner Highway was considered as the ultima ratio option for 
the group by both the AG and the Court. See Schmidberger, AG’s Opinion par. 110 and 118, and 
Schmidberger, par. 86 89, 90 and  92. They considered that Transit forum did not have an alternative 
means to express its  views in an equally effective manner They considered that there was  no means 
for the demonstrators  to make their point known which would have obstructed the free movement of 
goods in a less drastic way, without depriving the action of a substantial part of its impact.
202The latter was limited by a comparison with both the geographic scale and the intrinsic 
seriousness of the disruption caused in the case of Commission v France.
2. VIKING, LAVAL, RÜFFERT AND LUXEMBOURG
2.1 - The Enlarged EU as the background for the ECJ revirement
The historical development of the European Community is carachterised by a 
definite tendency to expansion; a growing membership, in fact, has been an integral 
part of European integration right from the start of this experience. Since 1957, 
therefore, the number of the Member States has grown, in several stages1, from the 
original six to the current twenty-seven; furthermore, since right after the decline of 
the Soviet regime in the late 80s and the democratic transitions2  occurred in the 
countries formerly falling under Soviet influence the Community has actively pursued 
the objective of a European “re-unification”, a process which has been carried out 
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1 And precisely in 1973 (involving Denmark, Ireland and the UK), 1981 and 1986 (Greece, Spain and 
Portugal, the so-called Mediterranean enlargement), 1995 (Austria, Finland and Sweden), 2004 and 
2007(considered by the European Commission as  part of the same round, and involving Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and 
Slovenia). For what it concerns future expansions  current candidate countries  are Croatia (whose 
accession, after the closing of negotiations  decided by EU Member States on the 30 of June 2011m, 
is foreseen for 1 July 2013), Iceland, Macedonia and Montenegro which are considered “official” 
candidates along with the long-term applicant Turkey (which officially applied for EU membership in 
1987) and, lastly, the remaining Western Balkans countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovinga, Serbia 
and Kosovo under UNSC Resolution 1244/99) which are considered as “potential candidates”. The 
challenges  posed by the so-called “Eastern enlargement”, which will be further analyzed infra, can 
easily be appreciated also simply by considering the fact that before 2004 the enlargement had 
involved a maximum of three countries per round. See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
5th_enlargement/index_en.htm, European Commission’s press  release EU closes access negotiations 
w i t h C r o a t i a h t t p : / / e u r o p a . e u / r a p i d / p r e s s R e l e a s e s A c t i o n . d o ? r e f e r e n c e = I P /
11/824&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en and http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/the-policy/countries-on-the-road-to-membership/index_en.htm
2 From a political point of view, a similar motivation for expansion of EU membership to former-Soviet 
countries is  to be found with regards to the Mediterranean enlargement, where Greece, Spain and 
Portugal had emerged in the 1970s  from dictatorships, and aimed at consolidating the renewed 
democratic regime through EU membership.
through the “post-cold war” enlargement round in 1995 and has been - at least 
formally - completed with the “Eastern” enlargement in 2004 and 20073; in 
particular, the accession of a significant number of Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs)4, alongside the smaller Cyprus and Malta, represents the most radical 
transformation in the EC (and subsequently EU) composition up to date, and 
possibly a fundamental landmark for the European Union history when globally 
considered; the Commission referred to enlargement as the “Union’s most 
successful foreign policy instrument”5.
The ex-Communist Member States, in particular, had faced a series of very 
relevant challenges with a view of accession to the Union, mainly linked to the 
transition from authoritarian regimes to pluralistic democratic frameworks, from 
centrally-planned to free-market economic systems, and with the transformation of 
a party-dictated system of industrial relations into one compatible with political 
freedom and a market economy6, which have caused loss of economic prowess of 
most CEECs, a generalized severe recession during the 90s, and a steep rise in 
unemployment levels.
Furthermore, notwithstanding their integration into international trade and 
capital flows, and the access to the EU Structural Funds in a variety of sectors, by 
the time of their accession the income levels of the new Member States were still 
low when compared to those of the EU-15 and, after an initial rise in foreign direct 
investment7,  attributable by a wide series of factors ranging from the low land 
prices and low level of business tax to the strategic geographical location and the 
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3  Under Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union, any European country may apply for 
membership if it meets a set of established political and economic criteria. In addition, the EU must 
be able to absorb new members, so the EU can decide when it is  ready to accept a new member. 
The criteria for EU membership require candidates to achieve “stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning 
market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within 
the Union; the ability to take on the obligations  of membership, including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union”.
4 10 out of 12 Countries  involved by the enlargement round in question. Although here considered as 
a whole, some relevant differences between the national situations will be further analyzed infra.
5 COM (2003) 104, March 11, 2003, p.4.
6 Weiss 2006, p. 170
7  Even before the enlargement, in the period 1995-2002, the  economic exchanges  had almost 
trebled and the FDI of EU-15 countries  towards the candidate countries had increased fourfold, on 
account of the free trade agreements signed between the EU and the would-be new members. See 
Inotai 2009, p. 94
high literacy rates in the working population, the inflows of capitals towards the 
CEECs has decreased, mainly because of the competition with strong extra-
European actors such as Russia and the rapidly-growing China and India.
The CEE states were also required to transpose all EC legislation (the so-called 
acquis communitaire) into their respective legal systems; in general, the candidate 
countries had no difficulty meeting this precondition for accession. With the help of 
external experts through the so-called “screening” process, they have largely 
succeeded in transposing EU law into their respective legal structures; however, as 
long as the institutions and actors that guarantee satisfactory implementation in 
actual practice are not available or inefficient in their action, it would be erroneous to 
assume that the mere transposition of EU law has an effective impact on the reality 
of the CEE states8, in particular in the areas that require the involvement of social 
partners and/or workers’ representatives9.
As a direct consequence of the 2004-2007 Enlargement round, the surface 
area of the EU has increased by one third, while the total population has grown by 
approximately 100 million people, roughly one quarter; this geographical expansion 
carried relevant consequences in the composition of the institutional bodies of the 
EU: both the European Parliament and the Council have widened their size and 
currently see consistent numbers of representatives and national votes assigned to 
new Member States such as Poland, Romania, Czech Republic and Hungary10; 
however, while the enlargement has always been considered a goal “in itself” by the 
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8 As already underlined by Vaughan-Whitehead 2003.
9 Such as those on working time or H&S.
10 Respectively, 50 (out of 736 EP representatives) and 27 (out of 345 votes  in the Council) for Poland 
(in both cases like Spain, and only less than Italy, Germany, France and UK), 33 and 14 for Romania 
(more than founding members  such as  Netherlands and Belgium) and 20 and 12 each for Czech 
Republic and Hungary. The average number of European Parliament representatives is  around 27, 
considering the exceptions  constituted by Germany (99 representatives), France, Italy and the UK 
(with 72 each); on the other hand in the Council the average is  around 12 national votes per MS, but 
the aforementioned countries (which maintain their positions of primacy) are only assigned 29 votes. 
The modification introduced by the Lisbon Treaty state that the European Parliament shall be 
composed of representatives  of the Union's  citizens and that there can only be 750 members, plus 
the President, bringing the maximum number up to 751 MEPs; the allocation of seats  shall follows 
the principle of degressive proportionality, with a minimum threshold of 6 members per member 
state. While no member state can have more than 96 seats, the 2009 Parliament elections took place 
under the Nice Treaty, and therefore there are currently 99 German MEPs. All of them will continue 
until the end of the 2009–2014 legislature. This  explains why the total number of MEPs until then will 
not be 751 as  laid down in the Lisbon Treaty, but 754, as  there are still 3 "Nice Treaty" German MEPs 
in Parliament. See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+IM-
PRESS+20100223BKG69359+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN
EU institutions,  and it is considered to have facilitated the spread of democratic 
values and protection of human rights and increased the EU’s global role, doubts 
and critics have been cast11 on the long-term impacts of this process on the ways of 
an effective management and governance of the Union, and on possible reforms in 
particular of decision-making procedures going beyond what has been 
accomplished with the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon12  in order to avoid 
“enlargement fatigue”, but rather to consolidate and deepen the process of 
European integration.
In particular, due to the lack of effective industrial relations structures in the 
majority of new Member States the EU was faced with the difficult task of creating 
an integrated system of industrial relations and social dialogue within the European 
Social Model, which had provided, in previous occasions, European trade unions 
with the opportunity to coordinate national responses to the changing opportunity 
and regulatory structures of which the Directives on fixed-term13  and part-time 
work14are an example. 
However, as a result of the very different industrial relations systems prevalent 
in the new Member States and in their slower response to the aforementioned 
societal, political and economic changes, the legislative aspects of the European 
social dialogue have slowly but increasingly been substituted by soft law 
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11  With particular reference to the issues  that surfaced as a consequence of the European 
Constitutional Treaty’s rejection in 2005.
12Among the latest emerging proposals, the former French President and Chairman of the European 
Convention Valèry Giscard D’Estaing has highlighted the continuing lack of the strong political 
structures  needed for governing the widened Union, and of an European public space, underlining 
the need for a Congress of the Peoples of Europe (an experience mutuated from other large and 
populous  countries such as China or the U.S.A.), and of a restructuring of the Commission, which 
should be composed by no more than 13 members chosen trough a rotation system", in order to 
revitalized the European integration process. http://www.euractiv.com/en/future-eu/giscard-europe-
needs-peoples-congress-interview-506083
13  Council Directive 99/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term 
work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP 
14  Council Directive 97/81/EC of 15 December 1997 concerning the framework agreement on part-
time work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP
mechanisms like the OMC15.
From an economic point of view, it has to be considered that several small 
Countries (and small economies) have joined the Union, and while EU’s GDP has 
only increased by 5%, the per capita GDP has in turn declined by approximately 
18%16; the enlarged Europe has came to represent the largest internal market in the 
world, accounting for more than 17% of world trade17, and more than 30% of the 
world’s GDP. However, significant gaps in wage and per capita income levels 
(around 60-70%)18 between older (EU-15)  and newer (NMS-12) Member States have 
to be highlighted; furthermore, there are continuing significant differences, in 
particular between the various CEECs, and it would be incorrect to lump them 
together, notwithstanding some common features, with respect to their responses to 
European, international and internal challenges deriving from their inclusion in the 
internal market: on one hand, Member States such as Poland, Slovakia and the 
Czech and Slovak Republics have shown greater shares of GDP deriving from 
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15  While this  instrument has the potential to increase the exchange of ideas and policies amongst 
Member States and the social partners on a trans-national level and thereby to gradually 
“europeanise” labour market and employment policies  across  the EU, the results thus far have fallen 
short of this goal. In particular, the approach of the OMC seems to rest more easily with the 
economic goals  of, inter alia, deregulation and flexibility as  favored by a majority of MS Governments. 
See Zahn 2008, p. 13, 15. infra in this paragraph (pp. 65-66) with reference to the potential for 
deregulation inherent in the application on the Treaty provisions on free movement, and in par. 2.3.2. 
with respect to the misgivings on the possibility for a EU intervention in “rebalancing” the conclusions 
adopted by the ECJ in the “Laval quartet”
16 See Weiss 2006, p. 169 and Cremers 2002, p. 29
17excluding intra-EU trade, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/5years/documents/impact/
commission_communication_5_years_enlarged_en.pdf
18 With reference to the income convergence of the CEECs with the enlarged EU average GDP per 
capita, it has  to be underlined that the reviving inflation, erosion of competitiveness, the growing 
pressure on the national currencies and the economic and financial crisis  have significantly slowed 
and in some cases  reverted (as for the case of the Baltic States, those with the highest catching up 
speed in the last years) the pre-accession process  of narrowing the development gap between EU-15 
and NMS. As highlighted, already at the “starting point” of the EU accession in 2004-07 the various 
MS presented relevant differences in this  respect, with Slovenia entering the single market at almost 
90% of the EU average, Poland, the Slovak Republic and the Baltic States  attesting between 45 and 
60%, and the late-comers Bulgaria and Romania around 40%; as  a (limited) comparison with 
previous rounds, for the case of Spain and Portugal enlargement te differential in the per capita 
income was  attested around 20-30%, almost a half with respect to countries  such as Bulgaria and 
Romania (The data derive primarily from Reuters EcoWin source). It has  also to be underlined how, in 
a way similar to the experience of some EU-15 MS, catching up on national economic level has not 
always been accompanied by narrowing of the existing regional gaps internal to the MS involved.
exports of goods and services19, high growth rates when compared with the 
EU-1520, not seldom outperforming them on a variety of indicators21, while a certain 
degree of economic cyclical volatility of some of the NMS was highlighted by the 
dramatic and far-reaching consequences of the economic and financial crisis on the 
Baltic States systems or in Member States such as Romania and Hungary22. 
Furthermore, the delivery of the pace of growth by the CEECs was based on heavy 
inflow of cheap funds, propelling of domestic consumption, continuing low level of 
national savings coupled with growing public spending, similarly to what happened 
to the Southern and Western rim Member States which joined the EU during the 70s 
and the 80s; the current economic hardships of many of these countries, raise 
therefore some relevant questions with regards to the general economic prospects 
of CEECs, since the former’s successful integration was an important evidence for 
the possibility of the latter catching up with Western Europe23.
Besides the national economic systems, the performance of different types of 
economic operators also vary greatly: in most countries, both from the EU-15 and 
NMS-12 area, the bigger transnational companies and their subcontracting 
networks can be identified as the actors which have most benefited from the 
accession to the internal market, while small- and medium-sized domestic firms, 
bound in their action by clear clear geographic, financial and logistic constraints, 
have been only able to partially exploit the opening up of a vast market, and have 
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19 The trade orientations  following the enlargement have shown not only a high degree of exchanges 
between the EU-15 and the NMS-12 Member States, but also the rapidly growing importance of 
intra-NMS trade, as well as  the use by some MS of their new membership position to increase their 
extra-EU trade, both towards neighboring countries (Russia, Ukraine, Balkans) and in the global 
market, above average.
20However, it has to be noted that accession seems to have dampened the speed of structural 
change and the political willingness to undertake fundamental reforms practically in all NMS. The 
knowledge, and maybe, even more, the feeling that a “safe harbour” had been reached, did not 
maintain the quality and speed of adjustment that characterized the pre-accession period (some 
experts try to identify a certain “accession fatigue” in several NMS). See Inotai 2009, p. 94
21 With the distinctive example of Poland, which also in the midst of the economic and financial crisis 
of 2008-09 maintained a positive rate of growth, becoming the one of the better EU performer in this 
respect.
22 See Galgóczi 2009, p. 5
23While it is clear that the existing development model will not deliver the expected results anymore, 
and there is  considerable uncertainty on what could provide a sustainable development path, it has 
however been noted that these countries did not have the time to “inflate the bubble” to similar 
proportions as  to the PIIGS and in most of the cases problems appear to be still manageable without 
major EU intervention. CEECs have all the instruments  at their disposal to avoid the fate of PIIGS, 
unless the overall European economic situation deteriorates rapidly. See Deák 2011, p. 4-5
mainly remained concentrated on cross-border trade.
In the European integration process the pursuit of the main objectives related 
to the creation and consolidation of the single market24, with the consequent 
expansion of the freedom of action (both in geographical and juridical terms) for 
economic operators, has often brought the EU institutions to reconcile diametrically 
opposite needs and demands coming from different MS, social partners, internal 
market operators, with specific regards to the subjects of economic freedoms and 
fundamental social rights, in particular when it is considered that, notwithstanding 
the explicitly stated objective of the promotion of a European social policy, on 
account of the interactions between the social policy-decision making provisions of 
the Treaty and the exclusion of certain key areas of labour law from the EU 
competences, the increased national diversities not seldom overcome the curdling 
of economic factors throughout the Union and the removal of obstacles by the MS25.
The “homemade globalization” carried out with the enlargement of the EU26 
has been carachterised by a highened mobility of undertaking and services, as well 
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24 From the very beginning of membership, all NMS considered the access to EU funds as a historical 
and unprecedented chance of socio-economic modernization. Expectations were particularly high 
from 2007 on, when the NMS became full-fledged members also from the point of view of Eu 
transfers. institutional, legal and financial preparation for successful application started everywhere, 
although at different speed (and quality). For the 2000-2006 period, these transfers  accounted for one 
third of the EU budget, or 213 billion euro; 195 billion euro were spent through the four Structural 
Funds (the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Financial 
Instrument for Fisheries Guidance and the Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund). EU transfers, however, represent one of the most important element of 
catching up but should never be considered as the most important goal or factor explaining 
accession; successful membership in the EU depends  on a number of other factors  as well, even if it 
is clear that the efficient use of Eu resources can evidently enhance the degree of success.
25 In a situation where the scope of national regulation is  limited, and given the general absence of 
harmonized labour standards, is  a central issue of concern whether the EU law allows for social 
dumping scenarios, related to the lowering of labour standards  in order to attract investment (which 
is less likely to occur, given also the specific “non-regression” clauses provided by EU legislation in 
several fields), the replacement of  high-cost producers by low-cost producers  from countries  in 
which wages, social benefits  and direct and indirect costs  entailed by protective legislation are lower, 
and exercising the possibility of business relocation to countries presenting lower labour standards 
and costs, or utilizing the threat in order to put pressure on local levels of bargaining. See Hendrickx 
2009, p. 55
26 “a laboratory of globalization in one continent”. See Dølvik 2008, p. 3
as an increased relevance of posting of workers27, which have decidedly raised the 
level of competition between the various economic actors, and the political friction 
between Governments of “sending” and “receiving” MS28; the possible clash 
between the promotion of the internal market’s economic freedoms with the labour 
law and social policy provision of the various MS became clear in the adoption 
process of the Services Directive29, ultimately issued in December 2006.
The original Bolkenstein proposal30 of 2004, emerged as part of the economic 
reform programme adopted by the Lisbon European Council in 2000 with the aim of 
making the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world; the completion of an internal market for services, through the liberalization of 
the sector and the removal of barriers hindering the expansion of service activities 
across Member States, was deemed to be a core element in the pursuit  of the 
objective of economic reform.
The basis for the issuing of such an instrument was the 2002 Commission 
report on the state of internal market for services31  in which, along with practical 
problems such as the lack of information and cultural/language problems and 
administrative constraints on the service providers the barriers hindering the 
development of the sector in question were also identified in national labour law 
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27 With respect to the two different legal forms (moving in another Member State as  an employee or 
establishing as an independent entrepreneur) in which internal market movement of persons  earning 
their living can take place. An “unintended consequence” of the restrictions on the free movement of 
workers  has been “an increase in outsourcing, temporary work and a flourishing secondary market 
for services and posted labour”. Providers of services move from one MS to another exercising their 
entitlement to freedom of establishment (ex Article 43 EC) and use independent contractors  or 
cheaper labour, in ways which undercut terms and conditions of domestic workers; this trend is 
further complicated by the actions  of service providers within EU-15 MS which create subsidiaries in 
NMS-12 so as to take advantage of reduced regulatory requirements  and lower labour standards. 
See Fitzpatrick in Dorssemont, Jaspers  & Van Hoek 2007, p. 92 and infra with specific reference to 
labour mobility and the Accession agreements.
28  It has  also to be noted that, in the wake of the enlargement processes and of the issuing of the 
“Laval quartet” rulings, trade unions have also been involved in this polarization of position, along the 
EU-15/NMS-12 divide rather than on the classical labour-management contraposition.
29 Directive 2006/123/EC of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market.
30 COM (2004) 2 final.
31 COM (2002) 441
provisions32, as in the case of posted workers33; the Bolkestein proposal, therefore, 
provided for the application of the “country of origin “principle, according to which a 
service provider is subject only to the law of the country in which he is established 
and Member States may not restrict services from a provider established in another 
Member State34, and that, in the case of posting of workers in the context of the 
provision of services, the allocation of tasks between the Member State of origin 
and the Member State of destination and the supervision procedures applicable.
Perceived as paving the way for social dumping35, potentially leading to the 
lowering of social standards across Member States and to the demise of the 
European Social Model, the proposal was opposed by trade union and various MS, 
and both the European Parliament version and the 2006 McCreevy draft were 
rendered “labour law neutral” as possible: the provisions of the Services Directive 
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32  The term "legal barriers" covers  all obstacles to the development of service activities between 
Member States deriving directly or indirectly from a legal constraint and which are liable to prohibit, 
impede or otherwise render less  advantageous such activities. Such barriers also stem from 
difficulties caused by divergent national regulations, as well as from problems relating to the behavior 
of national authorities, or from the legal uncertainty caused by the complexity of some cross-border 
situations. COM (2002) 441, § I.A.
33  The application to posted workers  of the host country's labour-law provisions, without account 
being taken of the obligations  and charges already met by the employer in the country of 
establishment, could lead to amounts  being levied twice and to additional administrative costs  and 
burdens  having to be borne by service providers from other Member States. Such cases of 
duplication, notably as  regards  the minimum wage or paid leave could have particularly restrictive 
effects in the case of short-term service provision and with regard to SMEs and service providers 
established in border areas who would like to post workers  to several Member States on a regular 
basis in order to provide their services there. Ibid., p. 23
34 This principle is accompanied by derogations which are either general, or temporary or which may 
be applied on a case-by-case basis; a number of derogations  from the country of origin principle that 
are directly linked to the specific characteristics  of certain activities, or necessary in order to take 
account of differences in the level of protection of the general interest in certain fields, the extent of 
Community-level harmonization, the degree of administrative cooperation, or certain Community 
instruments. COM (2002) 2 final, § 3.a-b
35  Defined as the “climax of neoliberal market logic”. See Barnard in De Vos  2009, p. 30 and 
Baumann 2009, p. 20.
provided an exclusion for labour law36 and fundamental rights37, through a technique 
similar to the one used by the ECJ in Albany38, and aimed at avoiding competition 
between Member States on the basis of labour law standards and preserving the 
national labour law and social policy frameworks from the impact of the “legal 
mechanics”39  of the DSIM and, in general, of the application of the European free 
market principles.
For what it refers to labour mobility, it has to be underlined that since its 
inception, the European Union has provided a structured framework in which 
transnational migration  can occur, mainly through the provisions of the European 
Community Treaty establishing the right of free movement of persons; these 
provisions grant individuals both the right to move and the right to claim certain 
welfare benefits in the host state on the same terms as nationals40. 
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36 The failry wide wording used, in absence of a Community definition of labour law, provides that the 
“Directive does not affect labour law, that is any legal or contractual provision concerning 
employment conditions, working conditions, including health and safety at work and the relationship 
between employers and workers, which Member States apply in accordance with national law which 
respects Community law. Equally, this  Directive does not affect the social security legislation of the 
Member States”. DSIM art. 1.6. Further specification is found in rec. 14, stating that the DSIM does 
not “affect terms and conditions of employment [...], nor [...] Member States' social security 
legislation”.
37  “This  Directive does not affect the exercise of fundamental rights  as recognized in the Member 
States  and by Community law. Nor does  it affect the right to negotiate, conclude and enforce 
collective agreements and to take industrial action in accordance with national law and practices 
which respect Community law”. DSIM art. 1.7. With specific regards  to the right to collective action, 
further guidance is provided by the aforementioned recital 14, making specific reference to the 
“relations between social partners, including the right to negotiate and conclude collective 
agreements, the right to strike and to take industrial action in accordance with national law and 
practices which respect Community law”.
38In which the nature and purpose of the collective agreement establishing a supplementary pension 
scheme were deemed by the ECJ as  falling outside the scope of Article 81. A similar conclusion was 
reached in Van der Woude v. Stichting Beatrixoord; a collective agreement establishing a health care 
insurance scheme was found as contributing to improving the working conditions  of employees (by 
reducing costs and ensuring the means to meet medical expenses), and therefore excluded from the 
application of art. 81.1. See supra §1.2.4 and Barnard in De Vos 2009, p. 29
39 See Hendrickx 2009, p. 65
40  Although the original EEC Treaty granted free moment rights not to persons but to individuals 
which had to hold the nationality of one of the MS (a matter for national law) and be economically 
active either as a worker under Article 39.1, or as a self-employed person under Article 43. 
Article 39, in particular, provided that the right of free movement for workers included freedom from 
discrimination based on nationality between workers of the MS, the respect of employment, 
remuneration and other conditions  of work and employment, and comprised the right to accept offers 
of employment actually made; to move freely within the territory of the member states  for this 
purpose; to stay in the member state for the purpose of the employment, and to remain in the 
member state after having been employed, and can be subject to derogations on the grounds of 
public policy, public security and public health. See Barnard 2006, p. 225
However, with specific reference to the enlargement process, transitional 
arrangements were agreed upon in the Accession Treaty of 2003, allowing for limited 
derogations to the free movement provision in the post-enlargement phase41, 
through the application of the “country of employment principle”; therefore, while 
official rhetoric during the pre-accession phase stated that free movement was an 
entitlement of fundamental importance that, especially for citizens from behind the 
former Iron Curtain, should be heeded from “day one”42, circulation of labour was 
granted only by some of the EU-15 Member States at the moment of accession (UK, 
Ireland and Sweden) while the others maintained restrictions for access to their 
territory, mainly by applying a work permit regime, sometimes combined with 
quotas43. 
Due to low inflows of foreign workers, rises in bogus service mobility and 
distortions of competition, several Member States, included Italy, chose to repeal 
their TAs before the transitional period had expired, opening their labour markets as 
early as 200644 and paving the way for a fairly swift transition to free movement for 
workers from NMS; furthermore, rising concern about the future supply of human 
capital and growing competition over skilled labor led both old and new member 
states to rethink their options and develop strategies to attract more labor 
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41  Furthermore,the NMS had also to accept important restrictions  with reference to agricultural 
structural fund (direct payments for farmers started at a fraction of the amount provided to EU-15 
farmers, progressively closing the gap in an annual process lasting until 2013). Participation in the EU 
budget became a reality as of January 2007, when the new seven-year financial framework of the 
European integration entered into force; during the first 32 months  of membership all NMS had only 
accessed the pre-accession fund, a fraction of the money they became entitled to as of 2007.
Furthermore, the Schengen requirements  had to be fulfilled (in a three-and-a-half-year process of 
adjustment) and the compliance of the conditions for membership in the European Monetary Union 
and for the eventual introduction of the common currency had to be ensured.
42 See Dølvik 2008, p. 4
43  The derogation was  shaped in the so-called ‘2+3+2’ formula, i.e. old member states were 
permitted to restrict the principles of internal market with regard to labour following a three-stage 
pattern: (1) from May 1, 2004 until April 30, 2006; (2) from May 1, 2006 until April 30, 2009 and, finally, 
(3) from May 1, 2009 until April 30, 2011; upon accession of Bulgaria and Romania the model of 
graduality has now shifted to ‘1+2+1’ formula. The third derogation is the most serious  one since in 
order to justify itself it requires evidence of ‘serious  disturbances’ or a ‘threat of serious  disturbances’ 
for labour market (the so-called ‘standstill clause’). Moreover, those MS within EU-15 who already 
opened their markets  could still invoke another provision (the so-called ‘safeguard clause’) which 
permits  them to impose restrictions up until the ultimate terms if there is  an evident threat of serious 
disturbances  in their labour markets. In particular, this provision is especially interesting in the light of 
Laval the threat for the standard of living or the level of employment in a given region or occupation 
was the argumentation Leitmotif of the Swedish government. See Belavusau 2008, p. 2294
44 Finland, Greece, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, followed in 2009 by Denmark and France.
immigration 45 . At the time of writing, there are no longer any special restrictions on 
the free movement of citizens of these NMS, since the transitional period irrevocably 
came to a end on 30 April 2011.
In this context, it has also to be put particular attention to the increased 
relevance of posting as the most important factor of labour mobility in the enlarged 
EU; the main difference between the legal forms and consequent applicable 
discipline is based on the potential access of the trans-national worker to the labour 
market of the hosting Member State46. With regards to the applicable EU law, ever 
since Rush Portuguesa, it is without doubt that the posting of workers of a company 
established in one EU country is a trans-national service to which Art. 49 EC is 
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45 It was also suggested that migration was a “win-win” game contributing to growth, brain-gain and 
brain-circulation, and - although somewhat in contradiction with the previous assertion - that 
migration, in view of the generally low mobility in the EU and limited net flows during the former 
Southern enlargement in the 1980s, most likely would be modest anyway. See Dølvik 2008, p. 4
46 In particular, “where there is a temporary movement of workers  who are sent to another Member 
State [...] as  part of a provision of services by their employer. In fact, such workers return to their 
country of origin after the completion of their work without at any time gaining access  to the labour 
market of the host Member State.” Case C-113/89, Rush Portuguesa Ldª v Office national 
d'immigration, par. 15
applicable47; in the context of the EU enlargement this has meant that, since free 
movement of services was fully granted immediately after the accession of the 
NMS-12, an increase in the flow of worker mobility via Article 49 EC has been 
expected as well as favored.
The gradual attraction of the regulation of the employment relationship in the 
area of the intra-Eu regulatory competition derives from the fundamental distinction 
between mobility towards  the employment48  and mobility within the employment 
relationship49 which, after its inclusion in the acquis communitaire, provides that the 
starting point for the regulation of posting, even if the requirements aiming at 
protection of the posted workers are not obliterated, is given by the economic 
interest of the service provider of carrying out its transnational activity without 
unjustified obstacles.
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47 See Reich 2008, p. 8. The complex and decisive “hiving off” of art. 39 EC from the hypothesis of 
“indirect” worker mobility in the context of a trans-national provision of services  was realized in two 
following steps. The first is evidently realized by Rush Portuguesa, which follows the Webb and Seco 
rulings, in which the ECJ had already classified the posting of workers as  a service, and affirmed that 
in this  context the principle of non-discrimination does  not imply that “all national legislation 
applicable to nationals  of that State and usually applied  to the permanent activities  of undertakings 
established therein may be similarly applied in its entireity to the temporary activities of undertakings 
which are established in other Member State” (Case  279/80, Criminal proceedings  against Alfred 
John Webb, par. 16); in Rush Portuguesa, the ECJ on one hand clarifies  that the posted workers 
follow their employer carrying its  transnational service activity, on the other underlines how 
Community law does not “preclude Member States from extending their legislation, or collective 
labour agreements entered into by both sides of industry, to any person who is  employed, even 
temporarily, within their territory, no matter in which country the employer is established; nor does 
Community law prohibit Member States from enforcing those rules by appropriate means” (par. 18).
The context in which the PWD was approved is also characterized by a more general principle related 
to the application of art. 49 EC; it was affirmed by the ECJ in Säger (C-76/90, Manfred Säger v 
Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd), that art. 49, in fact, does not only prohibit direct or indirect discriminations 
against the service providers, but requires also “the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies 
without distinction to national providers  of services and to those of other Member States, when it is 
liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the activities  of a provider of services established in another 
Member State where he lawfully provides similar services” (par.12). Through this  judgement the ECJ 
abandoned the “same conditions” found in article 50.3 EC and held that all restrictions  had to be 
abolished, and removed the need to classify the measures  as discriminatory in order to establish that 
the measure was  non-compatible with the Treaty. The “not only” of the formulation indicates  that the 
expansion of the concept of restriction did not include an abandonment of the prohibition of 
discrimination. In this perspective, however, the ECJ can therefore adjudicate on virtually every single 
piece of national legislation potentially interfering with the freedom recognized by art. 49 EC, with a 
view of an effective realization of a internal market for services requires. See Carabelli 2006, pp. 
25-31, Giubboni 2008, p. 16 and Sjödin 2009, p. 29
48 The genetic core of the pursuit of occupation is  embraced by the legal matrix of free movement of 
persons. See Belavusau 2008, p. 2283
49 “forme di mobilità  rispettivamente verso l’impiego (le sole a rimanere inquadrate nell’art. 39 Tratt. 
CE) ed all’interno dell’impiego (fatalmente attratte, invece, nell’orbita dell’art. 49 del Trattato)” See 
Giubboni 2008, p. 15
The issue of posting of workers was, as noted, a long discussed item in the 
European debate, and the Posting of Workers Directive50, an integral part of the 
European Commission Action programme linked to the CCFRW, was meant to 
establish a clear legal frame for posting activities, providing legal certainty as to 
which areas of the host MS labour law would apply, and to guarantee the position 
and the condition of the posted workers. 
This objective was pursued through close interaction and dependence 
between economic and social factors, promoting the recourse to this transnational 
instrument while respecting fair competition and providing measures guaranteeing 
the rights of workers51, on the basis of the the regulation provided by previous ECJ 
case-law52, which already did not preclude Member States from extending their 
legislation, or collective labour agreements entered into by both sides of industry, to 
any person who is employed, even temporarily, within their territory, on condition 
that EC Treaty rules, and in particular Article 49 EC, are complied with.
The main amendment achieved through the PWD was represented by the 
obligation for the host Member States to ensure a “nucleus of mandatory rules for 
minimum protection” for posted workers, transforming what earlier was a simple 
freedom for the Member States into an obligation under EU law53; the Preamble of 
the Directive characterized the structure of Article 3.1 PWD as a “hard core” of 
protective rules, to be observed regardless of the duration of the posting, defined by 
law or generally applicable collective agreements and concerning specific terms and 
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50 Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services.
51 PWD, recitals 3-5
52  The aforementioned Cases  279/80 Webb, 61-62/81 Seco, C-113/89 Rush Portuguesa, but also 
C-43/93 Vander Elst, C-55/94, Gebhard, in which the ECJ stated that extending national labour law 
could be a restriction of the free movement of services, which could be justified in accordance with 
the so called Gebhard-formula, relating to all the four freedoms: a restriction could be accepted only 
if justified (by overriding reasons of public interest) and proportional (that is, suitable for securing the 
attainment of the objective pursued and not going beyond what is  necessary in order to attain it), and 
C-369/96 and C-376/96 Arblade.
53 Hellsten 2007, p. 50
conditions of employment54. It is also appropriate to note that art. 3.7 provides that 
the rules laid down do not prevent the application of terms and conditions of 
employment which are more favorable to workers, and that Member States may 
impose other provisions on foreign service-providers only for the case of public 
policy provisions, ensuring at the same time compliance with the Treaty55.
The main implication deriving from the analysis of these recital and articles, as 
well as from the labour law “neutrality” option carried out in the DSIM, would be that 
the PWD was not simply thought as a normative item linked to the economic goal of 
facilitating the provision of services, and should be considered as a minimum labour 
law directive, rather than an instrument exhaustively coordinating the measures that 
the Member States are allowed to adopt in the context of posting56.
As it was later testified by the judicial course undertaken by the ECJ in Viking 
and Laval, the issue of the exercise of the right to strike is deeply connected with the 
application of the PWD, notwithstanding the Preamble stating explicitly that “this 
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54In particular, art. 3.1 lists: (a) maximum work periods and minimum rest periods; (b) minimum paid 
annual holidays; (c) the minimum rates of pay, including overtime rates; this point does not apply to 
supplementary occupational retirement pension schemes; (d) the conditions  of hiring-out of workers, 
in particular the supply of workers by temporary employment undertakings; (e) health, safety and 
hygiene at work; (f) protective measures with regard to the terms and conditions of employment of 
pregnant women or women who have recently given birth, of children and of young people; (g) 
equality of treatment between men and women and other provisions  on non-discrimination. Article 
3.1 also specifies that the concept of minimum rates of pay remains  defined by the national law and/
or practice of the Member State to whose territory the worker is posted.
55 PWD, Article 3.10. Apart from the indications  coming from the ECJ, particularly in Commission v 
Luxembourg (see infra), as  early of 2003, the Commission, in its  Communication on the 
implementation of the PWD, specified the nature of the standards applicable concerning matters 
other than those explicitly referred to in article 3.1; the Commission considered that the first indent of 
Article 3.10 has to be interpreted bearing in mind the objective of facilitating the free movement of 
services  within the Community. Member States  are not free to impose all their mandatory labour law 
provisions  on service providers established in another Member State. They must comply with the 
rules of the EC Treaty, and in particular Article 49 EC, as interpreted by the ECJ in particular in the the 
Portugaia Construções  (C-164/99) and Mazzoleni (165/98) judgments. Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions - The implementation of Directive 96/71/EC in the Member States, COM/
2003/0458 final, par. 4.1.2.2. It is  appropriate to underline that, already in this  early stage (on the eve 
of the Eastern enlargement), the references to the Community Charter of Fundamental Rights  of 
Workers  and to the joint promotion of the economic and social dimension of the Union had given foot 
to a definite neo-liberal attitude favorable to the liberalization of services and to the abolition of 
restrictions, granting precedence to the economic dimension and to the activities  of the service 
providers across Europe in the interpretation of the Treaty.
56  Of course, for what it refers to its legal base, the PWD was adopted with reference to EU 
competence in the field of free movement of services, mainly in order to circumvent the demanding 
unanimous agreement in the Council and the opposition of Poland and UK.
Directive is without prejudice to the law of the Member States concerning collective 
action to defend the interests of trades and professions”57. 
The PWD, in fact, operates on three types of collective agreements on the 
basis of art. 3.8: 
a) those declared to be of universal application (erga omnes);
b) those generally applicable to all similar undertakings in the geographical 
area and in the profession or industry concerned58,
c) those concluded by the most representative employers' and labour 
organizations at national level which are applied throughout the national 
territory59.
Each of these three types of agreement, as well as the ones signed at 
undertaking level, may raise the question about the possible relation between the 
exercise of the right to strike, for the negotiation for the reaching of a collective 
agreement or during its application, in the context of a posting situation, where the 
regulatory item involved, i.e the PWD, applies as an elaborating instrument in the 
legal framework of the Treaty60.
The main questions, therefore, relate to the possibility for Article 49 and 50 EC 
of having horizontal direct effect, and being relied upon for the case of industrial 
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57 PWD, recital 22. It should be noted that the inclusion of this  provision in the Preamble of the PWD 
was generated especially by the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. With specific 
regard to Sweden, this provision was  directly linked also to the labour market Declaration attached to 
the Accession Act and it was  intended to safeguard – in the form of assurances  given by the 
Commission – “the Swedish practice in labour market matters  and notably the system of determining 
conditions of work in collective agreements between the social partners” (Declaration No. 46  by the 
Kingdom of Sweden on social policy, annexed to the Accession Act of Austria, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden, OJ C241, 29.8.1994). This was fundamental in gaining the general public’s  support for the 
accession. See Hellesten 2007, p. 80
58 This kind of national agreements  was  intended to cover the Nordic MS situation of a de facto erga 
omnes  efficacy of the collective agreements concerned, due to the high degree of organization in 
those countries, complemented with separate company level agreements concluded by the national 
trade unions  or their local constituents with the non-organized employer, whether domestic or 
posting workers from another Member States. See
59  the latter types (b and c) of collective agreements  are secondary and also subject to additional 
provisions  on equal treatment between domestic and foreign undertakings. It has to be noted that the 
report by the Commission on implementation of the Directive in 2003 defined the question of the 
applicability of collective agreements is  particularly important, since wages  are “chiefly determined by 
collective bargaining”. While most MS’ legislations, provide for the application or extension of 
universally applicable collective agreements to posted workers, some national legal frameworks  do 
not allow for universally applicable collective agreements; consequently, the only rules that these 
States  apply to posted workers  are those contained in the law or in other legislative texts. See also 
Bercusson 2008b, p. 52
60 Particularly of article 49 and 50 EC.
action between private parties, and, secondly, to the compatibility of national strike 
rules with the Treaty, in particular when it is considered that, on the basis of the 
diversities in the transposition of the PWD in the various legal frameworks, various 
national law allow for the collective defence of actual wages or wage level through 
industrial action.
On the other hand it has to be considered that PWD Directive, rather naturally 
allows relevant pressure to lower actual wages, which often and sometimes even 
widely exceed the compulsory provisions in several Member States61; in the context 
of EU enlargement, the gap in wages and costs between the EU-15 and NMS-12 
highlighted the importance of the extension drawn by the ECJ as early as 1982 with 
Seco, and ultimately confirmed also in Vander Elst and Arblade62: posting of workers 
in the European Union should not be based on low-cost competition but on a 
reasonable compromise between the interests of workers and employers, of which 
the PWD should be the enforcement means.
It appeared therefore evident, from the several possible alternative approaches 
in the definition of the potential contrast between the exercise of the right to strike 
and the provision of services63, and from its increasing application of the market 
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61  Furthermore, the PWD leaves untouched the possibility for the Member States to utilize a 
competitive advantage in social security costs.
62 That is to say, in posting situations involving Member States  (Belgium and France) with essentially 
similar level of wages and other labour costs. In particular, in Arblade the ECJ underlined how, “even 
if there is no harmonization in the field, the freedom to provide services, as  one of the fundamental 
principles of the Treaty, may be restricted only by rules justified by overriding requirements  relating to 
the public interest and applicable to all persons and undertakings  operating in the territory of the 
State where the service is  provided, in so far as  that interest is not safeguarded by the rules to which 
the provider of such a service is  subject in the Member State where he is  established” (paragraph 34). 
Beside the overriding requirements related to the public interest, and the prohibition for duplication of 
the same for the case of equivalence with the country of origin legislation, the Court also defined the 
proportionality test, stating that the “application of national rules to providers of services established 
in other Member States must be appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective which they 
pursue and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.” (paragraph 35). Labour law, 
therefore, does not escape the overall justification test applicable under Article 49. 
63  Among the alternative hypotheses to be underlined are “strike exclusion” on the basis  of EU 
competences, an Albany-style immunity, a ‘fundamental rights’ exclusion, a public policy defense, 
and a justification by convergence of the doctrines on restrictions on services  (Arblade-test) and 
fundamental rights.
access approach to posting of workers cases64, the role of the ECJ as a 
fundamentally central actor65  in the development of the whole framework of rules 
and guarantees for workers, with a view of reconstructing a more mature European 
labour law in the face of increasing cross-border economic and trading relations, 
globalisation and the Europeanization of markets66, but also in the governance of the 
more clearly economic processes related to the renewed economic structure of the 
enlarged EU and the changing trends in labour mobility, in order to respond to the 
need of a fair balance between the social protection instances coming primarily from 
older MS and trade unions’ side, and the request for access and integration in the 
single market coming from the newer EU Members and economic operators.
	 2.2 - Analysis of the rulings
The rulings of the “Laval quartet” by the ECJ cover very different matters such 
as the possible limitations of right to strike and to undertake collective bargaining by 
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64 For example in Mazzoleni, the ECJ stated that the Belgian law breached article 49 by subjecting 
service providers to all conditions required for establishment, depriving the provision on services  of 
practical effectiveness. It however said that the requirement to pay the host MS’ minimum wage 
could be justified on ground of worker protection, although it concluded by suggesting that the 
application of Belgian rules might be disproportionate. The “national authorities of that State must, 
before applying them [...], consider whether the application of those rules is  necessary and 
proportionate for the purpose of protecting the workers  concerned”. Case C-165/98, Criminal 
proceedings against André Mazzoleni and Inter Surveillance Assistance SARL, par. 34-36. See 
Belavasau 2008, p. 2289 and also Barnard in De Vos 2009, p. 35-36
65 The European Court of Justice is, with reference to several fundamental right and to highly salient 
policy areas, a major centre of policymaking. Its  institutional mission comprises not only an 
interpretative role, but also a more “political” balancing and promotional role in the framework of EU 
institutions: this role is highlighted in the case of the clash between fundamental social rights  (among 
which particular relevance have the “new” labour rights) and the economic freedoms, linked to the 
defense of the original mercantile logic of the Community. In this sense, since 1989 the “compatibility 
strategy” elaborated by the ECJ provided that the fundamental rights  are not absolute, but must be 
considered in relation to their social function. Restrictions  may be imposed on the exercise of those 
rights, in particular in the context of a common organization of a market, provided that those 
restrictions in fact correspond to objectives  of general interest pursued by the Community and do not 
constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing 
the very substance of those rights  (Case 5/88 Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und 
Forstwirtschaft, par. 18). Its peculiar positioning in the EU institutional framework, furthermore. raises 
relevant normative questions and issues; especially from from a democratic point of view, the Court’s 
influence on policy-making is indeed problematic. See infra par. 4.1.1, and in particular Scharpf 2009, 
but also Veneziani 2008, p.3
66 See Blanke 2007
trade unions, the direct horizontal effect of articles 43 and 49 EC, in particular when 
applied to the PWD, and the balance of public policies with the economic freedoms 
established in the Treaty. However, what was unavoidably center stage67  in the 
circumstances of the four cases considered were the actual features of the EU 
enlargement in terms of differences in wage costs and labour standards between 
older and newer Member States, and of the marked divide between “competition-
friendly” NMS-12, favoring market access and opening, and the Nordic and 
continental social States, keen in protecting their advanced labour and welfare 
framework. 
The judicial course eventually undertaken by the ECJ in such cases would 
have also represented a fundamental test in evaluating the ECJ’s commitment in the 
promotion of fundamental rights, on whose respect the development of the 
Community should be based, at least when the solemn proclamations of the 2000s 
and their undergoing constitutionalization are considered, when confronted with the 
free movement provisions which had always maintained a very high status in the EU 
law because of their historical importance in the creation and consolidation of the 
internal market and had seen their centrality reconfirmed in the first years of the 
further “market building” stage consequent to the Eastern enlargement.
It can be affirmed that the often tortuous reasonings by the ECJ and its 
marked attitude in promoting market freedoms to the detriment of the protection of 
social interests have produced a series of rulings which not only can be questioned 
in their more technical aspects, but which also represent fundamentally a failure by 
the Court in striking an appropriate and impartial balance between the fundamental 
rights and economic freedoms, a setback in the progress of its instrumental role in 
the development of the Community, which it had held since the 1960s, and the 
creation of regulative frameworks prone to deeply affect workers’ rights in various 
Member States as well as solidarity at European level, and capable of putting in 
jeopardy the very process of European integration.
As a methodological note, the facts of the cases, the Opinions by the 
Advocate Generals and the Court‘s findings in the four main ECJ judgments will be 
analized singularly, and the connection points as well as discrepancies, in particular 
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67 Bercusson 2007b, p. 305
between the two rulings on the trade union rights to collective bargaining and action 
will be highlighted. Also the main doctrinal findings and critical responses with 
reference to the various items tackled by the rulings will be set out, while a more 
comprehensive overlook on the judicial course will characterize the analysis of its 
consequences in the various national systems involved as well as in domestic 
disputes and the responses proposed in the next chapters.
2.2.1 – Viking68
The setting of the Viking case was deceptively simple, in so far it concerned a 
collective action against the reflagging of a vessel from Finland to Estonia.
Viking Line Abp, a shipping company incorporated under Finnish law, owned 
and operated seven vessels, including the passenger and cargo ferry Rosella, 
registered under the Finnish flag, which traded on the route between Tallinn and 
Helsinki; the crew of the vessel was predominantly Finnish, and it s members were 
covered by a collective agreement negotiated by the Finnish Seamen’s Union (FSU). 
In 2003, Viking decided to re-flag the Rosella to Estonia69, which would allow 
the company to replace the existing, predominantly Finnish, crew with Estonian 
seafarers(while however retaining some Finnish key workers onboard) and therefore 
be able to negotiate lower terms and conditions of employment in order to better 
compete with other operators70  on the Helsinki-Tallinn route; the decision of the 
transfer of Rosella to a foreign ship register was notified to the FSU and to the crew 
of the Rosella, raising concerns on possible collective redundancies linked to the 
operation, and on its potential clashing with the long-standing and well-known Flag 
of Convenience Campaign (FOC) carried by the International Transport Federation 
(ITF), which is precisely directed at establishing a genuine link between the flag of 
the ship and the nationality of the owner and against the use of flags which do not 
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68  C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finish Seamen’s  Union c. Viking Line ABP, 
Viking Line Eesti, in Racc., p. I-10779
69 or Norway, see Dorssemont in De Vos 2009, pp. 68-69
70 Mainly Estonian-flagged.
correspond to the State where the beneficial ownership and the control over the 
vessel are situated71, typically in order to benefit from lower labour standards 72.
On the basis of the FOC policy, affiliates to the ITF agree that the wages and 
conditions of employment of seafarers should be negotiated with the affiliate in the 
country where the ship is ultimately beneficially owned; being affiliated to ITF, the 
Finnish FSU, would keep the negotiation rights for the Rosella even in the event of a 
re-flagging.
In support of the FSU, on 6 November 2003 the ITF issued a circular to its 
affiliates organizing Seafarers, Inspectors and Coordinators, not to conclude a 
collective agreement with the subsidiary of the beneficial owner73.
The negotiations between Viking and the FSU for a new collective agreement 
for the Rosella were unsuccessful and on 17 November 2003 the FSU gave notice 
that it intended to commence industrial action measures in relation to the Rosella on 
80
71 Often with little or no maritime heritage. It is to be noted that change of register and reflagging of a 
vessel are “abstract” forms of delocalization, and can occur over the course of as  little as 24 hours. 
See Chaumette 2008, p. 9
72 The flags of convenience campaign is perhaps a unique example of international labour solidarity 
in action. It was  formally launched at the 1948 World Congress  in Oslo (therefore pre-dating the 
functioning of the distinct economic region constituted by the European Community), and is 
constituted by two main elements: a political campaign designed to establish by international 
governmental agreement a genuine link between the flag a ship flies and the nationality or residence 
of its owners, managers  and seafarers, and so eliminate the flag of convenience system entirely, and, 
more importantly for the case at hand, an industrial campaign designed to ensure that seafarers who 
serve on flag of convenience ships, whatever their nationality, are protected from exploitation by 
shipowners. The policies developed by the ITF in the following years  in order to protect and enhance 
the conditions of seafarers  (in particular in the 70s  which saw an acceleration of shift to FOCs and the 
increased supply of seafarers from developing countries) form the basis  of the Standard Collective 
Agreement which is normally the only one available to shipowners  running into industrial action; while 
the political campaign has not so far succeeded in preventing a constant growth in ships using FOC 
registers, according to ITF estimates, about a quarter of FOC vessels  (nearly 5,000) are covered by 
standard agreements. Compliance is monitored by a global network of part-time and full-time 
inspectors; ITF’s membership consists of approximately 624 trade unions in more than 142 countries. 
See amplius  Chaumette 2008, Fitzpatrick in  Dorssemont, Jaspers & Van Hoek 2007, pp. 85-92. and 
http://www.itfglobal.org/flags-convenience/index.cfm. See infra on the possible negative 
consequences of the interplay between EU enlargement, re-flagging and ECJ judicial course on the 
ITF’s activities: the establishment of free movement within EU apparently renders very likely situations 
in which actual ownership, MS of establishment, prevalent nationality of the workforce and country of 
operation may differ significantly, with relevant consequences in terms of the working and 
employment conditions applied.
73 Therefore, the “collective action” of the affiliates  called for by the ITF boils down to a co-ordinated 
exercise of the freedom not to engage in a process of collective bargaining. See Dorssemont in De 
Vos 2009, p. 68
2 December 200374 since, having expired the  manning agreement, it was no longer 
under an obligation of industrial peace75.
After having commenced proceedings in the Finnish District Court seeking an 
urgent interim injunction against the FSU’s industrial action against the Rosella, and 
another round of negotiations before the National Conciliator, on 2 December 2003, 
in accordance with the terms of a settlement agreement, the parties entered into a 
revised manning agreement for the Rosella, with Viking putting an end to the dispute 
by fundamentally accepting the trade union’s demands76; the reflagging was 
therefore suspended and the FSU decided to withdraw the call to strike, before any 
action had effectively taken place77.
However, anticipating that a renewed attempt to reflag the Rosella would 
have entailed once more collective action from the ITF and the FSU78, on 18th 
August 2004, shortly after the accession of Estonia to the EU79, Viking brought an 
action before the High Court of Justice of England and Wales, Queen’s Bench 
Division (Commercial Court), requesting it to declare that the action taken by ITF and 
FSU in preventing the pursued re-flagging of the Rosella was contrary to Article 43 
81
74  Right to strike is  protected by Article 13 of the Finnish Constitution as a fundamental right in 
Finnish law, which has long since regarded the right to take industrial action as  an inseparable part of 
the freedom of association. Therefore, it was common ground between the parties, and accepted by 
the judge, that the FSU had a right under Article 13 of the Finnish Constitution to take strike action in 
the circumstances of the dispute, in particular to protect its members’ jobs  and in respect of vessels 
operating from Finnish ports  to enforce a collective bargaining agreement to improve the terms and 
conditions of the new crew.
75 In accordance with the Finnish Act on Mediation in Labour Disputes. It should be noted that on the 
same date Viking commenced proceedings before the Finnish Labour Court seeking a declaration 
that the then existing manning agreement covering the Rosella remained in force after 18 November 
2003, even if no new agreement had been reached before then.
76 Viking Line conceded the 8 extra crew members requested by FSU and agreed not to commence 
reflagging before 28 February 2005. It also agreed to discontinue the proceedings before the Labour 
Court (extension of validity of collective agreement) and the District Court (interim injunction).
77 However, in line with the FOC campaign, the ITF refused to withdraw the circular; because of that 
the ITF request to affiliated unions  from the ITF not to negotiate with Viking in relation to the Rosella 
remained in effect while, on the other hand Viking still planned to reflag the vessel to Estonia after the 
expiry of the new manning agreement on 28 February 2005.
78 Viking, AG’s Opinion, par. 11
79 Which notoriously occurred in May 2004. While the action was pending, the manning agreement 
for the Rosella was renewed until February 2008. As  a consequence, the date of 28 February 2005 
ceased to be of critical importance, but the Rosella continued to operate at a loss, as a result of 
working conditions that were less favourable for Viking Line than Estonian working conditions. Ibid.
EC, to order the withdrawal of the ITF circular and to order FSU not to infringe the 
rights which Viking enjoys under Community law80.
By decision of 16th June 2005, High Court (of London), Queen’s Bench 
Division, Commercial Court granted the order sought by Viking Line, issuing an 
injunction against any industrial action, even against the defendants causing such 
an action by other trade unions, related to wages applicable to seamen after the re-
flagging of MS Rosella in Estonia81, on the grounds that the collective action by the 
ITF and FSU imposed restrictions on freedom of establishment contrary to Article 43 
EC and, alternatively, constituted unlawful restrictions on freedom of movement for 
workers and freedom to provide services under Articles 39 EC and 49 EC. 
Both ITF and FSU were to refrain from taking any action to prevent the re-
flagging and ITF was further required to publish a notice withdrawing its letter to its 
affiliated trade unions82; furthermore, the injunction was customarily equipped with a 
penal notice against possible contempt of Court, and further strengthened by a 
threatened sequestration of the defendants’ assets. 
On 30 June 2005 the two trade unions brought an appeal against that 
decision of the High Court; in this occasion, Viking’s Estonian subsidiary, Viking Line 
Eesti OÜ, joined the proceedings and claimed to reconfirm the injunction by invoking 
its freedom to engage in the provision of maritime transport services between 
Estonia and Finland under Regulation 4055/86/EEC.
The Court of Appeal found that the case raised serious issues of European 
law, mainly referring to the uncertainties on the applicability of Article 43 to unions 
and, in case of breach, whether the unions’ actions83 amounted to direct or indirect 
82
80 While at first sight surprising, Viking was  able to start proceedings in England because the ITF has 
its secretariat in London and is  therefore domiciled in the UK. The jurisdiction, in fact, was clearly 
established pursuant to the Brussels  Regulation (Reg. 44/2001, artt. 2 and 6.1), which allows  the 
claimant to choose where to litigate (the possible choice, obviously, was between England and 
Finland). See Davies 2006, Pallini 2008 and Ewing in Dorssemont, Jaspers  & Van Hoek 2007, pp. 218 
ff.
81 Decision [2005] EWHC 1222 (Comm) of the High Court
82  It should be noted that the Commercial Court in its decision substantially ignored the maritime 
services  rules  laid out by EC law and ECJ rulings and based its judgment on the sole article 43 EC. 
See amplius Hellsten 2007, p. 215
83 Which, for the case of FSU, was confirmed as lawful under national law by the Court of Appeal, “by 
virtue of the right to freedom of association protected by Article 13 of the Finnish constitution”; par. 
26 i) of the judgement
discrimination and could be justified; therefore it determined that the case should be 
referred to the ECJ84.
The reference from the English Court of Appeal of 3 November 200585 
contained ten highly significant and technically complex questions to the ECJ86 
regarding the extent to which unions are able to use industrial action to resist social 
dumping87 in the EU; the ECJ was asked to decide on the applicability of article 43 
83
84 Two more aspects  were addressed by the Court of Appeal. In primis, the trade unions had argued 
before the High Court that the international law principle of comity— that one state does  not pass 
judgment on the activities of another state—would be infringed if the case was heard in England. This 
argument was  rejected on the basis  of the recognition by Finnish law of the legitimacy to restrict the 
right to strike in order to comply with Community law. The English courts would, therefore, not 
interpret Finnish law but would only be ruling on Community law. The Court of Appeal agreed with 
this  reasoning on the comity point; however,  the desirability of involving the Finnish government in 
the proceedings  was a significant factor in the Court’s  decision to make a reference to the ECJ. The 
second issue is  the one of the interim relief sought by Viking because of the probable length of the 
proceedings before the ECJ. The Court of Appeal set aside the order granted by the Commercial 
Court against the ITF and the FSU, lifting therefore the previous permanent injunction and, after 
detailed consideration, denied this relief, because of the lack of clarity on the applicability of Article 
43 EC to the unions, and on the consequences of its potential breach by the collective action. See 
Davies 2006. The Court of Appeal judgment is  available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/
2005/1299.html
85 Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (England and Wales), by 
Order of that court of 23  November 2005 in 1) The International Transport Workers' Federation 2) The 
Finnish Seamen's  Union v 1) Viking Line ABP 2) OU Viking Line Eesti (Case C-438/05), 2006/C 60/34, 
in OJ C 60/16 11.3.2006.
86 Written and oral submissions were also addressed to the ECJ by 14 Member States and Norway, 
as well as the parties  and the Commission. Furthermore, the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC) intervened by submitting a letter attached to the written submission of the International 
Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF): the various submissions addressed some or all of the questions 
posed by the English Court of Appeal, but often, more directly tackled the underlying issues; as  it 
was highlighted, in the Viking case “the new Member States making submissions  were unanimous on 
one side of the arguments on issues of fundamental legal doctrine (horizontal direct effect, 
discrimination, proportionality) and the old Member States  virtually unanimous on the other.” See 
Bercusson 2007b, p. 305
87  In the specific form re-flagging of a shipping company from a “higher-wage” country (in casu 
Finland) to a “lower-wage” one (Estonia). It should however be noted that under the Maritime 
Services Regulation 4055/86/EEC the right to liner traffic is not bound to flagging in one of the two (or 
more, such as the hypothesis of “triangle traffic”) Member States  of operation, but the flagging within 
the Community is sufficient; see Articles 1.1 and 1.2.
EC88 in the litigation89, of its horizontal direct effect, which had not previously been 
addressed by the Court, and its possible justifications in the circumstances 
considered90; in more general terms, the case concerned the policy of the ITF aimed 
at precluding negotiations with “black list” subsidiaries, with a view enhancing the 
conditions of seafarers 91.
The Assessment by the Advocate General underlined the fact that the 
promotion of the economic freedoms and the protection of fundamental social rights 
(or the pursuit of the Community’s social policy) are not irreconcilable, since the 
attainment of both objectives is included in the Treaty with a clear view of bringing 
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88 As well as the specific Regulation 4055/86 giving precise expression to the principle of freedom to 
provide services  in the maritime transport between MS in an intra-EU setting but also between MS 
and third countries. It was however found that the reflagging of the Rosella by Viking Line would 
amount to an exercise of the right to freedom of establishment, as  a prerequisite for the effective 
exercise of the freedom to provide services, as already held in in Factortame and Others (Case C‐
221/89, parr. 20-22). The ECJ indicated that the issues related to the freedom to provide services 
were premature, since they could only become relevant after the reflagging had taken effect. This 
reconstruction follows what the ECJ had held in Omega, stating that “where a national measure 
affects both the freedom to provide services and the free movement of goods, the Court will, in 
principle, examine it in relation to just one of those two fundamental freedoms if it is clear that, in the 
circumstances of the case, one of those freedoms is entirely secondary in relation to the other and 
may be attached to it”. Viking, AG’s  opinion par. 17-18 and Viking, parr. 30-31. See Hinarejos  2008, 
Hallesten 2007 and also C-275/92 Schlindler, parr. 22-25.
89 Or “in particular, by analogy with the Court’s reasoning in [...] Albany, paras  52-64”, the exclusion of 
collective action such as that under consideration from the scope of Article 43 EC and/or Article 1.1 
of Regulation 4055/86 by virtue of the Community’s  social policy. See Viking, Court Reference, parr. 
1-2
90 Ibid., par. 7 and 9. With specific reference to question 9, the Court of Appeal fundamentally asks to 
define whether the collective action that has been taken strikes “a fair balance between the 
fundamental social right to take collective action and the freedom to establish and provide services 
and is it objectively justified, appropriate, proportionate and in conformity with the principle of mutual 
recognition” (it can be underlined that the same wording is  used in the autonomous reference 
question regarding the objective justification on the ITF’s policy, see following note).
91Ibid., par. 8. It has to be underlined how trade unions, and ITF in particular, welcomed the Court of 
Appeal’s decision (the reference being considered as “a crucial win”, or in the words of ITF General 
Secretary “the first step to a complete vindication of the right of trade unions to show international 
solidarity and provide legitimate support for their members”), on the basis that, independently from 
its effects  on the Rosella dispute, it constituted an important opportunity for the ECJ to address  the 
relationship between between the free movement provisions and industrial action (press release 
http://www.itfglobal.org/news-online/index.cfm/newsdetail/645), in particular when it is considered 
that not even the company Viking Line had maintained that seafarers were not covered by the ILO 
right to strike/industrial action. It is  appropriate to note that what has ultimately occurred is  that the 
Viking case itself has been withdrawn from court, therefore depriving the process of the last judicial 
step in the determination of the matters  involved after the ECJ ruling; however the consequences of 
the Viking ruling by the ECJ have significantly rippled through the whole European setting, and in 
particular in the UK. See infra 3.2
them together, and therefore none of them can considered as absolute or as having 
an a priori precedence.
On the question of horizontal direct effect, the rules on freedom of movement 
were considered as not being clearly assigned such effect by the Treaty; however, 
along with the rules on competition, they are instrumental in ensuring the functioning 
and efficiency of common market by granting market operators and participants the 
opportunity to compete on equal terms; furthermore, the Treaty does not preclude 
horizontal effect of the provisions on freedom of movement, and it can imply that 
these provisions can protect the rights of the market participants by limiting the 
powers of the Member States but also the autonomy of private parties92, which 
cannot be allowed to act without appropriate concern for other parties’ rights93 
when their actions “by virtue of its general effect on the holders of rights to freedom 
of movement” are capable of hindering and restricting the exercise of those rights 
beyond what can be reasonably circumvented94.
With specific reference to the dispute at hand, the two types of collective 
action undertaken by FSU and ITF have to be distinguished: the protection of the 
crew of the Rosella95 by restricting the possibility for the undertaking to relocate was 
deemed to represent, in principle, a legitimate way for workers to preserve their 
rights, if corresponding to what would happen for the case of domestic 
relocations96. The more general action carried out at European level in order to 
improve the terms of employment of seafarers could also constitute “a reasonable 
method of counter‐balancing the actions of undertakings” seeking to exploit their 
entitlement to free movement in order to lower their labour costs; however, such 
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92 Viking, AG’s Opinion, parr. 33-38
93  The AG also underlined that the case, could have come to the Court in the “framework of 
proceedings against the Finnish authorities  for failing to curtail collective action against Viking 
Line” (similarly to Schmidberger, which was notably constituted an action by a private against a 
Member State, see supra par. 1.2.4), without affecting the “substance of the problem” constituted by 
the reconciliation of freedom of movement and right to strike on the basis of the consideration that 
“indirect horizontal effect may differ from direct horizontal effect in form; however, there is no 
difference in substance” Ibid., par. 40.
94 As for the case of intellectual property rights  holders and professional sports  associations. Viking, 
Opinion, par. 48.
95  Through coordinated collective action aimed at securing wages and working conditions, at 
preventing redundancies or obtaining equitable compensation.
96  And provided that action undertaken against the intra-EU relocation would not hinder the 
subsequent trans-national provision of services of an undertaking which had eventually relocated.
coordinated action, if entailing an obligation for support by the national unions to the 
primary action, could easily be abused in a discriminatory manner97. 
AG Poiares Maduro therefore concluded against the Albany-style exemption 
for the collective action98 and in favour of the direct horizontal effect of Article 43 EC 
and of Regulation No 4055/8699, and in particular suggested that the Court should 
rule in the sense that Article 43 EC would not “preclude a trade union or an 
association of trade unions from taking collective action which has the effect of 
restricting the right of establishment of an undertaking that intends to relocate to 
another Member State, in order to protect the workers of that undertaking”100. The 
national court should determine the lawfulness of such action in the light of the 
applicable domestic rules, provided that cases of intra‐Community relocation are not 
treated less favourably than cases of relocation within the national borders.
The Court’s reasoning took its start from the consideration that the questions 
referred by the national court could be answered only insofar as they concerned the 
provision on freedom of establishment, and proceeded in underlining how article 43 
EC, along with articles 39 and 49, determines not only the limits of the action of 
public authorities of the Member States, but is to be extended to agreements of 
different nature, which collectively regulate subordinate and autonomous work, as 
well as the provision of services; the judicial course defining collective agreements 
pursuing social objectives as excluded from the EU competition law provisions 
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97  Even to the extent of protecting the collective bargaining power of some national unions at the 
expense of the interests of others. Viking, AG’s Opinion, parr. 70-71
98  In particular because “the fact that an agreement or activity is excluded from the scope of the 
competition rules does  not necessarily mean that it is also excluded from the scope of the rules on 
freedom of movement”, and because of the absence of the possible contradiction between the 
encouraging of social dialogue by Treaty provisions  and the potential prohibition of such agreements, 
stemming by the Treaty itself, by reason of their inherent effects  on competition carachterising the 
Albany case; since the provisions on the freedom of movement can be reconciled with social rights, 
there is no need to extend the “limited antitrust immunity” previously provided by the ECJ to 
collective agreements. See Viking, AG’s Opinion parr. 26-27
99 Ibid., parr. 28, 56 and 73 (2)-(3)
100 Ibid., par. 73 (3). The compatibility with article 43 EC is to be on the other hand excluded for the 
case of “a coordinated policy of collective action by a trade union and an association of trade unions 
which, by restricting the right to freedom of establishment, has the effect of partitioning the labour 
market and impeding the hiring of workers from certain Member States  in order to protect the jobs  of 
workers in other Member States”. See par. 73 (4).
cannot be transposed with reference to the movement freedoms set out in Title III of 
the Treaty101.
Furthermore, since on the basis in particular of Defrenne102 the prohibition on 
restricting a freedom provided by the Treaty lies on all agreements intended to 
regulate paid labour collectively103, and that restrictions on free movement can be 
determined also by the actions of individuals or groups rather than caused by the 
State, the ECJ held that Article 43 could be directly invoked in the case at hand by 
an individual (the private undertaking Viking) against a trade union or a confederation 
(FSU and ITF), even if national law provided for the trade unions the right to 
undertake collective action and the actors involved are not associations exercising a 
regulatory task and having quasi-legislative powers but which are only exercising the 
legal autonomy conferred to them by national law104.
Having determined that collective actions by trade unions fall within the 
scope of application of Article 43 EC, and that the exercise of fundamental rights 
has to be reconciled with the rights and freedoms protected by the Treaty, the ECJ 
proceeded in determining the existence of the restriction to a Treaty freedom and its 
possible justification.
While recognizing the right to take collective action as a fundamental right in 
EU law105, the Court found that the unions’ actual or threatened actions amounted a 
restriction on freedom of establishment by making Viking’s intended reflagging “less 
attractive, or even pointless”106; the Court, in analyzing the situation presented by 
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101Along with the exclusion of the Albany-style immunity, the Court has also ruled out the Danish 
submission proposing an exclusion from the application of article 43 EC on the basis of the lack of 
EU competence on the matter set out by Article 137.5 EC (parr. 39-41), and the Danish-Swedish 
submission highlighting a “fundamental rights exclusion”: on the latter, in particular, the ECJ held that 
recognizing the strike as a fundamental right provides that its  protection can justify restrictions to the 
obligations imposed by Community law as   determined by its  case-law (which shows a settled course 
in assessing rivaling or overlapping internal market freedoms and fundamental rights, as in 
Schmidberger and Omega, with reference to the freedom of association and the respect of human 
dignity), but also that its exercise “may none the less be subject to certain restrictions”(parr. 42-47).
102 Case 43/75 Defrenne, parr. 31, 39
103 The Court had also held that the terms  of the collective agreements  are not excluded from the 
scope of the freedom of movement provisions of the Treaty. Viking, par. 54
104 Viking, parr. 56-66
105  Ibid., parr. 43 “the right to take collective action, including the right to strike, must [...] be 
recognized as a fundamental right which forms  an integral part of the general principles of 
Community law the observance of which the Court ensures”.
106  The Court also rapidly addressed (parr. 70-71) the inclusion of reflagging into the definition of 
establishment, in continuity with the judicial course set in Factortame and Others.
the Viking case in the framework of the Gebhard-formula107, underlined how the 
protection of the rights of workers constitutes, in fact, an overriding reason of public 
interest108, and emphasized that the Community is not only a single market, but also 
pursues “a policy in the social sphere”109; it subsequently demanded to the national 
court to decide “whether the objectives pursued by FSU and ITF by means of the 
collective action which they initiated concerned the protection of workers”110.
National courts have therefore to rule on justification, necessity and 
proportionality of the single actions111: with regards to the FSU, the Court stated 
that, in order for its action to be considered as falling within the objective of 
protecting workers it had to be shown that the jobs or conditions of employment at 
issue were under serious threat and, even in that case112, the national court would 
have to ascertain whether the action threatened or initiated by the trade union was 
“suitable for achieving the objective pursued” and did not “go beyond what was 
necessary to attain that objective”113: the ECJ then proceeded to provide a certain 
degree of guidance to the to national court.
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107  In order to determine, in primis, if the restriction pursues a legitimate aim compatible with the 
Treaty and is justified by overriding reasons  of public interest and, secondly, if it is suitable for 
securing the attainment of the objective pursued and not going beyond what is necessary in order to 
attain it. See Viking, par. 75, Gebhard, par. 37 and Bosman, par. 104
108 In particular on account of the fact that Viking Line (or its subsidiaries) would be prevented from 
enjoying the same treatment in the Member State of reflagging as  other economic operators, and 
would probably continue, in the particular situation previously detailed, to operate at a loss. See 
Viking, par. 74.
109 Ibid., par. 78. See also Articles 2 EC and 3.1) (c) and (j) EC.
110 Ibid., par. 87. The EU-Court ruled that such a collective action is not excluded from the scope of 
Article 49 TFEU (ex 43 EC) on the right of establishment. The Court also stated that Article 49 TFEU is 
capable of conferring rights on a private undertaking which may be relied upon against a trade union. 
Finally, the Court held that a collective action, such as  that at issue in the dispute, constitutes a 
restriction of the right of establishment. The restriction may, in principle, be justified by an overriding 
reason of public interest, such as the protection of workers, provided that it is proportional (according 
to the Gebhard-formula). It was for the national court to ascertain whether the restriction could be 
justified.
111 National courts  have “sole jurisdiction to assess  the facts and interpret the national legislation”. 
Ibid., par. 85
112 That is, if the national court, following that examination “came to the conclusion that, in the case 
before it, the jobs or conditions of employment of the FSU’s members liable to be adversely affected 
by the reflagging of the Rosella are in fact jeopardised or under serious threat”. Ibid., par. 84
113 Viking, par. 84
To determine whether and to what extent the collective action meets the 
aforementioned requirements, national courts would have to check in particular114 
whether the union did not have115  other means at its disposal which were less 
restrictive of freedom of establishment in order to bring to a successful conclusion 
the collective negotiations entered into, and whether the union had exhausted those 
means before initiating the collective action116.
With regards to ITF’s secondary action aiming at ensuring the implementation 
of the FOC policy, the Court was even less accommodating117: the ECJ, in fact, 
found that, while the policy of combating the flags of convenience also pursues the 
objective of protecting and improving seafarers’ terms and conditions of 
employment118, the solidarity  action initiated by ITF action after being asked by the 
national affiliates cannot be justified, in particular because the restriction on freedom 
of establishment deriving from it would be placed on the reflagging undertaking 
regardless of whether the exercise of this freedom would actually be liable to have 
“a harmful effect on the work or conditions of employment” of the workers119.
The ECJ, therefore concluded that collective action in order to induce an 
undertaking to enter into a collective agreement whose terms are liable to deter it 
from exercising freedom of establishment, is not excluded from the scope of Article 
89
114 With regards to the appropriateness of the action undertaken by FSU, the Court underlined that “it 
should be borne in mind that it is common ground that collective action […] may […] be one of the 
main ways in which trade unions protect the interests  of their members Viking, par.86. It is also 
noteworthy that the Court indicated in support of this conclusion ECtHR jurisprudence, in particular 
Syndicat national de la police belge (Syndicat national de la police belge v Belgium, of 27 October 
1975) and Wilson (Wilson, National Union of Journalists and Others v United Kingdom of 2 July 2002).
115 “Under the national rules and collective agreement law applicable to that action”. Viking, par. 87
116 It is  however to be noted that after the ruling issued by the ECJ, the parties in the dispute arrived 
at a private settlement, and the case has been therefore withdrawn from the national court. See infra 
par. 3.2.2
117 Hinarejos 2008, p. 720
118 Viking, par. 88
119 Specifically, the ECJ highlighted that, as  also Viking had argued during the hearing (without being 
contradicted by ITF), ”the policy of reserving the right of collective negotiations  to trade unions of the 
State of which the beneficial owner of a vessel is a  national is also applicable where the vessel is 
registered in a State which guarantees  workers a higher level of social protection than they would 
enjoy in the first State.” (that is, the policy would “kick in” even if the ferry were to be re-flagged in a 
Member State offering better employment standards  to its  workers, see Hinarejos 2008, p. 720). Ibid., 
par. 89
43 EC, and that the article itself can have direct horizontal effect by conferring rights 
on a private undertaking against the action of trade unions120.
With specific reference to the action in question the Court found that it 
constitutes a restriction that can, in principle, be justified by reason of public 
interest, insofar as it is necessary and proportionate to the pursuit of the objective of 
the protection of workers121.
2.2.2 – Laval122 
If the setting of the Viking case can be considered simple, even more 
apparently devoid from any kind of complexities were the factual premises that 
ultimately brought the ECJ to the issuing of the Laval ruling.
The Vaxholm dispute regarded the right to a collective agreement at a large 
workplace carrying out public works (i.e., the renovation and extension of school 
premises - formerly military structures - in Söderfjärd, within the Vahxolm 
municipality near Stockholm) that had been awarded, following a tendering 
procedure123, to a Latvian company (the Riga-based Laval un Partneri, henceforth 
Laval) though its Swedish-established subsidiary, L&P Baltic Bygg AB (henceforth 
Baltic).
The construction works were actually carried out by around 35 workers 
posted from Latvia by the parent corporation and from various subcontractors, and 
while the company, in settling with the Vaxholm municipality, had agreed to a 
contract explicitly providing that Swedish collective agreements and tie-in 
agreements124  were to be applicable to the workers constructing the building site, 
that clause was not respected in practice and Laval ultimately decided to apply 
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120 Viking, Operative part of the Judgment (2008/C 51/17), parr. 1-2, in OJ C 51/11, 23.2.2008
121 Viking, Operative part of the Judgment, par. 3
122 Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR-I 11767
123  The work on Söderfjärdsskolan was  procured by the City of Vaxholm in accordance with the 
regulations in the law (1992:1528) as to public procurement, based on the comparable EC directive 
on procurement.
124  A tie-in agreement (also “application agreement”, hängavtal) is  a standard collective agreement 
concluded at local level, between the local branch of the trade union involved and an employer who 
is not already bound by a collective agreement, and who is  not members of any employer 
organization. Furthermore, under the Law on workers’ participation in decisions  (MBL), once a 
collective agreement ora a tie-in agreement are signed, they apply to all workers  in the workplace, 
whether or not they are affiliated to a trade union.
instead to its posted workers the collective agreement concluded with the Latvian 
trade union125.
At the beginning of June 2004, when it appeared clear that a company 
without a valid agreement had begun to work on a large commission within the trade 
union division’s area, contact was taken by the local branch126 of the Swedish trade 
union of the construction sector with the representatives of Laval and its subsidiary 
with a view of concluding a tie-in agreement; the union objected to the presence of 
posted workers from Laval on the building site which had not signed a Swedish 
collective agreement, and should therefore not be allowed to carry out their work in 
Sweden.
While Byggnads127  evidently represents Swedish workers, and none of its 
members were employed by Laval, its demands for an agreement hardly constituted 
an exception in the Swedish labour market; according to the Mediation Institute’s 
annual accounts book, about 240 agreements were signed in 2004, affecting almost 
two million employees in private undertakings and civil services, of which Byggnads 
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125Baltic, according to its  articles of association and bylaws, conducted repairs, renovations  and 
construction additions  of buildings, and since its establishment, had conducted operations with its 
own employed personnel and had signed collective agreements  with Byggnads  of the same type of 
the one eventually pursued in the Vaxholm dispute. It has also to be noted that such collective 
agreement was  concluded long after the start of the building activities, on September 14, one day 
before the last attempt for conciliation carried out before the outbreak of industrial action in the 
Vaxholm dispute and October 20 (extending the application of the agreement to all the posted 
workers  and not only the members  of the union); therefore, during almost the whole duration of the 
negotiations  Laval was not bound by any collective agreement. According to information from Laval, 
saround 65% of the workers were members of LAC, the Latvian building workers’ union; however, the 
actual wage levels and working conditions of the Latvian workers were from the start at the centre of 
a harsh dispute between the company and the trade union. Laval held, including in its  summons 
before the Labour Court, that the figures  of 13,600 Kr per month (and benefits for further 7,000 Kr) 
contained in the employment agreement as well as  the working, lodging and transportation 
conditions (according to the description, laced with “paternalistic overtones”, provided by Laval, 
posted workers were entitled with free accommodation, three meals a day and transport) illustrated in 
a Swedish trade journal were correct. The union, on the basis  of details  from income to the Latvian 
tax authorities, was  able to determine that some of Laval's  workers made only 35 kronor an hour - a 
far cry from the 138 to 145 Kr hourly wage laid down in the collective agreements (but also from the 
wage provided by a potential fall-back clause in a sectoral agreement); however, even a monthly 
income of 4,000 Kr would represent an attractive offer when compared with the Latvian minimum 
wage - attesting at 1,400 Kr. See Persson 2005, p. 23, 27-30, Rönngren 2005, p. 2 and Eklund 2008, 
p. 552
126 Byggettan (Section 1 of the Swedish Building Workers’ Union)
127 Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, the Swedish construction workers union, including 128,000 
members, of which approximately 95,000 are of working age. Byggnads organizes workers  including 
carpenters, cement workers, bricklayers, floorers, construction workers  and road workers  as  well as 
plumbers. Approximately 87% of the country's construction workers are members in Byggnads..
alone had signed 98 with foreign construction companies128, and which had 
requirement the Arbitrators’ intervention in order for the signature of the agreement 
only in 9 cases. The aim in all these cases was to apply a collective agreement 
ensuring that the employees are paid wages reflecting the average wage paid in the 
geographical area in which the undertaking is located; in casu the request by 
Byggnads was that 145 Kr (circa 16 €) be paid per hour129.
It has to be noted that the Swedish national collective agreement for the 
building sector does not contain provisions on minimum wage, but includes a “fall-
back clause”  which is to be applied in case of failure by the parties in reaching an 
agreement on an higher wage level upon the conclusion of a collective agreement, 
for which negotiations are carried out on a case-by-case basis at the level of 
undertaking130; Baltic, however, was not a party in the sectoral agreement, therefore 
the fall-back clause would not apply131.
While the first contacts also proceeded routinely, during the summer-autumn 
2004, despite repeated negotiations, Byggnads and Laval had failed to reach a 
compromise and, instead of signing the agreement or backing off, the company had 
decided to pursue the matter, challenging Swedish legislation, the Swedish trade 
union movement and the conditions of the domestic labour market132; on  October 7 
it made it known that it did not intend to sign any collective labour contract133. 
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128 As a view of comparison, Persson 2005 underlines  (p. 11) how the Metal Workers trade union had 
signed agreements for about half this figure. 
129  This  amount was  based on statistics on average wages  for the Stockholm region for the first 
quarter of 2004, relating to professionally qualified builders and carpenters. See Malmberg & 
Siegman 2008, p. 1123
130  As confirmed by the Swedish trade unions, the “fall‑back” wage in fact represents only a 
negotiating “last-resort” mechanism, and does not constitute a minimum wage; at the time of the 
dispute, the clause stipulated for the second half of 2004 an hourly wage of 109 Kr. (approx. 12 €) 
See Eklund 2008, p. 551-552. 
131  It should be mentioned also that Sweden did not make use of the possibility of invoking a 
transitory regime against the posting of workers, as  had been conceded to Germany and Austria 
during the accession negotiations  with the new member countries, including Latvia. See Reich 2008, 
p. 134
132 It was noted by Swedish trade union officials participating at meetings and discussion with Laval, 
that the involvement of lawyers  occurred at a very early stage, and that the ideologically motivated 
opponent was determined not to sign an agreement but to consciously challenge the Swedish labour 
market system, a unusual decision, not least economically.   Person 2005, p. 19-24
133 And therefore, the Latvian posted workers  were not covered by any Swedish instrument related to 
minimum wages, because of the absence in the Swedish system of a statutory regulation of minimum 
wages and of the possibility of an erga omnes  extension of the sectoral collective agreement; the 
demand for a conclusion of a Swedish collective agreements remained.
As a  consequence of the oppository stance taken by Laval, after due notice 
given on October 19, at the beginning of November Byggnads imposed a blockade 
on the Latvian company, calling for a boycott of construction work at all Laval 
construction sites134; however, as there were no members of the Swedish union on 
either of the buildings that Laval was working on in the Stockholm region, the 
conflict measures did not initially lead to major consequences, at least until when 
Elektrikerförbundet, the Swedish electricians’ union, initiated sympathy measures in 
support of Byggnads’ demands135 and was quickly followed by several other unions 
expressing their support136.
Notwithstanding the eventual findings by the ECJ with reference to actual 
impediments for the Latvian goods and employees to access the Söderfjärd 
premises137, with the exception of two minor incidents138, Latvian workers in 
particular were free to enter and leave the construction site; however, as a result of 
the continuing blockade139, construction works eventually stopped.
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134  The blockad carried out by Byggnads, in fact, amounts to the labour union organization 
encouraging its  members  to refuse to perform their contract of employment to the benefit of Baltic as 
a client of their employer at its workplace.
135 Still far from a violent escalation of the dispute, and actually a completely legal form of sympathy 
action under Swedish industrial action rules  (sympatiåtgärd, see infra par. 3.1.1), the blockade 
undertaken by the electricians’ union produced relevant effects: without electrical installation the 
work on the Söderfjärd building would, in fact, soon come to a standstill (Swedish law, in fact, 
provides that electrical installation work may be performed only by tradespeople licensed in Sweden). 
See EIRO 2005, p. 2, Persson 2005, p. 31 and Dorssemont 2008, p. 20
136 In particular after the decision by the Labour Court to reject the claim for an interim injunction on 
the action.
137 The ECJ found that the blockading consisted, inter alia, of preventing the delivery of goods  onto 
the site (deliveries  of concrete were stopped on 8 December, but Laval managed to find concrete 
suppliers  employing non-unionized staff, and was able to allow the continuation of the work), placing 
pickets and prohibiting Latvian workers  and vehicles  from entering the site. Laval asked the police for 
assistance but they explained that since the collective action was lawful under national law they were 
not allowed to intervene or to remove physical obstacles blocking access  to the site”. See Laval, par. 
34
138 On 12 November 2004 a truck delivery was called upon not to deliver goods to the plant. After 
comments and inquiry from Laval, the delivery finally took place some days  later; on December 13 a 
protest demonstration outside the Söderfjärdsskolan site was  carried out, which effectively blocked 
the only access route and the gate, therefore forcing the Latvian workers to dismount from the bus 
carrying them to the workplace and to cross the picket line composed by Swedish union members, 
who sought to talk to the Latvian workers  about their rights  (also by handing out information sheets  in 
Lavtian), hampering them from entering the building site. As   noted in previous footnote, the police 
force was called but did not intervene directly. the See Persson 2005, p. 43-47
139Which would have eventually lasted several months, see Sweden pushes to protect collective 
agreements, The Local 7 April 2005, available online at http://www.thelocal.se/1240/20050407/
On December 7, 2004, Laval brought an action before the Swedish Labour 
Court against Byggnads and the Elektrikerförbundet, requesting a declaration that 
the industrial action to be unlawful, an interim injunction, and also demanding that 
the aforementioned unions should pay damages to Laval as a compensation for the 
moral and material losses in which it incurred. Furthermore, Laval requested that the 
Labour Court should submit a request to the European Court of Justice for a 
preliminary ruling on the matter; the unions contested all the claims140.
The Labour Court, however divided141, decided to reject Laval’s request for an 
interim decision to discontinue the industrial action, ruling that Byggnads’ blockade 
could continue until the whole matter of the Latvians’ legal rights in Sweden were 
clarified in further hearings142.
The Labour Court proceedings took place in March 2005143, and the Latvian 
group argued that while the union blockades may have been legal under Swedish 
law, they violated European regulations on the free circulation of labour and 
services; the Arbetsdomstolen concluded that issues relating to EU law had in fact 
been raised even though the trade union action was lawful according to Swedish 
law144 and as a result, reversing its earlier decision, sought a preliminary ruling from 
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140The Vaxholm conflict quickly gained attention in both the diplomatic and Swedish political arena. In 
particular, the Latvian Minister for Foreign Affairs demanded explanation for the “illegal measures” the 
Swedish union was  engaged in, and a parliamentary debate on the matter was  started in December 
17, 2004; responses and commentaries to the dispute also came from the Latvian Construction 
Contractors Association and the Latvian trade unions. See amplius  EIRO 2005, p. 2-4 and Persson 
2005, pp. 40-43
141 It was reported that union representatives  on the tribunal supported Byggnads’ action, whereas 
the two representatives of the employers’ organizations found in favor of the Latvian company. 
However, “Even those members of the court that found against [the action] did not say that [the union 
was] breaking EU law.” See Swedish court backs  action against Latvian builders, The Local 22 
December 2004, available online at: http://www.thelocal.se/762/20041222/
142 Labour Court decision 2004 No. 111 (dated Dec. 22, 2004)
143  It should be noted that, in the meantime, in February 2005 the Vaxholm municipality had 
requested to terminate the contract with Baltic, since it risked not being able to complete the school 
building on time, and the company consequently left the working site; the work was then completed 
by a Swedish construction company which used Swedish workers  paid approximately 163 Kr. per 
hour. In March, furthermore, the Swedish subsidiary was declared bankrupt and entered liquidation 
procedures. Laval, in the wake of the December decision by the Arbetsdomstolen had also 
expressed, through its  legal counselors, the will of pursuing the matter by taking into account EU law 
and also not to sign any agreement with the Swedish union.
144 Labour Court decision 2005 No. 49 (dated Apr. 29, 2005)
the European Court of Justice, referring two very wide questions145  on the 
interpretation of content of Articles 12 and 49 of the EC Treaty and the Posting of 
Workers Directive with specific regards to whether a contractual industrial action 
against a foreign company wanting to perform a work contract under Swedish 
procurement rules through the use of posted workers146 could be justified, as well as 
the interconnections of EU freedom to provide services with the specific structure of 
Swedish labour law in transposing and implementing the PWD147.
The Law on the posting of workers148, in fact, does not require posting 
employers to apply collective undertakings149  and, in indicating the terms and 
conditions of employment applicable to posted workers regardless of the law 
applicable to the contract of employment itself150, does not provide a definition for 
minimum rates of pay as referred to in the Article 3.1151 of the PWD152, confirming 
the dominant role of the Swedish social partners in defining terms and conditions of 
employment though collective agreements; this instrument, in particular, is regulated 
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145  Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Arbetsdomstolen by order of that court of 15 
September 2005 in Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Avdelning 1 of the 
Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Elektrikerförbundet (Case C-341/05), 2005/C 281/18 in 
OJ C 281/10, 12.11.2005
146 In particular considering a situation in the host country such as Sweden in which “the legislation 
intended to implement Directive 96/71 has no express provisions concerning the application of terms 
and conditions  of employment in collective agreements” and “has no system for declaring collective 
agreements  to be of universal application”. See Laval, Reference, par. 1 and Laval, AG’s Opinion, par. 
1
147  A relevant procedural remark is that, while subsequent as date of reference, Viking was an 
injunction case, and it was therefore given priority by the ECJ under Article 55 of its  Rules of 
Procedure. Thus, the judgment in Viking ultimately came before the one in Laval.
148 Lag om utstationering av arbetstagare, LUA (Official Gazette 1999:678, Government Bill 1998/99: 
90)
149 With a view, in particular, to avoid discrimination between foreign employers eventually bound by a 
declaration of universal application and those Swedish ones  which were not parties of a collective 
agreement. The Swedish liaison office is in charge of providing information to posting employers  with 
regards of the existence of applicable collective agreements. See also Laval, par. 7-9
150 LUA, Art. 5
151 Article 3.1, first subparagraph, (c)
152  Nor does it refer to terms and conditions  of employment relating to matters  other than 
remuneration that are governed by collective agreements. (art. 3.10 PWD). The issue of 
implementation of the provisions of the Directive on minimum rates of pay was considered 
extensively in the travaux préparatoires  for the LUA; As  the legislator upon the passing of the Act 
assumed that the PWD was a minimum directive and that Community law also allowed the trade 
unions  to continue to have the right to take industrial action in order to establish customary collective 
agreements  with posting employers from other EEA countries, no provisions were introduced for the 
matters  at hand. See Betänkande av Lavalutredningen - Förslag till åtgärder med anledning av 
Lavaldomen, p. 48, Statens Offentlinga Utredningar (SOU) 2008:123
by the Law on workers’ participation in decisions (MBL)153, which also sets out the 
limitations on the right to resort to collective action, with a view of ensuring the the 
good labour relations between the parties of a agreement.
In this regards, as a 1989 Labour court judgment154 established that industrial 
action aimed at replacing or altering an existing collective agreement applicable to a 
given workplace is prohibited even if those taking the action are not bound by the 
agreement concerned, the MBL was amended in order to limit the possible 
consequence of this ruling. Through the subsequent Lex Britannia155, introduced in 
1991, the legislature made it clear that this restricting principle does not hold where 
a union takes industrial action in connection with employment relationships to which 
the MBL is not directly applicable156, effectively grounding Lex Britannia as the 
cornerstone of Swedish system, in particular in its relations with foreign national 
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153 Lagen om medbestämmande i arbetslivet ou medbestämmandelagen (1976:580)
154  Arbetsdomstolen (AD) 120:1989, commonly known as the Britannia case, by the name of the 
container ship (which flew a flag-of-convenience, employed a Filipino crew and was bound by the 
terms of a Filipino collective agreement) whose crew’s working conditions were the object of the 
dispute. See Eklund 2006, p. 203 
155 Official Gazette 1991:681, Government Bill 1990/91:162. Introducing three new provisions in the 
text of MBL, and in particular art. 25a, providing that a collective agreement which has become 
invalid under foreign law on the ground that it was concluded after collective action shall nevertheless 
be valid in Sweden if the collective action in question is  authorized under Swedish law, art. 31a 
stating that in the event that an employer bound by a collective agreement, to which the present Law 
would not apply directly, thereafter concludes a  collective agreement […], the subsequent collective 
agreement shall apply whenever the agreements contain provisions conflicting with each other and, 
most importantly, art. 42.3, which provides: “Employers’ organizations or workers’ organizations shall 
not be entitled to organize or encourage illegal collective action in any way whatsoever. Nor shall they 
be entitled to participate in any illegal collective action, by providing support or in any other way. If 
any illegal collective action is commenced, third parties  shall be prohibited from participating in it. 
The provisions  of the first two sentences of the first subparagraph shall apply only if an organization 
commences collective action by reason of employment relationships  falling directly within the scope 
of the present Law.”. See Laval, AG’s Opinion, parr. 32-34
156 See Bruun, Jonsson in Bücker, Warneck 2010, p. 19
labour providers 157 , by lifting the prohibition on collective action against a foreign 
employer carrying out temporary activities158.
Sixteen Member States filed submission to the ECJ, laying out their position 
on the Vaxholm case; of these, the majority said that they supported the union's 
right to take action against the Latvian builders, a view partially shared by the 
Commission, which agreed on the fact that Swedish unions should be allowed to 
take action to defend collective agreements. It also said, however, that as the 
Swedish collective agreements cover more than just wage levels they are a 
disproportionate hindrance to the free movement of services and did not comment 
directly on the action taken by the union in the Vaxholm case159; on the other hand, 
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157 It should be mentioned, with reference to the context of the EU enlargement, that Sweden did not 
make use of the possibility of invoking a transitory regime against the posting of workers, as had 
been conceded to Germany and Austria  during the accession negotiations with the new member 
countries, including Latvia. See Reich 2008, p. 134 and supra, par. 2.1
158  The purpose of Lex Britannia (according to the legislative history of the instrument, to give the 
trade unions the possibility of acting in order to make all employers conducting activities  on the 
Swedish labour market apply wages  and other working conditions  corresponding to those generally 
applied in the sector, and to create favorable conditions for fair competition on equal terms  between 
Swedish companies  and service providers  from other countries  for which the connection to Sweden 
is deemed so weak that the MBL is not directly applicable to the working relationship) therefore is 
similar to the extension of the collective agreement, which has  been upheld by the Court, and which 
is a frequently used device in many continental countries  in order to combat social dumping (see, for 
example, Rush Portuguesa). In other words, collective agreements based on Lex Britannia put into 
practice the equal treatment principle enshrined in Article 50.3 EC; this is  besides  in line with Article 
137.3 EC which refers to the implementation of directives (like the PWD) by means of collective 
agreements. In both cases is the national collective agreement to which the foreign service provider 
is party will have to yield; the main difference (and a one which was  bound to have relevant 
consequences in the ECJ’s reasonings) is that the Swedish regime of law enforcement is  governed by 
private law, whereas  the continental erga omnes  model is governed by public law. See Eklund 2006, 
p. 208, Bruun in Dorssemont, Jaspers & Van Hoek (eds.) 2007, pp. 213-214, Hellsten 2007, p. 203
159  Charlie McCreevy, at the time Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, had previously 
expressed the less moderate opinion that Sweden's handling of the conflict was “a breach of the 
European Union's treaty”, since the case regarded the freedom of movement, and answered "yes" to 
the direct question of whether he would argue against the builders  union Byggnads in the EU Court, 
stirring up strong reactions  from Swedish trade union, in particular pointing out the express 
statement contained in the PWD with regards to collective action and the fact that the statements by 
Commissioner McCreevy were not followed by any official document by the EU Court in connection 
with the matter (EU to fight Sweden over Latvian builders, The Local 5 October 2005, available online 
at http://www.thelocal.se/2226/20051005/), and by  European Parliament, which summoned him in 
order to explain his  statements; he responded by stating that “Just because Latvia is  a new member 
state and one of its  smallest states does not mean its  concerns are less  important”, backed up by by 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso, who said he would not “attack Sweden’s  or 
Scandinavia’s social model”, but vowed at the same time to “respect and defend the rules spelled 
out in the European treaties.” (McCreevy defends  support for Latvians, The Local 26 October 2005, 
available online at http://www.thelocal.se/2367/20051026/)
a number of countries mainly in the Baltic region, stated their support for the Latvian 
company160.
AG Mengozzi gave his response on the questions submitted by the national 
court in May 2007; he underlined how the Posting of Workers Directive constitutes 
an instrument to ensure fair competition and respect for the rights of the workers in 
the context of the promotion of the freedom to provide services, by providing “a 
‘nucleus’ of mandatory rules for minimum protection” to be observed by the posting 
employer in the host Member State, set out in particular by art. 3 of Directive 
96/71161.
He maintained that industrial action 162does fall within the scope of EU law163, 
overcoming the objections by Denmark and Sweden linked with the exclusion of 
competences of EU institutions on the matter provided by art. 137.5 EC164 and with 
the recognition of the right to strike as a fundamental right in various international 
instruments concerning the protection of human rights165; a collective action such as 
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160  EU countries  support Swedish union, The Local 29 May 2006, available online at http://
www.thelocal.se/3936/20060529/
161  And specifically paragraphs  1, 8 and 10, which specifically lay down the minimum terms and 
conditions of employment (and in particular the minimum rates  of pay, along with work and rest 
periods, holidays, H&S and equality of treatment), the options to be undertaken in case of absence of 
a system for declaring collective agreements  to be of universal application, and the possibility for the 
Member States  to apply terms and conditions  of employment on other matters than those referred to 
in article 3.1 in the case of public policy provisions. See Laval AG’s Opinion, parr. 14 and 16
162 It was  duly noted by the AG that, according to recital 22 of Preamble, the Directive is without not 
prejudice the national right concerning collective action to defend the interests  of trades and 
professions
163  And it must therefore take account of freedoms  protected under Community law, including the 
freedom to provide services. See Laval, Ag’s Opinion, par. 91
164  Since “Article 137(5) EC seeks only to exclude from measures  which may be adopted by the 
Community institutions [...]  the aspects of the social policy of the Member States relating to pay, the 
right of association, the right to strike and the right to impose lock-outs” and hardly lends  itself to 
extensive interpretation (possibly not referring to other types of collective action, otherwise supported 
and supplemented by the EU). Furthermore, even if art. 137.5 would amount to exclusive 
competence for the MS on the matter, the MS would still have to ensure the respect of the 
fundamental freedoms within their territory. Laval, AG’s Opinion, parr. 50-59
165 In particular, on the basis  that ECtHR jurisprudence (which is  however described as  having been 
accorded “special significance” by the ECJ) indicates  the right to strike only as one of the means of 
defence of the workers’ interests (and not directly upheld until 2009, see infra par. 4.4) which can be 
subject to limits  and restriction by national law, also provided by the European Social Charter and the 
Community Charter of Fundamental Social RIghts, and on the absence of legal binding value of the 
CFREU, which reaffirms rights  stemming from constitutional traditions  of the Member States and the 
international instruments. Furthermore, “to recognise such a status  and such protection for the right 
to take collective action does not result in the inapplicability of the EC Treaty rules  on freedom of 
movement”, in particular with relation to the means  of exercise of collective action, which encounter 
restrictions in all the Member States and were, in fact, balanced by the ECj in cases  such as 
Schmidberger. Ibid., parr. 60-90
the one undertaken by Byggnads is capable of dissuading foreign undertakings from 
exercising their freedoms to provide services in the Kingdom of Sweden, and 
therefore constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services166 which must 
be justified.
The solution adopted by the Swedish Government in transposing the PWD, 
which provides by law to both sides of the industry the “mechanisms and the 
procedures” ensuring compliance with the terms and conditions of employment laid 
down by the collective agreements, was found to provide a suitable means of 
attaining the objective referred to in Article 3.1 of the PWD167  and could not be 
considered as constituting inadequate implementation of said Directive168, nor it 
discriminated against foreign service providers when their situation was compared 
with the regime applied to domestic undertakings in the building sector not affiliated 
to an employers’ organization169.
According to these reasonings, the AG concluded in the sense that, even for 
the cases in which there is no system for declaring collective agreements to be of 
universal application trade unions may seek to impose on service providers from 
another Member State to provide equivalent terms and conditions of employment 
through the use of collective action, provided that such action is motivated by public 
interest objectives170.
99
166 Laval, AG’s Opinion, parr. 234-240
167Approving therefore the Swedish Governments’ view, stating that the autonomous Nordic model 
would facilitate the attainment of the objective of the protection of posted workers. Ibid., parr. 166, 
187
168 In particular by the combined reading of recitals 12 (stating that “‘Community law does not forbid 
Member States to guarantee the observance of [rules for the protection of workers] by the 
appropriate means”) and 22 (the PWD does  not prejudice the national right to collective action), and 
on the basis of the consideration that article 3.8 PWD expresses only “a possibility offered to Member 
States  that have no system for declaring collective agreements  to be of universal application”, 
contrary to the opinion expressed by Laval (as well as  the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish and 
Czech Governments) that Sweden, not having availed itself of the second subparagraph of Article 3.8 
PWD, waived the right to apply to workers  posted temporarily to its  territory by a foreign service 
provider the terms and conditions of employment laid down in collective agreements, and that the 
Swedish option does not ensure equal treatment and is a source of legal uncertainty (in particular, the 
service providers are not apprised of all the terms and conditions  of employment, which will apply to 
them when they temporarily post workers to that MS). Ibid., parr. 169, 177, 179-187
169 Ibid., par. 193, 202
170 Such as the protection from workers and the fight against social dumping (See Arblade, par. 36), a 
requirements which also underlie the PWD. AG Mengozzi had also underlined how “the aims  pursued 
by the collective action taken by the defendants in the main proceedings are […] decisive in the 
context of a dispute to which only private persons are parties.” See Laval, AG’s Opinion, parr. 245, 
249 and 309.
Furthermore, in applying the principle of proportionality, the Arbetsdomstolen 
should have considered whether the terms and conditions sought by the trade 
unions, and in particular those relating to pay, were in conformity with public policy 
provisions as provided by article 3.10 of the PWD and significantly contributed to 
the protection of posted workers171; with particular regards to the rate of pay sought 
by Byggnads, the AG stated that the collective would not be disproportionate, given 
the fact that the actual wages paid by Laval could not be considered equal or similar 
than those deriving from the Swedish collective agreement172.
The ECJ173 assessed the questions stemmed from the Vaxholm dispute from 
two angles, the Posting of Workers Directive and article 49 EC 174 and, in both 
instances, it came to a conclusion implying infringement of EU law175, reverting 
almost completely the AG’s position on the matter.
Article 3.1 PWD, in fact, was deemed to be imposing on service providers 
only the minimum rates of pay, and could not be relied upon to impose on the 
foreign employer a workplace case-by-case negotiation on terms and conditions 
which do not constitute minimum wages176  and are not laid down in accordance 
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171 And, in particular, did not duplicate any identical or essentially comparable protection available to 
those workers under the legislation and/or the collective agreement applicable to the service provider 
in the Member State in which it is established. Laval, AG’s Opinion par. 310
172 Ibid., parr. 263-273
173 With regard to applicable Community law ever since Rush Portuguesa and Arblade, it is  without 
doubt that the posting of workers of a company established in one EU country is a service to which, 
for the case of its trans-national provision, article 49 EC is to be applied. The workers employed by 
Laval are not seeking access to the Swedish labour market but will be removed once the 
construction work as  contracted is  finished (see Case C-445/03, Commission v. Luxembourg, par. 
38). In principle, they remain under Latvian jurisdiction and therefore the provisions concerning free 
movement of workers (article 39) and non-discrimination (article 12 EC) could be disregarded in this 
context. See Laval, parr. 54-57
174 The Court dismissed the trade unions’ claims of “artificiality” of the dispute, which in their opinion 
had been raised with the exclusive aim of enabling Laval to circumvent Swedish law, on the basis 
that that the questions  referred do have a bearing on the subject-matter of the case in the main 
proceedings. See Laval, parr. 42-49, and declared unnecessary to rule on Article 12 EC, since when 
the freedom to provide services  is concerned, the principle of non discrimination is  given “expression 
and effect” by Article 49 EC (Laval, par. 55)
175 See Hendrickx 2009, p. 69
176 Laval, par. 70-71
with the possibilities available to the Member States177  for determining the terms 
and conditions178  applicable to posted workers; furthermore, the principle of 
application of the more favorable terms  to poster workers179 cannot allow the host 
Member State to render the provision of services conditional on the observance of 
terms and conditions of employment which go beyond the mandatory rules for 
minimum protection180: the maximum level of protection for posted workers 
imposable on foreign undertakings, therefore, is limited to the provisions of article 
3.1 of the PWD181.
These considerations rippled on the assessment of the Vaxholm industrial 
actions: the Court, in fact, while sharing the opinion that the right to collective action 
is to be recognised as a fundamental right which forms an integral part of the 
general principles of Community law, it is nonetheless subject to EU law182  and its 
exercise may encounter restrictions when reconciled with the Treaty freedoms. 
The Swedish right to take collective action to impose terms going beyond the 
minimum provisions of article 3.1 PWD constitutes a restriction on the freedom to 
provide services183; the ECJ reaffirmed the social purposes of the EU184, underlining 
also that the protection of fundamental rights is a legitimate interest185 and that the 
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177  Even if the Court recognized that “since the purpose of Directive 96/71 is  not to harmonize 
systems for establishing terms and conditions  of employment in the Member States, the latter are 
free to choose a system at the national level which is  not expressly mentioned among those provided 
for in that directive”. Laval, par. 68
178 For the case in question it should be noted that the determination of the minimum rates  of pay 
was the only item of Article 3.1 to be entrusted to social partners’ agreements; the other terms and 
conditions were, on the other hand, laid down by law.
179 Provided for by article 3.7 PWD.
180 Laval, parr. 78-80. In the main case, in particular, these terms regarded working time and annual 
leave and derived from the application of the collective agreement in the building sector.
181  For the case at hand, moreover, the pecuniary obligations regarding pay review and insurance 
deriving from the signing of a collective agreement were imposed without the national authorities’ 
having had recourse to Article 3.10 of the PWD, in particular because the social partners  involved in 
the definition of the collective agreement are not bodies  governed by law and “cannot avail 
themselves  of that provision by citing grounds of public policy” to maintain that collective action 
complies with EU law. Laval, parr. 83-84 
182 Ibid., par. 88
183 By rendering less attractive, or more difficult, for foreign undertakings to carry out construction 
work in Sweden, and forcing them to enter workplace negotiations of unspecified duration. Ibid., parr. 
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184 Against which the rights under the provisions of the EC Treaty on the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital have to be balanced. Ibid., par. 105
185 Ibid., par. 93, referring to Schmidberger
right to take collective action for the protection of the workers against possible 
social dumping may constitute an overriding reason of public interest186, which may 
justify a restriction of the obligations imposed by Community law187. 
However, when the specific features of the blockading actions undertaken 
and of the obligations sought by the trade unions were considered, the obstacle to 
the freedom to provide services was found to be unjustified, on the basis in 
particular of the lack of national provisions clearly determining the obligations for the 
foreign service provider as regards minimum pay188; trade unions, therefore, are 
precluded to undertake collective action aiming at the signature of a collective 
agreement imposing on a foreign service provider rates of pay which are not laid 
down according to the PWD and more favorable terms than those already contained 
in legislative provisions, as well as referring to matters outside of the scope of 
mandatory provisions189.
The signature of a collective agreement in the Member State of establishment 
by a service provider, moreover, has to be taken into account by national rules on 
posted workers; Lex Britannia’s provisions subject to the preliminary ruling, fail to do 
so190 and give rise to a discrimination against such undertakings which are treated in 
the same way to those national undertakings which are not parties in a collective 
agreement; this discrimination cannot be justified. 
The motivations produced by the Swedish Government for the application of 
Lex Britannia - ensuring wages and conditions of employment in line with those 
usual in Sweden and creating a climate of fair competition between national and 
foreign undertakings - cannot be considered grounds for public policy, public 
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186  Laval, par. 105, with particular reference to the principles elaborated in Arblade, Mazzoleni, 
Finalarte and Others and lastly Viking.
187  Furthermore, the “Community law [...]  does not prohibit Member States  from requiring [foreign] 
undertakings to comply with their rules on minimum pay by appropriate means”. Laval, par. 109
188 Ibid., par. 110
189  Ibid. par. 111 and Laval, Operative part of the Judgment par. 1. 2008/C 51/15 in OJ C 51/9, 
23.2.2008
190 By authorizing collective action against undertakings bound by a collective agreement subject to 
the law of another MS in the same way as against domestic undertakings  which are not bound by 
any collective agreement. Laval, par. 113
security or public health; Article 46 EC191, in the ECJ’s view, must be interpreted 
strictly, and the prohibition for a collective action seeking to set aside or amend a 
collective agreement must therefore hold also for the situations in which the national 
law is not directly applied192.
2.2.3 – Rüffert193 and Luxembourg194
Pursuing in the course set with Laval the ECJ issued two more rulings in the 
first half of 2008, clarifying the interactions between economic freedoms provided 
for by the EC Treaty and fundamental social rights; the focus was on the relationship 
between the mandatory minimum terms and conditions for posted workers set by 
the PWD and the restrictions to transnational provision of services that can be 
justified as being in protection of the workers, as well as the definition of the 
mandatory application of national social policy measures to foreign service providers 
and of the extension of the scrutiny on the public policy justifications in the light of 
the freedom to provide services.
As for the facts of the Rüffert case, the German Land Niedersachsen, 
following a tendering procedure, had awarded a German company (Objekt und 
Bauregie, henceforth O&B), a contract for construction work; the agreement 
provided that employees should be paid at least the wage resulting from the 
collective agreement in force at the place and time where the contract was 
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191“The provisions  of this chapter and measures  taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the 
applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action providing for special 
treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public health”, applied 
in conjunction with Article 55 EC.
192 Laval, par. 120 and Laval, Operative part of the Judgment, par. 2
193 Case C-346/06, Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen
194 Case C‐319/06, Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
performed195 and that the contractor should impose those obligations on potential 
subcontractors and monitor their compliance. 
O&B, in effect, went on to use as a subcontractor the Polish firm PKZ196; 
however, the discovery that the company paid to workers posted from Poland lower 
wages than those provided for in the German collective agreement197  caused the 
Land to terminate the contract, to issue a punishment order on the subcontractor, 
but also to seek the enforcement of a penalty clause against O&B, on the basis that 
the breach by the PKZ must have been known to the main contractor198.
In appeal, the liquidator of the contractor (supported by the Polish 
Government) claimed damages from the German authority, maintaining that the 
application of the sanctions provided for by Landesvergabegesetz was incompatible 
with the freedom to provide services set out in Article 49 EC199; in particular, the 
court of reference observed that the that wages set in regional collective agreements 
are much higher than the minimum wage applicable nationwide under the AEntG200, 
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195 As set out in the list of representative collective agreements  which applied to building work in the 
public sector; those terms were in accordance with Land Niedersachen’s law on the award of public 
procurement contracts  (Landesvergabegesetz), and in particular par. 3.1; the request for adherence to 
these so-called “social clauses” is  a decidedly common occurrence in the German public 
procurement system. With regards to the normative context, it should be noted that the original Act 
on Obligatory Working Conditions in the Event of Posting of Employees (Arbeitnehmer-
Entsendegesetz - AEntG) had been in force since 1996 (originally only for the building and 
construction sector), and had been amended after the issue of PWD to implement the EU legislation 
on the matter. According to Section 1 AEntG, the normative provisions of an extended collective 
agreement of the building and construction industries  concerning minimum wages (including 
overtime, holiday duration and pay/allowance), are applicable to the employment relationship 
between a foreign employer, and a posted worker performing work in the territorial scope of 
application of the respective collective agreement, provided that the activity falls  within the sector in 
question and that German employers  are also obliged to grant their employees the working 
conditions deriving from the collective agreement (as a consequence of the extension of any 
collective agreement in terms of Section 1 AEntG not only employees posted to Germany but also 
those regularly employed by an employer seated in Germany are covered). Compliance with these 
rules is ensured by several control measures  (among those, the duty for the employer to formally 
affirm that the posted workers will be granted the working conditions  provided for in Section 1 
AEntG) and severe sanctions (termination of ongoing contracts, fines, exclusion from competition for 
public authorities order). See Arthur 2008, p. 1., Weiss and Schmidt 2008, p. 53-54 
196 Also having a German branch established in the same Land Niedersachen.
197 i.e., 46.57% of the statutory minimum wage. Rüffert, AG’s Opinion, par. 37
198 The regional authority also maintained that the payment of wages at below the collectively agreed 
pay rate constituted a separate infringement for each of the 53 posted workers. The court of first 
instance granted the payment of a  fine corresponding to 1% of the value of the contract in favor of 
Land Niedersachen and dismissed the remainder of the action by the regional authority.
199 See Arthur 2008, p. 12
200 Which defines what is  necessary in order to ensure posted workers’ protection. See Rüffert, AG’s 
Opinion, par. 44
and the duty to comply with such agreements imposed on foreign service providers 
removes their main competitive advantage, based on lower labour costs201. 
The question to be assessed by the ECJ202, therefore, did not directly relate to 
the issues of collective bargaining and industrial action, but rather refers to the limits 
that each Member States encounters in defining its public procurement norms 
through mandatory rules which rely on the outcome of local collective bargaining 
procedures in order to complete their provisions203.
In the AG’s opinion, the PWD should not be interpreted as precluding such 
measures204, since the specific collective agreements represent the national 
implementation of enhanced national protection, authorized under article 3.7 
PWD205; furthermore, it was maintained that the reference to such agreements by 
collective agreements universally applicable206  constituted a system for determining 
minimum rates of pay in the construction industry compatible with the provisions of 
the PWD207.
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201 Therefore constituting an impediment to the effective unfolding of the freedom to provide services. 
The court of reference (Oberlandesgericht Celle) also underlined how the of complex of the provisions 
of the Lower Saxony law contributed in protecting German building undertakings from competition 
from other MS, since “as far as foreign workers are concerned, the obligation to pay the collectively 
agreed wage does  not bring about actual equality with German workers  but instead prevents  them 
from being employed in Germany because their employer is  unable to exploit his  advantage in terms 
of labour costs”; the economic purpose pursued by the law, therefore, could not amount in the Court 
of Appeal’s view to an overriding requirement of public interest justifying a restriction on the 
economic freedoms. Ibid., parr. 42-44
202  “Does  it amount to an unjustified restriction on the freedom to provide services under the EC 
Treaty if a public contracting authority is  required by statute to award contracts for building services 
only to undertakings which, when lodging a tender, undertake in writing to pay their employees, when 
performing those services, at least the remuneration prescribed by the collective agreement in force 
at the place where those services are performed?”. Reference for a preliminary ruling from the 
Oberlandes- gericht Celle (Germany) lodged on 11 August 2006  — Rechtsanwalt Dr Dirk Rüffert, as 
the liquidator of the assets  of Objekt und Bauregie GmbH & Co KG v Land Niedersachsen (Case 
C-346/06), 2006/C 294/38 in OJ C 294, 2.12.2006
203 and specifically, collective agreements which have not been declared universally applicable. See 
Angiolini in Andreoni and Veneziani 2009, p. 52
204 Rüffert, AG’s Opinion, par. 66
205  The rules  on terms and conditions of employment set by art 3, parr. 1-6 “shall not prevent 
application of terms and conditions of employment which are more favourable to workers.”
206 Within the meaning of the first subparagraph of Article 3.8 PWD.
207 Rüffert, AG’s Opinion, parr. 95-98. The AG also highlighted the German Government submission 
stating that the objective of worker protection is provided not only by the higher wage levels of the 
regional agreements, but also by the fact that such agreements  allow more differentiated and 
appropriate remuneration according to the work performed, setting more detailed and different wage 
levels than those provided by the federal level one TV Mindestlohn). Ibid., par. 121 and footnote 39
The legislation on the public contracts, while imposing additional burdens on 
foreign service providers, was applied without distinction of nationality208, with a 
view of protecting workers and preventing social dumping; since it did not go 
beyond what was necessary to secure these objectives, it could justify the 
restriction on the economic freedom209.
The ECJ, however, adopted also in this case a far stricter stance in assessing 
the case; the PWD, in fact, is to be intended as clearly defining the regulatory 
options to lie down the minimum terms and conditions that Member States intend to 
ensure to posted workers210; the Court found that Lower Saxony law did not set any 
minimum rates of pay - and could not therefore be considered a law under art. 3.1 
PWD211  - and that the collective agreement on which the law relied in order to 
determine them could be not considered as “universally applicable” since it only 
covered construction contracts in a particular geographical area, and even then, 
only contracts in the public sector212, nor as setting more favorable terms and 
conditions of employment for posted workers213. 
Therefore, the relevant provisions of Lower Saxony law, and the 
corresponding provisions in the building contract, were not permitted by EU law; 
directly referring to Laval, the Court maintained that a Member State cannot render 
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208 The difference of treatment between private and public contractors, in fact, was  deemed to be 
irrelevant, given also the provisions of Directive 93/37, and in particular article 23 which “expresses 
the notion that the performance of the work following the award of a public contract must comply 
with the employment protection provisions  and the working conditions in force in the place where the 
work is to be carried out”. Ibid., parr. 17, 59
209 The national judge, in the AG’s  view, should have assessed whether the rules of the Lower Saxony 
law conferred “a genuine benefit on the workers  concerned, which significantly augments  their social 
protection”; in particular, the national court must compare the gross amount of wages  paid in the MS 
of establishment and those in which the service is provided in order to determine if the protection 
enjoyed by workers is similar or equivalent (which does not appear to be so in the case). Rüffert, AG’s 
Opinion, parr. 116-118. 
210  The AG and the Court agreed in determining that “the mere fact that the objective of the 
legislation of a Member State, in this case the Landesvergabegesetz, is  not to govern the posting of 
workers  does  not have the effect of precluding a situation such as that in the main proceedings  from 
coming within the scope of Directive 96/71.” See Laval, AG’s Opinion, par. 64 and Laval, par. 20
211 Laval, par. 24
212  Not fulfilling therefore the conditions set by articles 3.1 and 3.8 PWD with regards to its erga 
omnes nature or the extension of its  application. The Court also underlined how the option provided 
by art. 3.8 PWD is applicable only where there is  no system for declaring collective agreements to be 
of universal application, which is not the case in the Germany, since the AEntG extends the 
application of provisions on minimum wages  in collective agreements  which have been declared 
universally applicable in Germany to employers established in another Member State which post their 
workers to Germany. Rüffert, parr. 25-31
213 The derogation provided by Article 3.7 PWD therefore did not apply. Ibid., par. 32
the provision of services in its territory conditional to the observance of terms and 
conditions going beyond the mandatory rules for minimum protection. 
Art. 3.1 PWD, therefore, completely defines the level of worker protection that 
the Member State is entitled to require from foreign service providers214, and the 
Lower Saxony law enabling the public authority to require that a contractor must pay 
wages in line with the relevant regional collective agreements consequently 
constitutes a restriction of the freedom (in particular of the Polish subcontractors 
involved by the case) to provide services215.
The ECJ went on to determine that since the minimum rates of pay to which 
the German authority had sought adherence by its contractor and its Polish 
subcontractor went beyond the minimum requirements set by PWD, the restrictions 
to the freedom to provide services could not be justified under article 49 EC by the 
objective of ensuring the protection of workers216.
The last ruling of the “Laval quartet” is constituted by the one issued in the 
Commission v Luxembourg case on 19 June 2008, which had been brought forward 
by the European Commission for “failure in fulfilling obligations deriving from the 
Treaty” under Article 226 EC217, in relation to the application of the national labour 
laws of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to workers posted from another Member 
State.
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214  Unless those workers already enjoy more favorable conditions in the MS of origin. Ibid., parr. 
33-34  
215 Thus, its  application is precluded by virtue of the provisions of the PWD, interpreted in the light of 
article 49 EC. Ibid., par. 43 and Rüffert, Operative Part of the Judgment, 2008/C 128/13, in OJ C 128, 
24.5.2008
216 In particular because of the limited geographical and sectoral scope of the collective agreement in 
question. Furthermore, the Court dismissed also the submission by the German Government aiming 
at justifying the provisions by the objectives  of ensuring “protection for independence in the 
organisation of working life by trade unions” (also on the basis  of the limited scope of the 
agreements) or “the financial balance of the social security systems” (the application of such 
measures did not appear necessary). See Rüffert, parr. 39-42
217 Action brought on 20 July 2006 — Commission of the European Communities  v Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg (Case C-319/06), 2006/C 224/50 in OJ C 224, 16.9.2006
The normative item whose legitimacy was questioned was the law 
transposing Directive 96/71/EC218, that went beyond the terms of PWD by imposing 
additional obligations on other Member States’ undertakings wishing to operate in 
Luxembourg, stating in particular that the terms of all collective agreements should 
apply, and that the cost of living adjustments relative to pay “to reflect changes in 
the cost of living” should be honored; the also law required for the posting 
undertaking the establishment of an agency resident in Luxembourg in order to 
retain the documents necessary for monitoring, and set up a reporting and 
monitoring system on the service providers.
The Luxembourg law, moreover, provided that the various matters associated 
with the employment relationship constituted mandatory provisions “falling under 
national public policy”219, and therefore applicable to all workers (including 
temporary posted workers) performing an activity in Luxembourg, regardless of the 
duration or purpose of the posting, and of the nationality of the worker or the 
undertaking220.
The main arguments brought by the Commission to the attention of the ECJ 
were that the Luxembourg law went beyond the scope of the PWD, by wrongly 
describing the national provisions as mandatory provisions falling under national 
public policy; furthermore the reporting conditions imposed to the service providers 
and the establishment of an agency were unnecessary and unclear, and the 
minimum work and rest periods were not regulated by the PWD transposition law221.
The Commission had questioned the automatic adjustment of rates of 
remuneration to the cost of living provided by Luxembourg Law222, and in particular 
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218  Loi du 20 décembre 2002 portant: 1. Transposition de la directive 96/71/CE du Parlement 
Européen et du Conseil du 16  décembre 1996  concernant le détachement de travailleurs effectué 
dans  le cadre d’une prestation de services; 2. Réglementation du contrôle del’application du droit du 
travail, concerning the transposition of PWD and the monitoring of the implementation of labour law, 
Journal Officiel du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg A - n° 154, 31 december 2002
219 As  stated in response to the Commission during the pre-litigation procedure. See Luxembourg, 
par. 9
220 “Les dispositions […] s’appliquent aux travailleurs, quelle que soit leur nationalité, au service de 
toute entreprise, sans préjudice quant à  la nationalité et au lieu juridique ou effectif du siège social de 
celle-ci [… et] également aux entreprises, à l’exception du personnel navigant de la marine 
marchande maritime, qui, dans le cadre d’une prestation de services transnationale, détachent des 
travailleurs sur le territoire du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg.”  Law of 20 December 2002, artt. 1.2 
and 2.1
221 Luxembourg, AG’s Opinion par. 17
222 Excluding from the submission the adjustment of minimum wage. see Luxembourg, par. 19
the fact that the indexation covered all wages, including those which do not fall 
within the minimum wage category; this measure was aimed, in the perspective 
brought by Luxembourg, at ensuring good labour relations within the national 
borders and that, on that basis, it constitutes a public policy with the scope of 
limiting the effects of inflation, protecting the purchasing power of workers and 
ensuring good labour relations; the Commission took the view that the transposition 
was based on too broad an interpretation of the concept of “public policy 
provisions” in Article 3.10 of the PWD.
The ECJ223, in assessing the various questions brought forward, confirmed 
that the list of matters in respect of which Member States can and must ensure the 
protection set out in the PWD has to be considered as exhaustive224; it then dealt 
with Luxembourg’s contention that the employment-related matters which the 
national law was designed to protect were covered by Article 10 of the PWD and 
that it was open to Member States to define the concept of public policy. 
Also in this case, the Court reinforced the position already expressed in Laval 
that, when the notion of public policy is used as justification, it must be interpreted 
in a strict sense, so that it is not left to the Member States to unilaterally determine 
the scope of their mandatory provisions of their employment law, in particular on 
foreign service providers225, without any control by EU institutions; only “crucial” 
public policy provisions226 can justify the imposing of further terms and conditions of 
employment.
Accordingly, the Court ruled that Luxembourg had failed to fulfill its 
obligations227 by wrongly seeking to define the protected employment-related areas 
as matters of public policy; the national transposition of the PWD therefore created 
unjustified obstacles to the free provision of services.
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223 in this case in agreement with the AG’s conclusions (See Luxemborug, AG’s Conclusions, par. 90)
224 Luxembourg, par. 26
225  The public policy exception was defined by the Court as “a derogation from the fundamental 
principle of freedom to provide services”. Luxembourg, par. 30
226  The Court also referred to Arblade (its  par. 30) in recalling that “the classification of national 
provisions  by a  Member State as public‐order legislation applies to national provisions  compliance 
with which has been deemed to be so crucial for the protection of the political, social or economic 
order in the Member State concerned as to require compliance therewith by all persons present on 
the national territory of that Member State and all legal relationships within that State”. Ibid., par. 29
227 In particular, under under Article 3.1 of PWD, read in conjunction with Article 10 thereof, and with 
articles 49-50 EC. Ibid., par. 97 
With regards to the reporting conditions and the establishment of an agency, 
it was noted by the ECJ that the reporting requirements228  imposed on foreign 
service providers were not sufficiently clear, that were liable to create uncertainty 
and that, in the case of the establishment of an agency, imposed additional burdens 
(both administrative and financial)  on such undertakings; the Court also considered 
that the monitoring of compliance was the responsibility of the Member State in 
which the undertaking was established, to which was also left the imposing of the 
necessary reporting requirements. 
Non-discriminatory rules restricting the freedom to provide services may be 
justified in so far as the public interest protected is not safeguarded by the rules 
applied in the Member State of establishment of the service provider; to require 
monitoring from both the origin and destination State would dissuade undertakings 
from exercising their freedom to provide services229.
Lastly, in relation to the working time submission, the Commission had 
complained that Luxembourg had failed to transpose the PWD, not regulating daily 
maximum work periods and minimum rest periods230; the Luxembourg Government 
agreed that the complaint was justified and that it had subsequently amended in 
2006 the national legislation to guarantee working time rights, but the ECJ ruled that 
Luxembourg had  not done so in a reasonable period of time, therefore not taking 
into account the subsequent changes in national law, and upholding also in this 
case the complaint.
2.3 - Assessment of the rulings
Extra-legislative processes traditionally mark the forming of labour law, both 
at national and Community level, and the decisions issued by the ECJ in the cases 
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228 In particular the prior notification procedures.
229 The ECJ held the same solution in relation with the Luxembourg rules  on part-time and fixed‑term 
work. Ibid., parr. 56-60
230 Art. 1, 3 of the Luxembourg Law, in fact, provided only for “working time and weekly rest periods”.
of the “Laval quarter” represent without doubt a fundamental landmark in the debate 
on collective action in a trans-national setting; the identity of the European labour 
law appears, in the wake of the ECJ rulings, contended between the protection of its 
link to the social values enshrined in national Constitutions, and the adapting 
individual and in particular collective labour rights to the to the logic of the internal 
market.
	 2.3.1 - The recognition of the right to strike and the limits to its exercise
The first major element stemming from the analysis of the cases in question - 
and one which received a widespread welcome - is the clear recognition of the 
fundamental nature of trade union rights, such as the right to take collective action 
in the European legal framework; for the first time the ECJ, questioned on the 
exercise of the right to strike, consecrated it among the general principles of 
Community law, drawing inspiration from European as well as international 
sources231.
Both Laval and Viking, have explicitly recognized the legitimacy of the trade 
unions’ role and of the social objectives underlying the core activities of regulating 
terms and conditions of employment and fighting against social dumping; this 
results is closely linked to the consideration that the European Union is more than 
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231 In particular, in affirming a convergence of the international juridical instruments  in recognizing the 
right to strike, the ECJ made reference to the ESC (also referred by article 136 EC), ILO Convention n. 
87, the Community Charter of fundamental rights of Workers 1989 and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights  of the European Union (Viking, par. 43 and Laval, par. 90) as well as  the ECtHR jurisprudence 
(Viking, par. 86). Viking and Laval constitute a sort of paradigm of use of the Charter as  an instrument 
of “semi hard law”, but they also highlight the intrinsic limits in the lack of legal bindingness of the 
same deriving from its being (at the time) proclaimed but not ratified. The daring recognition by the 
ECJ -  in particular when considered vis-a-vis the lack of MS initiatives aiming at at EU recognition of 
fundamental social rights  - would be tarnished by the severity of the control carried out by the Court, 
that leaves  very little space for the exercise of the right itself. See Nivard 2008, 1193-1195 and supra 
parr. 1.1.2 with regards to the contents of the instruments in question.
just a free trade area, but its social sphere represents also an element of constitutive 
importance232.
The Court however, by overcoming a series of conceptual hurdles and the 
various differences between the facts of the cases233, did not provide immunity for 
the right to take collective action against the unfolding and operation of the Treaty 
freedoms reflecting the internal market objectives of the European Union, but rather 
affirmed the relative nature of the right in question and proceeded to reconcile these 
two contrasting aspects234.
The question therefore remains as to the actual contents of the right to strike 
as structured by the Court; if on one hand, the recognition of the right to take 
collective action would appear a facilitating factor as to the adoption, in the exercise 
of the right concerned, of a legitimate objective justifying a restriction on the free 
movement provisions on the other, the ECJ determined that in order to determine 
the legitimacy of a collective action, it is necessary to go beyond the assessment of 
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232 In Viking, furthermore, the ECJ appears  as going as far as “validating” collective actions where the 
relocation of the undertaking would result in a serious threat to the jobs  and conditions of 
employment of workers. (Picard 2008, p. 164). It was also underlined that even in absence of such a 
reconstruction by the ECJ the CFREU would have been ultimately granted full legal efficacy by its 
recognition in the Lisbon Treaty, and therefore the most important aspect of Viking and Laval concern 
the recognition of trade union objectives and of of the social dimension of the EU.
233 Bercusson 2007b, and Ballestrero 2008, pp. 384-385
234 In this sense, it was underlined that in Viking and Laval the Court has recognized the right to take 
collective action in the same terms of art. 28 of the CFREU (Hinarejos 2008) and that a greater role of 
the Charter (maintained by Lo Faro 2008) in reconstructing the right to strike would not have brought 
different results (see Ingravallo in Vimercati 2009, p. 40). It is however to be highlighted a general 
poor performance of the Charter (and in particular of its  horizontal clauses) in the disputes  at hand 
(Serrano 2009, p. 171 ff.): the Court, in adjudicating of the compatibility of collective action with 
Community law, possibly disregarded art. 52 CFREU, stating that any limitation on the exercise of the 
rights and freedoms recognized by Charter “must be provided for by law and respect the essence of 
those rights and freedoms”, and conducted an operation of “free balancing” (see Caruso 2008, p. 
736), in which the results  could have been different if the fundamental social rights to strike and of 
collective action, here implicated, had drawn their origins  from a primary source legislative source.
(Caruso and Militello 2008, p. 15). See also infra with reference to the multi-source reconstruction  by 
the ECtHR in Demir and Enerji 
the purpose of the exercise of the right; its fundamental nature does not shield its 
exercise from the application of a proportionality test on the action undertaken235.
In Viking and Laval the inclusion of the right to collective action among the 
fundamental rights and the assertion that the protection of labour can justify 
restriction to the economic freedoms represented the two counterintuitive 
assumptions on which the ECJ based an interpretative operation turned to the 
definition of substantial limits to its exercise236; the theoretical importance of the 
recognition of a fundamental “right to strike”237  is overshadowed, so much to be 
rendered irrelevant, by the “inevitable” structural and functional restrictions set by 
the Court238.
According to the ECJ’s reasoning in Viking and Laval, collective actions liable 
to make it less attractive, or more difficult for employers to relocate or provide 
service in another Member State were considered restrictive of the economic 
freedoms, and therefore could be warranted if pursuing an objective compatible with 
the Treaty and justified by by overriding reasons of public interest; moreover, the 
action undertaken must undergo a rigorous control in order to ascertain whether it is 
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235 The so-called “Schmidberger line” was also followed by the AGs in both cases, and derived from 
their denial in applying the Albany immunity (on the basis  that the freedom of movement provisions 
are not inherently contradicting with collective bargaining autonomy, to the contrary of the Treaty 
provisions  on free competition ex artt. 81 ff. EC), the fundamental rights and the lack of competences 
deriving from art. 137.5 EC arguments: in particular the latter provision was found as preventing 
Community institutions  from passing laws  on these matters, but at the same time indicating that 
Community principles  are not to be infringed by the regulation and exercise of the right to strike. This 
reconstruction by the ECJ trims  down the fundamental importance previously recognized by the 
Community to collective action as grounding element of the industrial relation systems and of the 
fundamental laws of the various  MS. The Court, furthermore, did not acknowledge the various 
features differentiating the two disputes involved in Viking and Laval from Schmidberger; among 
those, the fact that (in Viking) no public authority was involved and the dispute regarded an employer 
seeking to preclude to other private parties, the trade unions, from exercising fundamental rights, 
with a view of preventing them to take any action in the future. See Bercusson 2007b, p. 451 Blanke 
2007, p. 4, Carabelli 2008, pp. 154 ff., Gragnoli in Andreoni and Veneziani 2009, pp. 163-164 and 
infra par. 2.3.2 for assessment and criticism of the application of the  proportionality principle.
236 See Carabelli 2008. It has  been underlined that the reasoning carried by the ECJ was based on 
assumptions that could have been reconstructed in a different way, not only politically preferable but 
also perfectly compatible with the norms  of the Treaty, and what was reached was substantially an 
“avoidable” balance. See Bercusson 2008, Lo Faro 2008
237  Also with respect to potential immunities from the application of EU law. It was  however 
suggested that classifying the right to strike as a fundamental right was not necessarily helpful as 
fundamental rights are essentially individualistic and are not geared to the protection of collective 
interests. Stewart & Bell 2008
238  au contraire Hinarejos 2008 underlines  that the while right to strike is, in effect, considered a 
restriction to the economic freedoms  and therefore subject to the proportionality test, this  also 
implies that the economic concerns are not automatically considered as superior.
suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not 
go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it239.
The central question regards therefore the bargaining aims of the collective 
action; the strikes undertaken in the Rosella and Vaxholm disputes were deemed as 
aiming at forcing the employers to the conclusion of a collective agreement, 
interfering in a purely “voluntary” regulation of the terms and conditions of 
employment, in particular when no such obligation can be derived from the law of 
practices of the Member State of establishment of the undertaking240; this 
questionable reconstruction created the necessary opening for the evaluation of the 
compatibility of the contractual demands with the exercise of the economic 
freedoms by the employer241. 
The compatibility of the former is linked therefore with the assumption of the 
collective bargaining performing a residual (and subsidiary) function with respect to 
the legislative setting of minimum standards for terms and conditions of 
employment242, in particular with reference to posting hypotheses; in Laval the 
Court, while recognizing that collective action to impose “terms and conditions of 
employment fixed at a certain level, falls [in principle] within the objective of 
protecting workers”, the requested compliance by the service provider could be 
related only to minimum rates of pay set in strict accordance with the PWD243.
With reference to the actual terms and modalities of the collective action, the 
previous rulings in Spanish Strawberries  and Schmidberger could constitute only 
indirect terms of reference for the ECJ244; however the Court completely rejected the 
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239 See Viking, par.47, Laval, par. 95
240  By that implying, that the economic freedoms protected by the Treaty cannot be breached by 
collective agreement which the employer voluntary agreed or adhered to. See also Laval, par. 81, 
where the Court expressly states “the right of undertakings established in other Member States to 
sign of their own accord a collective labour agreement in the host Member State, in particular in the 
context of a commitment made to their own posted staff, the terms of which might be more 
favourable”, where the focus, of course, should be on the wording “of their own accord”.
241 See Lo Faro 2008, p. 92
242 And in particular wage setting. See amplius Ales 2008 and Veneziani 2008,
243  It follows that in practice almost any trade union action is  to be considered automatically 
disproportionate in posting hypothesis, as its underlying rationale is always that of trying to impose 
on undertakings something that they are not required to meet. See Orlandini 2008
244  As noted before (parr. 1.2.1 and 1.2.4) in both cases the disputes  did not involve aspects of 
industrial conflict between workers  and employers, and the assessment of the ECJ was mainly 
directed at the Member State’s stance and attitude in governing the clash between social rights and 
economic freedoms. Furthermore a functional evaluation of the aims was not carried out by the 
Court.
solutions found in these precedents and opted for more radical modules of 
assessment implying direct liability of the trade unions and an evaluation in the merit 
of the union demands underlying the collective action undertaken.
Collective action was listed by the ECJ among those means by which trade 
unions pursue workers’ protection245: however, this assumption does not entail that 
it should not be automatically considered as imposing appropriate restrictions to the 
fundamental freedoms but the assessment of its legitimacy necessarily needs to be 
linked to the circumstances of the case, and in particular with the possible negative 
consequences on terms and conditions of employment deriving from the exercise of 
the collective freedom; therefore, if jobs and conditions of employment are not as 
“jeopardised or under serious threat”, the action cannot be considered as 
concerning the protection of workers at all246.
Another element of possibly more general application is the provision by ECJ 
that strike action should be deemed compatible with the Treaty provision only when 
utilized as ultima ratio by the trade unions; as noted, national judges have to 
examine whether the union did not have other, less restrictive, means at its disposal 
in order to pursue its objectives and if it exhausted them before initiating collective 
action247.
This conditional framework set by the ECJ, carachterised by relevant 
constraints on legitimate objectives coupled with the strictness of the proportionality 
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245 Like collective negotiations  and collective agreements, collective action “may […] be one of the 
main ways in which trade unions protect the interests of their members”. Viking, par. 86
246 In Viking the national court is  demanded the role of verifying such condition (and in particular the 
fact that the relocating company had not undertaken any legally “binding” commitment not to affect 
the jobs or conditions of employment of its  employees), although the Court suggested that this  was 
unlikely with reference to the facts of the case, because Viking had given an undertaking that no 
Finnish workers  would be made redundant (see Viking par. 11). On the other hand, in Laval the same 
ECJ proceeded to rule against the action undertaken by the Swedish union (supra par. 2.2.2). In any 
case the ECJ made it clear that “simple” threat or the “possibility” that conditions  of employment 
may be jeopardized is not enough to call a collective action, paving the way for a questionable 
judicial interference in trade unions’ strategic choices. See Orlandini 2008, p. 578
247  this  examination must be carried out respecting “national rules” and “collective agreement law 
applicable to that action”, and therefore does not add per se any restriction on the right to strike, 
while however providing a very clear policy guidelines to those countries in which the strike is  not 
considered and instrument of last resort for industrial disputes (see infra par. 3.1.2 with reference to 
the Italian situation). The application of the proportionality principle, however, should preserve the 
exceptions to the ultima ratio principle provided by national legislation such as the German “warning 
strikes” (see supra par 1.1.1 and infra par 3.1.2) 
test carried out248, contributes to the idea of “limited” right to strike, especially when 
exercised in a context where it could collide with the with the unfolding of the 
economic freedoms provided by the Treaty and in particular with the entitlements to 
free movement of an employer.
It is noteworthy the fact that in Viking and Laval one of the main features of 
the Swedish and Finnish systems of industrial relations, that is a strong systems of 
collective bargaining, also represented the focus of the ECJ’s restrictive analysis; the 
Swedish trade unions, entrusted with significant regulatory powers by the State249, 
are nonetheless clearly separated from the concept of public actor and therefore do 
not pursue a public aim of general interest250  but are considered as parties of a 
“classical” contraposition of economic interests251.
In consideration in particular of the transnational dimension of the disputes252, 
an adequate response in reconciling the economic freedoms and social rights would 
have entailed a comparative approach, attentive to the international standards and 
of the common traditions of the Member States253; the balancing carried out by the 
Court also provided the opportunity to effectively bring the renewed role of the 
social rights in the EU legal framework closer to the one historically played by the 
economic freedoms in the process of European integration254.
Instead, the ECJ carried out a traditional internal market test, not exploiting 
this potential for actual incorporation of the social rights, and seemingly refused to 
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248Among other considerations, the ECJ also confirmed that the magnitude of any restriction to the 
freedom of movement or establishment is  irrelevant; this may entail that trade union actiuon can be 
challenged by an employer on community law grounds even if it only resulting in a minor hindering. 
Ornstein, Smith 2009, p. 3, see also infra par. 2.3.5
249  And the autonomy of the social partners  (in “Nordic model” but also in MS such as  Italy) is 
inherently bound to produce norms  that escape the authority of the State, See Sciarra in Andreoni 
and Veneziani 2009, p. 36
250 Laval, par. 84.
251 Altough they were “paradoxically” equiparated by ECJ to “bodies  governed by public law” but not 
in recognition of their autonomous role, but rather in order for the article 49 EC to apply and to 
determine that fundamental economic freedoms be relied on in regulating the relations between 
private entities. it must also be noted that the ECJ left open the broader question relating to the full 
horizontal direct effect of such articles and their consequent application to private individuals. See 
Ales 2008, p. 12
252 Obviously deriving from the specific features of the freedoms involved but also, with regards  to 
their European relevance, from their unfolding (with the possible exclusion of Luxembourg) along the 
“border” between EU-15 and CEE Member States.
253 Sciarra 2008a
254 See Robin-Oliver and Pataut 2008, p.6
acknowledge the importance of collective bargaining procedures as the main 
instrument of activity coordination at European level255.
The ECJ therefore, demonstrating a poor familiarity with national labour 
practices and institutions256, chose to apply an invasive and dangerous 
interpretation of the aims of the collective action and of its modalities of exercise; 
the pursued conformity of this framework with the “spirit” of the internal market, 
furthermore, severely hinders in particular the possible unfolding of cross-border 
solidarity aspects of collective action257 which represented probably the main core 
of the union activity in Viking and Laval258.
2.3.2 - The principle of proportionality and the prevalence of market freedoms 
over fundamental social rights
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255 The Court lacks the hermeneutical instruments to evaluate the single mechanisms (such as the 
Swedish de facto extension of collective agreement) provided by the various  national models  of 
industrial relations  and, in particular, to assess  the function of the industrial conflict as “functional 
sanction” in the progress of negotiations for a collective agreement (See Laval, parr. 110). An even 
bigger interference in the role of the trade unions  is  represented by the broad verification of the 
suitability of the action in securing the objective of the protection of workers  carried out by national 
and EU judges, which is  at risk of dispossessing trade union organizations of an essential part of their 
historical attributions. See Belavusau 2008,  Robin-Olivier & Pataut 2008, p. 13 and Sciarra in 
Andreoni and Vaneziani 2009, p. 36
256 Especially in comparison with the competence showed with reference to the economic freedoms, 
whose development and fine tuning, on the other hand, has  been historically one of the main drives 
underlying the harmonizing role of the ECJ.
257  In particular when is  considered that, according to Viking, the lawfulness  of trade union action 
cannot be taken for granted when pursuing aims  other than the protection of workers employed by 
the undertaking that intends to relocate, and that in Laval an effective equality on terms  and 
conditions of employment for national and foreign posted workers could not be pursued by the trade 
unions, since the the Court claimed that the needs of protecting posted workers  were already 
safeguarded by what is prescribed in the PWD. Furthermore, in Laval the ECJ accepted as a 
legitimate objective of strike action the”protection of the workers  of the host State against [...] social 
dumping”, in a perspective which leaves  the  improvement of the terms and conditions of 
employment of the posted workers only as a (possible) consequence of the collective action 
undertaken. Therefore, an action carried out directly by posted workers against their employer or its 
client (and possibly supported by an action by the host MS trade unions), could certainly dodge 
accusations  of protectionism, but would probably still be subject (at least) to an assessment along 
the lines of Viking. See also Hös 2009, p. 22, Orlandini 2008, p. 581
258 It has  also been underlined how fundamental issues  underlying the judicial course set by the ECJ 
in the “Laval quartet” is represented by the continuing lack in the development of a EU social policy 
model, in line with the realities  of the globalization, and in the absence of Community legislation on 
dedicated instruments directed against social dumping, which on the other hand is  further 
aggravated by the restrictive interpretation provided by the ECJ also on monitoring and reporting 
procedures in the posting sector (infra, par. 2.2.3). See Sciarra 2008a and Hendrickx 2009.
Despite the “social rhetoric”259  of the Luxembourg Court and the proclaimed 
equivalence between social and economic aims of the European Union, Viking and 
Laval made clear that the “economic” Europe is based on much more solid 
foundations than the “social” one260; from the control on the justification to the 
proportionality test, to the possible liability of the trade unions261, the ECJ envisions 
a strict regulation for the right to collective action, although recognised as a 
fundamental right in a European setting.
The recent developments of the case-law of the ECJ, especially in the post-
enlargement stage, tend to a less social view of the EU integration by giving a 
certain precedence to the freedoms of movement in their eventual clash with the 
social rights; these judgments, in particular, clarify the role played by fundamental 
rights, which is the one of restricting market rules, and of possibly justifying an 
exception to their full application262; with particular reference to Viking and Laval, 
collective actions need, as noted, to be justified on a case-by-case basis, while the 
exercise of an economic freedom was not required to263.
The different hierarchical position between economic freedoms and 
fundamental social rights can be in particular deduced from the combination of the 
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259 Reich 2008, p. 160
260 Robin-Olivier & Pataut 2008, p.13. Furthermore a hierarchy - although not schematized - can be 
envisioned also between the various economic freedoms provided for by the Treaty; in the current 
timeframe (which has  probably produced effects in the evaluation of the ECJ on these and similar 
cases, see Hendrickx 2009) the freedom to provide services  (which, as noted, tends to cover the 
current model of labour mobility inside the EU) seems  to present, in the consideration by the Court, a 
closer link with the enlargement processes than others, and in particular with the needs and demands 
of market operators in particular in terms of “market access” (see Lo Faro 2008, p. 66), and with the 
consolidation of the enlarged internal market.
261 See infra par 2.3.5 and, with specific reference to the national ruling on the Vaxholm dispute, par. 
3.2.1 
262 See Orlandini 2008, p. 595
263 In Viking and Laval the right to strike is not the starting point for analysis  (Davies  2008, p. 141). It 
was underlined such a reconstruction implies that once the exercise of the right to collective action is 
found to be a restriction and therefore in breach of EU law, it means that the ‘‘social’’ interests are on 
the back-foot, having to defend themselves  from the economic, in a perspective that inherently 
restricting rather than promoting the social dimension of the Union. See Barnard 2008b, p. 264
horizontal direct effect of Treaty provision and of the application of the 
proportionality principle as envisioned by the ECJ264.
In primis, with regards to horizontal direct effect, the Court has explicitly, if 
summarily265, affirmed it for articles 43 and 49 EC, on the basis of the facts that EU 
law exacts compliance both from public and private actors266  and that the 
promotion of the Treaty freedoms through abolition of State barriers could be 
compromised by the exercise of their legal autonomy by private associations or 
organisations267.
 The provisions on economic freedoms can be consequently applied to trade 
unions, and the right to collective bargaining and action can affect the economic 
freedoms of the undertakings only in the limits in which a law or a public act can, id 
est only through non-discriminatory and proportionate restrictions justified by 
imperative reasons of general interest.
In order to fall under under the application of Article 43 or 49 it is sufficient for 
the collective action to render the free movement of companies or the provision of 
services “less attractive” or “more difficult” in the internal market268; since strike 
action269  inherently causes costs to the employer and implies a restriction of its 
economic freedom, it can be affirmed that the Court provided a presumption for the 
restrictive effect of collective action, shifting therefore the burden of proof on trade 
unions to justify their action on the test of proportionality.
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264 See Picard 2008, p. 164. It was noted that also the solutions adopted by the Court with reference 
to the assertion of its  competence in balancing the right to strike notwithstanding article 137.5 EC 
contradicts the hypothesis for a judicial self restraint by the ECJ with regards  to fundamental rights 
(Jorges  2007, p 28) and represents substantially an “ideological adhesion” to the idea of the primacy 
of the economic freedoms in the EU legal framework. See Ballestrero 2008, p. 389 Carabelli 2008, 
pp. 156, Supiot 2008, p. 2.
265  Ales  2008, p. 11. See also Robin-Olivier & Pataut 2008, p. 8 “Aucun effort d’argumentation ne 
vient soutenir un tel mouvement”.
266 Viking, parr. 33-55 and Laval, parr.86-91
267 Viking, par. 57 and Laval, par. 98.
268  Even if it was argued that collective action of trade unions making relocations more costly for 
employers but not preventing them from exercising their economic freedoms and pursuing a 
legitimate social policy objective should be lawful even in light of the economic freedoms (see Reich 
2008), the ECJ made it clear that any kind of hinderace to the economic freedoms allows the 
application of the Treaty provisions, and consequently the collective action does not (even) need to 
be fully effective to fall under the scope of application of Article 43 or 49.
269 Both conducted at a completely national level or in presence of elements of transnationality. See 
also infra par. 2.3.5
In fact, according to the hypothesis that fundamental rights are not 
guaranteed without limitation, the exceptions to the unfolding of economic freedoms 
do not escape the Court’s scrutiny in the light of the proportionality test and the 
boundaries and the guarantees of the exercise of collective action need to be 
circumscribed270.
 An appropriate application of the proportionality principle would have 
required the ECJ to respect the essence of both rights to be reconciled; the Court 
should have therefore counterbalanced the effective protection and enforcement of 
the fundamental freedoms ex articles 43 and 49 EC and the effective protection and 
enforcement of the social right collective action, in particular when it is considered 
that the exercise of fundamental freedoms should not be understood as providing a 
convenient way for undertakings to circumvent national rules on workers’ protection. 
However the ECJ did not modify its interpretation on the contents and 
promotion of the economic freedoms and chose to apply to collective action a very 
strict form of proportionality test, unmitigated by any references to ‘‘margin of 
appreciation’’271; in order for the exercise of this fundamental right to be compatible 
with the Community law, it is not sufficient that the action undertaken would 
otherwise be lawful272 under national labour law but its aims need to be considered, 
as well as the suitability of the action to pursue them273.
The test of proportionality has to be ultimately carried out by the national 
court, which has the sole jurisdiction to assess the facts and to interpret the national 
legislation, in order to determine whether and to what extent such a collective action 
meets those requirements; however, with particular reference to the “other means 
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270 Both in Viking and Laval also the AGs provided that the proportionality test should be taken on a 
case-by-case basis, as  underlined by Blanke 2007. Moreover, the Säger approach followed by the 
Court implies  that even in presence of a justification, trade unions  have to prove that their action 
pursues  the (legitimate) aim of protecting workers  in a “proportionate” manner. This  implies  that the 
ultimate recognition by ECJ of the right to strike is  only conditional on the satisfaction of the 
proportionality test. See Davies 2008, p. 141, Orlandini 2008
271 the strictness of such a proportionality test highlights that the ECJ did not take into consideration 
the need to preserve the “substance” of the right to strike. See Lo Faro 2008, Barnard 2008b, p. 264
272 Nor with the framework presented by the Finnish situation, in which strike action is  already set up 
as an ultima ratio instrument, decisively connected to the signature of a collective agreement. Viking 
parr., 36, 75 and 90 Sciarra 2008a, p. 253
273  Since the Court refuted the existence of a justified aim for restricting the freedom to provide 
services  in Laval, the aspects relating to the proportionality test have not been developed any further 
and the legality of the action was defined only as subject to the maximum standards principle of the 
PWD. Dorssemont in De Vos 2009, p. 95
less restrictive of free movement” that could be used by trade unions in the dispute, 
the Court failed to acknowledge the relative efficacy of different methods of action in 
the bargaining process and in protecting workers’ interests274.
 It is clear from what has been previously analyzed that from an essential 
“rivendicative” instrument the strike is reconstructed as a mainly “defensive” 
industrial relation tool to be only utilized against the most serious disturbances on 
jobs and conditions of employment deriving from the exercise of economic 
freedoms and in a very limited manner; by this reconstruction, linked in particular 
with the conditions for the activation of the right in question275, the very essence of 
the right seems greatly undermined276.
Furthermore, the potential scope of the both vaguely-defined and widely-
applicable proportionality principle elaborated by the ECJ could extend beyond the 
ultima ratio assessment to the concrete features of an otherwise legitimate action; a 
balancing assessment taking into account also the timing of the action and the 
economic losses suffered by the employer in the dispute and, in particular, from the 
precluded exercise of its economic freedom, could entail the risk for more effective 
actions to be considered disproportionate because of the costs and difficulties 
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274 As  noted, a union disposes  probably of a  wide panoply of protest methods which do not imply a 
collective abstention from work (such as a leafleting campaign or a  demonstration conducted outside 
the working hours) or whose definition falls  short of a strike, such as an overtime ban. All these 
options may easily be considered “less restrictive”, however it is clear how they may represent also 
“less  effective” means than collective action for the protection of workers. See Davies  2008, p. 143, 
Hös 2009, p. 29
275  With a judicial assessment substituting trade unions’ considerations  on the necessity of the 
action. See Davies 2008
276 With reference to Viking, the typical pattern for relocation (excluding the maritime sector regulated 
by a specific set of norms), involves the closure of a business and the start of a new one in another 
MS, which does not allow the application of Directive 2001/23, and makes trade union action 
pointless if pursued in ways  and with aims (protecting contractual terms applied prior to the 
relocation) similar to the action undertaken in the Viking case. On the other hand, when the case 
constitutes in fact a transfer of enterprise (characterized by a “significant” transfer of workers), 
Directive 2001/23 can be applied; since the directive safeguards  the jobs  and conditions of 
employment for the workers transferred, collective action aiming at the same goals  becomes 
pointless, and any collective action aimed at obtaining further protection would be disproportionate. 
Similarly, in Laval the right to collective action seems reduced, for the posting of workers  hypotheses, 
almost to an enforcement tool to impose the respect of national collective agreements on 
unscrupulous employers. This  kind of implementation entails  the irrelevance of the recognition of the 
strike as  a fundamental right at EU level and its consequent balancing with the economic freedom 
involved. The combined application of national law on strike and EU norms on the provision of 
services  would in fact suffice to ascertain the lawfulness  of the action undertaken without any need of 
an recourse to the CFREU. See also Orlandini 2008 p. 599
imposed on the employers277, stripping the recognition of the right to strike of any 
possibility for an effective enforcement in the EU framework.
Historically, the “emancipation” of the labour law from the market rules  has 
passed through the creation or the recognition of space for the exercise of collective 
action, and through the provision of tendentially general wage-setting mechanisms 
both by law and by collective agreement278. 
The ECJ judgments tackled both this instruments; by questioning the 
workers’ prerogative to organize themselves for the defence of their interests and to 
determine the appropriateness of an action in pursuance of such objectives and by 
interpreting formalistically the collective agreement they challenge the disassociation 
of the labour norms from the market rules and erode the foundations of the national 
labour law systems279.
In absence of a defined and coherent route for the promotion of  fundamental 
labour rights and their reconciliation with other Treaty freedoms, the economic 
dimension of the European Union cannot but gains once more a clear prevalence280 
over its social aspects281, in particular when it is considered that ECJ’s “hard” 
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277  Thus possibly reverting ECJ’s  previous findings  in Schmidberger, in which the ECJ did not 
proceed in assessing the aims  of the demonstration but only conceptualized the MS’ purpose as 
protecting the fundamental right to strike. See supra par. 1.2.4 and also Reich 2008, p. 22
278 Lyon Caen 2008, p. 2
279  As famously stated by Bercusson, “nineteenth century doctrinal ghosts of the dominance of 
market freedoms, long since revised to reflect the social model of industrial relations in twentieth 
century European welfare states, have returned to haunt EU labour laws  of the twenty first century”. 
(in ETUI Expert Group 2009, p. 462). The Viking and Laval did certainly not represent the first instance 
in which the ECJ was  called to rule on the clash between the fundamental rights  and the economic 
freedoms, but are the first time in which ruled on collective actions which had been undertaken 
directly against the exercise of economic freedoms strictly connected to the demands and instances 
deriving from the enlarged EU. The leeway for the exercise of collective action granted by the Court 
to social actor, entitled to a fundamental social rights, does  not match up to the one recognized to 
the MS (i.e., in Schmidberger and Omega) in order to determine the modalities for protecting other 
fundamental rights (Robin-Olivier and Pataut 2008, p.11). This   concurs to the idea that the collision 
adjudicated by the ECJ is  strictly connected to the concrete development of the enlarged internal 
market, and that the Court positioned itself in a central place for the governing of such process.
280 See Barnard 2008b, p. 264
281 Sciarra in Andreoni and Veneziani, p. 37
scrutiny on the cases in question is embedded in a context carachterised by the use 
of “soft” modules for governance especially in the field of social policy282.
The “Laval quartet” represents therefore a major setback in the construction 
of a EU social right, and the Court’s “unbalanced” solutions risk to further reduce the 
democratic features of the EU283, while providing more opportunities to circumvent 
the norms on workers’ protection284.
2.3.3 - Differences and continuity in the rulings of the “Laval quartet”
While it is evident that in both the Viking and Laval rulings the relationship 
between the fundamental right to take collective action and the free movement 
principles was adjudicated by the ECJ285, the two cases also present various 
differences; in particular, the transposition of the PWD and Lex Britannia are peculiar 
to the Swedish situation, while the events related to the re-flagging of the Rosella 
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282  And, for the particular case of the right to strike, by a continuing lack of competences by EU 
institutions. See amplius  Joerges-Rödl 2009. As it was  underlined, the balancing undertaken by the 
ECJ will remain meaningless  if it is  not possible to effectively test the socially irresponsible exercise 
of fundamental freedom (going against the principles laid down by art. 52 CFREU) as  a restriction to 
the exercise of collective action as  a fundamental right; as noted, in Laval the Latvian company was 
not found to be trying to circumvent the application of national labour law while in Viking the Court 
considered more serious the infringement to economic freedoms than the one to the protection of the 
working condition (with the possible exception of the “serious  threat”). See Ales 2008, p. 15-16, 
Caruso 2008, p. 35, 40
283  Or, in other words, to increase its “democratic deficit” See also Carabelli 2008, p. 164, Supiot 
2008, p. 7
284 Furthermore, the restrictions introduced by the ECJ to the exercise of collective action are at odds 
with the the European Committee on Social Rights case-law on the interpretation of the ESC. In 
particular, the ECSR maintained that allowing a national judge to determine whether recourse to 
strikes is  premature fails to comply with Article 6.4 ESC; the courts  can verify that the exercise of the 
right to strike is in accordance with the rules on fairness  in a dispute, but they cannot supplant the 
social partners in assessing the appropriateness of taking collective action in view of the interests at 
stake (ECSR Conclusions XVI-1  Germany). Similarly, using the principle of proportionality to judge the 
strike’s appropriateness in order to impose bans on a strike if the harmful effects  of a strike are 
disproportionate and that strike could be organized at a less damaging time without losing its 
effectiveness  was  regarded as restriction of the right to strike going beyond those accepted in article 
31 of the Charter (ECSR Conclusions XVI-1 Belgium). See also Dorssemont in De Vos 2009, p. 96
285 Which treated the two cases  very similarly, although not homologously, as testified by the (limited) 
admissibility for the exercise of the right to strike found by the Court in Viking which was, on the other 
hand, excluded in Laval.
(before and after the EU enlargement) and ITF’s fight against flags of convenience 
characterize the Viking case286.
The latter, in particular, is a classic example of frequent occurrences in the 
global maritime transport, a fact that explains the involvement of the ITF, where 
employees are exposed in an exceptional manner to a downward spiral of social 
competition. Moreover, it is to be underlined how, at EU level, the maritime sector 
concerned by Viking, as opposed to the construction sector affected by Laval, is 
regulated by a specific set of rules with reference to the freedom to provide 
services287, which excludes from application both the Collective Redundancies288 
and the Acquired Rights289 Directives290.
The type of action undertaken by the unions involved in the disputes also 
represents a distinction; in both cases are indicated as boycotts, but in Viking the 
core of the collective action is represented by the refusal to enter negotiation and 
conclude collective agreement with the reflagging employer, while in Laval a partial 
refusal by the workers to perform their contract of employment is directed against 
certain clients of their employer291 that are being blacklisted292.
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286 However, as it was  clear from the facts  of the cases, in both situations the trade unions  entered 
negotiations  and started industrial action in manners  compatible with the national and sectoral laws 
and practices; furthermore, the main element representing a substantial departure from other similar 
cases was the opposing attitude by the employers and their intention to pursue the matter resorting 
to legal ways  at very early stages of the negotiations  or commencing procedures against the as soon 
as that possibility ws granted to them. See supra par. 2.2.1 and 2.2.2
287 As noted, mainly constituted by Regulation 4055/86
288 Directive 98/59, art. 1.2 c)
289 Directive 2001/23, art. 1.3
290 In particular, this  exclusion entails that, even without any pronunciation on the matter by the ECJ, 
outsourcing operations are, in effect, easier to carry out in the European maritime sector for the 
specific event of reflagging since maritime employers are free to adopt such strategies without risking 
them being pointless due to the legal safeguarding of employment relationships provided for in the 
Directive. This exclusion is striking in particular when it is  considered that maritime industry has 
already the single most globalized and deregulated labour market. However, while it must be 
underlined that while the undertaking’s  right to change ownership and headquarters is  not denied, 
according to Viking workers can take action not to suffer the more detrimental effects of this  decision 
(on the basis  of the “serious  threat” on the terms and conditions of employment). See Fitzpatrick in 
Dorssemont, Jaspers  & Van Hoek 2007, p. 86, Dorrsemont in De Vos 2009, p. 103 and Orlandini 
2008, p. 599
291  Dorssemont in De Vos 2009, p. 69. As noted above (par. 2.2.2) the ECJ tends  to refer to the 
actions in Laval primarily as blockade actions.
292 It must be noted that, on the other hand, the co-ordinated action of FSU and the boycott of ITF 
was directed only against one part of the business of Viking (the re-flagging of “Rosella”), while the 
action against Laval made the provision of services  through the use of posted workers impossible, 
insofar as it was conditional to the respect of collective bargaining procedures. See Reich 2008, p. 22
However, it is to be considered that in both cases solidarity actions were 
undertaken or threatened, and in both cases they were not simply in support of the 
demands pursued by the trade unions in the main dispute, but were significantly or 
directly enforcing the effects of the primary ones; for the Vaxholm dispute it was the 
boycott of the electricians’ union which actually hindered the prosecution of work293, 
and action by ITF’s affiliates and inspectors represents the core aspect of the FOC 
campaign294.
Lastly, as noted before, in Laval the balance was struck with regards to the 
freedom to provide services ex article 49 EC, while in Viking the freedom of 
establishment is concerned 295.
Since in Viking the exercise of the freedom of establishment was considered 
as a prerequisite for the provision of services, Article 43 EC was applied directly by 
the ECJ in defining the dispute296  to assess the restrictive effect of national and 
transnational collective action on the freedom of establishment; on the other hand, 
given the fact the labour law issues connected to the freedom to provide services 
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293As a matter of fact, the strike implemented by the electricians’ trade union to hinder the 
performance of the contract actually lacked the “main” action that it should have supported since, as 
noted, there were no trade union members among the construction workers employed at the 
Vaxholm site. See Orlandini 2008, p. 586
294 With particular reference to Viking, the question arose with reference to the obligatory nature of 
the ITF’s circular on its  affiliates; the circular seems  to have a declaratory nature clarifying in a 
concrete case the implications of the FOC (and therefore, its withdrawal would not fudnamentally 
affect the possibility for prosecution of the boycott), in particular because the the refusal to conclude 
a collective agreement with a reflagging employer cannot be carried out by ITF but is operated 
through the national affiliates. Furthermore, the “obligation” to respect that campaign does not stem 
from the circular, but from the voluntary affiliation of a national trade union to the ITF. In this sense the 
idea of a solidarity strike “proportional if voluntary” (as provided by AG Maduro in Viking) would 
stand. See Bercusson 2008, p. 7/465
295  However, also from this  point of view the two cases present an element of connection, when 
Article 1.2 PWD is considered; the article in question states  “This Directive shall not apply to 
merchant navy undertakings as regards seagoing personnel”. 
During the course of the FInnish dispute, in particular, Viking Line had maintained (before the High 
Court) that the aforementioned clause would recognize that the principles  set down in the posting of 
workers  case-law were not appropriate for seafarers; however already in Seco the ECJ maintained 
that MS are not required to tolerate low-wage or dumping competition within the field of the free 
provision of services provided by the Treaty. Therefore, secondary legislation like the PWD cannot 
validly exclude the seagoing personnel from the protection granted by the EC Treaty, and by its 
interpretation by the ECJ. See Hellsten 2007, p. 220
296  Altough the reference for a preliminary ruling concerned the interpretation, first, of article, and 
secondly, of Regulation No 4055/86, the Court determined that the question on freedom to provide 
services  can arise only after the reflagging of the Rosella envisaged by Viking (which had not yet 
happens), the questions  referred could be answered “only in so far as they concern the interpretation 
of Article 43 EC”. Viking, parr. 29-31
are dealt with in the Posting of Workers’ Directive, the Laval judgment concerns 
more specifically the relationship between this instrument and primary EC Law297.
In this sense Laval, and not Viking, represents the functional connection 
between the rulings regarding collective action and the two subsequent ones 
concerning the fight against social dumping and the social public order, and testifies 
the continuity of the ECJ’s reasonings in reconciling collective  labour rights and the 
exercise of economic freedoms298.
From this point of view the complex of the four rulings considered represents 
an “escalation” in the balance carried out by the ECJ; Viking and Laval, in fact, 
referred mainly to private disputes299  while Rüffert and Luxembourg concerned the 
public authorities of the host Member States in a posting situation and their freedom 
in determining public policies; the latter case, in particular, constitutes an 
infringement proceeding by the Commission and represents a more political rap 
towards a Member State in its transposition application of the an instrument such as 
the PWD, directly linked to the promotion of one of the Treaty freedoms300.
Furthermore, this growing role in the governing of economic processes is 
apparently accompanied by a declining attention to the promotion of fundamental 
social rights; the Court, in fact, reached possibly more “unbalanced” results, since in 
ruling on Rüffert and Luxembourg the ECJ did not resort to the Charter of 
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297And the restrictive effect of the collective action undertaken by national trade unions was 
apparently scrutinized on the basis of the national legal context.
298  It has however to be underlined how in all the cases  the ultimate goal of trade unions and 
legislatures was  to avoid that the exercise of a fundamental freedom by posting employers would 
have as a direct or indirect side effect the worsening of wage standards and, consequently, of living 
conditions, thus contradicting the principle of “harmonisation in the improvement” laid down in art. 
151, par. 1 TFEU. See Ales 2008, p. 9
299 Altough, as  noted, in Laval the Court had in effect questioned the Swedish transposition of the 
PWD, and the consequently had struck down the right of trade unions of a Member State to take 
collective action - and not the trade union action as such - as  constituting an impediment on the 
freedom to provide services. See also Hös 2009, p. 20
300 This  course appears supported also by EU institutions such as  the Commission; its  position was 
“ambivalent” (both in media appearances  by its representatives  and in its  submissions) in Viking and 
Laval, but in Rüffert it submitted a series of considerations against the Lower Saxony law on public 
procurement (which was  deemed incompatible with PWD as it did not rely on erga omnes  collective 
agreements, and created discrimination between workers of the construction industry on the basis  of 
the public or private nature of the contractor), stressing that the aim of the PWD is  to strike a balance 
between the freedom to provide services and the protection of posted workers, and that the detailed 
framework provided by this instrument must be complied with by the MS.
Fundamental Rights301 or other international instruments to reconcile the contrasting 
social and economic aspects connected to the posting of workers, provided a 
formalistic and static interpretation of collective agreements and antidumping 
measures302 vis-a-vis the exercise of the economic freedoms, and underlined that a 
strict analysis of the reasons justifying the derogations is needed; in particular the 
requests for “appropriate evidence or by an analysis of the expediency and 
proportionality of the restrictive measure adopted by that State, and precise 
evidence enabling its arguments to be substantiated”303  represent an invasive 
interference on the national prerogatives in the regulation of the labour market304, 
especially when it is considered that such an analysis should address the desired 
effects and actual consequences of domestic measures on an indefinite variety of 
situations possibly covering the entirety of the national system defining labour 
relations.
2.3.4 - The PWD revirement
Through its rulings in Laval, Rüffert and Luxembourg the Court has completed 
a substantial reversal from its “strong worker protection” approach set out as early 
as Rush Portuguesa and Albany305, in which art. 49 EC allowed for a high 
justification level and the PWD, from its entry into force, set a level of minimum 
rights for posted workers, to an approach substantially promoting the unfolding of 
economic freedoms and competition among economic actors at EU level.
By narrowing as much as possible the space accorded to the workers 
protection justification allowing the Member States to impose legislative or collective 
bargaining terms on posting undertaking, the ECJ did not recognize the autonomous 
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301 And in particular, article 31 on “fair and just working conditions” which, it should be noted, found 
application in subsequent ECJ jurisprudence such as  Palhota (see infra par. 4.3.1). See Reich 2008, 
p. 359
302 Not taking into account the fact that regulatory options such as  the one carried out in the Lower 
Saxony public procurement law have not only the clear objective of protecting the national labour 
market, but are also part of a system aimed at guaranteeing a more general adequacy of the 
contractors with respect to entrepreneurial and organizational standards.
303 Luxembourg, parr. 51
304 See Sciarra in Andreoni and Veneziani 2009, pp. 37-38.
305 In the competition law context. See supra par. 1.2.4
political core right of a Member State to define which of its social policy measures 
are considered so important that they should apply to all its national service 
providers, and therefore as well to cross border service providers to counter unfair 
competition.
In Rüffert and Luxembourg, in particular, the ECJ has applied the principles 
developed in Laval to declare national collective labour law protection incompatible 
with the PWD and Article 49 EC: this result has been achieved by repositioning the 
PWD as an almost exhaustive statement of the art. 49 EC justification for posted 
workers as well as by tightening the applicability of the PWD with regards to 
monitoring and reporting conditions306.
Therefore, the matters covered by the EU instrument not only represent those 
areas in which Member States must act in order to provide a coordinated ensemble 
of national measures protecting workers in posting situations, but also constitute the 
boundaries beyond which the action of the Member States cannot be justified307, 
and therefore the maximum level of protection that a Member States is entitled to 
impose on foreign service providers.
The Court’s interpretation thus comes rather close to an understanding of the 
Posting of Workers Directive as a ceiling: that is, an almost exhaustive description of 
the competence of the Member States in relation to the terms and conditions which 
can be imposed on posted workers308. 
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306 Adding to the already existing “inventory of restrictions” mainly deriving from ECJ case-law with 
reference to various aspects of the posting such as  obligatory adherence to funds (Seco, Arblade), 
the the need to obtain a work permit for the staff (Rush Portuguesa, Vander Elst), and the “absolute 
restriction” constituted by the requirement of a permanent establishment which “is the very negation 
of the fundamental freedom to provide services in that it results in depriving Article [49] of the Treaty 
of all effectiveness” (C-493/99 Commission v. Germany, par. 19). See Sjödin 2009, pp. 34-50
307  In the Laval case, it was  industrial action by Swedish unions  that was  found to infringe the right to 
provide services. In Rüffert, it is  the inclusion of contract compliance conditions  in public 
procurement contracts that not only infringes the right to provide services, but is  also unlawful solely 
because the contract compliance conditions exceeded the protections  laid down in the PWD (the 
wage level, in particular, was transparent and easy to ascertain in advance for a foreign service 
provider).
308 Malmberg 2010a, p. 7
The labour law and collective action “neutrality” set by the EU legislation on 
services309  seem lost in the ECJ’s reasonings, and the “country of origin” principle 
set under the initial draft of the Services Directive310 seems to be partially re-instated 
by the ECJ with regards to posted workers311; the ECJ judgements in question have 
created a situation whereby intra-EU competition is not required anymore to be on 
equal terms, since foreign services providers are allowed to widely exploit their 
competitive advantage on wage levels and do not have to comply with mandatory 
rules that are imperative provisions of national law and that therefore automatically 
apply and must be respected by domestic services providers.
While the PWD still does not harmonize the material content of those 
mandatory rules for minimum protection and a certain degree of autonomy is 
necessarily left to MS, the clarification that the public interest justification is 
excluded a priori for the cases in which the national provisions regard matters 
already covered by the EU law, for which minimum requirements are set both by the 
host country and by the other Member States312  represents possibly the most 
disruptive outcome of the judicial course set by the ECJ, and could result in a “free 
ticket” for social dumping313, given the prohibition for the Member States to maintain 
or adopt measures “more favourable to workers” than the minimum ones.
	 The ECJ, by interpreting both the PWD and the national laws transposing 
it314, has therefore provided to Member States a series of indications on correctly 
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309 Namely, the PWD (96/71/EC) and the DSIM (2006/123/EC). The ECJ in the rulings at hand has 
clarified unequivocally a crucial point, declaring that “according to Article 3(1)(a) thereof, Directive 
2006/123 is  not intended to replace Directive 96/71 and the latter prevails over the former in the 
event of conflict” (Luxembourg, par. 23) because it represents  a distinct and more specific source of 
law. See Sciarra in Andreoni and Veneziani 2009, p. 25
310 By greatly reducing the possibilities  for the application of the “country of employment” principle 
the ECJ has re-introduced the Bolkenstein proposal “through the back door” (Baumann 2009 p. 21). 
See Pallini 2006 and Hendrickx 2009, p. 72.
311 See supra par. 2.1. In particular the provisions of the DSIM aimed at the protection of the national 
labour law systems, negotiated by the trade union in order to avoid social dumping, can be 
threatened by the persisting application of the more general provisions of the EC Treaty, as  it has 
happened in Viking and Laval, leaving very little room to the possible interference with the four 
freedoms. See Barnard 2008a
312 As  for the case of fixed-term and part-time work regulated by Directives 97/81/EC e 99/70/EC. 
See Pallini 2008, p. 9
313 Picard 2008, p. 165
314 The AG in Luxembourg had also stated that it is  standing case-law related to article 49 EU that “all 
restrictions, even if these are mandatory for domestic service providers” have to be abolished 
(Luxembourg, AG’s Opinion, par. 56).
implementing EU law, with a view of reducing uncertainty and potential burdens for 
service providers.315
	 Apart from challenging the national labour market policies and industrial 
relation systems as well as jeopardizing the position of national undertakings, these 
judgments challenge the original intention at the base of the drafting the PWD316, 
meant to be an instrument to secure national working conditions instead of 
discarding them; the PWD was aimed since its inception at simplifying and 
promoting the posting of workers, and clarifying the conditions applicable to them.
 On the other hand, the requirements for a “climate of fair competition” and for 
“measures guaranteeing respect for the rights of workers”317  are explicitly stated; 
such objectives coexist in the wording of the Directive and therefore, in its rigidly 
market-oriented interpretation of this instrument the ECJ disregarded a set of clearly 
identifiable alternatives318.
Furthermore, ECJ’s reductionist interpretation implies the removal of every 
obligatory notification and registration of the service provider and the workers 
involved, which have to be guaranteed, along with their monitoring, by the country 
of origin; this reconstruction, throughly supported by the Commission, is however 
bound to hinder the reciprocal evaluation and information exchange between 
national bureaucratic apparatuses and monitoring authorities, with severe risks for 
the operativity of instruments directed at preventing abuses319  and ensuring 
compliance with workers’ rights, which represent a basic element in the fight against 
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315 However the PWD, as noted, provides  a certain margin of discretion for the MS while the direct 
application of home state standards or of a Community-wide set of minimum standards  are arguably 
the best way to achieve clarity. In this perspective it has  to be underlined that collective bargaining 
(while being in effect “uncertain” and potentially time consuming) also presents  a set of advantages: 
in particular, it gives  the employer a say in the terms and conditions it must apply to the posted 
workers  and an opportunity to argue, for example, that it cannot afford a proposed minimum wage 
level; wider benefits  may relate to the building up relationships with local trade unions. Davies 2008, 
p. 144-45
316 See Giubboni 2008, p. 27
317 PWD, recital 5.
318  In particular, there seem to be three feasible perspectives  for understanding the PWD: non-
discrimination of workers, equality of treatment of undertakings  and prohibition of obstacles to 
freedom of services applicable without distinction. See Borelli 2008a, p. 360.
319As, for instance, Luxembourg’s  provision requiring a written labour contract for all employees, 
independent of whether workers are national or foreign citizens. See in Andreoni and Veneziani 2009, 
p. 25
bogus work agencies and other undeclared practices320 which the EU nonetheless 
promotes321.
2.3.5 - Further considerations 
The implications of the judgments need also to be analyzed within the context 
of the “Europeanization” of labour and collective relations and the European Social 
Model 322; the prejudice showed by the ECJ towards social intervention by Member 
States or trade unions in defense of workers’ interests323  is at risk of creating 
negative consequences in the national systems. 
Moreover, the framework provided by the rulings is still far from being clear 
and several elements of the rulings remain in strong need of a clarification, leaving 
potentially many kinds of actions or normative provisions at risk of being subject to 
an assessment on the compatibility with the Treaty freedoms324.
As noted, it is clear that the Laval, Rüffert and Luxembourg course defines a 
complex, if not complete, discipline for the interactions of the fundamental social 
rights, included the one to take collective action, with the hypotheses of trans-
national posting of workers regulated by the PWD: several elements are clearly 
stated, although no guidance was issued by the ECJ specifically in order to assess 
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320 Such as the fictitious autonomous work
321 See amplius Cremers and Janssen 2008 and Cremers and Donders 2009.
322 In particular it was noted how the lack of effective IR systems  in the NMS-12 does not help in the 
creation of an integrated system of IR (for instance, coordinating the systems for collective 
bargaining) within the European Social Model (see supra 2.1); in this  context, the ECJ’s reconstruction 
of collective bargaining and action as auxiliary and residual hypotheses with respect to minimum 
standard and wage setting through legislative provision, does not seem to promote social dialogue at 
national level (through, for instance, recourse to art. 3.8 PWD) and, by that, hinders the effective 
implementation of social legislation in these MS and the ability of NMS-12 social partners  to act at 
EU level (Zahn 2008, p. 16). Major consequences  may affect the stability of the Nordic social model, 
nonetheless praised by the EU as  reconciling flexibility and security, and the European Social Model 
in general, given the apparent precedence of the economic perspective over the social one (see infra 
“flexibility” and the paradox of the Nordic model). As predicted, in fact, national welfare systems like 
the Swedish one, were modified in order to correctly implement the case-law on the conflict with the 
rights and freedoms protected by the Treaty. See Barnard 2008b, but especially with reference to the 
reflections on the rulings on the national systems the following chapter
323 Which made the ECJ overcome art. 137.5 of the EC Treaty in Viking and Laval. See Reich 2008.
324 With the further vuluns  for the effective enforcement of the right to take collective action deriving 
from the uncertainity by trade unions with regards to the possibility that a collective action might be 
‘disproportionate’ or not. See Picard 2008, p.165
trade union and Member State liability, and, major policy indications can be drawn 
by the Member States on the matters covered by the rulings325.
Viking, on the other hand, delegates the concrete definition of the 
compatibility of the collective action with EU law to domestic courts, which have to 
operate through the aforementioned criteria in determining the action’s justification 
and its proportionality; its wider scope326  entails that at the moment the control of 
proportionality in cases involving the reconciliation of right to take collective action 
with economic freedoms327  other than the one to provide services is demanded to 
the national judges328.
While the referral of the analysis on proportionality to national courts can be 
considered appropriate, It must be underlined that, apart from the strict 
proportionality test, Viking does not provide such courts with sufficient guidance in 
the balancing of the economic freedoms and the rights involved by the dispute329.
Such a situation is liable to produce negative effects, since the application of 
a proportionality principle in industrial action cases requires highly specialized labour 
courts with a deep understanding of the industrial relations context330, but the 
national courts actually involved may not have the institutional strength or the 
technical capacity to fully evaluate the merits and the backgrounds of an industrial 
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325 See supra par. 2.3.4. It is not by chance that Sweden, Denmark and Luxembourg amended their 
national legislation in direct accordance with the main points deriving the ECJ rulings. See infra par. 
3.1, also with reference to the more complex German situation, which entails  significant differences at 
national and regional level and presents different problematic aspects.
326 Deriving from the direct application of the Treaty provision to the dispute.
327A series of brief observations  must be made with regards  to the potential useful space of a 
definition of trans-nationality of the dispute or action in order for the ECJ case-law to apply, and the 
consequent reduced ability for TUs to take industrial action in transnational situations. However, as 
confirmed by Viking and Laval, any kind of restriction allows the application of EU law; therefore, even 
if required, an indefinitely small element of trans-nationality (see infra par. 3.2.2 with regards to the 
contested strategic outsourcing decision by British Airways  that gave origin to the BALPA dispute), 
would entail the possibility for an employer to challenge collective action by trade unions. It could 
also be argued that the ability to invoke community rights only where there is an international element 
is of itself a  restriction of Community rights, and that therefore in all “free movement” disputes the 
rules on the right of strike should follow those set in Viking and Laval, regardless  of the existence of 
an international or cross-border element (in particular for those situations, such as  the German one 
where different geographical areas present different levels in terms of statutory minimum wages and 
social protection standards). See Carabelli 2008 and Ornstein, Smith 2008 
328 Which entails  the major consequence that these rulings  could potentially be recurred against in 
international Courts  and adjudicating bodies such as  the ECtHR and the ILO Committee of Experts 
(see infra BALPA case cap.3) for breach of fundamental rights.
329 As also underlined supra, par 2.3.4
330 Davies 2008, p. 146
dispute (especially in presence of wide-ranging economic considerations or social 
protections issued linked with the core of the national system), such as whether it 
would in fact protect workers' rights, the steps taken to resolve the dispute, and the 
effective use of the conciliatory instruments where provided to the parties331.
Allowing reliance to the provisions on economic freedoms against private 
actors needs for the definition of specific limits and boundaries, especially in 
consideration of the remedies available to and legitimate reactions by employers; in 
particular, the direct subjection of the trade unions to the respect of the economic 
freedoms implies sanctions which are not necessarily identical to the ones imposed 
to Member States.
The ECJ’s decisions, therefore, pave the way for a Francovich-style of 
damage claims against private actors332 - in casu labour unions - for breach of the 
market freedoms for all the cases in which the collective action is deemed unlawful 
by the ECJ or by the national courts because of its incompatibility with Treaty 
provisions; such a solution is at risk of further restricting the exercise of the right to 
collective action333  which, in absence of detailed and sound criteria, finds its 
lawfulness or unlawfulness linked to the problematic judicial reconstruction of 
justification and proportionality334.
As noted, in Viking the ECJ followed a different approach in its conclusions 
concerning the FSU strike and coordinated solidarity action taken in order to 
implement the ITF’s FOC policy; for the latter case, even if the objective of that 
policy was to protect and improve the conditions of seafarers’ terms and conditions 
of employment, “the restrictions on freedom of establishment resulting from such 
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331 As  noted supra, the absence of guidance on the application of the “least restrictive alternative” 
test could entail the risk that the courts “will identify alternatives without considering their 
effectiveness in the bargaining process”. See Davies 2008, p. 143
332 In Francovich, the Court allowed individuals  to claim damages against a State that has failed to 
apply or implement EC law correctly. Case C-479/93, Francovich v Italy. Such a claim had only been 
allowed in “private” cases under the competition rules (see Case C-453/99, Courage and Crehan). 
See infra par. 3.2.1 for the Swedish Labour Court findings on the matter. 
333 In particular in consideration oif the fact that in many national systems, restrictions to the right of 
strike are only directed at ensuring the respect of equally protected constitutional-level rights, among 
which the economic freedoms  are only seldom considered. See infra with respect to the Italian 
situation.
334  And is  directed furthermore to the whole organization rather than on the individually identified 
striking workers  (as provided, for instance, by the French and Italian law). See Robin-Olivier and 
Pataut 2008
action could not be objectively justified”, in casu because the exercise of the 
freedom of establishment had been effectively prevented, and more in general 
because the refusal to enter negotiation and sign agreements with reflagging 
shipowners  undertaken by ITF’s affiliates activates regardless of the presence of 
actual harmful effects for the workers involved 335.
However, the coordinated action against the reflagging is evidently composed 
by two main elements: the circular issued by the ITF, aimed at reserving the right of 
collective negotiations to trade unions of the State of establishment of the 
“beneficial owner” of the vessel and the various collective actions carried out by the 
national affiliates336.
The nature of the ITF action appears therefore, modest; the national trade 
unions, in fact, can autonomously decide whether to enforce the circular or not337, 
and any collective action undertaken should be consistent with the legal framework 
and social model of the Member State concerned. 
However, notwithstanding the fact that ITF’s activity is much less than the 
action taken by national affiliates, the balancing carried in Viking undermines the 
main purpose of this policy338, at least within the boundaries of the European Union, 
134
335 Similar doubts and criticism were also expressed by the AG , which concluded that in principle, 
coordinated collective action can be an effective means  to counterbalance the economic power of 
employers in the case of relocations. However, the obligatory nature of the ITF’s policy enabled “any 
national union to summon the assistance of other unions  in order to make relocation to another 
Member State conditional on the application of its  own preferred standards of worker protection, 
even after relocation has taken place. In effect, therefore, such a policy would be liable to protect the 
collective bargaining power of some national unions at the expense of the interests of others, and to 
partition off the labour market in breach of the rules on freedom of movement.” See supra par. 2.2.1
336 As  previously underlined (see supra footnote 494), if on one hand in the maritime sector relocation 
can take place through a merely legal and not physical (and therefore easier) relocation of the work 
place, on the other hand the trade union strategy (based on a co-ordinated exercise of the freedom 
not to engage in collective bargaining) appears  far less  complex than those carried out in a “typical” 
case of relocation (which often implies more radical pressure means  such as  blockades or factory 
occupation). See Jaspers in Dorssemont, Jaspers & Van Hoek 2007, p. 64, Orlandini 2008, p. 578
337 It has  to be noted that the issuing of the circular by ITF falls short of the exercise of the right to 
collective action, especially when it is considered that is  not directly implemented. The decision by 
trade unions, furthermore, is as  autonomous  as the one to join ITF in the first place and therefore, as 
noted, no obligatory nature can be derived by the circular (see supra par. 2.2.1), although, of course, 
to adopt this approach would jeopardize their membership of the ITF; in this sense the effect of the 
criticised automatism in the application of the FOC policy is  greatly downsized. See Bercusson 
2008a, p. 685 
338  id est, to protect and to enhance the protection of seafarers  on ships flying under a “flag of 
convenience”.
in which its objectives constitute a restriction on the economic freedoms promoted 
by the Treaty339.
It has to be noted, in fact, that the coordinated action against the reflagging 
employer was far from questioned when it involved a non-EU establishment, nor did 
the need for reconciliation between social rights and economic freedoms came into 
consideration340; once Estonia became part of the EU, however, a relocation based 
on exclusively economic consideration was protected by the Treaty provisions 
without the need for the employer to provide any guarantee with respect to the right 
of the workers. 
The trade union position, in particular with reference to the shift of the burden 
of proof for the justification and proportionality of the action and the close scrutiny 
carried out by the ECJ, highlights how there is currently no need to preliminarily 
verify the respect of EU provisions on terms of employment and working condition, 
which would ideally offset the risk for social dumping within the Union341.
 ECJ’s interpretation of the PWD in the light of Article 49 EC also tackles the 
main issues of the national application of the ILO Convention 94342 on social clauses 
in public contracts, stating that such contracts shall include clauses ensuring to the 
workers concerned “wages (including allowances), hours of work and other 
conditions of labour” not less favorable than those established for similar work in 
the sector where the work is carried343. 
 In particular, the first option provided by the Convention for the setting of 
such terms and condition is the recourse to “collective agreement or other 
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339The Court, questionably, did not sufficiently assess the link between ITF’s policy and the 
circumstances of the case - which could have been established - but addressed directly the 
objectives and the justification of the policy of the international federation. See Nivard 2008, p. 1203.
340 That is, it can still be affirmed that such an operation involving third countries would still be seen 
as “reflagging under a flag of convenience”, and consequently as social dumping.
341  Two main troubling considerations can be drawn: in primis, the continuing lack (beside the 
definitions by the ECJ with relation to PWD) of an effective discipline on social dumping, and 
secondly the possible extension of the Viking prohibition on coordinated action to other types of 
social action deriving from trade union affiliation, especially at sectoral level where ETUC and ist 
affiliate organizations would face an inadmissibility of (much needed) cross-border coordination in the 
enlarged internal market. See Sciarra 2009, pp. 15 ff.
342 It has to be noted however, that Germany had not ratified ILC 94.
343 ILO Convention 94 concerning Labour Clauses in Public Contracts, 1949, article 2.1
recognised machinery of negotiation”344; in adopting and implementing the PWD, 
the Commission declared that such instrument was fully consistent with ILC 94. 
 In particular after Rüffert the situation may vary between Member States on 
the basis of the fact that they have or have not ratified ILC 94, heightening the level 
of uncertainty on the application of national rules345; these Conventions in fact, 
being part of secondary legislation, could be seen as not “crucial for the protection 
of the political, social and economic order” and therefore deemed as hinder the free 
provision of services346.
 The legitimacy of the continuing development of European integration on 
social themes depends also on being at the forefront for workers’ protection; the 
possibly negative consequences of the ECJ’s judicial course on ITF’s “flags of 
convenience” campaign and on the application of international instruments such as 
the ILO Conventions jeopardize EU’s role in the promotion of global workers’ rights, 
in particular when it is considered that a higher level of workers’ protection finds 
easier application situations involving non-EU countries than in intra-Community 
ones.
 It was noted that the systematic “decoupling” of social issues from the 
economic integration project has led to a constitutional asymmetry between the 
social and economic dimensions of European integration, which makes the 
resolution of any conflict between the economic and social values and goals of the 
EC Treaty extremely controversial347. 
 With particular reference to the EU initiatives in the areas of employment and 
social policy and labour law, these have shown a preference for the use of 
mechanisms such as the Open Method of Coordination and other “soft law” 
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344 Which need to be carried out “between organisations  of employers  and workers representative 
respectively of substantial proportions of the employers and workers  in the trade or industry 
concerned”; other options indicated are arbitration award or national laws or regulations. Ibid.
345  Even if the conflict highlighted by Rüffert is of limited scope, not relating to purely domestic 
situations, or involving non-EU countries, as  well as  those hypotheses  of public procurement which 
do not involve the posting of workers. See Bruun & Jacobs 2008, p. 10
346 Cremers 2008, p. 13
347 See Joerges & Rödl 2008, Scharpf 2009
governance instruments348, with the consequent enforcement and monitoring resting 
at national level, over the use of harmonization and legislative (and in particular of 
constitutional level)  mechanisms to reconcile social policy and the enlarged market 
order.
 Within this approach, the labour law which is being currently advocated and 
encouraged by the Commission promotes “flexicurity” and social inclusion349  and 
therefore foresees a flexible labour market in which workers will routinely be required 
to re-skill (through comprehensive lifelong learning) and move between sectors and 
in which active welfare and labour market policies as well as modern social security 
systems are bound to play a deeply complementary role350.
 It must however be noted that the rulings of the “Laval quartet” place more 
emphasis on the promotion of the economic dimension of the internal market and, 
for the case of Viking and Laval, ostensibly unfold their most direct effects on the 
industrial relations, welfare systems and social partnership models of Member 
States which have been at the forefront of these kind of progress long before the 
enlargement351.
	 Furthermore, in the European integration process, in which judge-made law 
has always been of crucial importance, the very role of the ECJ has expanded from 
a mainly sanctionatory intervention against violations of unambiguous prohibitions in 
the Treaty and protectionist measures to a quasi-federal and quasi-constitutional 
activity, gradually involving in its decisions not only partial sectors of the national 
juridical corpus, but the constitutional structures regulating the fundamental social 
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348As  well as programs for direct assistance such as the European Globalization Adjustment Fund 
(EGAF), which has the aim of “stimulating economic growth and creating more jobs in the EU”, 
allowing the EU institution to provide support for workers  made redundant as  a result of structural 
changes in trade patterns due to globalization (EGAF Regulation, art 1.1). It has been underlined that 
such a choice may also be derived from the delays and the inaccuracies in the transposition of the 
EU law into the national systems that have hindered the harmonization processes  and have paved 
the way for the prevalence of the recourse to soft law instruments  such as the European Employment 
Strategy. See Sciarra 2008a, De Vos 2009, pp. 120-125, Vandamme 2009.
349 Michelini & Piccone 2008, p.3. See infra par 4.2.1 with reference to the developments in the Single 
Market Act
350 On the matter of flexicurity, which evidently escapes the focus of the analysis, see amplius  De Vos 
in De Vos 2009, p.105-120.
351  Barnard 2008b. The “paradox” of the Nordic model was also underlined by Chaumette 2008, 
Baumann 2009 and Weiss 2010.
rights352; the latter need therefore to be reconsidered, in a EU setting, not only with 
reference to their content but also to the instruments available to guarantee their 
enforceability353, especially when it is considered that ECJ appears to thin out the 
national protections, rather than integrate the various levels of protection available to 
workers.
	 The clearly political stance taken by the ECJ, promoting market deregulation 
and placing the logic of the internal market above the social protection even at risk 
of the technical soundness of its juridical reasoning, coupled with the fundamentally 
secretive and stand-alone nature of this EU institution, interferes decisively with the 
application national labour rules354  and public procurement law and undermine 
national collective agreement systems. 
 Furthermore, it allows economic freedoms, tampered only by an unspecified 
“social dimension” of the European Union355, to question the labour and social 
constitution of the most socially advanced Member States, in a context 
carachterised, as noted, by an increased mobility of workers and services, and by 
the multiplying of possible stata for the workers, of which the major part of the 
workers fall outside the protective umbrella of the trade union affiliation356, and in a 
critical economic situation in which should be paramount to maintain or even 
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352 See Scharpf 2010. It has however been underlined that when national constitutional rights and 
deep-rooted models of social regulation are involved, the judicial seat - how ever  authoritative and 
enlightened - cannot be “left alone”. See Lo Faro 2008, p. 89
353 See Caruso 2008.
354 In particular heightening the degree of uncertainty related to the possible application of the widely 
recognised collective labour rights. See Van Peijpe 2009
355 Joerges & Rödl 2008
356 Union density figures  highlighted an average density for the year 2008 of around 26 %. Source: 
Industrial Relations in Europe, Report 2010, European Commission; the main source used is the 
ICTWSS - Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social 
Pacts, a database containing around 100 variables  for the 1960-2009 period and for 34 countries. 
See also Amoroso in Andreoni and Veneziani 2009, 74. 
extend357  the level of minimum social protection358  rather than carry out market 
deregulation strategies and the watering down of minimum standards.
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357 Baumann 2009, p. 22
358  In this  sense, it should be underlined that some rulings by the ECJ contemporary to the Laval 
quartet (C-268/06  Impact, in which the Court stated that fixed-term workers are entitled to equality of 
treatment with respect to pay, benefits, working conditions, promotion, training and opportunities  and 
C 246/06 Velasco Navarro, in which it was provided that a guarantee institution must provide equal 
treatment to all the cases of indemnity for unfair dismissal, without distinction between those 
established by courts and those agreed by the parties in a pre-procedural conciliation) lay at the core 
of their analysis  the protection of fundamental rights and also provide that the principle of equality 
can be relied upon directly before a national court. These decisions can be welcomed with somewhat 
cautious optimism, since they highlight the need for a nucleus of protection for the social dimension 
of the EU less and less exposed to attacks  from mercantile demands, but at the same time underline 
a fundamental difference in reconstructing individual and collective employment and labour rights by 
the ECJ. See also Michelini & Piccone 2008, p. 9
3- CONSEQUENCES AND DEVELOPMENTS
3.1 - Impact and Influence on national Industrial Relation systems
3.1.1 - Sweden: a paradigm for the Nordic MS
Among the most evident effects of the judicial course undertaken by the ECJ 
in the aforementioned cases is the series of amendments of national legislation in 
the Member States directly concerned by the rulings, in primis  those experiencing 
the so-called “Nordic model” of industrial relations, the scene the two most relevant 
cases of the Laval quartet; the restrictions to the demands of host MS’ trade unions 
constitutes a new concept in Sweden: the impact of the judgments is of great 
importance in such an industrial relation system, where the social partners have 
enjoyed great freedom to negotiate and conclude collective agreements in just 
about any issue concerning the relationship between employers and employees.
The Swedish experience, in fact, has historically presented as its main feature 
an autonomous involvement by social partners1  in the definition of the labour 
regulation, and a corresponding non interventionism by the State; this attitude, 
providing for little or no state authority overseeing the activities and operations by 
the social partners, has been made possible by the pervasiveness of multi-level 
collective bargaining systems, an high degree of membership in the representative 
organizations2  and by the spirit of cooperation and partnership which have 
carachterised the self-governance by the social partners.
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1  The main confederations, LO (Landsorganisationen i Sverige) on the trade union side, and on the 
other hand Svenskt Näreingsliv (formerly SAF), have in fact, been active since the end of the XIX 
Century. See Rönmar 2004, p. 95.
2 Around 70-75% for the trade union side (73% at the thime of the Laval decision), a data in line with 
the average for the Nordic countries, which present a minimum of 60% in Norway and a maximum of 
about 90% in Iceland.
Notwithstanding the relevance of the standard setting role of collective 
bargaining in the Swedish experience3, collective agreements are still regarded as 
private law instruments; signature of collective agreements on employment and 
working conditions  and relationships between workers and employers can occur at 
national, sectoral and company level.
The three levels in collective relations maintain their autonomy and 
progressively complement the higher one, producing a very flexible system, in 
particular at local level, where the wage bargaining occurring between the individual 
employer and the local branch of the trade union, which allows a high degree of 
adaptability in the autonomous standard setting by social partners; as noted before4, 
an employer not affiliated with any representative organization (including a foreign 
employer) can sign directly with the union an application agreement (hängavtal) 
which usually extends the provisions of the sectoral collective agreement in force in 
that particular branch of activity to all workers in the workplace, regardless of their 
affiliation to a trade union.
The highlighted ideological and political consensus on cooperative self-
regulation does not necessarily imply the absence of conflict in the relationships 
between trade unions and employers’ organisations5: the Swedish industrial action 
legislation presents at its core a constitutional protection for the right to strike6, 
coupled with the restrictions to its exercise set by the rules of the 1976 Co-
Determination Act7 for both unions and employers.
It has to be underlined how also for this sector State intervention has been 
kept to a minimum, and while the Parliament has maintained the possibility of 
issuing legislation on the matter, the main premise of action by the legislator was to 
leave to the social partners the responsibility of ensuring a correct use of the 
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3  The “centre of gravity” of the Swedish system, collective agreements  concluded between the 
representative organizations cover around 90% of workers, and represent, as  noted supra (par 2.2.2) 
the only source of regulation with regards in particular to pay and other remuneration. See Swedish 
Government 2008, p. 9
4 See par. 2.2.2
5 See Bruun-Jonsson in Bücker and Warneck 2010, p. 17
6 Complemented by the still valid 1936 Saltsjöbaden agreement (signed between SAF and LO), which 
contains rules for industrial action and for bargaining and for disputes regarded as posing a danger to 
society. See Eurofound 2003
7  Lag on Medbestämmande i arbetslivet (1976:580), literally Act on Employee Consultation and 
Participation in Working Life and following amendments  (hereby MBL), designed to promote “labour 
stability”.
collective action instruments.
According to Swedish Instrument of Government8, Chapter 2, Section 17, any 
trade union or employer or association of employers is entitled to take strike or lock-
out action or any similar measure unless a law or an agreement provide otherwise; 
the starting point in the Swedish experience is therefore one of a very wide 
recognition, both in terms of  entitlement to the right to take collective action, 
encompassing both workers’ and employers’ associations9, and in terms of the 
features of the specific actions that can be undertaken10  and aims pursued, 
although collective action must exert pressure on the opposite party in a work-
related dispute and, to be legal, it must take place in an organized manner and 
following a decision taken in accordance with the rules of an organization entitled to 
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8The Instrument of Government (Regeringsformen, RF) is the most important of the fundamental laws 
composing the Swedish Constitution, the others being the Act of Succession regulating the access  to 
the monarchy, the Freedom of the Press Act and the Fundamental Law on Freedom of Expression. It 
sets out the basic principles of Swedish political life, as well as the fundamental rights and freedoms
9  In Sweden, therefore, non-union workers cannot exercise the right to strike, which cannot be 
considered as  an individual right but of exclusive union entitlement. In 2004 a Council of Europe 
committee found that fact alone did not violate the European Social Charter, on the basis  of the fact 
that  that a vast portion of the Swedish workforce is unionized and that workers  are free to form trade 
unions  without excessive Government intervention. The MBL, in fact, prohibits any interference with 
the right of association; in particular sect. 8 provides that an infringement of the right in question 
occurs when an employer or employee, or their representatives, take action “detrimental to the other 
party”or “for the purpose of inducing that party not to exercise” the right of association. With more 
specific reference to the right to collective action, the Employment Protection Act (LAS, covering 
almost all workers  in both private and public sector) protects  workers, including union members, 
against dismissals for taking part in a legal strike; striking workers  are still employees  and entitled to 
their jobs  after a legal strike ends. See 2011 OSCE (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights) Report, available online at http://legislationline.org/topics/country/1/topic/1/subtopic/17
10  The starting point of both of the constitution and of the MBL, therefore, is that that of an 
unrestricted right to strike. Collective actions  are lawful and allowed unless  specifically prohibited, 
and may include strikes, boycotts, blockades, go-slow, work-to-rule and overtime ban and, more 
importantly, solidarity strikes. Industrial action must not be taken against companies  without 
employees, and it must also not be used against companies  where the person running the business 
or the family of the person running the business  are the sole employees and sole owners, or in order 
to support “someone who wishes  to reach a collective bargaining agreement with such a 
business” (Sect. 41b MBL); however, a union may urge its  members  and other individuals  not to enter 
into employment in the enterprise concerned. A set of rules “absent” from the MBL is the one 
regulating the strike in essential public services and important societal functions: however, according 
to the Public Employment Act, public sector employees also have the right to strike and take other 
forms  of union-authorized collective action. See Warneck 2007, p. 68, Bruun-Jonsson in Bücker-
Warneck 2010, p. 16, and infra for a more detailed analysis of the solidarity strike.
sign a collective agreement11.
 Notwithstanding some attempts dating to the late ‘90s12, a general principle 
of proportionality for collective action is still absent from the Swedish legal 
framework on industrial disputes, in particular due to the Government’s restraint 
from putting forward any proposals for its introduction13. 
Among the more detailed legislation contained in the aforementioned MBL, of 
fundamental importance for the definition of the Swedish industrial relation systems 
are the rules governing the peace obligations, which constitute key limitations to the 
industrial conflict right14, those regarding the lawfulness of secondary action and, 
lastly the role of mediation authority in the arising disputes. 
Therefore, according to Sect. 41 of the MBL, an employer and employee who 
are bound by a collective agreement may not “initiate or participate” in industrial 
action15 if the action is in breach of a provision on peace obligations included in a 
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11 While collective action must be duly “sanctioned” or “ordered” (see Sect. 41 MBL), and approval 
by the union is therefore to be considered mandatory, no legislative instrument requires a prior union 
membership vote. In practice, the decision is  taken by the board of the sectoral union. With reference 
to the possibility of the undertaking of a collective action for political purposes, it is not automatically 
unlawful but it cannot compress the other party’s  rights in such a way to be considered a strike 
aimed at achieving any change to the agreement (see infra). Political strike is, on the other hand, 
tendentially excluded  for the public sector (through the 1994 Public Employment Act, imposing a 
ban on political action in work involving the exercise of public authority, and more in general 
prohibiting action directed at influencing Sweden's political situation). See also Warneck 2007, p. 68
12 In 1998, following an an inquiry, the Mediators’ Institute presented its final report (SOU 1998:141), 
proposing the introduction of a proportionality rule in order to provide a reasonable balance between 
the social partners by limiting the possibility of industrial action, causing significant costs  for the 
other party or third parties. These proposals, however, did not find any place in the following 
interventions of the Government on the MBL, which was  nonetheless  the object of changes including 
an extended period of notice and opportunity to postpone industrial action (see infra). See Labour 
Committee Report 2010/11:AU10
13 More recently, in June 2011, the Swedish Parliament rejected (approving by consensus  the Labour 
Committee’s proposal) motions to include a proportionality principle in the Swedish legislative 
framework on industrial conflict (in line with the proposal in the aforementioned SOU 1998:141). The 
Committee had noted that the National Mediation Office estimates that Sweden highlighted a relative 
calm in the national labour market (for the 205-2009 period, Sweden had on average fewer than 10 
days lost per 1000 workers, while the EU-15+Norway presented averages exceeding 40 days), and 
therefore there was  no need to reconsider the previous positions  (and in particular the the 
government choice to implement changes  in the MBL but not to impose an explicit proportionality 
principle in for collective action). See Labour Committee Report 2010/11:AU10 and Review of 
Proposals (Redovisning förslagspunkter) 2010/11:AU10, § 7
14 Defined as  “labour-stability obligation”, these agreement cannot however result “in the removal or 
limitation of rights or obligations under this Act”. MBL sect. 4.1
15Defined as “a stoppage of work (lockout or strike), blockade, boycott, or other industrial action 
comparable therewith”. MBL, sect. 41.1. It follows further from Sect. 42.1 MBL, that an employers’ 
organization or a trade union may not organize or in any other manner induce unlawful collective 
action, nor participate, through support or otherwise, in unlawful industrial action.
collective agreement; the MBL provides for a mandatory labour-stability obligation 
which prohibits strikes during the period when a collective agreement is still valid. 
Furthermore, most collective agreements contain clauses prohibiting strikes 
or other types of industrial action during their validity; a peace obligation more 
extensive than that prescribed by the MBL may be stipulated by collective 
agreement16.
The key element of the statutory peace obligation as defined by Sect. 41 is 
that  collective action is not unconditionally prohibited, but it may not be used with a 
view to achieving changes to the agreement in force; this prohibition covers what is 
expressly regulated in the agreement but also its implied supplementary rules17. 
Similarly, industrial action may not be used in order to force a settlement or 
agreement on terms and conditions that would be applied after the expiration date 
of the agreement in force18; furthermore, in the event of disagreement or dispute 
over the interpretation or application of the agreement, the opposing parties are 
required to submit the matter to conciliation committees, and also for this case the 
use of industrial action must be considered unlawful19.
The main exceptions to the restrictions set by the MBL refer to the cases in 
which the objective of the action is not covered by the collective agreement, and the 
144
16  According to the SFS 2005:392 amendment, in particular, “collective bargaining agreement may 
also prescribe more extensive labour-stability obligations  than those mentioned in Sections 41, 41 a, 
41 b and 44, as  well as  more extensive liability for damages” than those prescribed by the MBL. See 
4.3 MBL. modern-day collective agreements contain exhaustive rules  on permitted actions and 
sanctions for non-compliance.
17 For example regarding the employer's right to direct work and right to exercise management.
18  MBL, Sect. 41.1.1-2-3. Strikes are to be deemed permissible only if a collective agreement has 
terminated or expired and after all channels for mediation provided for in the collective agreement, or 
any other agreement binding the parties, have been exhausted; when there is  no collective 
agreement a trade union is  free to take industrial action, including sympathy action, to induce the 
employer to sign an agreement, regardless of whether the trade union has members  at the workplace 
or not.
19  An unlawful breach of industrial peace can give rise to damages against the trade union, while 
individual participants may be fined (or, for the case of serious offences, dismissed) only if they have 
participated in a strike non sanctioned by the union (i.e. wildcat/spontaneous; in this  sense it must be 
read the provision stating that “where any person has taken unlawful industrial action, no other 
person may participate in such action”). Sect. 42 MBL also provides that “An organisation that is 
bound by a collective bargaining agreement shall also be obliged, if unlawful industrial action is 
imminent or is being taken by a member, to attempt to prevent such action or to endeavor to achieve 
a cessation of such action”; furthermore if employees have in fact undertaken an unlawful action the 
employer and the employees' organization concerned (including, if existing, the local chapters) must 
immediately enter into discussions and “jointly” work for its cessation (Sect. 43)
so-called “collection blockade”20, in order to recover payable and unpaid wages or 
other remuneration for work completed that are clearly due; however, also for these 
cases the precondition of the duly order of boycott decision by the trade union 
stands.
More importantly, since there is there is no requirement in the MBL that 
industrial action shall be directed against the opposing party, the solidarity strike 
(sympatiåtgärder)  encounters a very broad recognition in Swedish law; 
representative organisations and their members, while bound by peace obligations 
with their primary counterpart, may therefore participate in secondary actions (for 
instance through boycotts and/or blockades)  in support of those engaged in a lawful 
dispute21. 
The MBL does not present any requirement for reasonable proportionality 
between primary and secondary action and for a legal or economic connection 
between the targeted parties22; therefore, the main element to be considered is the 
lawfulness of the primary action23; as long as the primary action is lawful, the peace 
obligation does not apply to secondary action, and therefore a trade union is free to 
take industrial action to induce the employer to sign an agreement24.
With regards to procedural requirements, formal notice of the industrial action 
(containing information of the reason and the scope of the action) must be 
submitted seven working days in advance by the party undertaking it both to the 
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20 Sect. 41.3 MBL, as amended by SFS 1993:1498
21 Sect. 41.1.3, infact, explicitly refers to collective action undertaken “to aid someone else” (that is, 
the party in the primary conflict); this, combined with the fundamental tenet of 2:17 RF (see supra), 
provides for a general lawfulness of secondary action. See Fahlbeck 2006, p. 8
22 As for the case of sub-contracting companies, or when the third party has expressed loyalty with 
the opposing party in the dispute.
23 Difficult legal issues  may arise when assessing the lawfulness  of the primary action, in particular in 
an international perspective. If the action is permitted by a foreign country's  law the Swedish 
sympathy action is  also lawful. On the other hand, if sympathy action is illegal under the law of the 
country, the secondary action undertaken in Sweden should be considered illegal, if such a 
prohibition does not stand in clear violation of Swedish public policy.
24 In a sense, the rule allowing secondary action derived from Sect. 41.1.4 MBL refers to collective 
measures simply intended to support the primary conflict; if the secondary opposing party becomes 
part of the conflict, the actions undertaken will then have to be evaluated in the light of the collective 
agreements  in force between the opposing parties. In line with this  is  that sympathy action, as stated 
above, requires  that the primary conflict is  not undertaken merely for appearance's sake (1989, No 
120 and AD 1990 No 113, limiting the possibility of recourse to “offensive” solidarity strikes) and that 
solidarity action must be temporary (see supra for similar considerations  with regards  to the political 
strike). See Fahlbeck 2006, p. 10
opposing party and to the Mediator Office25, which appoints26  independent 
mediators on a case-by-case basis; in order to seek an agreement between the 
parties, the appointed mediator may summon the parties to negotiations or 
implement other appropriate measures27; in particular, following previous 
consultations and if it promotes the “good resolution of the dispute”28, it may 
propose that the Mediator Office decides the postponement of an action for at most 
14 days29.
It is of the outmost evidence that the Vaxholm conflict and the subsequent 
ECJ ruling on the matter have represented a watershed in the Swedish labour 
market regulation30, and can be considered the cause for substantive changes in the 
Swedish legal framework; one of the major aspects covered by the ECJ in the Laval 
ruling was, as noted before, the compatibility of Lex Britannia31, which allowed 
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25 MBL Sect. 45, which also specifies  that “the obligation to give notice does  not apply if there is a 
valid impediment to giving notice” and for  the case of industrial actions to recover unpaid wages. 
These provisions shall also apply to secondary action.
26 Both at the request by the parties, but also in specific cases provided by law, in absence of such 
request. the Mediation Institute can also appoint regional mediators  to be used for the case of 
company-level disputes.
27  MBL, Sect. 48. Organizations that have reached an agreement on collaboration and negotiation 
procedure, defining rules governing the appointment and the powers of mediators, are exempt from 
this  rule (The first agreement of this type was  the Industry Agreement, signed in 1997). See Svenskt 
Näringsliv 2005, p. 5
28 MBL, Sect. 49
29 Sect. 49 of the MBL states that such decision by the Mediation Office may entail that “a party shall 
postpone industrial action for which notice has been given for a consecutive period of at most 14 
days for each industrial action or extension of an industrial action”. This kind of decision may only be 
issued once for dispute/mediator assignment; the mediator “shall also work to ensure that a party 
postpones [...] industrial action” (MBL Sect. 48)
30 Persson 2005, p. 7. In particular, with respect to the Court’s analysis  of the content of art. 3.8 PWD 
it can easily be seen that the collective agreement has been greatly tarnished as a regulatory 
instrument on the Swedish (and also the Danish) labor market. Eklund 2008, p. 569
31 It should however be noted that Lex Britannia’s  compatibility with EU law was  discussed already in 
the preparatory works to the legislation even though Sweden at that time had not joined the 
Community; since the legislative procedure concurred with Sweden’s  application to join the EU and 
the compatibility was again discussed when Sweden joined the EEA agreement and then later the 
Union, and the item in question became the object of a separate investigation in which it was 
concluded that it was not necessary its amendment (Ds 1994:13 Lex Britannia). See Ahlberg 2010b, 
p. 4
industrial action directed against a foreign company temporarily active in Sweden 
and bringing in its own workforce 32, with the Treaty provisions on free movement33.
As the ECJ found Lex Britannia incompatible with Articles 49 and 50 EC34, in 
particular because it was not justified on grounds of “public policy, public security or 
public health”, a Governmental Committee was set up with a view of harmonizing 
the protection granted by the Swedish labour market model, which was left 
substantially untouched especially with reference to the principle of autonomous 
regulation by social partners for pay and other employment conditions, with the 
respect of EU law, including in particular the case of posting of workers, the 
principle of non-discrimination and the PWD35  and, by that way, “ECJ-proofing”36 
the legal framework while protecting its main features. 
The proposed amendments contained in a governmental inquiry report37, 
therefore, didn’t provide for legislative imposition of a minimum wage nor towards a 
system for extending the effects and scope of application of a collective agreement; 
instead they focused on the drafting of a special rule containing a conditional 
restriction of the trade unions' powers to take industrial action to force foreign 
companies to sign up to a collective agreement, should the voluntary negotiations 
fail38.
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32 And therefore in the context of the posting of workers  as defined by Directive 96/71. Lex Britannia 
was intended as  an instrument for trade unions  to ensure that all employers, both domestic and 
foreign, would apply rates of pay and other terms and conditions of employment “in line” with normal 
conditions in the Swedish labour market and that they would thereby be able to combat unfair pay 
competition; Furthermore, the aim was also to facilitate international solidarity actions within the 
merchant navy. See Swedish Government 2008, p. 17 and supra, par. 2.2.2
33  It must be noted that in Sweden the Laval judgement by the ECJ has given rise to two different 
processes: in primis, a legislative process undertaken in order to amend the Swedish law on 
collective actions in relation to foreign service providers. In second place, the judicial process 
between Laval and the trade unions in the Labour Court: in this  case the main issue was under which 
conditions a trade union shall be liable for damages. See Malmberg 2010b, p. 13
34 Now Article 56 and 57 TFEU.
35 As well as in line with the requirements  established by the ECJ in Laval (par. 110) with regards to 
predictability and transparency for the foreign employers of the pay and working conditions deriving 
from the application of collective agreements, which has ultimately led to the provision of an 
obligation for the parties of a collective bargaining agreement to submit to the Swedish Work 
Environment Authority the conditions in the collective bargaining agreements that are to be applied 
applied to posted workers. See Nordegran-Ahlén 2010, p. 4
36 See Blauberger 2011.
37 Governmental Inquiry Report SOU 2008:123, presented in December 2008
38  Trade unions are described as  having “other possibilities” of using industrial action against 
employers responsible for posting. See Laval case brings new Swedish law, Ahlberg 2010a,
Subsequently, in November 2009, the Swedish Government submitted a 
governmental bill39  to the Riksdag, largely linked to the governmental inquiry 
report40, proposing legislative changes to the MBL and the LUA41. 
The provisions42  resulting from an heated legislative debate43  (which were 
given the label of Lex Laval) introduced Section 5a in the LUA, and came into force 
on 15 April 2010; the right for Swedish trade unions to take collective industrial 
action with the aim of regulating the employment conditions of posted workers 
against a foreign employer established in another EEA country, while explicitly 
stated, was also subjected to a series of conditions44, whose fulfillment is ultimately 
necessary for the action to be lawful under the MBL45.
Under Lex Laval industrial action against a foreign employer may be 
undertaken only if the conditions demanded by the union correspond to the 
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39 Prop. 2009/10:48 of 5 november 2009
40 Rönmar 2010, p. 285. It should however be noted that the amendments contained in the inquiry 
report present several differences  with the bill ultimately presented before the Parliament; in 
particular, while the core of the legislative changes to the LUA (i.e., the conditional restriction to the 
right to strike in posting situation) was already present, the addenda to sect. 5 of the LUA envisioned 
by the report featured three more elements  which did not find any recognition in the proposed bill. 
These were sect. 5a stating that “an employees’ organization may make demands for an employer to 
apply conditions  according to a collective bargaining agreement in Sweden in relation to its posted 
workers”, sect. 5c, providing that the application of more favorable terms and conditions was  not 
prevented, and the possibility for the posted worker to claim work and employment conditions 
provided by a collective agreement entered by a Swedish trade union and an EEA-established 
posting employer, “even if he or she is not a member of the contracting organization” (sect. 5d).
41  Lag om utstationering av arbetstagare, Posting of Workers Act (Official Gazette 1999:678, 
Government Bill 1998/99: 90), see supra par. 2.2.2
42 SFS 2010:228 of 25 March 2010
43  Characterised, in particular, by a strong opposition by the Social Democrats, which tried to 
suspend the adoption of the normative instrument in question, by making use of the of the possibility 
(provided by Ch. 2, s. 12 of the Instrument of Government) to request to have a Bill declared dormant 
for a year for the case of the restriction of fundamental rights protected by the Constitution (in the 
case at hand, the right to freedom of association and right of industrial action), and also formed a 
working party together with the trade unions at central level, to deliver a new legislation in the event 
of a change of Government after the general elections of September 2010. While the bill was 
accepted by the Parliamentary Committee on the Constitution and the Parliament could therefore 
commence the process for its  adoption, it should be noted that the parliamentary opposition made 
reference to the at the time recent ECtHR case law in the cases Demir and Baykara and Enerji 
(however it was stated that a potential limitation of fundamental rights was to be interpreted solely in 
relation to national constitutional provisions). See Rönmar 2010, p. 286, infra in this paragraph and in 
par. 3.2.2
44 See Bruun, Jonnson and Olauson in Bücker and Warneck 2011, p. 29
45 It should be noted in this sense that the original proposal stemming from the 2008 report provided 
for a separate restatement for the right to collective bargaining by trade unions (Sect. 5 a) and to the 
restrictions on the right to strike (Sect. 5 b), while the resulting amendments directly affirm the right to 
collective action for the case of posting and subject it to several conditions. See Swedish 
Government 2008, p. 41 and LUA sect. 5a
conditions contained in national level collective agreements which are generally 
applied in the relevant sector46.
In second place, with reference to the kinds of conditions and the relative 
level of such conditions which may be demanded with the support of industrial 
action, the demands may only involve minimum levels as regards rates of pay or 
other conditions, covered by the Swedish law on the posting of workers, derived 
from the central sector agreement47; such conditions, furthermore, must be more 
favorable to employees than what specified points of the Swedish legislation on the 
posting of workers ensures48.
In addition to this, industrial action is nevertheless unlawful if the posted 
workers already enjoy essentially the same conditions in their home countries49; 
while this condition derives directly from the terse rejection by the ECJ of the 
difference of treatment for firms on the basis of the signature of a collective 
agreement under Swedish or foreign law, it also addresses also the problem of 
verifying whether the firms involved find themselves in an effectively comparable 
situation. 
This provision is linked to an “evidential requirement”50, and therefore a 
collective action cannot be undertaken if the employer proves that the posted 
workers have conditions which are essentially at least as favorable as the minimum 
conditions in the collective agreement51; in this case, the employer may be obliged 
throughout the period of the posting to provide proof that the conditions applied are 
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46  Such an agreement is a nationwide sector agreement that regulates terms and conditions  of 
employment for the category of workers to which the workers posted to Sweden belong. The first 
part of the provision aims to qualify the Swedish collective agreement model so that it falls  within the 
scope of Article 3.8, second paragraph, first indent of the PWD. See Swedish Government 2008, p. 
29
47 It must be noted that in Sweden the term ‘minimum rates  of pay’ applies not only to basic pay, but 
also to mandatory overtime rates and supplements for inconvenient working hours, night and shift 
work. Moreover, basic pay may be differentiated according to type of work, experience and skills, and 
the level of responsibility involved. See Ahlberg 2010b par. 4.1.2
48 The efforts of the Swedish Government to preserve the existing model of industrial relations implies 
that Lex Laval provisions  prevails  on those deriving from Lex Britannia for the posting situations in 
order to determine the lawfulness of industrial action, but also that the latter remains intact outside 
the circumstances specified.
49  The terms and conditions in question must be “in substance [...] as favorable as the minimum 
conditions in the central collective agreement”. LUA, sect. 5a.2
50 See Swedish Government 2008, p. 31
51 See Malmberg 2010b, p. 9
at the same level than those demanded52.
The Social Democrats and the trade unions have long criticized53  the 
Government for the introduction of the Lex Laval, being seen as limiting the right to 
take collective action further than what is stipulated in EU law, possibly colliding with 
the national commitments with the ILO Convention on the right to association54, and 
- while applying to a small number of individual posted workers  and posting 
situation55  - bound to have serious consequences for Sweden's autonomous 
collective bargaining model56, and in particular for its parties’ ability to make sure 
that foreign employers companies posting workers to Sweden provide wages and 
working conditions on par with Swedish collective agreements57.
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52 According to the Swedish Work Environment Authorithy, which acts  as a liaison office for posting-
related issue, providing information to employers on the terms of work and employment that may be 
applicable to postings in Sweden, “the employer may be required to show documentation or similar 
evidence to certify that this really is  the case”; furthermore the Authority provides information with 
regards  to the content of collective agreements  received to the trade unions, which have in turn to 
submit the conditions in the collective bargaining agreement which they are to demand through the 
use of industrial action.
53  in particular, a LO (Swedish Trade Union Confederation)-TCO (Swedish Confederation of 
Professional Employees) joint opinion on the Laval inquiry was issued during the preparation stages 
of the legislative changes, criticizing in particular the evidential requirement provided for by the 
proposal, described as  an unnecessary loophole advantaging unscrupulous  employer. See LO och 
TCO i remissvar till Lavalutredningen: EGs  lagstiftning måste ändras  (Press Release in Swedish), 
available online at http://www.tco.se/Templates/Page1____238.aspx?DataID=8807
54  See also Ahlberg 2010c. Furthermore, comments were filed by LO and TCO unions to the 
Committee of Experts  on the Application of Conventions  and Recommendations of the ILO 
concerning Sweden's application of C. 87 and 98, mainly on the basis  of violation of the principles  of 
equal treatment and non-discrimination of workers  due to national origin (deriving from the imposition 
of peace obligation for agreements setting inferior wages and benefits for posted workers), as  well as 
the inability to monitor employer’s  compliance with the asserted standards  porvided; given the 
importance of the matters  raised by the unions and the significance of the potential effect of the 
mentioned measures, the Committee has requested the Swedish Government to monitor the impact 
of the legislative changes  on the rights  under the Convention and provide a detailed report in time for 
its examination at the CEACR’s next meeting in 2012. (See CEACR Individual Observation nr. 
062011SWE098)
55 The Swedish Minister of Labour, in presenting the amendments to the LUA, reiterated that there are 
only 2,000 people stationed in Sweden and that most of them are covered by Swedish collective 
wage agreements. see Sweden presents  new law on collective wage agreements, The Local 8 
October 2009, available online at http://www.thelocal.se/22548/20091008/
56 It has been however noted that, while under Lex Laval collective agreements  cannot be effectively 
enforced by trade unions, a  short-term effect of the media attention on the Laval case in Sweden 
appears to be that foreign service providers were increasingly willed to sign application collective 
agreements  with Swedish trade unions (thereby avoiding negative media coverage) instead of 
entering in confrontations. and Bruun and Jonsson in Bücker and Warneck 2010, 28.
57  On the other hand the Swedish Confederation of Enterprise (Svenskt Näringsliv), which had 
supported - also from an economic point o view - the Laval undertaking in the dispute, contended 
that the proposal was  still not in line with some aspects of EU law, in particular not introducing 
legislated minimum wages.
In June 201158  the Swedish Parliament, at the initiative of the political 
opposition to the (minority) centre-right Government in the Swedish Parliament’s 
Committee on the Labour Market, decided to submit three notices to the 
Government, prompting it to “urgently”59 initiate a review of Lex Laval and to assess 
the necessary amendments required to protect and reinforce the Swedish labour 
model60 in an international perspective61 and subsequently present to the Parliament 
a legislative proposal on the matter62.
Furthermore, it was also indicated to the Government the need to take new 
political initiatives at EU-level to ensure that the PWD maintains its character as a 
minimum-requirements directive, in particular for wages; lastly, the Labour 
Committee required the Parliament to ratify ILO Convention 94 on social clauses in 
public contracts63, guaranteeing that wages, working hours and other employment 
terms and conditions cannot be less favorable than those provided for by collective 
agreement or through other accepted bargaining methods, arbitration or the national 
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58  Approving the Labour Committee Report (Arbetsmarknadsutskottetsbetänkande) 2010/11:AU10. 
See Protocols 2010/11: 16  and 2010/11:117 (decision of 16 June 2011), § 13
59 The inquiry must be completed by 1 September 2012. See Swedish Parliament Press Release of 7 
June 2011 (Labour Committee to change the lex Laval)
60The Labour Committee’s central premises were that the social partners' autonomy and contracts in 
the labor market must be always fully respected and that all forms  of social and wage dumping must 
be always deterred and punished. See Labour Committee Report 2010/11:AU10
61 It is, in fact, specified “that the solutions  proposed by the Inquiry must meet the requirements of 
EU law”, and should be compatible with conventions to which Sweden is bound. The amended 
legislation should also be “stable” in the sense that upcoming legal changes may not be at significant 
risk of being contested by the Commission or in the complaint to the ECJ. Ibid.
62  According to the Labour Committee’s Report, the starting point of the new legislation should be 
that Swedish collective agreements will apply to everyone working in Sweden, including posted 
workers, in order to ensure that every worker in Sweden is subject to the same conditions (including 
insurance coverage, considered as part of the protection to be ensured for safety, health and hygiene 
in the workplace in accordance with Article 3.1, first paragraph e PWD), regardless of origin. 
Furthermore, on the basis of a motion by the Social Democrats, the inquiry should also investigate 
the possibilities for modification or removal of the aforementioned “evidence rule”; an employer 
claiming that the wages and conditions are acceptable and should verify their implementation 
through an agreement with the trade union. Otherwise, a set of qualitative requirements for the 
equivalence of the foreign contract should be put in place: however, individual employment 
agreements  or unilateral commitments  made by employers will not suffice in determining the 
equivalence. Ibid.
63 Not ratified by Sweden at the time of its issuing, and object during the 90s of an ILO inquiry.
legislation in the specific branch in which the work is carried out64.
While not directly touched by the ECJ’s ruling in Laval, Denmark’s industrial 
relation context and legal framework in transposing the PWD shared several points 
in common with the Swedish one65; in this case, however, the efforts directed to the 
protection of the autonomy of the collective bargaining system were shared by the 
social partners, which found common ground in responding to the challenges posed 
by the judgments in question to the national industrial relations system66.
This has translated in a swift67  reaching of consensus for the necessary 
amendments to be implemented into the national legal framework in order to comply 
with the new case law68. The Danish Lex Laval, amending the transposition law of 
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64 The ratification of ILC 94, highlighted in several motions from the Social Democrats, Green Party 
and Left Party, was deemed by the Committee as  instrumental in the fight against social combat 
social dumping (depriving companies that compete on poor employment standards of the benefits 
deriving from such practices  in a public tender setting) and facilitating the maintenance of good 
wages and working conditions in Sweden. See Labour Committee Report 2010/11:AU10
65  Sweden and Denmark share a similar model of autonomous collective agreements, entrusting to 
trade unions, in absence of general applicable collective agreements  and of a minimum wage set by 
law, to uphold a general level on wages and employment conditions  and protect the workers  from 
social dumping.
With more specific reference to strike rules, while the right to collective action is  protected by the 
constitution and to its  exercised are exclusively entitled the representative organizations, is possibile 
to identify a more active role of the social partners  (the Landsorganisationen trade union and the 
employers’ association Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening) in its  regulation and in the definition of the 
conditions that need to be fulfilled for a conflict to be considered lawful. The most important 
differences refer to the procedures prior to the initiation of the action (ballot in the executive body of 
the organization in question, a  double issuing of the strike notice and the possibility postponement of 
the strike to a maximum of two weeks per notice); furthermore, if one of the parties asserts that the 
conflict is  unlawful, the action is not carried out but instead it is  customary practice to await the ruling 
of the Labour Court. More importantly, the Danish legal framework presents a proportionality 
requirement for the collective action (which must have a “reasonable union aim”, meaning that it has 
to be relevant to the working conditions  and that there must be a reasonable relationship between 
goal and means), and to certain restrictions put on solidarity actions (lawfulness of the main dispute, 
community of interest between employees in the main and secondary conflicts).
66 The difference between the Danish and Swedish Laval solutions  mirrors the level of trust between 
the social partners in the two countries. In Sweden, there was no joint position adopted or any joint 
analysis  of the judgment conducted by the social partners, while the Danish social partners 
cooperated in the joint defence of the IR model. See Bruun-Jonsson in Bücker-Warneck 2010, p. 23
67  The entire process took less  than a year, with the setting up of a tripartite commission (the so-
called Laval Commission) in spring 2008; its findings were fully supported by both the trade unions 
and employers’ organizations, and were not challenged by the Government or Parliament. The first 
legislative proposal was  issued in June 2008, and was  later enacted by the Parliament as Law No L 
36 of 18 December 2008 on implementing the recommendation of the working group on the 
consequences of the Laval decision and on the extension of the deadline for revision of the Law.
68 See Malmberg 2010b, p.7
the PWD69  by the insertion of a single provision, entered into force on the 1st of 
January 2009.70
 Collective action against foreign service providers may be undertaken only in 
relation to pay71, and its lawfulness is subject to four main criteria: firstly, there must 
be correspondence of the wage claims with wages paid for similar works by Danish 
employers. In second place, pay levels must be regulated only by a collective 
agreement signed by representative social partners and applied throughout the 
national territory.
Furthermore, a duty of information to the service provider with reference to 
the provisions of the collective agreement was included, as well as a requirement for 
clarity in the provisions of the agreement regulating the wages72.
For the case of disagreements arise about the interpretation and application 
of this article in posting situation,, the Danish Labour Court has jurisdiction to decide 
on the application of Law to the actual situation, and in particular on the respect of 
fulfillment of the conditions of Sect. 6a(2).
3.1.2 – Germany
In order to properly assess the consequences of the rulings of the Laval 
quartet and their potential impact in the German framework, two main aspect need 
to be focused on; in a perspective more closely linked with the ECJ’s ruling involving 
the Land Niedersachsen, it is necessary to analyze the legislative modifications in 
the public procurement laws induced by the ECJ. With more direct reference to the 
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69 Lov om udstationering af lønmodtagere, Law nr. 964 of 2. november 2001 (LUL, Posting of Workers 
Act).
70 See Lind 2010, p. 14
71  “With a view to ensuring for posted workers  rates of pay corresponding to those which Danish 
employers are obliged to pay for the performance of equivalent work”. LUL, §6a(1). However, it has 
been noted that the concept of minimum rates of pay was interpreted quite extensively by the Danish 
Lex Laval, in accordance with the practice in Denmark.
72 “It is  a condition for initiating the collective action referred to in paragraph 1 that the foreign service 
provider should previously have been referred to the provisions in the collective agreements  between 
the most representative parties  on the labour market in Denmark applying to the whole of the territory 
of Denmark. These collective agreements shall state, with sufficient clarity, what rates  of pay must be 
used under the collective agreements.” LUL, §6a(2). According to the preparatory documentation, the 
requirement for referral to existing terms  means that, it should be clear which provisions are referred 
to, which collective agreement is  referred to, who the parties to the collective agreement are, and 
how long the collective agreement in question has been in force. See Lind 2010, p. 15
right to strike, the interactions between key concepts of the German framework on 
collective action such as proportionality and ultima ratio73  with the indications 
stemming from the ECJ judicial course.
For what it refers to national legislative modification induced by the ECJ, the 
German situation appears substantially twofold; on one hand, at Federal level no 
obligation to pay employees the wages set in collective agreements is provided by 
the recently amended Act Against Restraints of Competition74, in accordance with 
the provisions deriving from Rüffert75.
On the other hand, in particular for what it refers to public procurement76, 
several Länder have introduced norms attaching to public contracts the condition 
for tenderers that collectively agreed wage structures should be adhered77 - which 
represented the trigger for the ECJ decision - referring to the full pay scale of (non-
extended) collective agreements and extending the scope of the social clauses, 
initially linked only with the construction and public transport sectors, up to the 
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73 See supra, par. 1.1.1
74 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (also Antitrust Act) 703-5 of 27 July 1957, amended by 
the Law on the Modernization of the Public Procurement Law of  20 April 2009 which, according to 
its draft document “serves  to implement other provisions of the EC procurement directives 2004/17/
EC and 2004/18/EC” (as well as lines of the Remedies  Directive 2007/66/EC), and had no impact in 
the situation currently analyzed, since they only codified the previous legal situation.. See Entwurf 
eines  Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Vergaberechts of 13 August 2008, (BT-Drs.16/10117), p. 1 and 
Bücker in Bücker and Warneck 2010, p. 37
75 Similarly, the legal framework transposing the PWD has also been amended in 2009 independently 
from the Laval ruling though the Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz (AEntG) of 20 April 2009, replacing the 
previous AEntG of 26 February 1996 (BGBI I, p. 227), setting minimum standards  for working 
conditions (specifically minimum wage, annual leave, H&S and the conditions  for the provision) for 
posted workers, in particular in the construction sector.  See Bücker, Hauer and Walter  in Bücker and 
Warneck 2011, p. 55
76  For which individual Bundesländer, according to art. 74.1.1 of the German Constitution has 
competing legislative competence (i.e., if the Federal Government does not provide a regulation for 
the matter), and can issue legislation for the case of internal procurement, when the object to be 
procured are for its own use. the legitimacy of social clauses in public procurement with regards  to 
the fundamental right of freedom of association (Art. 9 §3 GG) and of occupational freedom (Art. 12 
§1 GG) was sanctioned by a judgement of the German Constitutional Court of 11 July 2006 (1 BvL 
4/00, published 3/11/2006), which derived from a submission of the Antitrust Division of the Federal 
Court concerning the unconstitutionality of a provision in the Berlin Public Procurement Act. See also 
Rödl in Vimercati 2009, p. 135-136, Walters in Bücker and Warneck 2010, p. 44
77  Also defined as  Tariftreueerklärungen (pay clauses), collective agreement declarations or, more 
generally, “social clauses”, such provision represent a “softer generally binding declaration”, and a 
relevant element of the German legal and industrial relation systems. See Zimmer 2011, p. 225, See 
Bücker, Hauer and Walters in Bücker and Warneck 2011, p. 74
removal of the limitations referring to the branch of activity78.
As a direct consequence of the ECJ ruling in Rüffert, in the early 2008 Lower 
Saxony (the Federal State directly involved in the case)  removed the obligation for 
tenderers to commit to the remuneration specified by local collective agreements 
that have not been declared generally applicable, and all the Länder whose public 
procurement acts contained identical or similarly worded obligations to comply with 
collective agreements suspended the application of their social clauses, either by 
completely removing them79, or by rendering its application voluntary rather than 
mandatory80; at the same time several Regional Governments gradually started a 
revision process with a view of amending their public procurement legal 
frameworks81 in order to still limit unfair competition.
It should be noted that the ECJ declared the constitutive collective agreement 
declaration82  of the Lower Saxony Public Procurement Act incompatible with the 
PWD and the freedom to provide services; social clauses requiring compliance with 
pay rates should therefore considered to be allowed if linked to a public declaration 
of general application to all employees as a minimum wage83.
The application of the ECJ jurisprudence by various German Courts and 
public procurement bodies has also produced varying effects: on one hand, Rüffert 
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78  At the time of Rüffert Bundesländer presenting “social clauses” in their procurement legislation 
were Bavaria, Berlin (the first Länder to introduce it in 1999), Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, 
Niedersachsen (the cited Lower Saxony), the Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein. Saxony-Anhalt and 
NRW, which had introduced pay clauses, abolished them respectively in 2002 and 2006 (the latter in 
particular was evaluated after a Government change and found as not reaching its objective)
79 As  for the case of Berlin, the Saar, which also gave the opportunity to undertaking participating in 
the awarding of public contracts to submit a modified bid taking the changed circumstances into 
account.
80 As for the cases of Bremen and Hamburg
81  With reference to the Federal States  having no social clauses  at the time of Rüffert, it must be 
noted that the recent draft legislation on the matter of Thuringia (of 21.09.2010) and Mecklenburg-
West-Pomerania (of 02.03.2011) ultimately incorporated the main amendments (see infra) occurred in 
the other Länder frameworks.
82  Konstitutiven Tariftreueerklärung, imposing also on tenderers  which were not parties  in collective 
bargaining procedures  the payment to its workers and by its  subcontractors  of wages  deriving from 
collective agreements (in particular could not be considered universally applicable since of sole 
regional relevance, and covering only contracts in the public sector). See supra par 2.2.3
83  Deklaratorischen Tariftreueerklärung (declaratory pay clause), in which the already existing 
obligation deriving from the normative effect of the collective agreement is  flanked by contract and 
public procurement law sanctions, such as penalties and barring orders for the non-compliant 
employer.
was “naturally applied” 84and social clauses in public contracts were struck down as 
being in conflict with EU legislation85.
In other cases, the validity of the obligation concerning collective agreements 
declarations was linked to the internal relevance of the procurement situation; 
according to a decision by the Bavarian Constitutional Court, in fact, the regional 
public procurement law, while similar to the Lower Saxony one, was not to be 
considered unlawful86, but “merely” that it would be inapplicable in those situations 
in which the relevant EU law can claim primacy87, the contrast not invalidating the 
standards set by the public procurement law, and therefore not requiring the removal 
of the normative item in question.
Furthermore, in the proceedings before the OLG Celle regarding the tendering 
of S-Bahn services, the Court indicated that it would overturn the ruling by VK 
Lüneberg88 on the basis of the special regime determined by EU for the transports, 
which explicitly excludes urban, suburban and regional transport from the scope of 
the PWD89, consequently preventing the application of the Rüffert jurisprudence to 
the transport sector.
Notwithstanding the relevance of its first impact with the regional legislation 
and the jurisprudence, Rüffert has not led to a complete abolishment of social 
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84 Bücker in Bücker and Waneck 2010, p. 37
85 In particular, the decision taken on 8 December 2008 (VII-Verg 55/08) the Procurement Division of 
the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court made direct reference to the constitutionality of pay clauses 
but also the implication deriving from Rüffert that compliance may be required only for universally 
applicable collective agreement (par. 35), and by the Arnsberg District Court (VK 16/08) stating that 
companies not bound by collective agreement may forced apply certain wages in tender procedures 
(on penalty of exclusion from the tender) only by law.
86 On the contrary, the social clause was in accordance with the Bavarian Constitution, in particular 
since economic and social policy measures need to counteract a threat to the public interest such as 
the one deriving from competition on wage levels.
87 See Bayerischer Verfassungsgerichtshof, Vf. 14-VII-00 (decision of 20 June 2008), par. V.3.b
88 VgK-12/2008, in which the Court, referring to Rüffert, had rescinded the award decision noting that 
the need for a collective agreement declaration by the subcontractors violated Art. 49. See Denzin, 
Siderer and v. Bechtolsheim 2008, p. 34, and Bücker in Bücker and Warneck 2010, p.38
89 See also recital 8 of Reg. 12/98, stating that “Whereas  the provisions of Directive 96/71/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in 
the framework of the provision of services [...] apply in cases  where, for the provision of special 
regular services, carriers, post workers, who have an employment relationship with those carriers, 
from the Member State where they ordinarily work”.
clauses throughout Germany90; instead, similarly to what has happened in the 
Nordic system concerning Laval, many of the collective agreement declaration 
frameworks involved by the ruling have been carefully changed and adapted to the 
ECJ jurisprudence, in order to defend at least partially the original idea underlying 
the provision of social clauses while avoiding the risk of further private litigation and 
possible infringement actions by the Commission.
The political responses and legal solutions to Rüffert present a high degree of 
variance, which can be explained, on one hand, on the basis of the ideological 
features of the governing parties in the various Länder concerned91, and on the 
other of the different use of the regional regulatory autonomy in determining the new 
legislative framework; currently three main types of pay clauses can be identified in 
the German context92.
Firstly, recently amended public procurement legal frameworks provide for 
pay clauses making to reference to generally binding collective agreements or 
collectively agreed minimum wages which are extended on the basis of the German 
Posted Workers Act93, as for the case of Lower Saxony94 and Hamburg95, Saarland 
and Rhineland-Palatinate.
In other cases, such as the new Berlin public procurement law adopted in 
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90 It should be noted that Bremen has in fact proceeded to the abolition of its social clauses in 2009, 
and that Schleswig-Holstein has  amended its  public procurement law in 2008 (which should have 
been in force since 2003 to 2010), removing the obligation for collective agreement declaration for 
contractors and subcontractors; furthermore, in May 2009 a recommendation was issued, stating 
that written commitments were only to be demanded with respect to collective agreements declared 
universally applicable, and that this  applied beyond the construction sector to the public rail transport 
and waste collection sectors. 
91  In particular, while through the instrument of social clauses  it had been possible to consolidate 
political majorities  with regards  the protection of wage and social standard for workers, for Länder 
governed by centre-right coalitions (CDU/CSU, FDP) the ECJ judgment largely represented an 
occasion to abolish or disapply the contested provisions, while the picture becomes diverse for the 
case of governing coalitions  which cannot be clearly classified as  centre-right or centre-left. On the 
other hand, all governments led by the social-democrats (SPD) reformed or are still reforming their 
public procurement legislation so as  to include social criteria  in public tenders, comprising the 
requirement of collective agreement declarations. See Rödl in Vimercati 2009, p. 141, Blauberger 
2011, p. 18
92 Schulten, WSI Report of October 2011
93 i.e., declaratory pay clauses, therefore in line with art. 3.1 PWD. From the extension of the Posted 
Workers  Act derives  a wage floor for public procurement contracts  with EU-dimension for the 10 
branches of activity provided.
94 NdsGVBl. of 22. December 2008, 411, which refers to generally binding collective agreements of 
the construction sector. However, collective agreements still have to be complied with for contracts 
worth 30.000 € or more.
95 HbgGVBl. of 23. December 2008, 436.
June 201096, a requirement of the application of a minimum hourly wage is present, 
which also apply to subcontractors.
Furthermore, constitutive pay clauses with reference to collective agreements 
in public transport on road or rail have been introduced97 on the basis of the special 
regime for the transport sector defined by the EU legal framework, in particular art. 
51 limiting the freedom of services with regards to transport98 and the Regulation on 
Public Transport No. 1370/200799, that render the Rüffert jurisprudence not 
applicable to the transport sector100; in these cases pay clauses make reference to 
the full pay scale of (non extended) collective agreements101.
It should be noted that further social clauses not regarding pay have also 
been included in the revised procurement legislation: social and ecological criteria, 
such as the promotion of women employment and gender equality, the hiring of 
disabled employees or the provision of vocational training may therefore translate in 
preferential placing for companies participating in public tenders. 
Therefore, while the “Rüffert-shock” of 2008 did not apparently leave any 
space for the survival of social clauses in the German legal context, the issue of 
social clauses is not disappeared from the German political arena, and as an 
intermediate result of the aforementioned revision and amendment process, nine 
Federal States currently present Tariftreueerklärungen in their regional public 
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96  Along with Bremen, Brandenburg and Rhineland-Palatinate laws, revised or introduced between 
2009 and 2011. Minimum wage clauses  have also been planned by further two Federal States: 
Baden-Wuerttemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia. It should be also noted that the Berlin Länd had 
already extended the applicability of the Procurement Act to all sectors  (beyond the public one) and 
introduced a minimum wage for workers employed in public contracts (in the amount of 7.50 €) in 
March 2008, but at the end of April the clause was  rescinded. (VBl. Bln of 29 March 2008, 80; 
Berichtigung in GVBl. Bln of 15. May 2008, 112)
97 In Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Berlin and Bremen Länder.
98 As well as art. 70-80 of the EU Treaty, defining the separate title for “Transport”, to which art. 51 
explictly refers.
99  And specifically its recital 17 stating that “competent authorities are free to establish social and 
qualitative criteria in order to maintain and raise quality standards for public service obligations, for 
instance with regard to minimal working conditions, [...] collective agreement obligations and other 
rules and agreements  concerning workplaces and social protection at the place where the service is 
provided. In order to ensure transparent and comparable terms of competition between operators 
and to avert the risk of social dumping, competent authorities should be free to impose specific 
social and service quality standards”
100 In a way similar to the solution proposed by the OLG Celle, see supra
101 See also Bücker in Bücker and Warneck 2010 p. 38 and the Schulten WSI Report
procurement legislation, and three more have announced the introduction of  such 
clauses.
However, while these developments highlight a general tension towards the 
protection of the main features of the national systems of labour relations and wage 
setting through collective agreements, several differences remain both in the 
regulatory detail of the regional public procurements acts102  and in the various 
solutions elaborated by the jurisprudence, in particular by the Regional 
Constitutional Courts103.
Although at the present moment such differences do not appear to 
particularly reflect on wage levels104, some aspects still need to be considered; 
firstly, it is without doubt that Rüffert has increased of the possibilities for 
competition based on wage levels in Germany, with the consequent risk of social 
dumping at trans-national level, and potential negative consequences for the market 
presence of German companies because of the pressure by foreign bidders. In this 
sense the strategy to establish a minimum wage in the procurement acts of the 
states is only the second best solution because, while public procurement norms 
provide the possibility for further measures with particular reference to monitoring 
and sanctions, the confirmation of the already prescribed minimum wage lacks the 
binding force of the entire pay scale105.
Furthermore, while regional solutions appear to be based on the same aim of 
implementing social clauses which are compatible with the EU law, the effective 
compatibility of provision introducing social criteria into public procurement 
legislation (in particular for the case of going beyond minimum wages) with the 
frameworks on the posting of workers and the provision of services is still to be 
159
102  Ranging from frameworks which have determined the abolition or non-application of social 
clauses (the mentioned Bavaria and Schleswing-Holstein), to the extremely progressive Länd Berlin 
procurement law, which provides  for the setting of a minimum wage, the separated discipline for the 
transport sector, and the further social criteria in public tenders. 
103 See also Bücker, Hauer and Walters in Bücker and Warneck 2011, pp.85-86
104  Specifically, the minimum wages range from 7,50 and 8,62 € p/hour with reference to regional 
minimum wage clauses and from 6.75/7.80 to of 9.75/13,00 € p/hour (depending on the sector of the 
employment in one of the nine sectors of activity and its geographical setting) for what it refers to the 
extension of  collectively agreed minimum wages  which are extended on the basis  of the German 
Posted Workers Act.
105 Like the one deriving from a collective agreement declaration. See Zimmer 2011, p. 227
considered uncertain, in particular with reference to its stability in the light of future 
scrutiny by the ECJ106.
The proportionality and ultima ratio principles elaborated and applied by the 
ECJ in Viking and Laval are concepts at first glance very much compatible with the 
German framework on collective action, in which they are have been present for a 
relatively long period of time and appear strictly connected in determining the 
lawfulness of a collective action107.
As noted, the German legislature has not implemented a legal framework that 
ensures the respect of meaning and purpose of interrelated rights and freedom with 
reference to collective action108; the Courts therefore have gradually derived the 
substantive regulatory framework for industrial disputes from the general principles 
governing the legal relationship in question109. 
In the design of industrial action law, the courts have had above to ensure 
that an existing balance of power between the parties to collective bargaining is not 
disturbed or imbalance is amplified, and central standard of review is the principle of 
proportionality110; according to the judicial elaboration carried out in particular by the 
Federal Labour Court (BAG)111, a collective action should be initiated only in order to 
achieve legitimate objectives and is legitimate insofar the measures undertaken are 
appropriate and necessary to the achievement of the particular aim pursued. In 
addition to the respect of this general principle, the industrial action must not be 
disproportionate in a narrow sense, that is it must not interfere excessively with the 
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106  With the possible exception, for the mentioned reasons, of the frameworks elaborated for the 
transport sector.
107 Along with the capability of representing collective interest of the involved parties, the aims which 
need to be achievable through collective bargaining, and the respect of the peace obligations and 
duties.
108 In particular art. 9 §3 GG protecting the freedom of association and Art. 12 §  1 GG defining the 
professional freedom (for workers  and employers). It should be noted that also intervention and 
interference by State regulation can be considered as allowed only insofar it sets a level playing field 
necessary for the parties to bargain on an equal footing. See Schlachter in Blanplain and Światkowski 
2009, p. 69
109 BAG 19 June 2007 - 1 AZR 396/06, par. 16
110 Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit. See BAG GS, 21/4/1971 (Fn. 33) Teil III A 1 and also BAG 19 
June 2007 - 1 AZR 396/06, par. 17
111 And in particular the groundbreaking ruling of the 21 April 1971, BAG Grand Senate, 21/4/1971 
(par. 33), confirmed by the Federal Constitutional Court (1BvR BVerfGE 418/71) on 19 February 1975.
rights of others and do not go beyond what is absolutely necessary to achieve the 
purpose112.
The principle of proportionality was initially designed as an external limit to 
the recourse to collective action industrial disputes; while industrial action must 
indeed be deemed as feasible option in the German system of collective bargaining, 
it has also to be kept into consideration that the consequences of industrial actions 
such as strikes and lock-outs can possibly involve non-striking workers and other 
third parties as well as the common good, especially for the case of long-lasting 
disputes 113.
The application of the principle in question in case-law tends to prevent the 
abuse of collective action, and is particularly referred to the reciprocal interference 
between fundamental rights and freedoms, enjoyed by both sides of the labour 
market, and deriving from their exercise 114 ; collective action, therefore, is seen as 
the exercise of the fundamental right to organize and as an interference with the 
freedom of exercising a procession of the single employer or with the corresponding 
right to organize of another party.
In the balancing of the rights of both parties, it has emerged that violations of 
the social partners’ right are, from a theoretical point of view, inconceivable, while 
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112 Proportionalität, BAG Decision of 10 June 1980 (1 AZR 822/79)
113 As  noted, one of the major implications deriving from such reasoning (given in particular the fact 
that the self-assessment by the union of the necessity of particular measures in case of industrial 
conflict was bound to overcome the efficacy of proportionality as a  guidance and control rule for 
collective action) is  the requirement of “fairness” of the strike, which cannot be directed towards the 
destruction of the undertaking involved, but must pursue the aim of the establishment of a negotiated 
equilibrium in collective bargaining. While the BAG has indicated that requirements  of a fair strike 
may also be infringed if the strike reaches a certain level of intensity, the strike patterns carried out in 
Germany generally seem to meet the requirement of a fair strike, and the Federal Labour Court 
therefore has  never determined for a strike to be disproportionate on this basis. See Weiss  and 
Schmidt 2008
114 In the recently issued “Flash-Mob” Decision (BAG 22/09/2009 - 1 AZR 972/08), the Labour Court 
had to rule on a  trade union action which called participants to purchase low value goods  or proceed 
to filling and then abandoning shopping trolleys in a retail store in order to disrupt business 
processes in order to enforce collective bargaining goals. The BAG re-stated that the choice of 
“industrial weaponry” (not limited therefore to the coordinated work stoppage) is inherent in the 
freedom of association protected by art. 9 §3 GG, but that the admissibility of an industrial action 
depends not only by the intended achievement of a collective bargaining goal (See parr. 10 and 38, 
which also make reference to the “ongoing labour struggle” and the “failure of conciliation 
processes”, therefore implying the respect of the ultima ratio principle), but also by its 
appropriateness, which must be defined through the principle of proportionality (See par. 10), and in 
particular with reference to means  of defense available to the employer. For the case at hand the 
“flash mob” actions of the type described were considered not generally inappropriate, since the 
employer could have enforced its authority or responded through a temporary shutdown (See par. 33)
the exercise of the fundamental right to organize legally justifies interferences with 
the others’ freedom to exercise a profession115. This does not appear to be the case 
for the ECJ jurisprudence, which did not recognize that as the right to collective 
action obviously restricts the exercise of economic freedoms, the exercise by the 
employer of its economic prerogatives infringes the right of individual workers and 
their union to bargain for the protection or improvement of working conditions; as 
noted, the Luxembourg Court did not grant equal footing to the right to collective 
action and to the fundamental economic freedoms, and ultimately gave precedence 
to the fundamental economic freedoms determining the compatibility of the 
collective action with the EU framework.
When considering furthermore the permissible aims for the collective action, 
the ECJ, on the other hands, limits the goals to be pursued to the protection of 
individual workers’ employment security and working conditions. According to the 
German domestic perspective, all the relevant interests of the parties should be 
taken into account116; furthermore, the objective of the collective action remains in 
principle an autonomous decision of labour market parties, and neither the specific 
type of terms and conditions of employment nor the level of employment bargained 
for can be curbed by a court as inappropriate.
Furthermore, with regards to the means by which collective action is carried 
out, another striking discrepancy can be highlighted between the supervision by the 
ECJ on collective action on the basis of the test of adequacy and necessity and the 
recently reasserted general principle of freedom of choice of instruments of 
collective action117.
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115 Although infringement of other rights (such as the one to property, violated in the case of plant 
occupation, see BAG, Decision of 14 December 1978) cannot be justified. See Deinert in Ales and 
Novitz 2010, pp. 72-73
116  For instance, collective interests of workers and unions’ procedural rights  which are not 
considered lawful aims by the ECJ in Viking (par. 81). See Schlachter in Blanplain and Światkowski 
2009, p. 69
117  In particular, it should be noted that the duration of a strike cannot be used in determining its 
unlawfulness (BAG, Decision of 26 October 1971 - 1 AZR 113/68). See also supra with reference to 
the “Flash Mob” decision, and Deinert in Ales and Novitz 2010, p. 74.
Similar considerations can be drawn with reference to the principle of ultima 
ratio118 which represented, until recently, one of the most important limitations to the 
right to collective action in the German framework.
Collective action is to be considered the last possible means of achieving the 
goals pursued, and can only come into question when the alternative means119 have 
been exhausted or have been refused by the other side120: more importantly, a party 
would be in violation of such principle if it would refuse any negotiation and 
immediately resort to collective action.
The principle of ultima ratio, however, has been the object of a progressive 
erosion in German case-law, in particular in relation to the legitimacy of “warning 
strikes”: in 1976 the BAG admitted such instrument121, having recognized their often 
positive effect on the reaching of a quicker compromise between the parties. It 
further specified that this mild pressure on the employer might be exerted before 
means of negotiation are exhausted; the ultima ratio principle was therefore to be 
applied only to strike of long or indefinite duration122.
Subsequently the BAG, while determining that both “normal” and “warning” 
strikes fall under this principle, significantly lowered the conditions to be fulfilled in 
order to meet the requirements of ultima ratio123; a formal declaration of failure of 
negotiations cannot be considered anymore as a prerequisite for the initiation of an 
industrial action, which by itself reflects the fact that the party concerned has 
considered the possibilities of reaching an agreement without making recourse to 
such means of pressure to be exhausted124. More in general, according to the 
Federal Labour Court, it is possible to identify a “uniform point” as from which a 
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118  Ultima-ratio Prinzip, originally derived from the “Social adequancy” doctrine. See BAG GS, 
Decision of 28 January 1955, I, 289
119  Including mediation procedures provided by statute or collective agreement. See BAG GS, 
Decision of 21 April 1971 - GS 1/68
120 See Kraus 2011.
121  Previously considered unlawful, because spontaneously called by the workers  (and only 
afterwards backed by the unions), therefore violating the need for a ballot, and because they did not 
constitute a means of last resort, being called during collective bargaining procedures (although for 
periods of time not exceeding three hours).
122 See BAG, Decision of 17 December 1976 – 1 AZR 605/75
123 See BAG, Decision of 21 June 1988 – 1 AZR 651/86
124Therefore, it is  up to the trade union to declare that negotiations have failed whenever it seems that 
further negotiations would be useless and that the seriousness and execution of negotiations  are not 
subject to judicial control. See Weiss and Schmidt 2008 p. 162
warning strike, like any other form of industrial action, is not excluded, “even though 
collective bargaining continues”, therefore explicitly admitting the recourse to 
collective action during the course of ongoing negotiations.
Therefore, while the principle of last resort is still formally present in the 
German legal framework, the strict judicial control on the existence and exhaustion 
of less restrictive means to conclude the negotiations indicated by the ECJ as 
necessary in order to ascertain the suitability and necessity of the collective 
action125  significantly diverges from the free and non-verifiable decision of the 
collective party in the introduction of collective action in the industrial disputes.
3.1.3 – Italy
The Italian framework on the right to strike was not directly involved by the 
ECJ jurisprudence in the matter; however, it is not possible to a priori exclude a 
certain degree of influence for this and the other Member States which find 
themselves in a similar situation; it is necessary therefore, to address the possible 
interferences of the principles inferred in particular by Viking and Laval with several 
elements both referring to the detailed regulatory framework, developed in particular 
by the courts, and to the Constitutional basis for the collective action126; a system 
such as the Italian one may very well be affected by the consequences of the Viking-
Laval judicial course, in particular when is considered that the lawfulness of the 
action according to national legislation does not guarantee compatibility with EU law 
per se.
The first element to be considered in this context is the relevance granted by 
the ECJ to the economic freedom; in primis, it came to represent a right that can be 
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125 C-438/05 Viking Line Abp, Par. 87
126 See supra par. 1.1.1
enforced in private disputes127, unlike in particular those listed in the Charter of 
Nice128. 
Secondly, its content, which is to be balanced against the right to collective 
action, refers to the protection of the company’s business and its freedom to 
operate and move on the market129; this implies that even the normal activity of the 
undertaking would be protected from the exercise of the collective action, while 
currently in the Italian framework, a disruption of the economic activity which can 
justify the liability of strikers in the case of a legal collective action is only one posing 
unjustified obstacles to the “fundamental economic freedom” of the employer130.
With regards to the permissible aims of the collective action, it should be 
noted that the ECJ, in particular in Viking131, refers to very specific kind of strike 
action that can be undertaken when internal market issues are concerned; trade 
union, in fact, can only rely on the objective of the “protection of workers”132, and in 
particular when “jobs or conditions of employment at issue” are “jeopardised or 
under serious threat”133; such a reconstruction may reflect in the Italian context from 
a double point of view.
According to the ECJ, in fact, any action not aimed towards the objective of 
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127 It should be noted that the Italian constitutional order recognizes  the right to “private economic 
enterprise” (art. 41) through a relatively wide formulation which at the same time imposes the limits  of 
common good and safety, and in particular liberty and human dignity, and the possibility for the law 
for the orientation of economic activity towards  social purposes. The horizontal direct effect of EU 
legislation granting economic freedoms, however, greatly reinforces the contraposition between the 
predominance social interests  - and in particular labour rights  - as  fundamental principles  in the 
Italian Constitution versus  the prevalence of economic freedoms  in the EU framework as crucial 
elements for the realization of the internal market. See also Orlandini in Ales and Novitz 2010, p. 99
128 See supra par. 1.2.3 and also Serrano in Vimercati 2009, pp. 173-175. See infra parr. 3.3.2 and 
4.1.2 for the possible implications on the matter deriving from the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty
129 Ales and Orlandini in Bücker and Warneck 2010.
130 The constraints to the right of strike present in the Italian framework with reference to the freedom 
of undertaking derive from the principle that the exercise of the right to strike must not infringe other 
constitutionally protected rights, and is therefore aimed at protecting the very survival of the company 
and its ability to remain on the market once an industrial dispute is  over (so called business 
productivity). See also supra, par. 1.1.1
131 Often seen as  “less  restrictive” in respect to Laval, but in fact setting up a  framework of principles 
which, notwithstanding their uncertainty, may translate into severe constraints  on the right to take 
industrial action. See Pallini 2008, pp. 2, Orlandini in Blanplain and Światkowski 2009, p. 105 and 
also infra parr. 3.2.1-3.2.1 with reference to the British experience.
132 Viking, par. 77 
133 Viking, Par. 81. See also supra par. 2.3.1
the protection of workers is to be considered incompatible with the EU framework, 
or at least questionable by the other party; the theoretical application of such a 
principle in the Italian system would therefore constitute a complete overturn of the 
current discipline, in which no limitations can be set to the aims of the collective 
action134; reasons outside the framework of collective bargaining135  represent 
legitimate expressions of industrial dispute from a civil and criminal point of view, 
and its participant continue to be protected by the provisions of the Workers’ 
Statute from disciplinary actions dismissal by the Workers’ Statute.
The Viking-Laval doctrine also casts serious doubts on the lawfulness of any 
collective action whose aim is to prevent the exercise of market freedoms of national 
operators, as for the case of delocalization, outsourcing and off-shoring, on the 
basis of the “indirect” negative consequences of such operations, or to impose on 
foreign undertaking the signature of the collective agreements or the respect of 
social clauses provided by the latter136.
A further element in need of analysis is represented by the reconstruction of 
the right to collective action as ultima ratio in the event of industrial dispute, whose 
exercise, as noted before, may only be justified when the other means and options 
provided to the parties in order to settle the dispute have been exhausted137; it is to 
be underlined that in the Italian legal framework presents no obligation determining 
the recourse to collective action as an instrument of last resort in the private sector, 
nor it provides for mandatory procedural restrictions on collective action. 
Such restrictions, generally not in line with the italian experience, are set by 
law for the “essential public services”; while the kind of balance sought by the italian 
regulation is aimed at making possible the exercise to the right of strike and the 
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134 In particular see Court of Cassation decision no. 5053/1979, which dismissed the possibility of 
judicial control in assessing wheter the reasons at the basis of the protest were well grounded. 
135 e.g., the political strike, which has been the object of several pronunciations by lower courts but 
also by the Constitutional Court (no. 290/1974) and by the Court of Cassation (nr. 5053/1979, 
16515/2004) or a sympathy action.
136 With particular reference to the interaction between tendering procedures, collective action and 
employer’s liability, see Cass. 10139/2006 
137 Viking, Par. 87
enjoyment of other personal rights of Constitutional value138, the application of the 
ECJ doctrine to the sector  would mean that workers involved in collective action 
undertaken without the respect of the conciliation procedures would face the 
imposition of the sanctions provided by law, but also a possible tortious liability for 
damages139 suffered by the undertaking.
Similar conclusions must be drawn for the case of the voluntary provision of 
conciliatory procedures in collective agreements for the private sector; the workers 
belonging to the trade unions which have signed agreements containing such 
clauses are to be considered bound to their respect, and their infringement would 
render a collective action unlawful from a Community law perspective.
However, the contractual source in question cannot be seen as extending its 
binding force to the organisations which have not signed an agreement, to their 
members, or to non-unionized workers, notwithstanding the fact that its partial 
coverage may affect the very function of such clauses in reducing and 
proceduralising the recourse to collective action140, nor it can be taken into account 
the fact that conciliatory instrument are theoretically available within the undertaking.
It should be lastly noted that the Italian transposition of the PWD provides141 
the extension to posted workers of the collective agreements signed by the most 
representative employers' and labour organizations 142 , therefore imposing by law 
duties on foreign service providers in order to prevent social dumping; the italian 
frameworks, however, makes reference to “the same working conditions” deriving 
from law and from collective agreements, which are applied to workers performing a 
comparable work in the area of posting.143
Therefore, in accordance to the Laval and Rüffert jurisprudence, such norms 
should be interpreted as imposing on foreign service providers the respect of the 
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138 The Law 146/90 provides  indications on the “quantity” of services to be supplied to the public, a 
ten day’s  notice, and a series of procedures  in need of compliance before the beginning of the strike 
action.
139  See also infra par. 3.2.4 with reference to workers and trade union liability, remedies  and 
sanctions.
140 See also, with reference to the contractual peace obligations, Pallini in Sacchi 2011, p. 6
141 Art. 3, c. 1, D.lgs. 72/2000
142 In accordance with art. 3.8 PWD
143 It should be further considered that social clauses in tender procedures  referring to the respect of 
collective agreements are present Italian experience. See in particular D.lgs. 163/2006, art. 96
minimum standards set by law for the matters listed in art. 3.1 PWD and, with 
reference to wage levels, with the minimum rates of pay deriving from the partial 
extension of the enforceability of the collective agreements144; only in this case an 
industrial action against a foreign service providers and in defence of posted 
workers should be considered compatible with the EU-framework.
Furthermore, the recent decentralization of the bargaining system, allowing 
plant-level agreements to derogate form the result of national-level bargaining 
processes accentuates the risks of social dumping, in particular because it prevents 
a clear identification of minimum standards “applied throughout national territory”145, 
and further reduces the space for collective action, which could not force the foreign 
employer to enter in case-by-case negotiations on the place of work, in a context 
carachterised by lack of transparency and predictability with regards to the 
conditions to be applied146.
3.2 -  Reflections on national disputes and rulings
3.2.1 - The Swedish Labour Court judgment in Laval: claim for damages  and 
trade union liability
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144  According to consistent italian case-law (dating back to the ‘50s), art. 36 of the Constitution 
(“workers have the right to a remuneration commensurate to the quantity and quality of their work 
and in any case such as  to ensure them and their families  a free and dignified existence”) has 
mandatory nature. The constitutional norm has to be applied by the courts in conjuction with the 
provision of the civil code referring to remuneration in work contracts  (art. 2099.2 civil code), which in 
turn implies  that the judges have to define the “sufficient” wage level by specifically referring to the 
minimum pay provided for in industry-wide collective agreements (collective agreements therefore 
work as “interposed parameter” in the determination of the wage level to be applied). It should be 
noted, however, that the jurisprudence on the matter has identified different clauses to determine the 
minimum wage, and for what specifically refers  to foreign workers, have taken into account the 
differences in the cost of living in the country of origin (Cass. 26.11.2004 n. 22332, MGL, 2005, 457). 
See Orlandini 2011, pp. 409-410
145 For instance with reference to the working time (D.lgs. 66/2003)
146 See Laval, parr. 71 and 110
In one of the two “flag-cases” for the judicial course in object, Laval, the ECJ 
left no “margin of appreciation” to the national courts with regards as to the 
compatibility of the industrial action carried out by the Swedish trade union with art. 
49 EC and the PWD; however, since the issue had not been referred to it, did not 
provide directly an answer to the consequent question on whether the renewed 
context regulating the collective action allowed for claims for damages by employers 
against trade unions147.
In December 2009 the the Swedish Labour Court148 issued its judgment on 
the Laval case, following the preliminary ruling by the ECJ; a split decision149 
determined the Swedish Building Workers’ Union and the Swedish Electricians’ 
Union could be made responsible for the violations of EU law as a result of the 
industrial action carried out at the Vaxholm site, and therefore liable to Laval for 
damages: the Labour Court, in consequence, awarded the company compensation 
for three trade unions’ breach of EU law and sentenced the union to pay 55.000 € in 
damages, as well as the majority of the litigation costs150.
The case is particularly interesting since the Labour Court as late as in 
December 2004 – when deciding on the interim injunction151  – found that the 
collective actions were lawful; it should also be considered the fact that the Swedish 
trade unions had relied on the unequivocal right to collective action according to the 
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147  This  question has easily revealed its fundamental importance; as  noted, at the core of the 
outcome of the BALPA litigation (see supra) was  the argument made by British Airways that the cap 
for damages  usually applied to trade union liability could not find application in the case of industrial 
action breaching EU law, on the basis in particular of the consideration that a cap on damages was 
incompatible with the principle of effective remedies  under EU law. In this sense the ruling by the 
Labour Court of Stockholm, which recognized the absence of national provisions on the matter and 
derived it solely from EC law, represent a decisive innovation both in the Swedish national setting and 
at EU-level.
148 Arbetsdomstolen (Labour Court) judgment AD 2009:89. The text utilized is an unofficial translation 
by Jur. Dr Laura Carlson
149  Three of the seven judges  had a dissenting opinion and two of them (in particular the vice-
president - one of the professional judges  - and one of the members  representing the labour side) 
wanted to reject Laval’s claims altogether.
150 Amounting to roughly 200.000 €.
151 Labour Court decision AD 2004:11, see also supra par. 2.2.2
Swedish Constitution and legal framework152  as well as on consolidated praxes in 
conducting the dispute, and that ECJ had never ruled on such a matter at the time 
of the dispute153. On the other hand, Laval had made claims both for financial 
damages and punitive damages 154 for the breach of EU law155. 
Firstly, it should be underlined that the Court156, while admitting that it had not 
included questions on liability for damages in its 2005157 reference, stated that the 
preliminary ruling in Laval, together with the principle of effective enforcement of EU 
law developed in ECJ case law, provided sufficient guidance for deciding the issues 
of liability for damages in the case at hand 158.
Therefore, in order to determine the legal basis for damage liability for 
violations of EU law, the Labour Court copiously referred to the the fundamental 
principles of loyalty and solidarity159, as well as considering the criteria for Member 
State liability established, among others, in Francovich160; it further determined that, 
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152 While agreeing that the labour dispute should be considered unlawful, trade unions had denied 
any liability, arguing that they had applied explicit Swedish law on the matter. It has been noted that 
the fact that the Swedish trade union acted in full compliance with national law should exclude its 
liability, which should be imposed on the Member State. See Zahn and DeWitte 2011, p. 440
153 See Kruse 2009
154 Around 140,000 and 135,000 € plus interest; in Sweden, punitive damages are generally paid for 
breaches of labour law legislation and collective agreements. See Rönmar 2010, p. 281
155 It should be also noted that both parties requested that, if the Labour Court did not approve their 
claims, the case should be referred to the ECJ for another preliminary ruling on the question of 
liability for the breach of EU law. Ibid.
156 Which can be considered a court of last resort, see infra 
157 AD 2009:89, p. 18. see also supra in this parapraph and also par 2.2.2
158 “There was  therefore no need to refer the case for yet another preliminary ruling by the ECJ”. AD 
2009:89, p. 40. It should be noted, however, that the decision of the Labour Court not to submit the 
case to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the issue of trade union liability and damages does not 
seem appropriate. The Labour Court of Stockholm, is  a court of last resort in labour law disputes 
under the meaning of Article 234 EC (now Article 267 TFEU) and relevant ECJ case-law, and matter 
of individual rights to damages  for breach of EC law had, in fact, never been reviewed before the 
ECJ. When the acte clair doctrine and CILFIT (Case C-283/81) criteria are taken into account, it does 
not seem the case that the correct application of EU law was  “so obvious as to leave no scope for 
any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question [...] is to be resolved” (CILFIT, par. 16), 
given in particular the content of the dissenting opinions expressed by three of the members of the 
judging panel in the “clearly not unanimous” decision. While its unwillingness  to submit once more 
the case to ECJ is “understandable” (in particular because of the lenght of such procedure), it is to be 
considered that the Court had failed in including questions about the compensation for damages in 
its first reference. The Arbetsdomstolen, therefore, had the duty rather than the option to submit the 
case to the ECJ in order to clarify the matter and receive the necessary guidance. See Kruse 2009, 
Rönmar 2010, p. 284.
159 AD 2009:89, p. 13
160 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90
since no applicable regulation on the matter could be derived from the Treaty, 
national measures were to be applied in the case.
It then proceeded to consider that in order for the general legal principle of 
EU law161of liability between private parties for damages deriving from violation of 
Treaty provisions to be applied, the specific EU rule that has been violated must 
have horizontal direct effect162; the Court determined that the application of this 
principle to violations against other Treaty provisions beyond the area of competition 
law 163 could be derived in particular from the ECJ case-law in Raccanelli, which 
refers to the free movement of workers164. Lastly, it referred to Brasserie du Pêcheur 
and Factortame165, but only in order to generally affirm that a legal rule recognized 
by the ECJ should be considered as retroactively applicable to legal relationships166.
With specific reference to the trade union’s liability in the case, the 
assessment by the Arbetsdomstolen proceeded in two main directions, that is to 
ascertain the violation and trade union liability for what it refers to the EU framework 
on the freedom of movement and, on the other hand, in the light of the provision of 
the MBL; the Labour Court determined that article 49 EC had direct horizontal 
effect167, allowing therefore a private undertaking to invoke its rights against a labour 
union taking industrial action 168.
For what it refers to the appropriateness of the damages as remedy for the 
violation of the Treaty, the Labour Court underlined, in primis, how there was “no 
explicit support” in the ECJ case-law for the proposition that an individual is to pay 
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161  “It may [...] be considered established that there is a general legal principle within EC law that 
damages are [...] to be awarded between private parties upon a violation of a  Treaty provision that 
has horizontal direct effect.”
162 That is, the EU provision in question must have direct effect on the national level, create rights for 
the individual that the national courts have to protect, and the direct effect needs to  be applicable in 
the relationship between the private parties. See also Rönmar 2010, p. 281
163  Established in particular by Courage (C-453/99) and Manfredi (Joined Cases C- 295/04 to 
C-298/04)
164 Case C-94/07
165 Joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93
166  See amplius, with particular reference to the italian Constitutional framework, Saccà 2010, pp.
14-16
167 In order to reach this  conclusion, the Labour Court interpreted some different language versions  of 
the ECJ’s answer to the first question in Laval. See Rönmar 2010, p. 282
168  In particular referred to Viking (parr. 33 and 35) and Laval (par. 98)
damages on an EU law basis to another individual upon a violation of Article 49 
EC169.
However, without “taking a stance” on the possible applications of the 
damage liability criteria of Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, nor contemplating 
the possibility of liability for the Swedish State, the Labour Court determined that the 
trade unions’ actions, being in conflict with art. 49 EC, constituted a serious violation 
of the Treaty, and was directly linked to the damage suffered by the employer; 
notwithstanding the recognition of a fundamental right to collective action in the EU, 
the actual actions undertaken by the unions were not proportionate, and could not 
be considered acceptable despite their objective of protecting workers. Thus, the 
Labour Court also concluded in the sense of the existence of a sufficiently clear 
violation of EU law, and determined that the rules on damages for unlawful industrial 
action contained in §§ 54 and 55 of the MBL should be applied be analogy170, on 
the basis of national procedural autonomy, equivalence, effectiveness and 
proportionality171.
With reference to the national framework, the Court found that, because of 
the provisions of the MBL, the fact that Laval was already bound by a collective 
agreement did not mean that the collective actions were unlawful under Swedish 
law. However, on the basis of the ECJ’s decisions determining that such provisions 
were discriminatory and in violation of the Treaty, the rule should, in accordance with 
EU law172, not be applied; as a result of this, the Court decided that also in this 
perspective173  the collective actions were to be considered unlawful and the trade 
unions were to be held liable for damages under the provisions of the MBL.
Several aspects emerging from this approach need to be analyzed, and in 
particular it must be considered whether the eager references made by the Labour 
172
169 AD 2009:89 p. 22
170 AD 2009:89 p. 28
171  With particular reference to the principle of equivalence, the Labour Court held that since the 
Swedish legislator provides the imposition of punitive damages as  a sanction in industrial disputes  it 
should also be imposed for the breach of EU law deriving from unlawful collective action.
172  In particular, cases C-106/77 Simmenthal, C-81/05 Alonso and, with specific reference to the 
incompatibility of national legislation weakening the effect of EU law, C-213/89, Factortame. The 
Labour Court therefore considered that the effect of EU law would be jeopardized if it was  not 
possible to oblige the trade unions to pay damages. 
173 And specifically, from the application of the “Britannia rule” (AD 1989/120)
Court to EU fundamental principles and case-law 174 represent an accurate 
interpretation of the EU framework175.
As noted, Art. 49 EC was to be viewed by the Labour Court as having 
horizontal direct effect, notwithstanding the absence of explicit support in the ECJ 
case-law for the proposition that an individual is to pay damages to another 
individual upon such violation specifically176; most of ECJ’s jurisprudence cited with 
reference on the established liability for damages for private parties for violations of 
EU law, however, concerns individuals’ rights to compensation for a Member State’s 
breach of EC law in very specific situations involving competition law177  and, in 
particular for the case of Raccanelli178, the hypotheses concerning a breach of the 
non-discrimination rule in which a horizontal effect on the freedom of movements is 
affirmed in order to strike down the application of overtly discriminatory measures179 
which prevented the enjoyment by citizens of other Member State of rights 
“reserved” to nationals180.
In the cases referred to by the Labour Court the ECJ, while referring to the 
principles of equivalence and effectiveness did not apply the principles of Member 
State liability by analogy181; a broad interpretative reconstruction of the principles of 
EU law would certainly serve in filling the gaps of EU law, but because of the 
consistent presence of the right in question in national frameworks, and in particular 
consideration of its mention in art. 28 CFREU (where, among other things, it is 
specified that the right in question can be exercised "in the event of a conflict of 
interest") it is not possible to identify such gaps with reference to collective action182.
173
174 Whithout a compelling reason for it. Sciarra 2011, p. 366
175 See Comments by LO and TCO to the CEACR on Sweden's application of C. 87 and 98, par. 43
176 See Orlandini 2008c, p. 3
177 Where Treaty provisions are clearly directed towards companies and private parties
178 On which the Labour Court relies heavily, see Kruse 2009
179 “‘in the event that the applicant in the main proceedings is justified in relying on damage caused 
by the discrimination to which he has been subject, it is for the referring court to assess  [...] the 
nature of the compensation which he would be entitled to claim” (Raccanelli, par. 52)
180 While in the case at hand the collective action represents the exercise of an autonomous right by 
national citizens  and does not interfere with the exercise of that right by foreign nationals; 
furthermore, it has  been noted how the autonomy of a research institute such as the one involved in 
Raccanelli, presents very different features from that of a union, with regards to its relationship to 
State law as well to the functions effectively carried out. See Lo Faro 2008, p. 80
181 See Rönmar 2010, p. 283
182 See Sciarra 2011, p. 367
Another fundamental aspect, in fact, regards the the private nature of trade 
unions, which nonetheless are subjected to the direct effect of the rules of 
fundamental economic freedoms and consequently held liable for the exercise of the 
right to collective action. On one hand the Labour Courts proceeded to apply art. 49 
EC to the trade unions by virtue of the private nature of such organizations, on the 
other it did not carry out the necessary distinction and adaptations in consequence 
of the specific role183  of the various subjects involved; as noted, the Labour Court 
made only a formal reference to the criteria set by Brasserie du Pêcheur and 
Factortame, without actually deciding whether they could be completely applied in 
the situation at hand, in particular when the autonomous collective bargaining model 
characterizing the Swedish system is taken into account.
Similarly the Court did not address the question on the basis of the principles 
set in competition law which, while suggesting a rule of strict liability for repairing 
damages represents an appropriate remedial standard, also refer to the fault 
requirement as a necessary condition for damages claims, on the basis in particular 
of the “excusable error” which allows infringers to exceptionally escape liability in 
such matters184.
Since this judgment lacks therefore a clear analysis and consequent 
identification of the various elements determining trade union liability, the possible 
consequences stemming from the different role of the trade unions in the various 
contexts remain unpredictable. For what it concerns the Nordic model, it has to be 
noted that the interaction between public and private regulation, legislation and 
collective agreements is already in general rather complex; the pictures becomes 
even more complex when the analysis moves from the organisation-related nature of 
the right to collective action typical of the Swedish and Finnish systems to the 
exercise of such a right in legal frameworks entitling every individual to such a 
right185  or for situations in which single individuals conduct such a protest; in the 
first case, the complexities may stem from the consideration that unions’ liability 
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183 In particular it has  been argued that the trade unions’ sui generis nature of quasi-public regulatory 
bodies, See Apps 2009
184 Cf. in particular Manfredi and White Paper on Damages actions  for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 
COM(2008) 165, par. 2.4. See Saccà 2010, p. 11 and Van Bael 2011, p. 406
185 Such as the Italian one, see in particular Ales, Orlandini in Bücker, Warneck 2010
may be incremental to or replace that of the individual worker186; in the latter case187 
the collective action could even fall outside of the scope of Viking and Laval, as 
these only contemplate liability for trade unions and not for private individuals188 
deriving from an industrial action incompatible with EU law.
With reference to the damages awarded by the Arbetsdomstolen it should be 
noted that on the basis of the provisions of the MBL employers, employees and 
organisations who violate the Act or a collective agreement must compensate all the 
damages incurred by the other party189; furthermore, according to § 55, in 
determining the extent of the damage, the Court must also take into account the 
interests of the injured party with respect to rules deriving from laws and collective 
agreements, as well as the other circumstances of other than purely economic 
importance (so-called “punitive” or “non financial” damages).
The Labour Court concluded its assessment in the sense of the existence of a 
right to compensation for the Laval company for punitive damages 190 but not for the 
economic loss suffered by the company, since it had not succeeded in providing 
sufficient evidence of it191; the Labour court disregarded the trade union claims 
which had adduced that a prerequisite for liability to pay damages is negligence by 
considering that when applying the MBL provisions on damages it is sufficient that 
the action constitutes a breach of the Act, and the same should apply to breaches of 
EU law.
Furthermore, the Court did not utilize the statutory possibility to reduce or 
waive damages when it is reasonable under the circumstances192; in particular, the 
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186 See Orlandini 2011, p. 414
187 See infra par. 3.2.2 with regards to the “wildcat” strikes during the course of the Lindsey dispute.
188 See also Novitz in Bücker, Warneck 2010
189 MBL, §  54. The assumption underlying such provision is  that the compensation should cover the 
entire amount of the loss suffered; the burden of proof on the amount of damages generally lies on 
the employer, except for the possibility for the judge to order compensation on an equitable basis 
when proof on the exact amount of damages results particularly difficult. See Bruun 2011, p. 399
190  Of the total of the damages 20,000€ were imposed on the Swedish Building Workers’ Union, 
20,000€ on its local branch and 15,000 € on the Swedish Electrician’s Trade Union.
191 Malmberg 2010a, p. 16
192 MBL, §  60. If it is reasonable damages may be reduced or waived entirely. When assessing the 
workers' liability for participation in unlawful industrial action the circumstances  that have emerged 
from consultation that must be undertaken with a view of terminating the industrial action (§  43 MBL) 
must be taken into account.
Labour Court held that the trade unions should have taken into account the 
possibility that their action could be incompatible with EU law, in particular on the 
basis of the objections raised by Laval and of the retroactive effect of ECJ 
jurisprudence193.
Therefore, the liability ultimately recognized by the Swedish Labour Court 
according to § 55 MBL significantly differs from an economic compensation and 
appears more similar to penalty or fine for breach of EU law: as noted, the Swedish 
legislative frameworks provides both the functions of guaranteeing compensation 
for the economic losses and providing a deterrent tool against further violations, 
even if the former remedy was not applied because of the dismissal the financial 
claim.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned problems in the determination of the 
effective elements of the trade union liability, and the factual occurrences at the 
basis of the dissenting opinions, the extension of the national framework set by the 
MBL to the cases of breach of EU law represents at first glance a reasonable result 
of the national Laval judgment and a seemingly fair application of EU law on 
damages194, in particular for what it refers to the principles of equivalence and 
effectiveness195; however it should be noted that the “effective remedies” to protect 
an individual’s rights under EU law should rather aim at restoration of the offended 
party rather than to the punishment of the side in violation of EU law, and that, more 
than anything, the national Laval case has strongly highlighted the need to 
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193 On the “negligence” of the trade union on the matter see also Saccà 2010, p. 30
194 See Kruse 2009. See also infra par. 3.2.2 with reference to the British framework on damages, and 
in particular, the limits set by §22 TULRCA 
195  In particular, see Unibet (C-432/05) which represents one of the mots  comprehensive modern 
summaries of the basic position on the principle of effective judicial protection, reaffirmed in Article 
47 of the CFREU (right to an effective remedy and a fair trial) and Impact (C-268/06). It should be 
noted that under Lex Laval a conduct similar to the one in the Vaxholm dispute would be unlawful 
under sect. 5a LUA and sanctioned according to sect. 54 and 55 MBL, whose extension to disputes 
in breach of EU law has  been istitutionalized by the 2010 amendments to the Swedish statutory 
provisions on collective action in the contex of the posting of workers.
determine guidelines 196  and criteria on the delicate and matters of trade union 
liability197.
Furthermore, while the Laval judgment is clearly a domestic decision, a 
theoretical application of this principle in a system such as the Italian one would 
presents several complexities: it is without doubt, in fact, that an action similar to the 
one undertaken in the Laval dispute does not involve constitutional rights of parties 
third to the dispute 198 . The “equivalent” national remedies for unlawful actions in 
such cases, in practice do not include compensation for damages 199 , and could 
therefore fall short in providing effective judicial protection to an individual’s rights.
Beside the exceptional possibility of the creation of a “new remedy” 
determined by the ECJ in Unibet200, it should therefore be considered whether the 
application of the compensatory remedies provided in the framework on essential 
public services could be extended also to the collective action in violation of EU law.
In particular, the damages awarded by the Swedish Labour Court in the 
national Laval case appear similar to the sanctions issued by the competent 
Commission201  to the trade unions or their legal representatives202  in the event of 
proclamation or participation to an unlawful strike; the similarities refer to the 
sanctionatory nature of the remedies at hand, to the degree of discretionary power 
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196 Bruun 2011, p. 402
197  It should be noted, that the possibility of a future amendment of Lex Laval does not allow to 
consider the analyzed extension as a stable innovation in the Swedish system. Another element of 
uncertainty in the present situation refers  to the fact that, as  noted, trade unions  were condemned 
because of their compliance of the national norms  and regulation; there is therefore the possibility of 
a further claim by trade unions  for State compensation for the damages suffered in accordance with 
the principles of MS liability. At the basis of such a claim would be application of the principle of 
legitimate expectations with respect to the incorrect implementation of EU law by Sweden, or more 
specifically the fact that the Swedish Labour Court unilaterally concluded in the matter without 
recurring to the available instruments. See also Bruun 2010
198  And would not therefore be covered by the discipline on the collective action in the “essential 
public services” (l. 146/90)
199 It should be considered, however, that this possibility is not excluded de jure. Lo Faro 2011, p. 422
200 According to which Union law does  not create new remedies in the national courts unless it was 
“apparent [...] that no legal remedy existed which made it possible to ensure, even indirectly, respect 
for an individual’s rights under [Union] law.” (Unibet, par. 41)
201 See supra par. 1.1.1
202 l. 146/90, articles 4.4-bis and 4.4-ter.
by the adjudicating body in issuing the sanction203, and to the economic 
consistence of the latter204.
However, it must be noted that the discipline set by l. 146/90 refers only to 
the safeguard of human rights protected by the Constitution, and therefore its 
extension would not not meet the principle of equivalence, since those remedies are 
provided in domestic law with respect to different situations from those at issue in 
the hypothetical case in question; for “normal” collective actions, therefore, 
sanctionatory economic measures should not be applied in the Italian context205.
Furthermore, the specific aims of the sanctions should be taken into account 
when considering the possibility of utilizing such parameter in guiding the 
discretionary power of the judge in determining the compensation; the Swedish 
system, in fact, provides both a sanctionatory and restorative remedy, which would 
have been activated had the company provided proof of the damages suffered. 
On the other hand, the exclusively sanctionatory nature of the Italian remedy 
would not fulfill the essentially restorative function that should characterize an 
effective remedy for an undertaking which had suffered a damage deriving from the 
violation of its economic freedoms206, nor it could be applied as an insurmountable 
threshold once determined that the compensation, in order to be effective, should 
cover the entire extent of the damages suffered207.
Lastly, it should be underlined that on 6 May 2010 an extraordinary appeal 
was been lodged by Byggnads, Byggettan and Elektrikerna before the Supreme 
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203  In the italian discipline, linked to the size of the organization, the severity of the violation, the 
eventual repeated infringement, as well as  the severity of the effects of the collective action on the 
public service, therefore is  not to a precise economic quantification nor to (unlimited) claims by the 
employer.
204 A maximum of 51.645,69 €.
205 Furthermore, widely applied solutions like the interim injunction (ex art. 700) would also imply that 
beside the economic compensation provided by the Swedish Labour Court, other effective remedies 
could already be provided by national legislations and case-laws.
206 On the basis of the same reasoning, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions  should be excluded 
without any consideration of a possible contrast between the EU and domestic constitutional 
framework. See Lo Faro 2011, p. 426 
207  It should be noted that such a reconstruction, would also trample frameworks such as the UK 
one, which present a cap for damages that seems to derive from a balancing of the protection of the 
trade unions’ ability to bargain collectively without the threat of unlimited damages, and the demand 
for an effective restoration by the employer, in particular when the variation of the size of the cap on 
the basis of union size is taken into account. See infra par. 3.2.2 
Court against the judgment of the Labour Court (whose judgments cannot be 
normally appealed) by the Swedish trade unions, on the basis that its determination 
of the existence of a principle of damages between individuals in EU law without the 
support of any judgment of the ECJ establishing horizontal damages for breach of 
Art. 49 EC (Article 56 TFEU), and that the Arbetsdomstolen was under an obligation 
to make a preliminary reference to the Luxembourg Court. 
The Supreme Court, however, has rejected the claim to have the judgment 
reverted, since it was not proven that the Labour Court’s decision constituted a 
manifest infringement of the law and/or amounted to a serious fault in the court’s 
procedure which affected the issue of the case208; the “very weak” ruling209 by the 
Arbetdomstolen, therefore represent the final judgment on the Vaxholm dispute, 
more than five years after its start210.
3.2.2 - A British “trio” for collective action? BALPA, Metrobus and Lindsey 
As noted before, the ECJ’s decision in the Viking judgment was only an 
interpretation of the EU law in order to assist the Court of Appeal, and did not 
represent a final judgment on the facts of the dispute211; the Court, in fact, stated 
that it pertains to the national court to determine the justification, necessity and 
proportionality of the collective actions212.
The case was referred back to the English Court of Appeal that should have 
issued a judgment on whether or not to maintain the original injunction granted 
against the FSB and ITF in the light of the judgment from the ECJ; however the 
parties involved213, after the interim  decision, had reached an out-of-court 
settlement for the dispute before it returned to the Court of Appeal in United 
Kingdom214. The Finnish company accepted an undisclosed sum covering its legal 
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208 HD 2181/10 of 6/7/2010
209 Kruse 2009
210 See Ahlberg 2010d, Saccà 2010, p. 2, Malmberg 2011, p. 376
211 For what it refers the ECJ’s assessment of ITF’s action, see supra par. 2.3.5
212 and in particular, it has to ascertain whether, the union involved did or did not have other means at 
its disposal which were less restrictive of freedom of establishment in order to bring to a successful 
conclusion the negotiations entered and whether the trade union had made use and exhausted those 
means before initiating the action. See Viking, par. 85
213 i.e. Viking Line and the FSU
214 See Bell 2008, p. 6
costs as well as compensation for having to agree to a manning agreement in 
consequence of which the vessel was continuing to fly the Finnish flag but with 
slightly reduced wage supplements for new crew members215.
The main dispute that had originated the ruling by the ECJ remained 
untouched in the agreement, nor it was assessed and ruled upon by a British judge; 
however the ECJ jurisprudence on collective action could give rise in the United 
Kingdom to some of the  potentially most far-reaching consequences in the various 
domestic settings analyzed, and some peculiar features emerging from recent 
industrial disputes can be attributed to the influence of the Viking-Laval judicial 
course.
In particular it should be considered whether Viking and Laval add another 
layer of restrictions on the ability to take industrial action216 to the statutory and case 
law restraints already present in the British framework, by imposing the application 
of the EU free-movement rules on the action at least for the case of real or potential 
existence of an element of trans-nationality in the dispute or in the actual action 
undertaken217.
As collective bargaining is not the main form of implementing EU Directives in 
UK, the other main issues emerging from Laval did not, similarly, produce an 
immediate impact in the British framework, in particular because of the existence of 
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215  The agreement on the matter was reached in January 2008. Subsequently, Viking Line Viking 
chose to register its new fast ferry (the Viking XPRS, which entered service on 28 April 2008 XPRS) 
replacing the MS Rosella under Swedish rather than Estonian flag, and manning Swedish, Finnish 
and Estonian crew members. Finnish Shipping Group Settles  Case Over Cheap Labour, Financial 
Times, 4 March 2008, and Tallink eyes  Finnish flag, TradeWinds News 23 April 2008, available online 
at http://www.tradewindsnews.com/daily/article507968.ece?service=printArticle
216 It should be considered that the British framework already provides the opportunity for a scrutiny 
on the aims  of the collective action when it states that a lawful action can only be undertaken “in 
contemplation or furtherance” (which is determined by a subjective test) of “a trade dispute” (altough 
no reference is made to the further ECJ requirement of the “serious threat for jobs and employment 
conditions”). It should also be noted that the competence in determining the lawfulness of the strike 
pertains to High Courts  (which are common law bodies) instead than to the more specialized 
Employment Tribunals, and the English law’s  approach to the regulation of industrial action seeks to 
avoid “politicising” the courts by preventing them from ruling on the merits of the dispute, whose 
determination is left to the appreciation of the party taking a certain decision. See supra, par 1.1.1, 
Davies 2008, p. 146 and Szyszczak in Blanpain and Swiatowski 2009, p. 167
217 In this  sense, the ECJ rulings  cannot be seen as requiring the introduction of an explicit “right to 
strike” in UK law (as opposed to the system of  immunities that continues  to operate to this  day), 
since the recognition of the right to strike is limited to EU law, buth rather of a “binary system” 
regarding the lawfulness of industrial action in the British system: in particular, the courts should not 
apply the reasonings  and the principles deriving from Viking and Laval for the case of trade disputes 
not presenting EU features or dimension. See Countouris in Vimercati 2009, p. 98
a universally applicable National Minimum Wage218. The East Lindsey “wildcat” 
strikes, however, did not exclusively concerned the ability for individual workers to 
take unofficial action but also raised concerns regarding an ineffective transposition 
of the PWD in the domestic legal framework, as well as the EU incompatibility of 
solutions found in order to settle the dispute.
Furthermore, it should also be noted that Rüffert and Luxembourg could 
produce relevant consequences also the UK setting; in particular the Greater 
London Authority (GLA) Group and Olympic Delivery Authority’s (ODA) procurement 
requirements impose on contractors the payment of the so-called London Living 
Wage219  rates of pay instead of the lower National Minimum Wage220. As LLW 
agreements cannot be considered as “universally applicable”, ECJ jurisprudence on 
the matter would suggest that the living wage could not be imposed as a matter of 
local authority or Olympic Development Authority policy. 
The other main area in which social clauses have been widely applied is 
represented by the one referring to social cohesion and integration of minorities; in 
particular, “supplier diversity” requirement to be observed by contractors and sub-
contractors in public procurement (linked with the varied British situation), while not 
imposing “minority quotas” but rather the respect of good practices221  in the area 
may still collide with the minimalist and restrictive interpretations by the ECJ 
jurisprudence on social clauses and public policy justification.
The first test for the potential effect of Viking in the UK setting, and for the 
willingness of the British courts in applying the ECJ jurisprudence came in early 
2008.
181
218 Ewing 2009, p. 4
219 LLW, introduced in 2005 for achieving “adequate levels” in housing, diet, social integration and 
avoidance of chronic stress for earners and their dependents, and currently amounting to £8.30 per 
hour. Greater London Authority 2011, p. 11
220 As a matter of fact the same GLA states that LLW “is not the same as a minimum wage” Ibid., p. 
32
221 See Countouris in Vimercati 2009, pp. 105-106
The decision by British Airways to set up a wholly owned subsidiary based in 
France222, resulted in the opposition by British Airline Pilot Association (BALPA) 
aiming to prevent the company undermining terms, conditions and job security by 
employing pilots on wages lower than those paid to UK-employed “mainline” 
staff223. Once all the stages of the disputes procedures were exhausted without 
agreement been reached 224, the trade union promoted the recourse to strike action; 
the ballot  saw 93% of the workers eligible voting, and a vast majority (86%) voting 
in favour of the strike.
British Airways responded by announcing that if strike dates were issued it 
would have gone to the High Court to seek an injunction preventing the strike 
underlining that, the action would be unlawful by virtue of the protection to the 
freedom of establishment; in particular, BA relied on Viking, arguing that art. 43 EC 
would apply because of its intention of establishing separate companies in various 
EU Member States in order to run its business, as well as acquiring existing 
operations from third parties, and that BALPA’s opposition would have the effect of 
making the establishment in another Member State less attractive or even 
pointless225.
BALPA did not accept this argument but, rather than announce strike dates, it 
took the unprecedented initiative of referring the matter to the High Court to seek a 
declaratory ruling for determining the lawfulness of the action, and in particular on 
whether BA's reliance on Article 43 of the Treaty of Rome had any bearing on the 
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222 This  new business was established, with the purpose of flying Europe-US routes as  a result of the 
liberalization intervened as a response to the ECJ ruling in cases C-466-469/98, C-475/98, C-476/98 
Commission v. United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria and 
Germany. Prior to the Open Skies  Treaty, there were significant regulatory obstacles to an airline 
based in one EU state flying passenger operations from another EU state to the USA. 
223 It should be noted that BALPA accepted that the subsidiary, as a start-up company, would need to 
operate with lower labour costs  than in BA mainline. The protracted collective bargaining (started in 
summer 2007) concerned various various  protective amendments  to the long-standing substantive 
collective agreement, and in particular that Openskies pilots  should have common seniority with BA’s 
pilots, and that the same clause should apply to all other subsidiaries  in the EEA. See Ewing and 
Hendy 2010, p. 44
224 Including ACAS conciliation talks (commenced on 3 March and broken down on 8 March 2008). 
Acas is an independent statutory body (governed by a Council consisting of the Acas  Chair and 
employer, trade union and independent members) providing information and advice to prevent or 
resolve problems and improve performance. See 27th February, 2008, British Airways/BALPA - 
Openskies, Government News 27 February 2008, available online at http://www.gov-news.org/gov/
uk/news/british_airwaysbalpa_openskies/38327.html
225 Viking, par. 72
industrial dispute and whether the union may rely on the strike ballot to avoid a 
claim for unlimited damages226.
BA, while stating that BALPA had complied with the ballot and notice 
requirements provided by UK law, claimed that the Court should determine whether 
the action was “legitimate” and “proportionate”, and adducing several reasons for 
the incompatibility of the action threatened by BALPA227. Furthermore, early in the 
course of the proceedings the company stated that it would have claimed unlimited 
damages estimated at £100 million per day228, had the stoppages actually taken 
place229: furthermore it was made clear that, regardless of the outcome, the case 
would have progressed on appeal to Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, with 
possible future reference to the ECJ.
This threats were sufficient to make BALPA back down from the dispute230, as 
well as not following through with the strike, because of the prospect of mounting 
litigation costs of a drawn-out case and a long series of appeals231, as well as the 
possibility of being sued for the very consistent damages claimed by BA, leading to 
the possible bankruptcy of the union, in the event of a strike; therefore also in this 
case there was no determination of the relevance of EU law in the dispute at hand; 
subsequently, the trade union has launched a campaign for the review of Article 43 
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226  Furthermore, even if Viking applied, BALPA’s intended industrial action was  considered by the 
union a last resort and proportionate, there being no other way of protecting its members’ interests.
227  In particular, the guarantees given by the company with reference to the protection of existing 
terms and conditions were in line with Viking par. 85, while the union had not considered actions 
short of a strike (Viking, par. 75) and in particular its  request of applying the clause to future merger 
operations was disproportionate. Szyszczak in Blanpain and Swiatowski 2009, pp. 172-173
228  As the case was  discontinued, the effective amount was not determined but would have been 
plainly substantial. It should be noted tha BA claimed damages alleged to have been sustained by it 
by the mere fact that BALPA had served notice to ballot for strike action.
229  With specific regard to the amount of damages required in the dispute, the position by British 
Airways was that the cap for damages usually applied to trade union liability, could not find 
application in the case of industrial action breaching EU law, on the basis  in particular of the 
consideration that a cap on damages was incompatible with the principle of effective remedies  under 
EU law.
230  With the consequent withdrawal of the counterclaim by BA, in particular on the basis of the 
assurances by BALPA that it would not call industrial action based on similar issues  http://
business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article3986070.ece
231 And also because the original January strike ballot (which has only four/twelwe weeks of validity) 
(save where extended by the court for up to a further eight weeks) would have expired and a re-ballot 
would have been necessary if there was to be strike action. See Unite 2008, Ewing and Hendy 2010 
p. 45
EC232  and in particular submitted an application to the International Labour 
Organisation in which underlined the British government’s failure to meet the 
requirements of ILO Convention 87, protecting the right to freedom of association 
and the right of trade unions to organise workers233.
While it should be noted that there has been no further litigation on the issues 
of freedom of movement and strike action234, two main conclusions can be drawn 
from the BALPA litigation: in primis, it should be considered that the UK injunctive 
relief system provides the employers with a very powerful instrument in the national 
setting, exploiting the uncertainties linked with the possible application of the criteria 
and the proportionality test derived from the Viking Laval jurisprudence.
Given that the outcome of the test for the grant of an interim injunction is 
based whether the claimant can demonstrate the “existence of a serious question to 
be tried” and that the status quo should be maintained unless the “balance of 
convenience”235  disfavors it236, employers237  will not have to show in detail before 
the court that Community law actually applies or that the action proposed is 
unjustified or disproportionate. Rather, an employer can merely show that there is an 
arguable case that the proposed industrial action will infringe its rights under 
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232  While renouncing to its previous “BA plane - BA pilot” campaign. Details  of the Article 43 
campaign can be found at http://www.balpa.org/Campaigns/Article-43-(1).aspx,
233 See infra in this paragraph
234 See Novitz in Ales and Novitz 2010, p. 201-202
235 According to the Cyanamid-doctrine (American Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon Limited [1975] AC 396)
236 The “convenience test” is  not linked to issues of proportionality as  defined in Viking and Laval, but 
it represent an assessment of which of the parties would suffer the most inconvenience should the 
action take or not take place. In the BA/UNITE and Network Rail/RMT disputes, for instance, the 
setting of the strike over the 12 days of Christmas was deemed as “fundamentally more damaging to 
British Airways and the wider public than a strike taking place at almost any other time of the 
year” (and the balance of convenience, therefore, lay firmly in favour of granting relief. See British 
Airways  plc v Unite the Union (No. 1) [2009] EWHC 3541 (QB), [2010] IRLR 423, par. 83). For what it 
refers to the RMT row (Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd v National Union of Rail, Maritime & Transport 
Workers  [2010] EWHC 1084 (QB)), the element that was deemed “disproportionate” was  the potential 
disruption of more than 80% of the railway traffic, that would have caused a lot of damage “to the 
already stricken economy” by affecting, in addition to the claimant itself and train operating 
companies, also businesses  that depend on rail services  for transport and freight and the travelling 
public (par. 2). Nonetheless  concerns  have been raised on the use of “proportionality” in the UK 
judicial discourse with reference to injunctions, representing a troubling opening towards  the use of 
uncomplete standards, principles and legal reasonings. See See BA Christmas  strike blocked by high 
court, The Guardian 18 December 2009, available online at http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/
2009/dec/17/ba-christmas-strike-blocked-court, Novitz 2009, p. 184, Ewing and Hendy 2010, p. 44 
and Wicks 2010, p. 2
237 Which are undoubtedly the parties  more likely to suffer economic damages  deriving from a strike 
action.
Community law; the serious issue at hand therefore provides good prospects of 
obtaining an injunction238.
The British Courts have appeared very open to utilize a restrictive approach in 
responding to the employers' applications for injunctive relief239, and the request for 
ad interim  injunction, which by itself is not a new tactic in the British industrial 
relation system, has clearly become the preferred remedy for employers seeking to 
overcome the threat of industrial action, especially in consideration of the very 
serious consequence that may stem from the breach of an injunction240  and of the 
fact that it allows dilatory tactics in ongoing disputes which, while preventing the 
strike from taking place swiftly, may greatly reduce the effectiveness of the trade 
union’s initiative.
The many complexities brought in by the amendments to the ballot 
regulations have widened the scope for technical irregularities in the balloting and 
employer notice procedures, increasing the threat for injunction to prevent strike 
action241; therefore the detailed and rigid drafting of its formality provisions of Part V 
of TUL(R)CA 1992, which was “ostensibly”242  designed to protect the democratic 
rights of trade union members, can in effect be invoked by the employer to precisely 
the opposite effect243, notwithstanding the recent Court of Appeal decisions in BA v 
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238 See Ornstein and Smith 2009, p. 2
239 See EDF Energy Powerlink Ltd v National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers  [2009] 
EWHC 2852 (QB) [2010] IRLR 114. Given the relatively small workplace involved, it was determined 
that it would not have been “unduly onerous  or unreasonable” for the union to supply to the employer 
a detailed breakdown of the categories  of worker balloted, even if the former did not request a 
detailed job description (par. 18). It should be also noted that the fact that an injunction (ultimately 
granted for failure to comply with the notice provisions) had been sought before the before the ballot 
had been concluded was  not considered premature: the prospect of an unlawful strike was 
sufficiently imminent to justify the grant of quia timet relief (par. 6). See Hayes, Novitz and Reed in 
Bücker and Warneck 2011, pp. 207 ff. and Stilitz 2011, p. 5
240 Such as  fines  for trade unions and trade union officials, confiscation of union assets, and possible 
criminal liability for “contempt of the court”. See Novitz in Bücker, Warneck 2010
241 The law appears  designed to frustrate trade unions on technical grounds from exercising the right 
to take collective action, rather than to provide a framework for assessing whether there is genuine 
worker support for the proposed action. See Ewing and Hendy 2010, p. 21
242 See Prassl 2011, p. 91
243 See also the aforementioned Network Rail Infrastructure v. RMT, in which the inaction of the union 
in determining the workplace of its members (parr. 50, 53 and 60), the fact that 5 out of 21/23 had not 
received a ballot paper (par.67) as well the methods of information on the results  of the ballot (a text 
message making reference to the union website, see par. 71) were struck down as insufficient to 
comply with the balloting and notification procedures  (the last point should be reviewed following the 
judgment in BA v UNITE No.2)
Unite (No.2)244 and RMT v Serco245 which, while holding the unions to certain basic 
standards of compliance, have addressed the restrictive framework balloting and 
notice requirements of the 1992 Act and partly solved some of the problems in the 
domain of information and communication246.
It should be noted that many of the previously analyzed jurisprudence may be 
seen as stemming247  from the Metrobus248  case, which concerned collective 
bargaining arrangements for London’s decentralized bus drivers and once more 
referred to the interpretation of the statutory provision on information and notice 
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244  British Airways plc v Unite the Union [2010] EWCA Civ 669 [2010] ICR 1316. This long lasting 
dispute started with the 2009 “Christmas injunction”, granted on the basis  of the fact that 900 staff 
members that had accepted voluntary redundancy had been balloted, while regulations  provide that 
only qualified staff should be balloted, and redundant workers are not. UNITE had underlined that 
British Airways was unhelpful and uncooperative in response to the efforts  made to identify the 
redundant workers, and argued that ballot would still have resulted in a vote in favour of industrial 
action even if those members leaving the airline had not been balloted (of the 13,000 cabin crew 
balloted, over 9,000 voted in favour, see British Airways  cabin crew vote for Christmas strike, BBC 
News 14 December 2009, available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8411214.stm). UNITE 
proceeded to another ballot, and BA sought and was granted another injunction in May 2010, this 
time on the basis of irregularities  in information similar to those in the aforementioned Network Rail 
Infrastructure v. RMT. The Court of Appeal lifted the injunction by rejecting the argument that  the 
UNITE had not taken active steps to inform everyone entitled to vote and that Unite had not pursued 
all reasonable avenues to comply with the information duties. The Court was clearly influenced by the 
fact that BA had not raised any complaint about compliance in relation to the previous ballot, where 
the same methods of communication (text messages and public and internet notices) had been used. 
See also Prassl 2011, p. 87, Stilitz 2011, p. 9 and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10130274
245  National Union of Rail, Maritime & Transport Workers  v Serco Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 226 [2011] 
IRLR 399. In this  ruling the position upheld in Network Rail Infrastructure v. RMT with regards to the 
accuracy of the ballot notice was  reverted, since notification requirements must refer to the 
information actually in the hands of the union at the time when it sought to comply with its  obligations 
(see parr. 69-70).
246  In particular, both RMT v Serco and BA v Unite (No.2) make reference to a “reasonableness 
requirement” in. In particular, in the latter case it was  underlined how the insertion of such 
requirement in §231 TULR(C)A (“As soon as is reasonably practicable [...] the trade union shall take 
such steps  as are reasonably necessary to ensure that all persons  entitled to vote in the ballot are 
informed”) was precisely aimed at diminishing the strictness  of the necessity requirement and held 
that the correct test was to see whether the means  of communications used were sufficient to inform 
all members  of the results  in accordance with the statutory requirements, as opposed to the question 
whether every possible means had been deployed (par. 20).
247 See Countouris and Freedland 2010, p. 4
248 Metrobus v Unite The Union [2009] EWCA Civ 829
requirements; the Court, in granting injunctive relief to Metrobus249, rejected the 
argument by UNITE’s counsel that, on the basis of the requirement contained in §3
(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 that domestic statutory provisions should be 
construed in such a way as to be consistent with the fundamental rights protected in 
the ECHR. According to this view, the complex framework of requirements for the 
trade unions made it almost impossible to avoid errors, and that right of association 
provided by Article 11 ECHR, and in particular its “essential element” constituted by 
the right to strike, was constrained in a way to render impossible its effective 
exercise250.
Having considered the various provisions highlighted by UNITE, the Court 
underlined that251 the reference to international sources did not did not “affect the 
substance of the points arising under the ECHR itself” in the decision252  and that 
had constituted only the context for the decision by the Strasbourg Court; hence it 
proceeded to evaluate the reasonableness or proportionality of the various UK 
statutory provisions concerned by the case and found that the notice and 
information requirements, as well as their amendments and formalistic interpretation, 
did not amount to disproportionate restrictions on the right to freedom of 
association under art. 11 of the Convention 253 , given also that the legislation has 
187
249  Ultimately, the Court’s assessment determined four main results  with regards to notice to the 
employer the result of the ballot and  to lack of explanation in the ballot notice and strike notices: in 
primis, and perhaps more importantly, that the obligation to inform the employer of the result of a 
ballot under exists independently of the union’s  decision on the actual initiation of industrial action 
(par. 73), and that, under determinated circumstances  (the ballot involved around 800 workers) the 
term for the fulfillment of such information duties  may be the “same day as  the result of the ballot 
becomes known” (par. 82), since the statutory criterion must be interpreted strictly as  “the earliest 
time by which the communication of the information is reasonably achievable” and does not provide 
for elasticity for the unions choices  as well as an assessment of the employer’s  need to know. 
Furthermore, it was determined that unions are entitled to elect whether to provide the lists, figures 
and explanation or the information (§§  226A(2)(c) (ii) and 234A(3)(a)(ii) TULRCA) only with respect to 
those workers  who workers  have their union subscriptions deduced through authorized deduction 
from their wages (check-off), and that inaccuracies or errors in figures supplied by a trade union do 
not constitute a breach of the statutory provision for the case of their relation to figures which the 
trade union was not required to provide.
250 In particular in the light of the decision of the ECtHR in Demir and Baykara v Turkey and Enerji 
Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey, which recognized (contrary to decades of previous  case law) the right to 
collective bargaining and to collective action, by making also reference to international labour 
standards developed by the ILO and ESC. See infra par. 4.2 for a more detailed reconstruction of 
these cases and their potential interactions with the ECJ jurisprudence in Viking and Laval 
251 See Dukes 2010, pp. 89-90
252 Metrobus, par. 50
253 Metrobus, par. 113
been carefully adapted over many years, in order to balance the interests of 
employers254, unions and members of the public255.
The swift and abstract decision by the Court of Appeal, therefore, completely 
disregarded an evaluation of the link between the national setting and the 
international and European human rights dimension of collective action, and held 
the British legal framework was as justified and proportionate under the margin of 
appreciation inherent in Article 11 ECHR256. 
The consequences of Metrobus, which constitutes a binding precedent257, 
reflected on subsequent cases such EDF Powerlink v RMT, where the Court rejected 
the submission that §226A of the TULRCA should be construed, in accordance with 
section 3 HRA 1998, so as to give effect to the right to strike protected by art. 11 
ECHR. The Court, in the case at hand, determined that the acceptance of the fact 
that industrial action should to be considered from a human rights perspective 
cannot be considered “absolute and can be defined according to national law”, 
which can provide for “proportionate derogations”258; in this sense, the requirements 
as to pre-strike notification and ballots are simply seen as “not onerous or 
oppressive” and as not “unduly” restricting the exercise of the right to strike259.
The other main element deriving from ECJ jurisprudence giving rise to a 
“chilling effect”260  in UK industrial disputes is the potential absence of the cap for 
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254 In particular in consideration of the fact that a balance between the rights  afforded to workers by 
Article 11 ECHR and the rights of the employer guaranteed under Article 1 of the First Protocol to the 
ECHR is in any event necessary
255 Metrobus, par. 27
256 In particular, the Court of Appeal disregarded the fact that the margin of appreciation afforded to 
Members States  is  as to the choice of means to provide for unions to be heard and not as to the 
restrictions which may be imposed and, although concluding that the restrictions  were “not unduly 
onerous”, it failed to answer the question whether they were “necessary in a democratic society”, as 
required by art. 11 ECHR. See Countouris and Freedland 2010, p. 4 and Joint Committee on Human 
Rights 2010, p. 48
257 Metrobus, par. 27
258 EDF Powerlink v RMT, par. 3
259  Ibid., par. 4. It has  been duly noted that, had the restrictions been tested against Article 11.2 
ECHR, the actual output of such an assessment should have been that the two specific legislative 
restrictions at issue in Metrobus were not necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the 
rights and interests of others. See Ewing and Hendy 2010, p. 25
260  On the “chilling”, “ripple” and “disruptive” effects of the ECJ rulings, respectively limiting the 
ability of the unions to take industrial action, undermining collective bargaining in particular with 
reference to posting situations see amplius  Hayes, Novitz and Reed in Bücker and Warneck 2011, pp. 
227 ff.
damages recoverable from a trade union according to TULRCA §22, which lays 
down a scale of maximum damages against trade unions for tortious liability; in 
particular, the very high compensation claimed by BA exposed the trade union, as 
noted, to the risk of bankruptcy, even if only a small part of those claims could have 
been proved in Court. 
In particular, British Airways’ position in the BALPA dispute, advocating the 
removal of such limitations, was that a claim for damages based on incompatibility 
of the action undertaken with Viking and Laval would not be deriving from tort and, 
alternatively, that the cap on damages provided by the British law was incompatible 
with the principles of EU law on effective remedies261, which require that remedies 
for breaches of EU law should be effective and equivalent to parallel remedies in 
domestic law262; trade unions held liable for a breach of EU law263, therefore, should 
not benefit from any limitation of damages for impeding freedom of establishment or 
provision of services.
However the limit for damages for trade union liability, in addition to 
recognizing and addressing the asymmetry in the collective bargaining relationship 
by protecting the trade union’s ability to collectively bargain without the threat of 
unlimited damages264, does not simply provides an arbitrary maximum level for 
compensation but allows for variation in the size of the cap based on the 
membership size of the union265  and would apply independently266  from the 
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261 See in particular the aforementioned Unibet and Impact, par. 3.2.1
262  Similarly to the case for discriminatory dismissal: generally, damages for unfair dismissal are 
capped at about £75.000, however, there is no statutory cap on compensation payable under the 
Sex, Race and Disability Discrimination legislation (see Equality Act, §  124(2) and Marshall v 
Southampton and South West Hampshire AHA (C-271/91) [1993] E.C.R. I-4367; [1993] 3 C.M.L.R. 
293) or the "whistle blower" provisions (see the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998)
263 In this sense, it was underlined that In order to establish tort liability against a state in community 
law, it would be necessary to show a “sufficiently serious breach” under the principles  summarised in 
by the ECJ in Brasserie du Pecheur and Factortame. See Apps 2009, p. 145, and supra par. 3.2.1 for 
the findings of the Swedish Arbetsdomstolen in the national Laval judgment.
264  Firstly recognized by the notorious Taff Vale judgment (Taff Vale Co v Amalgamated Society of 
Railway Servants [1901] A.C. 426) 
265 Ranging from £10,000 (less than 5000 members) to £250,000 (for union counting 100,000 or more 
members). In this sense it is  considered that the number of members of a union is likely to be 
proportional to the economic power of the union and its  ability to pay damages, indipendently from 
the sanctionatory or restorative nature of the compensation awarded. See Apps 2009, p. 152 and 
supra par. 1.1.1
266  The limit on damages, in fact, applies to “any proceedings in tort brought against a trade 
union” (TULRCA §22, and more in general on trade union liability, also TULRCA §20).
domestic or EU origin of the tortious liability, representing therefore an effective 
remedy in this context267.
As noted, the East Lindsey Oil Refinery disputes in the first half 2009 has 
represented another example of the possible influence of ECJ jurisprudence with the 
national setting; the background of the dispute relates to a series of sub-
contractings involving foreign nationals in the construction of a new industrial 
facility268.
In order to complete the assigned project in the required timescale, Total’s 
main contractor - engineering firm Jacobs - and Shaw Group UK269  agreed to 
involve another company to carry out specific aspects work that had been taken 
from the main sub-contractor; IREM, the Italian company that was ultimately 
awarded the £200 million worth contract270, stated that it would employ its own 
Italian and Portuguese workers for its core activities271.
This decision sparked walk-outs in the Lindsey plant272  and triggered a 
widespread series of solidarity protests, picketings which involved a large number of 
workers273  and contractors in various oil refineries, power stations and nuclear 
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267 This point was also stressed by the UK Government in its reply to BALPA’s  Application to the ILO 
(see infra in this paragraph) stating that the limit provided by §22 TULRCA “has a sound basis  in the 
protection of the freedoms of trade unions  which would be taken into consideration if the limit were 
challenged as  contrary to the European Union law”. See International Labour Conference, 99th 
Session, Geneva, 2010, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions  and 
Recommendations, p. 209.
268  The construction of two new units for hydrodesulphurization (HDS) and hydrogen production 
(SDR) represented an investment of around €300 million, and was  part of a larger strategic plan that 
involved the sale of 70% of its interest in the Milford Haven refinery allowing Total to concentrate its 
U.K. refining operations at the wholly-owned and upgraded Lindsey Oil Refinery. See Total to Build 
Two New Units  at the Lindsey Oil Refinery in the United Kingdom Press release, available online at 
http://www.total.com/en/press/press-releases/consultation-200524.html&idActu=1478 and Total Sells 
Its  Interest in the Milford Haven Refinery in the United Kingdom Press  release, available online at 
http://www.total.com/en/press/press-releases/consultation-200524.html&idActu=1392
269  Both contractor and sub-contractors were UK-based companies, and in particular the Shaw 
Group had agreed to employ local personnel, in compliance with ECIA’s principles.
270 IREM waw one of seven companies  bidding for the work, all of which were European and five of 
which were based in the UK. IREM was awarded the contract on the basis of the safety, quality, 
scheduling and price of their bid. See ACAS 2009, par. 4
271Local workers  would be employed only on less  skilled work or where the work entailed servicing 
mainstream operations (cranage, riggers, NDT, painting etc) and for filling gaps  in the IREM 
workforce.   Ibid.
272  See Mass walkout over foreign labour, BBC News  28 Junuary 2009, available online at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/humber/7855752.stm
273 Including unemployed ones.
plants across the UK; the dispute was settled with a deal274, arising from ACAS 
talks275, in which the contractors and unions agreed to the hiring around 100 “locally 
sourced” skilled and unskilled workers276, and that no foreign workers would lose 
their jobs as a result of the deal277.
Workers protested that, at a time of deep recession in the UK and 
increasingly high unemployment, a contractor with a public commitment to 
corporate social responsibility was refusing to hire local workers278; the unions were 
also extremely concerned about about the lack of wage transparency and the 
employment status of the foreign workers, which potentially allowed the company to 
undercut labour costs in particular by not paying breaks and travel fees and 
allowances and not including the preparation time in the shift calculation, 
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274 It has been noted that nor Total nor the companies affected by solidarity strikes sought interim 
injunctions against the unofficial actions; this conduct, rather than based on a strict legal reasoning, 
seems to be deriving from the fact that it would not lead to “harmonious” or “productive” industrial 
relations  for the case of  highly unionized (and activist) workforce. See Novitz in Bücker and Warneck 
2010, p.103
275  Since the industrial action was  unofficial, ACAS could engage only in facilitation, not formal 
conciliation, of the dispute itself, although in practical terms  the differences between facilitation and 
conciliation are somewhat slim. See Barnard 2009b, p. 248
276 The unions had rejected a previous  offer of hiring 60 (out of 195 disputed). ACAS underlined how 
“locally sourced” only made reference to the advertisment through the public employment service 
and highlighted that such an expression would not entail direct discrimination on the grounds of 
nationality
277 See Foreign labour row 'deal reached', BBC News 4 February 2009, available online at  http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7868777.stm. It should be noted that in June, a dismissal and hiring of 
workers  carrying out essentially the same job by two of the Total sub-contractors involved in the 
January/February dispute gave origin to another wave of protests involving “wildcat” strikes  and 
walk-outs  (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/humber/8095182.stm). The unions lamented 
that the cross  redundancies and hirings were in breach or the February agreement and represented a 
victimisation of the workers  involved in unofficial action, while Total maintained that no such 
agreement existed; nevertheless  another round of ACAS talks  (this time made more difficult by the 
decision by Total to order to contractors to dismiss the staff taking unofficial industrial action, see 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/humber/8108434.stm) ultimately led to the reinstatment 
of the dismissed workers, and the exclusion of redundancy for original 51 workers  employed by 
Shaw.
278 It was underlined how the IREM workforce was not complete and that the Portuguese workers 
had been supplied or hired through an agency instead of recurring to local labour which had had the 
relevant skills  and experience. The Lindsey protest, however, were also characterized by the slogan 
“British jobs  for British workers” and were not seldom presented as part of a “new protectionism” 
with nationalistic and xenophobic overtones, as the far-right British National Party (BNP) supported 
and encouraged the action. See ACAS 2009, par. 9, Barnard 2009b, p. 252, Novitz 2010, p. 26 and 
http://libcom.org/history/2009-strike-lindsey-refinery-struggle-entangled-nationalism
notwithstanding the assurances by IREM that rates and allowances determined by 
the NAECI agreement279 would be paid.
It should be noted that while IREM is nominally bound by the “blue book” 
agreement when carrying out work in the UK, such agreement does not comply with 
the conditions set out by articles 3.1 and 3.8 PWD280 and cannot, therefore, serve as 
a source of mandatory rules281; English law, in fact, does not contain a mechanism 
for declaring collective agreements or arbitration awards to be universally applicable 
nor the UK has not decided to rely on the NAECI agreement as a source of 
regulation.
However while the Italian company, according to the renewed EU context 
deriving from Viking, Laval and Rüffert, could not have been forced to apply the 
terms and conditions deriving from the agreement in question but only to respect 
the minimum wage levels set by statutory provisions282, it should be also noted that 
it was a tender requirement that the awarded company would respect the content of 
the NAECI agreement and IREM accepted that it would comply with this 
obligation283.
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279 National Agreement for the Engineering Construction Industry, so-called “blue book” agreement, 
determines the pay and conditions for workers  at all major engineering construction sites  in the UK 
and requires  that all member firms of the Engineering Construction Industry Association (including 
Jacobs  and IREM) abide by the terms of the agreement where projects are put within its scope. It 
should be also noted that, while not obliged to agree, Total chose to conduct its  project under the 
terms of the NAECI agreement, and that therefore IREM, in in submitting a tender, was  implicitly 
accepting that all of their workers  on site would be employed on the terms of the blue book 
agreement independently from  its affiliation to ECIA. See ACAS 2009, parr. 4-7
280 Notably stating that standard terms  and conditions  of employment may be imposed by collective 
agreements  or arbitration awards which have been declared universally applicable (in particular in the 
construction sector) or collective agreements concluded by the most representative employers' and 
labour organizations at national level and which are applied throughout national territory
281 Except for those cases  in which the agreement may reflect obligations imposed in any event by 
law or administrative provision. See ACAS 2009, par. 22
282 In particular the National Minimum Wage Act of 1998. See also Orlandini 2009
283 There is no evidence that IREM ever objected to being subject to the more onerous  requirements 
of the blue book agreement, going beyond the the minima laid down by the PWD. The focus of the 
dispute at hand, therefore, was the actual compliance by IREM with the terms and conditions  (the 
ACAS inquiry was  not able to determine such compliance, nor IREM was able to provide evidence of 
it) and, on more general terms, the “weakness” of the UK’s  implementation of the PWD, which fails to 
guarantee UK agreements, leaving space for the employers to (further) undermine existing standard. 
It has been further noted that the agreement putting an end to the first dispute the provided that the 
contractors would hire 102 “locally sourced” workers; this solution also raises questions as to its 
compatibility with EU rules, given its  contrariness  to Articles 39 and 49. See ACAS 2009, par. 11, 
Barnard 2009b, p. 256 and 262 and amplius Novitz in Bücker and Warneck 2010, p. 114-118
The other main element emerging from the dispute regards once again the 
potential liability of unions for breaches of fundamental market freedoms under EU 
law; the strikes and protests in the Lindsey dispute represented a classic example of 
“wildcat” strikes,  undertaken without the authorization or endorsement of the union, 
and of secondary action in sympathy with the workers involved in the original 
dispute 284 . While UK law makes unions responsible for a wide range of strike 
activity even when the strike has not been initiated by the union such collective 
actions appear to lie beyond the scope of Viking and Laval285 , which referred trade 
union liability to actions challenging EU free movement rules thoroughly organized 
by such organisation.
Furthermore, it should be considered that individual workers cannot perform 
the same function of “quasi-regulatory bodies” carried out by the trade unions, and 
therefore cannot be considered liable relying on the Viking and Laval 
jurisprudence286.
In the aforementioned Lindsey dispute it was the suitability and 
appropriateness of the balance being struck between business and workers by the 
national framework to be questioned, as well as between the social and economic 
dimensions of the EU project.
Similarly, in the wake of the OpenSkies dispute, BALPA submitted an 
application to the Committe of Expert of the ILO against the United Kingdom for 
breach of the Convention No. 87287, underlining the failure of the Government to 
effectively protect the social rights jeopardized by economic processes through a 
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284 Authorization for the industrial action had been repudiated by the relevant unions (GMB  and Unite) 
under § 21 TULRCA.
285 See Kilpatrick 2009, p.21
286 It is therefore arguable that, If the unions were to be involved in the Lindsey dispute, they could 
have been considered liable. The UK disputes clearly raise the question whether unions will be held 
responsible under Article 49 for spontaneous industrial action not organized by the union in protest 
against the actions of foreign service-providers. See Syrpis  and Novitz 2008, 420, Apps 2009, 147, 
Kilpatrick 2009a, p.21 and Novitz in Bücker and Warneck 2010, p.102
287  Application by the British Air Line Pilots  Association to the International Labour Organisation 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations  against the United 
Kingdom for breach of ILO Convention No.87 (hereby BALPA Application), available online at http://
213.146.190.47/Document-Library/Industrial-Issues/BALPA-ILO-Application-2009-01-26.aspx. Soon 
after, UNITE also submitted in support of BALPA’s  application, which also was  secured the support of 
the International Transport Federation (ITF), the TUC, IFALPA and ECA. See, among others, http://
2 1 3 . 1 4 6 . 1 9 0 . 4 7 / D o c u m e n t - L i b r a r y / I n d u s t r i a l - I s s u e s / B A L PA - - U N I T E - I L O -
Submission-2009-03-11.aspx
detailed reconstruction of the facts of the dispute and of the UK restrictive 
framework and judicial attitude on collective action288; furthermore, the union 
brought forward the view that the restrictions on collective action deriving from 
Viking and Laval289 as well as, at national level, the threat for unlimited damages290 
and the uncertainties on the matter of the application of the proportionality test and 
on the absence of protection from dismissal for the workers represented severe 
inhibitions on trade union action and therefore could not be consistent with the 
respect for ILC 87, in particular when it was considered that the action undertaken in 
the OpenSkies dispute was legal according to the extensive UK regulation.
The succinct reply from the UK Government underlined that the trade union’s 
application was “misdirected and misconceived”, since the negative impact of 
Viking and Laval would be the consequence of the application of EU law, rather than 
of action by UK itself; furthermore, the actual impact on trade union freedoms 
remained uncertain, because the judgments would only apply when the economic 
freedoms are concerned, and were bound to produce different results on the basis 
of different facts of case concerned291.
Notwithstanding the CEACR stressed that its task is not to judge the 
correctness of the case law of the ECJ, the Viking and Laval doctrine was assessed 
by the Committee with reference to its potential impact at national level on workers 
freedom of association rights protected under ILC 87.
Taking in due consideration both BALPA’s application and the Government’s 
reply, the Committee considered that the ECJ judgements are likely to have a 
“significant restrictive effect on the exercise of the right to strike” in practice in a 
manner contrary to the Convention; in particular, among the permitted restriction on 
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288 See BALPA Application, parr. 14-30 (for the facts pertaining to the dispute), 36-61 (for the analysis 
of the UK statutory and case-law framework on industrial action) and 185, stating “the Courts 
themselves  have recognized a lack of sympathy with trade unionism which has required considerable 
judicial restraint to avoid”
289 “on the ground simply that the exercise of it interferes with an employer’s freedom to conduct one 
of his enterprises in another country” (par. 77) as well as applying in a “wholly arbitrary way” 
depending on the effect on parent company and subsidiary and on the country of establishment of 
the companies involved (in EU or non-EU States, par. 160-161)
290 Ibid., par. 31-33
291  There have been no subsequent analogous cases  at the ECJ level, nor have there been any 
decisions by the UK domestic courts as  to whether and to what extent the new principles  might 
represent an additional restriction on the freedom of trade unions to organize industrial action in the 
United Kingdom. Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions  and 
Recommendations, p. 209
the right to strike, the CEACR had never included the “need to assess the 
proportionality of interests bearing in mind a notion of freedom of establishment or 
freedom to provide services”292.
With regards to the BALPA dispute, it was underlined that the practical 
limitations to the right of strike, in particular the threat of an action for damages and 
the loss of relevance and meaning of the strike deriving from the lengthy legal 
process linked with the interim injunctions, created a situation where the rights 
under the Convention could not be exercised. Furthermore, the Committee argued 
that cases involving cross-border elements are, in the current context of 
globalization, likely to be ever more common, in particular with reference to specific 
sectors of employment, like the airline sector. For the workers in these sectors, 
restrictions on the right to strike following from the economic freedoms may 
seriously jeopardize to their ability to negotiate meaningfully with their employers293.
In conclusion, the Committee requested that the Government of the UK 
should review its national legislation and consider appropriate measures for the 
protection of workers and their organizations to engage in industrial action, 
especially in the light of the previous observation in which the Committee had 
already asked the UK Government to amend the TURLCA with regards to the 
qualification of strike as a breach of contract and the exclusion of secondary and 
solidarity actions from the notion of “trade dispute”, in order to broaden the scope of 
protection available to workers who stage official and lawfully organized industrial 
action. 
While it has been suggested that even small changes to the 1992 Act would 
provide responses to the problems highlighted by Viking 294, and Laval and could be 
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292  While it had suggested that a notion of minimum services  to avoid an irreversible or 
disproportionate damages to third parties “may be considered”. Ibid.
293  “The impact [...] may indeed be devastating”. See Report of the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, p. 209 and also Malmberg 2010b, p. 11
294 In particular, clarification on the existence of the cap for damages also for breach of EU law and a 
review of the rules  of interim injunction providing that an injunction should not be granted unless the 
applicant is  in all the circumstances substantially more likely to succeed than to fail at the trial of the 
action (as already proposed in the in accordance with the proposals  in the TUC’s Trade Union Rights 
and Freedoms Bill 2007).  See amplius Ewing and Hendy 2009, pp. 17-18
addressed by allowing for the registration and extension of national agreements295, 
there has been no legislative UK response on the matter, and the current lack of 
interest expressed in this issue by any of the major UK political parties296, 
compounded by the Court’s reluctance to take into account the international 
protection of fundamental right testified by Metrobus, highlight the uncertainty and 
potential procedural and financial burdens that have undermined the trade unions’ 
ability to provide democratic representation of workers’ interests in the aftermath of 
the ECJ judgments in question297.
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295 To be achieved on the basis of three main option, and specifically a)the “legalization” of defined 
collective agreements  b) the extension of the agreement to employers who were not parties (a regime 
similar to the repealed Employment Protection Act 1975) and c) the imposition a duty on posting 
employers to comply with defined collective agreements, with the exception for the case the terms  of 
the agreement were not being applied with the same obligations  or effects  by national undertakings 
“in a similar position”. Ewing and Hendy 2009, 19-21
296 Novitz 2010, p. 31
297 In particular when the British inactivity in adapting to the decisions is compared with the analyzed 
situation of other MS, which have taken elaborate steps in changing their national framework with a 
view of protecting their industrial relation and welfare systems from the more relevant consequences 
of the “Laval quartet”
4- IN SEARCH OF A REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN 
RIGHT TO COLLECTIVE ACTION CAPABLE OF RESTORING THE 
POWER BALANCE IN EUROPE: POLITICAL APPROACHES AND 
JUDICIAL PATHWAYS
4.1 - Early Responses and the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty
In Viking and Laval the ECJ has interpreted provisions of the Treaty, the 
legislative framework instrument as the PWD, but has also assessed trade unions’ 
rights of collective bargaining and the right to strike; diverging from previous case 
law the Luxembourg Court assessed the relationship between the economic 
freedoms and the collective labour rights by following an approach based on the 
principles of market economy1, disregarding the meaning of the rights involved as 
fundamental rights of the workers, and their function as main tools for rebalancing 
the asymmetries in the labour market recognised in most national Constitutional, 
legal and conventional frameworks and tipping the balance decisively in favour of 
the economic dimension of the EU2.
The seemingly broad recognition of the fundamental trade union right to 
undertake collective actions3  entailed an examination by the ECJ in the light of 
Articles 43 and 49 of the EC Treaty4, whose outcome determined that the limitation 
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1 Landa Zapirain 2010, p. 94
2 Eklund 2008, p. 570
3Viking, parr. 42-44 and Laval, parr. 89-91. Is  it noteworthy to further underline that the “organic” 
reconstruction by the ECJ of the role of trade unions  in collective action should not be 
underestimated, in particular with reference to those national systems in which also individual 
workers are entitled to strike, without the need for any trade union coverage.
4 See Novitz in Ales and Novitz 2010, p. 254
on free movement can be justified so far as the collective action is necessary and 
proportionate; the perspective adopted by the ECJ only recognizes collective labour 
right as a hinderance to the functioning of the single market5, rather than as a 
resource promoting its correct development. 
The main concepts and elements surrounding the actions involved in the 
disputes, namely the “protection of workers”6, the restrictions to the economic 
freedoms7  and the clarity, precision and accessibility of the provision regarding 
minimum rates of pay8, were also construed and interpreted in a restrictive way, thus 
determining a situation in which the trade unions may potentially create barriers to 
free movement in a very wide variety of situations, and be therefore held 
accountable for breach of Treaty provisions, when exercising their “regulatory 
functions” through collective bargaining and action9; in order to justify their activity 
the trade unions therefore need to demonstrate that their actions serve a wider 
public order goal, while on the one hand, an employer can act freely in pursuit of its 
company interest and to invoke the “heavy argument” related to the promotion of 
the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty10.
Indeed, the ECJ reaffirmed that the European project emerging from the 
Treaty of European Community and the Treaty on European Union maintains as its 
main purpose the economic integration of its Member States, and that social policy 
is to be considered nothing more than an accompanying policy, always subordinate 
to the realization the internal market, which represents the priority.
On one hand the ECJ approach on social dumping and on the rebalancing of 
social rights and economic freedoms appears particularly consistent with the 
measures adopted at  national and European level in response to the crisis, based 
on the idea that competitiveness and growth require more flexibility, less room to 
collective bargaining and cuts to social spenditures; furthermore, the judicial course 
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5 Almost in a “restraint of trade” perspective, See Rodríguez-Piñero y Bravo-Ferrer 2009, p. 538. 
6 Determined in a perspective closely linked with the workers’ immediate economic interests and job 
security. Viking, par. 90. See also amplius Pallini 2009, with particular reference to the public policy 
judtification.
7 Viking, parr. 72-73 and Laval, par. 99
8 Laval, par. 110
9 Viking, par. 62 and 65 and Laval, par. 98. 
10 See Zahn, De Witte 2001, p. 444
in object seems to favour progressively greater integration and a more unified 
framework with reference to the right to collective bargaining and action. When 
hindering the fundamental economic freedoms the national regulatory frameworks 
need therefore additional justification in the light of general criteria defined by the 
Court through an apparently arbitrary selection of various elements derived from 
different jurisdictions, reducing or even removing the policy options that can be used 
in order to respond to the pressures in particular deriving from the European 
enlargement in the process11.
On the other, as noted above, the domestic responses to the ECJ rulings in 
the Laval quartet present a high degree of variance, both in terms of intervening 
actors and of the actual features of the measures considered, which not seldom 
raise further doubts of compatibility with the EU framework; the criteria and 
principles elaborated by the Luxembourg Court, while evidently proceeding towards 
a restrictive reconstruction of collective labour rights deriving from clear political and 
regulatory options12, lack a certain degree of technical detail and do not appear to 
be based on sound legal reasoning, not offering therefore sufficient guidance both 
for national political institutions and juridical bodies13.
The uncertainties linked with the current situation can foster unfair 
competition, social dumping, and highlight existing tension between older and 
newer MS, while also threatening TU solidarity; it appears evident that the ongoing 
enlargement processes as well as the consolidation of the internal market should 
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11 It has  been noted that with the rulings in Viking and Laval, the Court did not seem to avoid anymore 
to make significant policy judgments  about national laws, having abandoned the restraint showed in 
the early goods (especially food)–related cases where in the assessment of the justifications  put 
forward by the MS (in particular, consumer protection and public health) and their proportionality was 
guided by the principle of majoritarianism in the EU. See Barnard 2009a.
12  In particular the noted proportionality and ultima ratio principles for collective action, the rigid 
criteria used to define collective agreements under the PWD (also for the case of public 
procurement), and the case-by-case assessment of public policy notions, on the basis  of a strict 
proportionality test often run counter the industrial relations traditions  of a significant number of EU 
Member States; in particular the latter appears  to significantly reduce the MS’ prerogatives  in 
determining which aspects of their labour law are so essential to the public interest that they must be 
respected by all undertakings operating on their territory because of their being limited in accordance 
with the “EU public order”: by doing so instead of evaluating the compatibility of the single national 
provision on the basis  of the same criteria (the common concept of public interest), the same 
minimum requirements are imposed for the protection of the different social and economical orders 
realized in the single national context . Such an interference collides with the aims and the 
competences  assigned by the Treaty not only to the ECJ, but to the EU as a whole. See Pallini in 
Vimercati 2009, p. 208, Novitz in Ales and Novitz 2010, p. 269
13 See infra in this paragraph.
not be left to often unsatisfactory case law and market operators’ initiative14  but 
should be articulated, in principle, from the legal instruments of EU law, without 
failing to take into account the social goals and dimension of the Union.
4.1.1 - ETUC and European Parliament Proposals
The need to respond legislatively to the serious challenges posed by that ECJ 
legal doctrine in order to avoid the consolidation of an unbalanced and precarious 
framework is also justified by the urgency of containing the progressive disaffection 
of large sectors of the society growing more and more disenchanted with the liberal 
economic approach undertaken in the development of the European project15 and 
with the interferences of the ECJ decisions with highly politically salient norms, 
institutions and policy choices on the basis of the extension the reach of Treaty 
freedoms into policy areas were nonetheless explicitly excluded from the domain of 
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14  It should be noted that that there was no written reaction from BusinessEurope on the matters 
involved by the Viking quartet. The organization, however, has given in several occasions oral 
statements  making it clear that ECJ rulings  are limited to a balance between rights and interests and 
that the right to strike has not been denied by the Court, but simply limited in its more disruptive 
effects in accordance with the established principle of proportionality, in order to prevent that its 
exercise may adversely affect the functioning of the internal market, by hindering in particular the free 
provision of services. BusinessEurope therefore has  opposed any proposal for reform of primary and 
secondary law that excludes  the exercise of trade union from the scope of market freedoms, and that 
no significant legislative revision (in particular of the PWD) is  needed. See also Warneck in Bücker 
and Warneck 2010, p. 126
15 Landa Zapirain 2010, p. 88, underlining in particular the “serious episodes” occurred in the EU-15 
national setting in the various EU referenda conducted so far
delegated powers such as pay, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts16, 
education17, vocational training18, culture19 and health care20.
A coordinated set of responses to the negative consequences to be taken at 
EU level was early proposed by ETUC, in particular demanding the addition of a 
legally binding Social Progress Protocol21  to the Treaties with the objective of 
defining the aims and principles of  the European social model22 and clarifying the 
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16 Art. 137.5 EC
17 Art. 149.4 EC
18 Art. 150.4 EC
19 Art. 151.5 EC
20Art. 152.5 EC. See Scharpf 2010, p. 231. In this context stands out the “negative solution” 
proposed by the same Scharpf, i.e. a refuse by the Member States to comply with ECJ rulings, on the 
basis  of the fact that “there is  quite a lot of clandestine non-compliance” among the MS, especially in 
consideration of the fact that any dissatisfaction of the voters is reflected on the national government 
rather than on the EU representatives or institutions. At the same time, however, no MS has publicly 
refused to comply with ECJ rulings and none will, since such a decision could likely throw the entire 
EU into a crisis. In order to maintain the support for European integration while defending from 
excessively restrictive judicial interpretation of Treaty clauses, if a government intends to react to an 
ECJ ruling, it should declare that it considers that judgement to represent a case of judicial legislation 
overstepping the limits  of European powers: compliance would be assured if judgment were to be 
approved by a majority vote in the Council of Ministers; this “appeal” to a EU political authority would 
ensure that the decision taken by the ECJ does in fact reflect the current political consensus.
The proposed procedure is certainly appealing, while presenting some legal complexities, but as also 
the author underlined, there not seem to be any country ready to publicly contesting an ECJ ruling, 
and on the other hand, the concept of “compliance to EU law” is often used by national governments 
as a justification for domestic and unpopular legislation. The presence of such an instrument would 
deprive national governments of such justification in the public eye or, at least, would make them 
accountable by voters  also for their excessive “zeal” or “passivity” in complying to directions coming 
from the EU institutions deemed as undesirable or unnecessary. Such a solution is  also bound to 
increase the political frictions between “sending” and “receiving” countries, since for the matter ay 
hand it is easy to imagine the clashing demands  and  expectations brought forward by these two 
categories  of MS, especially when it is considered that at the present moment MS with well 
developed IR and welfare systems (i.e. the older members) do not find much support from the EU, 
and that in the ECJ cases it has  been possible to identify a clear split between the choices  of the 
EU-15 and NMS-12 (and in particular CEE) Member States; this heightened sense of contraposition 
could also very well reflect negatively at trade union level (where the political boundary between “old” 
and “new” Member States  finds  a very similar corresponding split) radicalizing the differences and 
further undermining trade union solidarity at European level, a concept already severely challenged 
by the current situation. See Scharpf 2008
21 SPP. the proposal is available online at http://www.etuc.org/a/5175
22  Characterized in particular by “the indissoluble link between economic performance and social 
progress”, in a perspective in which a highly competitive social market economy “is  not considered 
an end in itself, but should be used to serve the welfare of all”. See SPP, art. 1
relationship between fundamental social rights23 and economic market freedoms24 
with the explicit aim of influencing future decisions by the ECJ, as well as an 
extensive revision in order “to better achieve its aims” of ensuring fair competition 
and respecting workers’ rights, whose specific features were defined by an Expert 
Group composed by trade unionists and academics25.
The main aspects of the PWD, such as the legal base, the definitions of 
posted worker and trans-national service, should be reviewed, and other important 
matters should be covered, with particular attention to the respect of the bargaining 
role of the trade unions and the possibility for MS to include workers’ protection into 
the notion of “public policy” and provide for social clauses in the case of public 
procurement procedures26, in order to restore the “minimum” character of the 
PWD27; specifically, while not containing a a positive regulation of the right to strike, 
the ETUC intends to protect the fundamental right to collective action through the 
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23  “in particular the right to negotiate, conclude and enforce collective agreements and to take 
collective action, [...] for the protection of existing standards as  well as for the improvement of the 
living and working conditions  of workers in the Union also beyond existing (minimum) standards, in 
particular to fight unfair competition on wages and working conditions, and to demand equal 
treatment of workers regardless of nationality or any other ground” SPP, art. 2
24  In particular, economic freedoms and competition rules  shall not have priority over fundamental 
social rights and social progress, and in case of conflict fundamental social rights  shall take 
precedence. Economic freedoms  “cannot be interpreted as  granting undertakings  the right to 
exercise them for the purpose or with the effect of evading or circumventing national social and 
employment laws and practices or for social dumping” and must be interpreted as  not infringing 
upon “the exercise of fundamental social rights” (including collective bargaining and action) and “the 
autonomy of social partners when exercising these fundamental rights in pursuit of social interests 
and the protection of workers.” Ibid., art. 3
25  Furthermore, as a practical reaction to the ECJ decisions ETUC established an “early warning 
system” network of lawyers in the national federations in order to be able to be proactive in 
upcoming cases of concern to trade unions in Europe.
26  Also addressed by ETUC Expert Group, infact, is the relation between PWD as  is currently 
interpreted and ILO Convention 94, which has been ratified by 10 MS and whose ratification and 
implementation process continues. ILC 94, in fact, states  that conditions under public procurement 
contracts should not be less  favorable than those established for the same work in the same area by 
collective agreement or similar instrument, apparently in direct contrast with the solution found by the 
ECJ in Rüffert. See supra parr. 2.2.3 and 2.3.5
27  Therefore reverting its  current configuration as a “maximum” directive with regard to the matters 
that can be regulated, the degree of protection that can be required, and the methods that can be 
used to ensure the employment condition are observed by all undertakings in the same region or 
sector. See ETUC Expert Group on Posting 2010, p. 18
introduction of a “Monti-style” clause in the principles of the PWD28, as well as 
several references to the legitimacy exercise of the right to strike, both with regards 
to the host country workers29 and to the posted workers30.
For what it refers to the EU institutions, in April 2008 a Commission statement 
emphasized that the freedom to provide services did not contradict and was not 
superior to the right to strike, organise and join a trade union or negotiate collective 
bargaining agreements, that the ECJ decisions did not jeopardize national systems 
of industrial relations and that the the Commission would “continue to fight against 
any form of social dumping or disrespect of workers’ rights”.
The urgency of the need to mobilize the Community institutions for the 
defense of fundamental rights of European citizens is also testified by a European 
Parliament Resolution of October 200831, adopted as a direct reaction to the ECJ 
rulings of the “Laval quartet” and stressing the need of restoring the balance 
between respect for the fundamental economic freedoms32, the guarantee of the 
fundamental rights and social objectives set out in the Treaties, and in particular the 
exercise of trade union action, recognised by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
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28 By-passing the preclusion of art. 153.5, the amended article 1 would provide that the PWD “may 
not be interpreted as  affecting in any way the exercise of fundamental rights  as recognized in 
Member States and in international treaties , including the right or freedom to strike and the right to 
collective bargaining These rights may also include the right or freedom to take other actions covered 
by the specific industrial relations  systems in Member States.” See ETUC Expert Group on Posting 
2010, p. 22
29With particular reference to the fact that the current interpretation of art. 3.7 PWD, allowing the 
“application of terms and conditions  of employment which are more favourable to workers”, only 
refers to a situation where employers sign on their own accord a collective agreement in the host MS, 
prohibiting trade unions to use their usual means  of pressure in order to encourage the employer to 
conclude collective agreement in the host Member State, therefore depriving the article of a lot of its 
practical effect. Ibid., p. 19
30 However, as  it was noted by the same Expert Group, a revision of the text of the PWD does not 
imply a change in the ECJ’s  approach to Article 56 TFEU (49 EC). This  issue, as  well as  the limits  on 
the right to strike, can only be addressed at Treaty level, possibly “taking into account the now 
binding Charter of Fundamental Rights  as well as  the relevance of ILO and Council of Europe 
standards”. See also the similar conclusions reached in the darft resolution at the 7-8 December 
ETUC Executive Committee (Achieving social progress  in the single market: proposals  for protection 
of fundamental social rights  and posting of workers, EC196/EN/8), http://www.etuc.org/IMG/pdf/08-
EN-Achieving-social-progress-in-the-single-market.pdf
31 European Parliament resolution of 22 October 2008 on challenges  to collective agreements in the 
EU 2008/2085 INI (Own-initiative procedure, hereby also Challenges  Resolution), adopted by  474 
votes in favour, 106 against and 93 abstentions
32 Defined as “one of the cornerstones of the European project”. See Challenges Resolution, par. 1
the European Union33 and protected by the constitutional practice of most Member 
States, and the right to ensure non-discrimination, equal treatment, and the 
improvement of living and working conditions.
The analysis of the relation between the economic freedoms and the right to 
collective action is particularly focused on the concept of proportionality; the 
rebalancing must take into account on one hand that cross border activities of 
undertakings which may jeopardize terms and conditions of employment in the host 
country must be proportionate and cannot automatically be justified by the EC 
Treaty provisions on economic freedoms, and on the other that the requisite of 
proportionality introduced by the ECJ should not be applied to collective actions 
against undertakings deliberately undercutting terms and conditions of 
employment34. 
With specific reference to the PWD the main points highlighted refer to the 
possibility for public authorities and social partners to lay down more favorable 
terms and conditions of employment, in accordance with the different traditions in 
the Member States, the provision of recital 22 which states that such instrument 
does not prejudice the national frameworks on collective action and that any 
interpretations which may invite unfair competition between undertakings is 
incompatible with the Directive35; the European Parliament, demonstrating a far 
superior social sensitivity than the ECJ, called on the Commission to prepare the 
necessary legislative proposals which would assist in preventing any future 
conflicting interpretation deriving from “loopholes and inconsistencies” present in 
the current framework. 
Furthermore, it also underlined the possibility of partial reviews of the PWD 
should not be excluded, aimed at clarifying its relationship to ILO Convention 94, 
laying down clear rules to combat abuses, in particular “letterbox companies”, in its 
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33 Several references  were made to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the fact that the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights  of the European Union is to be made legally binding, and that the ECJ did not 
recognize that, under the ILO conventions  87 and 98, restrictions on the right to industrial action and 
fundamental rights can only be justified on grounds of health, public order and other similar factors
34 Challenges Resolution, par. 16
35 Ibid., parr. 6, 7 and 12
code of conduct for companies under the Services Directive36  and putting forward 
the Communication on transnational collective bargaining37.
Notwithstanding the fact that the European Parliament had put forward the 
question of potential amendments at European level for the Treaty and the PWD the 
Commission, while agreeing that “correct and uniform application and enforcement 
of the provisions of the PWD are essential in terms of protecting posted workers 
rights”, did not see any need for such legislative action, maintaining the view that 
“the current PWD provides a sufficient and appropriate framework within which the 
issues raised can be appropriately addressed” and focusing instead on the 
improvement of the implementation with particular reference to the administrative 
cooperation of national monitoring and enforcement bodies38. 
4.1.2 - The Treaty of Lisbon and the European “social market economy”
In December 2009, however, a long and difficult process of reform39, marked 
in particular by the failure of the draft of the European Constitution, was concluded 
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36 Challenges Resolution, par. 34
37 The Member States were asked to enforce the PWD in a proper manner;  particular reference was 
made to the fact that labour market legislation and rules  concerning negotiations and collective 
agreements  are the competence of Member States and social partners  and that it is the task of the 
Member States to improve and to make full use of prevention, monitoring and enforcement 
measures, in conformity with the subsidiarity principle. See Challenges  Resolution, par. 25 and 
Warneck in Bücker and Warneck 2010, p. 124
38  SP(2008)7292/4, 12 January 2009. This  attitude would subsequently change, see infra in this 
paragraph
39 Started at the Laeken summit in 2001 with a declaration (the Convention on the future of Europe) to 
investigate the simplification and reorganization of the EU Treaties and institutions, and underlining 
how the potential outcome could have been a Constitution. Such text was  signed in Rome in 2004, 
and subsequently rejected by French and Danish referenda in 2005. An agreement on the main points 
of a replacement treaty was reached (under the German EU presidency) and the final draft was 
ultimately agreed on by the leaders  of the MS in October 2007 at the meeting of the European 
Council (the signing of the Treaty took place in Lisbon on 13 December 2007). Instead of a 
representing a new text the Reform Treaty, while implementing many of the reforms included in the 
European Constitution, was proposed as an amendment of the existing Treaties which was intended 
to come into force on the 1st of January 2009.
when the Treaty of Lisbon40 was ratified by all Member States41 and entered into 
force, amending the EU Treaty and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
which was renamed Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union42; the most 
relevant development with regards to the fundamental rights is represented by the 
attribution to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the "same legal value as the 
Treaties"43, which recognizes a comprehensive list of social and labour rights at the 
highest level of the European legal sources.
The social rights recognized in the Charter, while not incorporated in the hard 
letter44, are echoed in the opening articles of the new EU Treaty: the Union poses as 
its basis the values of dignity, equality, solidarity and equality between men and 
women45 and between the objectives it is called to pursue it is set the creation of a 
"highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social 
progress"46.
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40 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, 2007/C 306/01
41 During the course of 2008 most MS ratified the Treaty trough parliamentary processes (see infra for 
the German Federal Constitutional Court ruling of 2009); however, an Irish referendum in 2008 
rejected the Treaty, and was reverted (by a second referendum) the October of following year. 
Furthermore, Czech Republic had subjected the ratification to the extension of the UK-Poland 
protocol (see infra in this paragraph) and to a positive ruling on the compatibility of the Treaty by the 
national COnstitutional Court, and the instrument of ratification was ultimately lodged only in 
November 2009.
42 Treaty of Lisbon, art. 2(b) 
43 See art. 6.1 TEU. As  previously noted (see supra parr. 1.2.2 and 1.2.3) the Charter, adopted in Nice 
in 2000 as a "political manifesto", and and while assuming judicial relevance in particular in a 
“confirmatory role”  it  was  not granted with binding nature. The Charter was intended to be at the 
core of the European constitutionalization process, acquiring full legal force in EU law, with the 
rejection of the Constitution the Charter was at risk of being dropped, but this  danger was ultimately 
averted with the reference in the new version of the Treaty, which avoided the problematic 
incorporation of the Charter in the Treaty (notwithstanding the proposal for instance by ETUC, the 
text of the Charter, revised in 2007, has not been reproduced in the text of the Treaties, and it does 
not appear in the Protocols), but still should be read as requiring institutions to respect the rights it 
contained in the exercise of their prerogatives. See Orlandini 2010
44 It was  noted that the the choice of a separated Bill of Rights was probably connected to the opt-
out decisions of United Kingdom, Poland and Czech Republic (in the latter case still to be 
implemented, see infra), in particular to avoid partial ratification of a single reform text; furthermore, 
art. 6.3 TEU clarifies that the CFREU does not represent an exhaustive list of the rights protected in 
the union, since the ECHR (independently from the accession indicated by art. 6.2 TEU) and the 
constitutional traditions  common to the MS (which are evidently not incorporated in the text of the 
Treaties) are also to be considered sources  to identify and protect the European heritage of 
fundamental rights. Gianfrancesco 2008 p.8 and infra for the possible interaction of the ECtHR rulings 
with the ECJ jurisprudence with regards to collective action
45 Art. 2 TEU
46 Art. 3.3 TEU.
However, while the reference to the CFREU undoubtely represents a positive 
development, it must be considered whether the “constitutionalization” of the 
Charter on the basis of the approval of the Lisbon Treaty entails that the exercise of 
fundamental rights, including therefore the right to strike forms a non-derogable 
content of the acquis  communitaire47, entailing therefore that no amendments would 
necessary be in the fundamental EU legal framework to “reorient” the aims of the EU 
towards the reconciliation of the social and economic dimensions of the Union, 
given in particular the references to the promotion of the “social market economy” of 
art. 3.3 TEU48  and the protection of the “essence” of the rights and freedoms 
recognised by the Charter set by art. 52 CFREU49, in order to ensure changes in the 
dynamics of European integration towards the development and the protection of 
workers' rights50.
It should be underlined how article 6.1, while formally recognizing the Charter, 
also recalls that the rights, freedoms and principles of the Charter shall be 
interpreted in accordance with the provisions of Title VII of the Charter itself51, as 
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47  See Landa Zapirain 2010, p. 99, underlining also that such a solution would resolve the almost 
permanent conflict between the domestic and EU dimensions raised in Solange I and II (29/5/74 and 
22/10/86, respectively), where the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 
BVerG)  stated its   jurisdiction over those actions  or provisions adopted at Community level that were 
not consistent with respect for fundamental rights enshrined in German constitutional law.
48 See Scharpf 2010, p. 212
49 See Ales 2008, pp.15-16
50  See Orlandini 2010. In particular it must be noted that the reference to the internal market is no 
longer accompanied by the requirement for “free and undistorted” competition formerly embedded in 
the fundamental provisions of the EC Treaty (art. 3.1(g)EC) which was  also used by the ECJ as 
interpretative guidance to support an expansive reading of the competition rules  as  fundamental 
provisions  essential for the accomplishment of the Treaty objectives (see Cases 6/72 Europemballage 
and Continental Can v Commission and C-453/99 Courage v Crehan, in which the ECJ held that 
violations of Article 81.1 could lead to a right to damages before national courts); therefore the 
current catalogue of aims  only provides  for the establishment of an internal market. The principle of 
undistorted competition appears in the Protocol (No 27) on Internal Market and Competition stating 
“the internal market as  set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union includes  a system 
ensuring that competition is not distorted”, and providing  that the Union “if necessary” may “take 
action under the provisions of the Treaties”, including art. 352 TFEU; it may also be considered that 
art. 3.1(b)TFEU, stating the exclusive competence for the Union in the matter, refers  to “the 
establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market” and art. 
119, underlines  that the activities of the EU and of the MS in the economic and monetary policy shall 
be carried out “in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition”. 
As art. 51 TEU gives equal weight to the Treaty and Protocols, the excision of art. 3.1(g)EC from the 
letter of the Treaties  cannot be considered as necessarily implying a change in core policy aspects  of 
the Union. See also Van Rompuy 2011
51 The provisions governing the application of the Charter, so-called “horizontal clauses”, artt. 51-54 
CFREU
well as explanations of the Presidium52, and that it unambiguously reiterates, in 
particular in combined reading with art. 51 CFREU53, the impossibility of extending 
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52 In particular, for what it refers to collective action, it is stated that art. 28 CFREU is  based on Art. 6 
of the ESC and on the CCFSRW (points  12 to 14). Reference is  also made to the recognition by the 
ECtHR of the right to collective action as  “one of the elements  of trade union rights laid down by 
Article 11 of the ECHR” (see infra for the evolution of the ECtHR on the matter); the modalities  and 
limits for the exercise of collective action, including strike action, come under national laws  and 
practices, including the question of whether it may be carried out in parallel in several Member 
States. With regards  to the binding force of the explanations, it is stated that they lack as such a 
status of law, but  they represent “a valuable tool of interpretation intended to clarify the provisions  of 
the Charter” and must be given “ due regard by the courts  of the Union and of the Member States”, a 
formula which evidently dilutes  the original intention of a mandatory application and an extensive 
evolution of the rights  protected under CFREU, in particular when the inadequacy of the updating 
process  (as well as the quality of the explanations themselves) is taken into consideration; their 
relevance is therefore substantially non-existent, and that its  content appears directly linked to the 
interpretive approach already established by ECJ doctrine. See Explanations  relating to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights  (2007/C 303/02) and for an early analysis, Bercusson in Alston and De Schutter 
2005, pp. 204-205
53  Underlining how the CFREU’s provisions “cannot be used to extend the field of application of 
Union law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union.”
the powers and competences as defined in the Treaties, significantly limiting its 
scope54. 
While the rights recognised in the Charter and the relevance given to the 
social dimension of the Union should inspire the action and policy initiatives of the 
EU institutions such activities apparently continues to be limited by the provisions of 
the TFEU for what it concerns their specific competences, by the political balances 
between the institution themselves and, notwithstanding the recent occurrences, by 
the absence of supranational institutions capable to adopt economic, financial and 
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54  It must also be given note of the “opt-outs” contained in the British, Czech and Polish Protocol 
(Protocol 30 on the application of Charter of Fundamental Rights  of the European Union to Poland 
and to the United Kingdom OJ 306, 17/12/2007, p. 156-157), and in particular with reference to the 
fact the the British opposition derives  mainly from concerns  relative to fact the the Charter could have 
been used to alter British labour law, especially the collective action framework (on the other hand, 
the Polish Government voiced “moral” concerns regarding equality of rights  and benefits  for 
homosexual couples  and abortion, while the Czech Government, whose opt-out will be ratified in the 
next Treaty, feared that the implementation of the Charter could enable claims from WWII expellees). 
The “opt-outs”, aiming to “clarify the application of the Charter” (8th preamble) where realized 
through the inclusion of two articles  stating that the scope of the ECJ in particular is  not extended to 
the point of that laws, regulations or administrative provisions, practices or action of Poland or of the 
United Kingdom are inconsistent with the Charter (art. 1.1) and that, “for the avoidance of doubts”, 
the latter shall only apply to the extent that the rights  or principles that it contains are recognized in 
the national law or practices (1.2). It has however been noted that while apparently the recently 
confirmed binding force of the Charter (in particular see the decision in Case C-555/07 Seda 
Kücükdeveci v Swedex GmbH & Co. KG underlining the potential relevance of the Charter as  the 
benchmarking tool for national and EU legislation) cannot be considered as  generalized, in particular 
because of the fact that within the EU the European courts cannot rule on fundamental rights  issues 
related to the Charter if they emerging in or from determined legislations, it must also be considered 
that the Protocol implies  that the Charter finds  application to the national frameworks considered 
within the limits of the rights already recognized (the analysis  for the UK framework therefore reverts 
to the legal definition to be given to collective action, protected as a right in the Charter but subject to 
severe limitations in the national framework). See also Pernice in Griller and Ziller 2008, p. 247.
Lastly, it must be taken into account that the Charter applies  to Member States only when they are 
implementing EU law (art. 51.2); Notwithstanding the attempts  to limit the concept of “wholly internal 
rule” (see AG’s  opinion in Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon 
Government v. Flemish Government) and the conclusion reached in Case C-48/07  État belge – 
Service public fédéral Finances v Les Vergers du Vieux Tauves  SA, in which the ECJ stated that its 
jurisdiction extends  to “questions  concerning Community provisions in situations where the facts of 
the main proceedings are outside the scope of Community law but where those provisions have been 
rendered applicable by domestic law”, and that the reference for preliminary ruling (implying that the 
national court has  established, a connection between the national and EU law) leads  to the 
conclusion that that ECJ judgment will nonetheless  bind the national court, the Court recently (Case 
C-339/10 Estov v. Ministerski savet na Republika Bulgaria, Order of 12 Nov. 2010) reaffirmed that 
purely national issues escape EU jurisdiction and therefore should not be affected by the application 
of the Charter. See Barnard 2011, pp. 4 and 10
fiscal measures and policies common between the Member States55; it should also 
be noted that the rules promoting the economic freedoms and governing the single 
market remained untouched by the reform process56, and still require that any right 
and in particular those of workers, should be exercised so as not to jeopardize the 
functioning of internal market.
In particular, social policy “for the aspects defined” in this Treaty represents 
one area of shared competences between the Union and the Member States under 
art. 4 TFEU, and one in which the Union may take initiatives to ensure the 
coordination between the Member States57; however also in this case the detailed 
rules governing governing the field in question were not substantively changed, 
aside from some technical adjustments. Therefore the the references to 
harmonization in art. 151 TFEU58 are diluted by the distinction between the areas in 
which unanimity59  within the Council prevails and those where decisions can be 
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55  In this sense it must be taken into account the intergovernmental agreement to guide the 
intervention in the sovereign debt crisis in the EU and for the safeguard of the common currency, as 
well as the new Regulations aimed at further strengthening the surveillance mechanisms in the euro 
area, as  well as a Green Paper on presenting options  for euro Stability Bonds. The current 
understanding reached by the Eurogroup is  that the agreement involving 26 Euro countries and 9 
more MS will focus on the union budget, by strengthening the coordination of economic policies, in 
particular through  the adoption of more stringent rules to ensure compliance with the balanced 
budget providing a structural maximum overshoot of 0.5% of GDP (while leaving open the 
exceptiona possibility of deficit “adjustments”); for what it regards the instruments the debate is still 
open on the possibility of using the so-called “eurobonds”, recurring to ECB-managed funds, which 
should enter into force even earlier than planned, and the granting of loans on a bilateral basis to the 
IMF. At the time of writing, such intervention appears only in its initial stages; however, while 
providing more stringent rules  it cannot be compared to a fiscal union, and the refusal by the UK also 
highlights the economic and political tensions and difficulties  in reaching the unanimity necessary for 
substantial modifications of the EU legal framework. See Uni-Europa Legislative Report September-
N o v e m b e r 2 0 1 1 , h t t p : / / w w w. f a b i . i t / p u b l i c / d o c u m e n t i / re l a z i o n i - i n t e r n a z i o n a l i /
2011_12_06_uni_legislativereport.pdf, and also http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/
p re s i d e n t / n e w s / d o c u m e n t s / p d f / re g u l a t i o n _ 2 _ e n . p d f a n d h t t p : / / e c . e u ro p a . e u /
commission_2010-2014/president/news/documents/pdf/green_en.pdf
56 In particular see the competition law provisions (now artt. 101 and 102 TFEU)
57 Art. 5.3 TFEU
58 Which in any case only makes reference to the ESC and the CCFSRW as instruments that have to 
be considered by the Union and the Member States  in the promotion and harmonization in 
employment and living and working conditions, while explicitly recognizing (along with art. 152 TFEU) 
the “diverse forms  of national practices” and the “diversity of national systems” (id est of industrial 
relations); a similar diversity is also suggested by art. 155.2 TFEU. See Dorssemont 2011b, p. 5
59 And in particular the issue of representation and collective defense of the interests  of workers and 
employers, including co-determination
made by qualified majority vote60  and the exclusion of harmonization in the field of 
Member State cooperation61. 
Similarly, the exclusions of competences set by art. 153.562 relating to pay, 
the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs, which the 
proclamation of the fundamental right to collective action in the Charter63 inevitably 
needs to confronted with; the contradiction between recognition of the right to 
collective action and absence of legislative competences in the field emerged with 
the approval of the Charter, is possibly even more visible after the Lisbon Treaty64.
The need to accommodate the political and economic tensions with regards 
to the right to strike and more in general to social policies should therefore rely on 
the Member States but, regardless of diverging political orientation of national 
Governments65, it appears extremely difficult for the EU-27 to find the necessary 
consensus to adopt social policies achieving the harmonization while maintaing the 
improvement living and working conditions still expected in the text of the art. 151 
TFEU; such potential stalemate in the promotion of the social dimension of the EU 
evidently entails the risk that even the widest and progressive recognition of 
workers’ rights, and especially the right to collective action, would not cause 
significant changes in the current EU framework, in particular if those rights are not 
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60 Now “ordinary legislative procedure”. See 153 TFEU
61 Art. 153.2 (a) TFEU
62 Formerly 137.5 EC, which was not amended by the Treaty of Lisbon
63  The proposed dichotomy between “implementable rights” and “recognisable principles” in the 
Charter escape the focus  of the current analysis; it must be considered however, that, even if it is 
possible to draw such a distinction, that the Charter does not specify does not identify which 
provisions  contain rights and which principles, and that the revised explanations, while giving 
examples of principles (artt. 25 on the rights of elderly people and 37 on environmental protection), 
also state that some provisions may contain elements  of rights and principles, such as the case of 
man-woman equality (art.23) and of social security and social assistance (art. 34). Lastly, with direct 
reference to the matter at hand, art. 28 on collective agreements  and action as  well as  art. 30 on 
protection from unfair dismissal appear to be drafted in terms of (justiciable) rights.
64  The Charter neither empowers  the Community nor requires  Member States to create a right to 
strike. Fudge 2011, p. 252
65  It must be underlined that there can be identified a certain resistance against the acceptance of 
cooperative and unitary logics: alongside the absence of political consensus in the EU institutions 
about strategies to be pursued, at a national level against employers tend to exploit the situation to 
their advantage, especially where it is supported by the Government (as  demonstrated by the 
Swedish case), while the new MS (in this  supported by the UK) oppose the potential amendments of 
the relevant EU frameworks. Furthermore, the aforementioned national legislative responses to the 
ECJ judicial course are not inspired by the research and implementation of common solutions  in the 
sectors involved, but rather appear directed towards the impact reduction and the “ECJ-proofing” of 
the domestic frameworks  (also this sense it must be explained the Swedish opposition to the revision 
of the PWD). See also Blauberger 2011
given content through a systematic, effective and appropriate review of policies 
undertaken by the Union institutions.
4.2 - Institutional Developments: towards a rebalancing of the economic 
and social dimension of the Union?
4.2.1 - The Monti Report and the Single Market Act
In the wake of European elections of 2009 Commission President Barroso, in 
a speech to the European Parliament66, stated his “attachment to the respect of 
fundamental social rights and to the principle of free movement of workers” 67 , and 
highlighted that “the interpretation and the implementation of the posted workers 
Directive falls short in both respects”. In order to solve the problems arisen and with 
a view of fighting social dumping he proposed, instead of a revision of the PWD, a 
Regulation to be issued “alongside” the Directive; in particular, it was underlined 
how such an instrument would provide more legal certainty and a quicker 
application than a revision of a directive, which “would still leave too much room for 
diverging transposition, and take longer to produce real effects on the ground”68. 
Furthermore, President Barroso, in his political guidelines for the new 
Commission, identified the further evaluation of the single market, at the same time 
the core of the European integration but still an incomplete process, as a key 
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66  Passion and responsibility: Strengthening Europe in a Time of Change, 15 September 2009. See 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/391
67 President Barroso also agreed on the need of a social impact assessments  for all future proposals, 
stating that the first test case for such a social impact assessment would be the revision of the 
working time Directive, and that the new review would be based on a two-stage consultation of the 
social partners  at EU level as well as  on a detailed impact assessment paying attention to both social 
and economic aspect come with a comprehensive legislative proposal. Along with an assessment 
study (Study to support an Impact Assessment on further action at European level regarding Directive 
2003/88/EC and the evolution of working time organisation, so-called Deloitte study), one-year-long 
consultation were launched on 25 March 2010, with the result that the social partners  jointly decided 
to launch talks  unde art. 155 TFEU and have nine months to reach agreement. See the 
aforementioned Passion and responsibility and Review of the Working Time Directive - Press Release 
by the Commission, 
h t t p : / / e u r o p a . e u / r a p i d / p r e s s R e l e a s e s A c t i o n . d o ? r e f e r e n c e = M E M O /
11/789&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
68  The speech also contained a passage indicating that a revision of the PWD was not a priori 
excluded: “If we discover during the preparation of the Regulation that there are areas  where we need 
to revisit the Directive itself: I will not hesitate to do so.”
strategic objective for Europe, and entrusting former Commissioner Prof. Mario 
Monti69  with the mission of preparing a report containing options and 
recommendations for a relaunch of the single market; the so-called “Monti Report”70 
highlighted three main challenges for the single market.
In particular, the two reinforcing trends of "integration fatigue" and “market 
fatigue” erode the political and social support for market integration in Europe both 
in the wake of the crisis and in the longer term71; furthermore, uneven policy 
attention given to the development of the “various components of an effective and 
sustainable single market”, especially for what it refers to the connection between 
the internal and European market and the inability to expand to new sectors72 and to 
ensure that the single market represents a common space of freedom and 
opportunity working for all73.
Lastly, it is stated that the third challenge derives the tendency to believe that 
the single market is an achieved result for the Union; however, while with the 
institutional reforms deriving from Lisbon Treaty all the three major recent priorities 
of the EU have been achieved, the “correct functioning of the monetary union and of 
enlargement” need a strengthening of the role of the single market, and the building 
of consensus around it74, in a context carachterised by global changes and specific 
European transformations75.
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69 Commissioner for the Internal market, Financial services and Tax policy (from 1995 to 1999) and for 
Competition (1999-2004)
70 A new Strategy for the Single Market at the Service of Europe’s Economy and Society - Report to 
the President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, 9 May 2010 (hereby Monti Report) 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf
71  According to the “political incorrect” distinction carried out, three different groups may be 
identified; the “radical critics”, the “conditional supporters” (the vast majority of the MS, political 
groups and stakeholders), and the “unwavering supporters”. See Monti Report, p. 20
72 For instance to support “green growth” and “Europe's  transition to a low-carbon, resource efficient 
economy”. Ibid., p. 8
73 “citizens, consumers and SMEs”. Ibid., p. 6
74 The comprehensive approach, laid down by the report highlights  the need for initiatives to “build” 
and “deliver” a stronger single market and to “build consensus” around it. Ibid., p. 32
75 Among those are listed the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the consequences of the enlargement (size 
of the union, economic and cultural diversity, increased migration), the introduction of the Euro and, 
in particular, the adoption the Lisbon Treaty and of the concepts of “"sustainable development” and 
(highly competitive) “social market economy” as well as the critical national responses to the 
European integration (the referenda rejecting the European Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty as  well 
as the ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the limits of integration). Ibid, p. 16
The Report acknowledges the tensions tensions between market integration 
and social objectives in particular after the formal introduction the objective of a 
"highly competitive social market economy", the need for their reconciliation as a 
consequences of the “Laval quartet” rulings, and the awareness that a clarification 
on the issues of the  adequacy of the protective framework set by the PWD and of 
the reach of EU law to collective labour disputes should not be left to future 
occasional litigation before the ECJ or national courts76.
It proceeds therefore to identify two main balancing strategies: in primis, the 
provision of more clarity in the implementation of the PWD, the facilitation of the 
access to information, the strengthening of cooperation between national 
autorithies, as well as a better sanctioning of abuses77.
Secondly, having discarded the ETUC Social Progress Clause as a non-
realistic option78 and the EU regulation of the right to strike as explicitly prohibited, 
the Report suggests “a targeted intervention” to be implemented for the case of the 
adoption of measures are to clarify the interpretation and application of the PWD.
Such intervention would aim at protecting the right to strike in the context of 
freedom of movement of workers and building confidence in the social partners; it 
should be based on the introduction of a provision modelled on art. 2 of Regulation 
(EC) No 2679/9879, ensuring that the posting of worker in the context of the 
provision of services does not affect the right to strike as protected by the CFREU 
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76  The proposed solutions  on the matter are included in the “consensus” chapter (Chap. 3) of the 
Report
77 Particular reference is made to the fight against "letter box companies" and to the effectiveness of 
national remedies. See Monti Report, p. 70
78 “seeking Treaty changes does not seem a realistic option in the short term”. Ibid.
79  The so-called “Monti Clause” (see supra par. 1.2.1), as well as the mentioned “labour law 
safeguard” contained in the Services  Directive (see rec. 14 and art. 1.6), which states  that the DSIM 
“does not affect labour law, that is  any legal or contractual provision concerning employment 
conditions, working conditions, including health and safety at work and the relationship between 
employers and workers, which Member States  apply in accordance with national law which respects 
Community law”. It should be noted that the prohibition of actions that "cause grave disruption to the 
proper functioning of the internal market and inflict serious  losses on the individuals affected" whilst 
recognizing that the right to strike is  unaffected by that prohibition provided by the Monti-clause, 
appears significantly different from the DSIM “exclusion”.
and in accordance with national laws and practices which respect EU law80, and on 
a mechanism for the informal solutions of labour disputes concerning the 
application of the PWD and involving the national social partners, the Member 
States and the Commission81.
The key objective of the reaffirmation of the concept of a “highly competitive 
social market economy” and the relaunch of the single market, deriving from the 
Monti Report, was included in a Communication by the Commission in November 
201082, with which the governing body of the EU put forward its own "package" of 
proposals for the adoption of the Single Market Act, promoting “strong, suitable and 
equitable growth for business”, especially in the context of the EU 2020 strategy; 
while reaffirming that the free movement of goods and services represent two of the 
fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaties, the Communication also stated that 
the single market “is not an end in itself”, but it represents “a tool for implementing 
other policies”, which are more likely to succeed if the single market is functioning 
properly83.
Among the fifty proposals, with a view of increasing solidarity in the single 
market84, the Commission recognised the need to reconcile “economic freedoms 
and freedoms of collective action” (sic.), as well as the revitalization of the social 
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80  The reference to the “respect of Community law” of the EU national legal or conventional 
framework on collective action raises doubts  to its suitability as a reference for an EU “immunity” for 
collective action, in particular given the findings of the ECJ on the combined provisions of the 
Swedish Lex Britannia and Posting of Workers  Act in the Laval case; independently from the recourse 
to collective action (which in a specific dispute may or may not be undertaken by workers  or the 
union), the main focus would be on the aims pursued through collective bargaining and their 
compatibility with the provsions of the PWD, as well as the restrictive interpretation of the concept of 
“workers’ interest” carried out by the ECJ.
81 It is  also proposed that if the parties refuse the solution proposed, they would be free to defend 
their rights in court.
82 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions  - Towards  a Single Market Act - For a highly 
competitive social market economy - 50 proposals  for improving our work, business  and exchanges 
with one another COM(2010) 608 final/2. It should be noted that the EP Resolution of 20 May 2010 
on “delivering a single market to consumers and citizens” (2010/2011(INI) which “encourages  the 
Commission to present the ‘Act’ by May 2011” (par. 77), while having regard of the CFREU and 
emphasizing the need for the single market legislation to protect and preserve “specific fundamental 
rights of citizens, such as security and privacy”, did not refer explicitly to the right to collective action 
nor the PWD. See ht tp : / /eur- lex .europa.eu/LexUr iServ/LexUr iServ.do?ur i=COM:
2010:0608:REV1:EN:PDF#page=2 and http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//
EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2010-0186+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN
83 Towards a Single Market Act, p. 4
84  Within the larger aim of “restoring confidence by putting Europeans at the heart of the single 
market”, which echoes the objective of “building consensus” of the Monti Report.
dialogue85; the two proposals on the matter regarded on the one hand, within the 
strategy for the implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the 
assessment the social impact that any legislative proposal on single market may 
have, to ensure that it is taking into account respect for fundamental rights, 
including the trade union action86; on the other , it announced the adoption of a 
proposal for reform of Directive 96/71 intended at improving its implementation87, 
which would “likely” include or be supplemented by a clarification on the exercise of 
fundamental social rights in the context of economic freedom88.
This first Communication was followed by a wide debate at European, 
national and local level, and by the endorsement of the relaunch of the single market 
by the Council89; the latter in particular considered that proper implementation and 
enforcement of the PWD can contribute to a better protection of posted workers’ 
rights and ensure more clarity regarding the rights and obligations of service 
providers and national authorities, helping therefore to prevent the circumvention of 
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85  It also referred to the activities and surveillance of pension funds, as well as to the launch of a 
consultation with the social partners  in order to create a European framework for the advance 
planning of industrial restructuring. It must be noted that the three proposals directly linked to the 
single market based on a “highly competitive social market economy” regard the development of 
socially innovative corporate projects  (social ratings, ethical and environmental labeling, revised rules 
on public procurement, and by introducing a new investment fund regime and tapping into dormant 
saving), the (foundations, cooperatives, mutual associations, etc., proposal 36), the improvement of 
quality of legal structures such dations, cooperatives, mutual associations, in order to optimize their 
functioning and facilitate their development within the single market (proposal 37), and the launch of 
a consultation on corporate governance and on the improvement of the transparency of social and 
environmental information (proposal 38).
86 Proposal No. 29
87 And therefore, more closely linked with the first strategy highlighted in the Monti Report proposals 
with regards to effective monitoring and cooperation by national authorities, as  well as  to the 
continuing difficulties  in the posting of workers  (in particular underlined are the complex national 
administrative procedures  as  well as double-taxation problems) which make it more difficult to 
exercise the freedom to provide services.
88 Proposal No. 30
89 Conclusions on the Single Market Act 3057th Competitiveness (Internal Market, Industry, Research 
and Space) Council meeting Brussels, 10 December 2010, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/intm/118409.pdf. It should be given note also of the EP resolutions of 6 
April 2011 (P7_TA-PROV(2011)0144-145-146), in which the EP called the Commission in the 
framework of the re-launch of a more competitive single market creating sustainable growth with 
more and better jobs, to ensure that all social rights  are respected and that, where relevant, due 
account should be taken in single market legislation of artt. 8 and 9 TFEU and the entry into force of 
the CFREU which provides a whole range of civil, political, economic and social rights to Europeans, 
as well as the right to negotiate, conclude and enforce collective agreements in accordance with 
national law and practices  and with due respect for EU law. See “Single Market for Europeans” EP 
Resolution, par. 48. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-
TA-2011-0145&language=EN
the applicable rules, and that a clarification of the exercise of the economic 
freedoms alongside fundamental social rights is necessary. 
In April 2011, the Commission issued another Communication90, identifying 
“twelve levers”, and proposing that the EU should adopt key action for each one of 
them by the end of 2012; with regards to the “inclusive growth” in the framework of 
the EU 2020 strategy, the Single Market Act highlights the Commission will continue 
to improve its coverage of the social dimension of the impact assessments which 
accompany legislative proposals concerning the internal market, ensuring that such 
proposals include a appropriate references to social policies and social rights, taking 
into account articles 8 and 9 of the TFUE as well as the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, in particular its art. 28.
With specific reference to the “social cohesion” lever91, the Single Market 
Acts underlines that employers should be able to provide their services more easily 
throughout the EU, while at the same time guaranteeing “high quality jobs and a 
high level of protection for workers and their social rights”.
Therefore, the need for improvements and reinforcement of the transposition, 
implementation and enforcement of the PWD is highlighted; action is to be taken 
with reference to the prevention and sanctioning of abuses and circumvention of the 
applicable rules, especially to facilitate the flow of information between businesses 
and Member State authorities, to enable more stringent checks to be carried out 
and to combat abuse, with particular regard to workers' rights.
Furthermore, the Commission should propose legislation applicable to all 
sectors clarifying the exercise of freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services alongside fundamental social rights, including the right to take 
collective action, in accordance with national law and practices and in compliance 
with EU law, for which the solutions found in Regulation (EC)  No 2679/9892 would be 
the starting point.
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90 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions  - Single Market Act - Twelve levers  to boost 
growth and strengthen confidence "Working together to create new growth" (COM/2011/0206 final) 
(Single Market Act)
91 Single Market Act, par. 2.10
92 And in particular, a “Monti-style” clause (“This  Regulation may not be interpreted as  affecting in any 
way the exercise of fundamental rights as recognized in Member States, including the right or 
freedom to strike. These rights may also include the right or freedom to take other actions  covered by 
the specific industrial relations systems in Member States”)
4.2.2 - The Monti II Regulation
According to the DG Employment Roadmap 93, there were several legislative 
options available in order to tackle the issues raised by the ECJ rulings94; firstly, a 
“broad, wide ranging review” of the PWD, modifying the core provision on minimum 
terms and conditions and on standard setting instruments95, potentially going as far 
as establishing equality of treatment between posted and domestic workers96, 
therefore reverting the ECJ rulings and significantly shifting the balance of the PWD 
from the fundamental freedom to provide services and the need to guarantee an 
appropriate level of protection of the rights of posted workers97.
Another possibility open was a legislative initiative98  on enforcement of the 
PWD, setting more detailed provisions in particular with reference to administrative 
cooperation, the exchange of information and possibilities granted to the workers to 
better defend their rights; such a proposal could contain recitals stressing the 
respect of collective rights of workers and the role of social partners in the 
implementation of the act in question.
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93  New legislative initiative for Posting of Workers, CWP DG EMPL, 25 October 2010, http://
ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/2011_empl_001_posting_of_workers_en.pdf. The 
Commission had indicated that a legislative initiative on the Posting of Workers was due on 20 
December 2011, however the publication of proposals has been postponed until end January/
beginning of February 2012. See http://www.emf-fem.org/Press/Labour-related-news/Social-Europe-
Delay-regarding-the-Posting-of-Workers-and-Monti-II
94  Identified as  the extent to which trade unions  can recur to industrial action in order to protect 
workers' interests without undermining economic freedoms (concerning the balance between 
fundamental principles of Community law established in the Treaty) and the possibility for MS or 
national social partners to determine more favorable conditions  for posted workers  going beyond the 
minimum conditions  laid out in the Directive (without creating obstacles to cross border provision); 
this  issue concerns the interpretation of the provisions of the PWD. It was also determined that the 
status  quo could not be considered a viable option and “soft law” instruments seemed insufficient to 
appropriately tackle the problems laid down. 
95 Artt. 3.1-7-8-10 PWD. See on the matter also Ales 2008, p. 17
96 On the basis of art. 154 TFEU
97  It was also noted that such wide review would also give the opportunity to clarify specific 
implementation problems. (e.g. exclusion of seagoing personnel of merchant navy undertakings, the 
treatment of certain activities  in the transport sector or the link with the recent Directive on interim 
agency work (Directive 2008/104. However, it was noted that a wide ranging review would have few 
chances of being adopted in Council and would raise severe controversy in the Parliament.
98 Which, according to the legal basis of such a proposal, should have been a Directive.
Lastly, a Council Regulation (which would have to be adopted by unanimity 
by the Council and approved by the Parliament) based on the “Monti-clause”, 
defining a framework for dealing with obstacles to the free provision of services and 
recognizing the exercise of fundamental rights, such as the right or freedom to 
strike.
The options ultimately chosen, according to the Commissioner for 
employment99, social affairs and inclusion, were the implementation of an 
enforcement Directive on posting, which should clarify the existing PWD without 
amending it, accompanied by a new Regulation on fundamental social rights, 
dubbed Monti II, to clarify the extent to which trade unions can use the right to strike 
in the case of trans-national activities, without reverting ECJ case-law100; should 
such a solution prove not acceptable, the Commission would have to review the 
Posting of Workers Directive itself.
The challenging objective of the proposal is represented by the facilitation of 
economic integration and, at the same time, the fostering of social protection; with 
reference to the clarification of the PWD, such objective translates in the continuing 
promotion of worker mobility alongside the protection from abuses of economic 
freedoms  or ambiguities in the national implementation or enforcement of the EU 
provisions, resulting in a downgrade of working condition.
The enforcement Directive, respecting the different social models and the 
national traditions of social dialogue and industrial relations, would entail a series of 
provisions improving the access to information and enhancing administrative 
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99 The following considerations and analysis  are derived from the speech given by Mr. László Andor, 
EU Commissioner responsible for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, at the Conference on 
Fundamental Social Rights and the Posting of Workers in the framework of the Single Market 
"Balancing economic integration and social protection" held in Brussels, 27 June 2011. SPEECH/
11/478 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/478&type=HTML
100  See Directive to be supplemented - not revised - by end 2011, EUROPOLITICS 27 June 2011 
http://www.europolitics.info/social/directive-to-be-supplemented-not-revised-by-end-2011-
art308225-25.html
cooperation101, increasing the effectiveness of controls and sanctions and posted 
workers' possibilities to better defend their rights, in order to prevent abuses102, 
circumvention or disrespect of law such as in the case of “letterbox companies” or 
subcontractors failing in their obligations103.
The still embryonic Monti II Regulation, on the other hand, should explicitly 
recognise that there is no inherent conflict between exercise of the right to strike and 
freedom of establishment and of provision of services, or primacy of one over the 
other, while recognizing the key role of the social partners in taking action to protect 
workers' rights, including through strikes.
Furthermore, the future proposal could stress the role of national courts in 
applying the proportionality test on a case-by-case basis, while reconciling the 
exercise of fundamental social rights and economic freedoms, and it should also 
confirm the role and contribution of alternative dispute settlement mechanisms at 
national level, including in cases of disputes in transnational situations; lastly, the 
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101  Including the development an electronic information exchange system between MS and 
clarification on what type of checks and controls  should authorities carry out without creating undue 
obstacles to the free provision of services. According to article 4.2 of the PWD, the national 
authorities  (set up “for the purpose of implementing this Directive” and represented by ad hoc bodies 
or existing structures such as the Labour Inspectorates) should mutually cooperate to provide to 
each other information “on the transnational hiring-out of workers”, including possible abuses, and 
cooperate alongside the Commission in order to examine potential difficulties in the application of art. 
3.10 (public policy provisions); in order to promote the cooperation, each MS has to notify the others 
and the Commission the competent bodies, and the various informative activities  must be carried out 
free of charge.
The importance of the cooperation as a fundamental tool for implementing the PWD was recognized 
by the ECJ already in Arblade, in which the Court underlined how the effective protection of workers 
may require the accessibility of documents  in the host MS for control by the competent authorities as 
the only appropriate means of control, in the absence of an organized system for cooperation or 
exchanges  of information between Member States as provided for in Article 4 of PWD. The effective 
development of such a system should render superfluous  the retention of the documents in the host 
MS after the employer has ceased to employ workers  there; it should be also noted that he 
Commission has  recently (March 2011) greenlighted the use of IMI system for the purposes of the 
PWD implementation, to improve and reinforce (electronic) information exchange between the various 
national authorities, allowing for a secure and fast data exchange enabling Member States to work 
together despite language, administrative and structural barriers, with the aim to provide each liaison 
office/monitoring authority with a quick reference tool on the legislation of the MS of the 
establishment of the service providers.
102 An important question in the field is  whether duration of posting can and should be a decisive 
criterion for the appreciation of its  temporary nature, and in which circumstances such criteria should 
be addressed
103 Furthermore, the enforcement Directive should also include specific provisions  for sectors  where 
the application of posting rules poses problems (such as international transport)
regulation could contain a clause establishing an information and notification 
obligation (an alert mechanism) for situations causing major disruptions104.
While measures aimed at preventing and sanctioning abuses, or reinforcing 
the information flow between Member States are possibly bound to reduce 
conflictuality in the posting sector and promoting a climate of fair competition 
preserving the rights of workers, all but the most radical changes in the language or 
the legal basis of the PWD105, would not guarantee an automatic reversal of the 
ECJ’s judicial course in the case of conflicts or disputes, and could also provoke its 
further strengthening through their setting in relatively stable EU secondary 
legislation rather than in potentially reversible jurisprudence.
With specific reference to the expected provisions of the current “Monti II” 
proposal, while the recognition of the union’s key role in protecting workers, nothing 
is said with reference to the possibility for the host member state unions of inducing 
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104 With reference to the responses to the mentioned proposal, it should be noted that already on 
28th June, MEPs Pervenche Berès (S&D, France) and Edit Bauer (EPP, Slovakia) warned that simple 
clarification of the PWD will not be enough, rejecting the proposals  outlined the day before by 
Commissioner Andor; in particular Berès expressed the opinion that the interpreting regulation will 
not be enough to “clear up grey areas and to combat abuse in posting of workers”. On the other 
hand, Bauer argued that the only action necessary is better application of the existing directive, 
which should be achieved through an agreement between the social partners (on the lines  of the one 
on parental leave), inviting the Commission not to act and the social partners  to take the lead in order 
in particular to avoid a political battle in the EP. At social partner level, Bernadette Ségol (general-
secretary of ETUC, which continues  to continues to attach a very high priority to the introduction of a 
social progress  protocol in the Treaties) stated that Andor’s stance was not encouraging since 
fundamental social rights have a priority over freedom to provide services  (and not be balanced as  in 
the ECJ rulings). In November 2011, BusinessEurope expressed a severe concern about the EU 
initiative,  stressing that there is no need to revise the PWD, and EU action is  needed to better 
implement and enforce the existing PWD to ensure compliance (favoring in particular better 
information of companies and workers through improved administrative cooperation between MS); 
the Monti II should therefore facilitate cross-border provision of services  and should not create new 
administrative burdens. BusinessEurope has stressed that “in order to be acceptable”, the Monti II 
regulation should “stick as close as possible to the Monti I regulation, in particular with respect to the 
short notification deadlines” and “limit obstacles to the freedom to provide service, including those 
deriving from an excessive use of the right to take collective action, and avoid any justification of 
obstacles deriving from <<social unrest>>”. See Two MEPs challenge Andor’s  plans, EUROPOLITICS 
29 June 2011, http://preprod.europolitics.abccom.cyberscope.fr/social/two-meps-challenge-andor-s-
plans-art308447-25.html and Andor: law on posting of workers will be ‘clarified', European Voice 20 
July 2011 http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/andor-law-on-posting-of-workers-will-be-
clarified-/71698.aspx and BusinessEurope Policy Briefing 2 November 2011, Posting of Workers, 
http://www.businesseurope.eu/content/default.asp?PageID=568&DocID=29411 and http://
www.feani.org/site/index.php?eID=tx_nawsecuredl&u=0&file=fileadmin/PDF_Documents/
F E A N I _ N e w s / S i n g l e _ M a r k e t _ F o r u m _ -
_Krakow_Declaration.pdf&t=1323657729&hash=72e799f523ab2e95e14dd4b6f6ffb45177a792d5
105 See Ales  2008, p. 17, also recommending trade unions and MS, to lodge a claim in front of the 
ECJ in order to ask for the withdrawal of art. 3, par. 1 because its  conflict with art. 45, par. 1 and 2, 
art. 151, par. 1 and art. 174 TFEU.
adherence to collective agreements providing more favorable conditions than the 
minimum standards set by the PWD106  supporting a posted workers’ action 
pursuing similar claims107; an enforcing role of the unions against unscrupulous or 
uncomplying posting employers and undertakings108 should already be considered 
as legitimate in the current EU framework, even if an explicit confirmation should be 
considered as a progress in the field, in a similar way to the provision of the “alert 
mechanism” for serious disruptions of the economic freedoms.
However, it must be considered that, while drawing inspiration from the 
Monti-clause of Reg. 2679/98109, the “Monti II” Regulation would present significant 
differences to its antecedent; in primis, rather than providing than the exercise of 
economic freedoms “does not affect” fundamental rights, it should simply state that 
economic freedoms and fundamental social rights are equally important, therefore 
not avoiding the possibility of a balancing by the ECJ, possibly reproducing 
therefore the assessment and interpretation problems highlighted with reference to 
the rulings of the “Laval quartet”.
Furthermore, the balancing the economic and social aspects in posting-
relating disputes should be carried out by national courts through a case-by-case 
proportionality test, replicating the ECJ’s main assumptions in Viking; in this sense it 
should be considered that the proportionality test represents a severe interference 
with the fundamental right to take collective action110, in particular when is taken 
into account the current absence of EU criteria in order to determine it, other than 
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106  It has  been noted that a rephrasing of the requirements  of art. 3.8 PWD, replacing the current 
emphasis on erga omnes  applicability/application by clear requirements of non-discrimination and 
transparency would effectively recognize and enforce the role of the unions in the area. See van Hoek 
and Houwerzijl 2011, p. 179 (Recommendation 4)
107  A legislative intervention should, in order to effectively protect fundamental rights, confirm the 
right of posted workers to initiate or take part in industrial actions in the host country. For similar 
conclusions, see also previous footnote
108 See art. 5 PWD
109 For the sake of repetition, stating that “This  Regulation may not be interpreted as affecting in any 
way the exercise of fundamental rights as recognized in Member States, including the right or 
freedom to strike. These rights may also include the right or freedom to take other actions  covered by 
the specific industrial relations systems in Member States”
110  See supra for the ILO Committee of experts Report of the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions  and Recommendations  in response to the BALPA Application for violation 
of ILC 87.
the very restrictive framework determined by the ECJ111. Furthermore, the suitability 
of non-specialized national courts to rule on transnational labour matters can be 
questioned, both with reference to the significant differences in the way in which the 
assessment of the proportionality and legitimacy of the action is carried out 112 and 
to the possible problems related to the technical capacity or institutional strength of 
the national bodies involved; the setting up of alternative dispute settlement 
mechanism for transnational situations, while in general terms an improvement 
promoting a correct application of the PWD, cannot be considered as sufficiently 
addressing this problem113.
Lastly, at the current stage there are no provisions regarding the specific 
indication of the elements of the possible trade union liability, nor a determination of 
the damages to be awarded by the national courts for the case of breach of EU-
law114, which represent fundamental critical features of the ECJ jurisprudence in 
Viking and Laval; as noted before, also in this sector the simple reliance on national 
provisions and frameworks do not seem an appropriate solution, given in particular 
the uncertainties emerging from systems such as the British and Italian ones with 
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111  For a similar position, see the aforementioned ETUC’s Achieving social progress  in the single 
market, p. 4. See also supra par. 2.3.2 for a detailed analysis of the principle of proportionality linked 
to the ECJ jurisprudence in Viking and Laval
112 See Novitz in Ales and Novitz 2010, pp. 266-268 and supra cap. 3 for the possible implications for 
the German and Italian framework, as well as for the findings of the Labour Court of Stockholm in the 
national Laval case.
113 Furthermore, the specific features of the ADR system defined by the Monti II Regulation must be 
analyzed; in accordance to the principle of “last resort” of collective action deriving from the ECJ 
jurisprudence its exhaustion by the parties should be considered mandatory, as well as  to be carried 
out on the basis  of a duty of cooperation with a  view to settlement (a general duty to “negotiate with 
a view to reach an agreement” is  also provided by several national legislation as  well as by 
international standards  such as ILC 98 with regards  to collective bargaining as  well as by art. 6.1 
EWC Directive (Recast), with reference to the SNB  and the management negotiations on the on the 
form and operation of the EWC themselves) and enforceable in court procedures  (in analogy with art. 
6 of the Mediation Directive 2008/52/EC). However, it should be noted that nothing is  currently said 
with regards to its supplementing the already existing ADR procedures or substituting them in reason 
of its specialty and particular scope of application; in the former case, furthermore, it must be 
considered whether the recourse to such instrument should occur before the exhaustion of national 
settlement procedures or only after such negotiation have not brought satisfactory result, in a “quasi-
ultima ratio” perspective defining this  remedy as  a direct alternative to industrial action in a trans-
national setting.
114 The Monti Regulation refers  to obstacles  occurring in the MS, and provides  the obligation for (or 
the request to) the Member State to “take all necessary and proportionate measures to remove the 
said obstacle” (artt. 4.1(a) and 5.1 Reg. 2679/98). The concept and principles  of liability to what it 
refers (and the only that could emerge in an application by analogy) would be therefore those 
articulated by the ECJ on the basis of Francovich and Brasserie du Pêcheur with regards Member 
States.
reference, respectively, to the potential absence of a cap for damages115, and to the 
effectiveness of the mainly non-restorative sanctions and remedies issued116, and a 
solution possibly combining measures at both EU and national level, in analogy to 
the antitrust damages actions117, would be needed to correctly address the issue.
The debate around the PWD revision and the analysis of the provisions of the 
current “Monti II” proposal highlights once more the invasiveness of the ECJ’s 
judicial legislation in the matter at hand, deriving from the extreme difficulty of a 
political reversal; at national level, in fact, judicial interpretations of a legal framework 
may be relatively easily corrected by parliamentary majorities118. On the other hand, 
ECJ decisions based on primary European law could only be reversed by Treaty 
amendments, which need to be ratified by all Member States, and interpretation of 
secondary EU law cannot not be corrected without an initiative of the Commission 
that needs the support of at least a qualified majority in the Council, and usually an 
absolute majority in the European Parliament119; alongside the ever-increasing 
diversity of national interests and preferences120, which make political corrections to 
ECJ interpretation in practice nearly impossible, it is to be considered that the 
interaction between a evolutionary or deregulatory effect on the freedoms of the 
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115 See par. 3.2.2
116 See par. 3.2.1
117 See the aforementioned (par. 3.2.1) White Paper on Damages  actions  for breach of the EC antitrust 
rules (COM(2008) 165 final), p. 2 (par. 1.1)
118 Courts  and Constitutional Courts may be invoved in this process, and the majorities involved may 
consquently change in accordance with the specific national provisions.
119 Scharpf 2010, p. 217
120  The Declaration elaborated at Single Market Forum in Krakow (3-4 October 2011, gathering 
market participants  as businesses, social partners, non-governmental organisations and public 
authorities  and examining the state of the Single Market, the transposition and application of 
directives, and the exchange of best practices, as  well as contributing to policy evaluations  and 
monitoring the implementation of the SMA) contains, among its operational conclusions  (pag. 3), a 
general statement regarding the possibility to reconcile the transnational provision of services  with 
the guarantee of an “appropriate level of protection” for posted workers; the starting point, however, 
is represented by the fact that “cross border provision of services and mobility of posted workers are 
essential elements of the internal market”. No reference at all is made to the reconciliation of the 
exercise of collective action or to the potential role of the unions in the protection of workers and the 
regulation of the market demands apparently continues to prevail on the promotion of social rights. 
Furthermore, as noted above (par. 3.2.1), in national labour law other methods  than (full) economic 
reparation are often used to counteract unlawful collective actions; these national experiences should 
be taken into account when deciding on remedies for unlawful collective actions.
See http://www.feani.org/site/index.php?eID=tx_nawsecuredl&u=0&file=fileadmin/PDF_Documents/
F E A N I _ N e w s / S i n g l e _ M a r k e t _ F o r u m _ -
_Krakow_Declaration.pdf&t=1323657729&hash=72e799f523ab2e95e14dd4b6f6ffb45177a792d5
internal market, as interpreted by the Court, and the competence to address or re-
regulate it by the European legislator does not exist in the case of the right to take 
collective action: therefore, while the ECJ was able to determine the incompatibility 
with EU law of national legal or conventional frameworks on collective action, the 
European legislator could not re-address the issue by setting a European standard 
through general harmonization measures seeking to protect public policy goals 
without (by definition) cause restrictions to the operation of the internal market121, 
because of the ban imposed by art. 153.5 TFEU122  which, as noted, has not 
undergone any modification under the renewed Lisbon framework; the workers, 
therefore, still are not entitled to effective instruments to defend and enforce their 
rights at the same supranational level in which European employers and 
undertakings throughly enjoy and exercise their market freedoms.
4.2 - The difficult “resurgence” of social rights in the ECJ jurisprudence 
and the EU relevance of ECtHR standards: judicial dialogue the solution for an 
effective protection of the right to strike in Europe?
The ECJ’s organization123 and jurisdiction were significantly amended by the 
Lisbon Treaty; in particular the disappearance of the so-called “pillar structure”, 
deriving from the Maastricht Treaty, and repeal by the Treaty of Lisbon of Articles 35 
EU and 68 EC, imposing restrictions on the jurisdiction of the ECJ, entail that the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union will extend to the law of 
the European Union, unless the Treaties provide otherwise124.
The most significant extension related to the area of freedom, security and 
justice, in which the ECJ had previously experienced a limited and asymmetric 
competence; under the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, therefore, police and 
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121 See Zahn and De Witte 2011, p. 442-443
122 In this particular constitutional situation, it was  frequently suggested the ECJ should have acted 
with greater caution and possibly should have avoided interfering with the national laws  relating to 
collective action altogether. See Bercusson 2007, Carabelli 2008, p. 7
123 In common with the institutions to be renamed, the whole court system of the European Union will 
be known as the Court of Justice of the European Union, comprising three courts: the Court of 
Justice, the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal.
124 Declaration No 38 on art. 252 TFEU, regarding the number of AGs in the Court of Justice
criminal justice, along with visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to 
free movement of person 125  have become part of the general law, and any court or 
tribunal will be able to request a preliminary ruling126, and the Court will have 
jurisdiction to rule on measures taken on grounds of public policy in connection with 
cross-border controls.
The Common foreign and security policy (CFSP)127, has remained subject to 
special rules and specific procedures128, and the jurisdiction of the Court is generally 
excluded in the area; there are however two exceptions to the main rule, regading 
the monitoring of compliance with art. 40 TEU, delimiting the CFSP with respect to 
the Union competences129, and the possibility130  for the Court to rule on 
proceedings reviewing the legality of decisions providing for restrictive measures 
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125 And in particular, judicial cooperation in civil matters, recognition and enforcement of judgments
126 Transitional provisions (art. 10 of Protocol No 36 on transitional provisions) provide that that full 
jurisdiction in criminal matters will not apply until five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, 
during which “the powers of the Court of Justice are to remain the same with respect to acts in the 
field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters which have been adopted 
before the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon”.
127 Title V TEU, artt. 21 ff.
128 art. 24 TEU
129 “The implementation of the common foreign and security policy shall not affect the application of 
the procedures and the extent of the powers  of the institutions  laid down by the Treaties for the 
exercise of the Union competences referred to in Articles  3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union. 
Similarly, the implementation of the policies listed in those Articles  shall not affect the application of 
the procedures and the extent of the powers  of the institutions  laid down by the Treaties for the 
exercise of the Union competences under this Chapter”
130 art. 275 TFEU
against natural or legal persons adopted by the Council on the basis of the specific 
provision of the CFSP131.
As noted above, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is 
now regarded as having the same legal value as the Treaties, forming part of the set 
of  of constitutional rules and principles by reference to which the Court of Justice 
can directly adjudicate; furthermore, articles 6.2 and 6.3 TEU provide that the EU 
“shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms” and that, independently from the planned accession to the 
ECHR132, the fundamental rights therein guaranteed, along with those resulting from 
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, “shall constitute general 
principles of the Union’s law”.
It is of the outmost evidence, therefore, that the framework from which the 
ECJ can and must derive its reasonings has been significantly expanded and 
enhanced in particular for what it refers to fundamental social rights, especially in 
consideration of the jurisprudential practice of the ECtHR and specifically of its 
dynamic interpretations of positive obligations and newly bred human rights133, 
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131 Chapter 2 of Title V TEU. The CJEU; in its Press Release The Treaty of Lisbon and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (No 104/09, 30 November 2009) specifically refers to the freezing of 
assets  in connection with the fight against terrorism as an example for the competence of the Court 
in the area. See in particular Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al 
Barakaat International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities, in which the Court already in 2008 annulled a Council Regulation (No 881/2002) 
imposing restrictive measures directed against certain persons  and and repealed another Regulation 
(No 467/2001) which prohibited the export of certain goods and services to Afghanistan, 
strengthened the flight ban and extended the freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect 
of the Taliban of Afghanistan with respect to Mr. Kadi and the Al Barakaat Foundation; in particular it 
should be noted that the ECJ, in adjudicating the compatibility of the regulation with human rights, 
held the regulation (which did not provide any procedure for communicating the evidence justifying 
the inclusion of the names of the persons  concerned in the “black list”), violated the right to be heard 
and the right to an effective remedy, which constitute fundamental principles  of the international legal 
order that not even the Security Council can just ignore, showing a confident approach confident 
approach with the protection of fundamental rights  even in “delicate” matters such as those 
regarding counter-terrorism. See Pernice in Griller and Ziller 2008, p. 250 Fabbrini 2011, p. 19
132 Art. 6.2 TEU specifies that “such accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in 
the Treaties”; furthermore, Protocol No 8 states that the accession agreement is  to specify, in 
particular, “the specific arrangements for the Union’s possible participation in the control bodies  of 
the European Convention [and] the mechanisms necessary to ensure that proceedings by non-
Member States and individual applications  are correctly addressed to Member States and/or the 
Union as appropriate”. See infra in this paragraph
133 Azarov 2008. See infra
which could encourage the ECJ to reassess the nature of the relationship between 
the economic and the social dimension of the EU134.
4.3.1 - A “social” jurisprudence by the ECJ?
The potential significance of the renewed context with regards to the 
reconciliation of the tensions between social and economic aspects in transnational 
situations was highlighted in particular in two cases regarding transnational 
provision of services and public procurement directives and proceeding apparently 
in diverging directions.
 In Commission v Germany135, stemming from a infringement procedure136, 
the ECJ condemned Germany for breach of its obligations deriving from Directives 
2004/18 and 92/50 over the practice of local authority employers to award contracts 
for pension services directly on the basis of a preliminary selection laid down in the 
terms of collective bargaining agreements; Germany had questioned the possible 
applicability of the relevant directives, arguing in particular with regards to an 
“Albany immunity” from art. 101.1 TFEU for collective agreements and, more 
specifically that the public procurement directives could not be applied since the 
awarded contracts derived from collective action. 
Following on the basis of the Viking and Laval137 case law, the ECJ reaffirmed 
that the right to bargain collectively, whilst being a fundamental right, is not 
absolute, and “must be exercised in accordance with European Union law”138; 
therefore the collective agreement source does not entails an exclusion of the 
contract awards from the scope of the obligations in the directives139, in particular 
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134 Syrpis 2008, p. 235
135 Case C-271/08 Commission v Germany
136  The European Commission, in particular, considered that the award of contracts for pension 
services  by public authority employers should be conducted with the tendering procedures required 
by EU public procurement law.
137 And of the rejection of the “Albany venue”
138 Commission v Germany, par. 43
139 Ibid., par. 50. The Court had also determined that unlike the objective of enhancing the pension 
levels, the designation of bodies and undertakings in the collective agreement at issue “does not 
affect the essence of the right to bargain collectively” (par. 49). It must be noted that the AG had also 
had preliminarly determined that the “Albany exclusion” should be narrowly construed and does not 
imply a general exception from the competition rules under primary law for collective agreements. 
See Commission v Germany, AG’s Opinion, par. 62
because it is possible to accommodate the various social objectives of the national 
scheme with the EU frameworks140.
The ECJ concluded that, above the relevant thresholds, the social partners in 
the public sector cannot on directly service contracts for occupational old age 
pensions and, in accordance with the public procurement directives, a call for tender 
must be advertised at EU level; it should be however noted that the Court, in its 
reasonings, explicitly referred to  the need to reconcile the right to bargain 
collectively and the social objectives pursued by the parties with the Treaty 
freedoms and the requirements of the public procurement directives141; it also 
underlined that such reconciliation should be carried out in accordance with the 
principle of proportionality, also entailing the verification on whether “a fair balance 
was struck in the account taken of the respective interests involved”142.
References to the “fair balance” between rights and freedoms and the 
proportionality test as the appropriate instrument to carry it out were included in AG 
Trstenjak’s Opinion, whose most interesting elements refers to the conclusion that 
the right to bargain collectively and the “inherent” autonomy of the parties in the 
process must be recognised in the EU legal order as fundamental rights which form 
an integral part of the general principles of Community law143, and must be 
presumed to have “equal status” with the economic freedoms in the case of 
conflicts144.
In consequence of this unequivocal recognition it must be complementary 
investigated not simply if the exercise of fundamental rights demand that the scope 
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140 See Syrpis 2011, p. 224
141 Commission v Germany, parr. 44 and 51. See also Lo Faro 2011a, p. 203
142 and, namely, “enhancement of the level of the retirement pensions of the workers  concerned, on 
the one hand, and attainment of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services, 
and opening-up to competition at European Union level, on the other”. Ibid., par. 52
143 The AG referred to “settled case-law” and to the recognition by instruments such as the ESC, the 
CCSRW and the CFREU (Commission v Germany , AG’s  Opinion parr. 76-77). Furthermore, the AG 
stated “by the Treaty of Lisbon – not relevant, ratione temporis, in the present case – the primary law 
enshrinement of the right to bargain collectively was  strengthened” by art. 6 TEU declaring the 
binding force of the CFREU, which expressly incorporates the right in question into primary law (par. 
79).
144 The AG questioned the approach adopted in Viking and Laval, highlighting in particular that the 
necessary (written or unwritten) ground of justification for a  restriction on a fundamental freedom “sits 
uncomfortably alongside the principle of equal ranking for fundamental rights and fundamental 
freedoms”, and suggests  “the existence of a hierarchical relationship between fundamental freedoms 
and fundamental rights in which fundamental rights are subordinated to fundamental freedoms”. 
Commission v Germany, AG’s Opinion, parr. 81, 183-184
of the fundamental freedoms “and the secondary law based thereupon” must be 
limited, but also whether the fundamental freedoms may justify a restriction on the 
fundamental right to collective bargaining145; in order to determine the “exact 
boundary between fundamental freedoms and fundamental rights”146 the principle of 
proportionality should be applied to symmetrically review the appropriateness, 
necessity and reasonableness for the attainment of interests protected of the 
restrictive measures in question147.
However the AG did not proceed in the examination of the justification and 
proportionality of the public procurement directives in particular because the 
“German Government advanced, above all, arguments seeking to justify a 
restriction” on economic freedoms and the assessment of whether fundamental 
rights are justified and proportionate represents the option which batter allows “a 
thorough evaluation of the arguments advanced by the German Government”148; 
therefore the AG’s “promising” approach149, in concrete, did not significantly deviate 
from the restrictive case-law of Viking and Laval, predictably resulting in an adverse 
ruling on the German pension scheme150; also the Court, as noted, avoided to 
question the status of fundamental economic freedoms while subjecting the 
exercise of social rights to a proportionality test, ultimately determining that the 
national measures were disproportionate151.
An apparently different approach may be found in the almost contemporary 
Palhota152, in which the Court, while stating that no registration and notification 
procedure for posting should be set up by the hosting Member States’ 
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145 Ibid., par. 84
146 Ibid., par. 189
147 Commission v Germany, AG’s  Opinion, parr. 190, 192 and 199. The AG also concluded that such 
an approach would not constitute a “fundamental reorientation in the case-law” but rather a return to 
the values  of Schmidberger (par. 195), and would be in line with the qualification of the Viking and 
Laval approach undertaken by the ECJ in Rüffert, where the Court “considered, at least, implicitly, the 
possibility that the fundamental social right to freedom of association, in itself, could justify a 
restriction on fundamental freedoms” (par. 198). See also Vecchio 2010, p. 11
148 Ibid., parr. 203-204
149 Syrpis 2011, p. 226
150 Commission v Germany, AG’s Opinion, parr. 232-234
151 Commission v Germany, par. 105
152  Judgment in criminal proceedings  against Vítor Manuel dos  Santos  Palhota, Mário de Moura 
Gonçalves, Fernando Luis das Neves  Palhota, Termiso Limitada (C-515/08), judgment of 7 October 
2010
authorities153, implicitly reaffirmed the right of “fair and just working conditions”154 
when determining the compatibility with the EU framework of the requirement to 
present copies of certain documents155  from the country of origin and to send 
copies to the authorities of the host-Member State at the end of the posting period.
It must be noted that the AG called for interpretative changes of the 
derogations of the economic freedoms deriving from the intervened modifications of 
the EU constitutional framework, i.e. the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, in 
order to address the “inherent tension between the construction of the internal 
market and the protection of social values”156.
In particular, the Court’s assessment should investigate the EU compatibility 
of national the national supervision and monitoring provisions with articles 56 and 57 
TFEU157, rather than the provisions of the PWD, because the substantive rules on 
posting of workers158 “coexist with an additional but essential set of rules in order to 
give them effect” and in particular to ensure the respect of the posted workers’ 
rights159, whose enforcement is entrusted to the Member States160.
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153National legislation requiring a prior declaration of posting and allowing the posting only after the 
authorities  receive confirmation of the declaration and a registration number is given, is precluded 
under articles 56-57 TFEU, in particular because of the lenght of the procedure, which may impede 
the the planned posting and, consequently, the provision of services  by the employer of the workers 
who are to be posted, in particular where the services to be provided necessitate a certain speed of 
action. It should be also noted that the formalities  provided by the Belgian declaratory procedure 
have, in the meantime, been replaced by the so-called LIMOSA declaration, which appears  to stand 
the test of the Court. The mandatory LIMOSA-declaration must be kept during the stay: the ID of the 
employee, the employer and the Belgian client or principal, the starting and termination dates, the 
type of service or the economic sector, the location of the activities, the weekly working hours  and 
the time schedule of the employee have to be included in the declaration. See Palhota, parr. 36, 44 
and 52, and Skouris in CJEU 2011, p. 21
154 Art. 31 CFREU
155 Equivalent to the social or labour documents required under the law of the ... MS and enabling the 
authorities  to monitor compliance with the terms and conditions of employment of posted workers 
set by art. 3.1 PWD and therefore, to ensure their protection. See Palhota, par. 61
156 Palhota, AG’s Opinion, par. 38
157 In line, therefore, with the criteria found by the ECJ in Arblade. Palhota, AG’s Opinion, par. 46
158 Specific reference is made to 3.1, 3.7 and 3.10 PWD
159 Art. 5 PWD
160 While this “constitutional” perspective apparently diverges from the “broad interpretation of the 
substantive provisions  of Directive 96/71” (in particular art. 3) adopted in particular in Laval and 
Rüffert, the AG also underlined that in  Commission v Luxembourg the ECJ “analysed substantive 
national measures in the light of Article 3 of Directive 96/71, leaving the supervision and monitoring 
measures to be reviewed pursuant to the Treaties”. Palhota, AG’s Opinion, par. 45
The AG recognized that the recent ECJ judicial course, using a broad 
definition of restriction in relation to freedom to provide services and strictly 
interpreting the public interest justification through the proportionality review “was 
clearly inclined in favour of freedom to provide services”161; however, since the 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, it  should be necessary to take into account in the 
interpretation of the posting of workers of primary social law provision which “affect 
the framework of the fundamental freedoms”162 such as art. 9 TFEU, art. 3.3 TEU as 
well as art. 31 CFREU, which were deemed as defining and clarifying the “social 
obligations” of the Union163.
Therefore, in the renewed institutional context, in the case that “working 
conditions constitute an overriding reason relating to the public interest justifying a 
derogation from the freedom to provide services”, they should not be interpreted 
strictly, since the mandatory high level of social protection provided by the EU 
primary law authorized the Member State to restrict a freedoms “without European 
Union law’s regarding it as something exceptional” 164.
This approach has been regarded as giving the same standing and 
importance as fundamental freedoms and undoubtely implies that certain 
restrictions on free movement of services, in casu social protection of workers, can 
be given the same importance as the fundamental freedoms involved165; however it 
must be noted how the practical application of this perspective was represented by 
the principle of proportionality, and that the ECJ, in ruling on the matter, did not 
address the issues relating to the the potential changes introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty, but applied a straightforward approach based on the existence of a 
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161 Palhota, AG’s Opinion, par. 44
162 Ibid. par. 51
163 As noted, art. 9 TFEU obliges  the EU institutions “to take into account requirements linked to the 
promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight 
against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and protection of human health”, art. 
3.3 TEU refers  to “a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social 
progress”, and art. 31  CFREU provides that every worker “has  the right to working conditions which 
respect his or her health, safety and dignity”.
164 Palhota, AG’s Opinion, par. 53
165 See also Dagilyte 2010
restriction of the freedom to provide services, and on the assessment of justification 
and proportionality of the national measures166.
Notwithstanding the larger scope and renewed importance granted to 
fundamental social rights, especially in the AGs’ legal reasonings, implying a 
potentially more extensive compatibility of social provisions with the EU framework 
on economic freedoms it must be concluded that the Court, even under the 
renewed Lisbon Treaty context 167, has not  been able to revert or escape the major 
criticism moved towards it in the wake of the Viking and Laval judgments, id est the 
inability to provide the right to take social right with sufficient status compared with 
the status accorded to the freedom of establishment by imposing, in particular, the 
"general interest" and "proportionality" test to the trade unions exercise of the right 
to collective in a way that restricts economic freedom protected by the TFEU; in 
particular it must be considered that the apparently more detailed balancing 
operated by the ECJ in Commission v Germany and Palhota derived from 
established adjudicating mechanisms and interpretative approaches which 
produced the criticized result in object and, while deriving from situations 
comparable to those in Rüffert and Luxembourg and making explicit references to 
the case law in Viking and Laval, the cases at hand did not address or involve the 
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166  Furthermore, while the AG had concluded determining its  incompatibility with artt. 56 and 57 
TFEU (Palohta, AG’s  Opinion par. 93), the Court did not deliver a judgment on the fact that the 
exemption from drawing up and saving the social documents provided by Belgian law only applies 
for a limited period of six months, stating that such assessment was not relevant as  the posting 
lasted less than six months (Palhota par. 32)
167  With regards to political tension inherent in the EU social policy between its  “collective 
order” (solidarity) and “individual” (non-discrimination) elements see the judgment of the Court in 
Rosenbladt (C-45/09) with regards  to discrimination on the grounds of age, in which the ECJ upheld 
the role of collective agreements  providing clause for automatic termination on reaching retirement 
age, on the basis  of the fact that it pursues a legitimate aim (striking a balance between political, 
economic, social, demographic and/or budgetary considerations and the choice to be made between 
prolonging people’s working lives or, conversely, providing for early retirement, parr. 44-45 and 67) in 
an appropriate and necessary manner; in particular the ECJ considers that the mechanisms for 
automatic termination derive from an agreement, which implies  that the employer must obtain or 
confirm the consent of the workers on such clauses (consequently, the collective negotiation of 
standard and clauses may be legitimately implement EU law, see parr. 49-51) . On the other hand in 
Hennigs  and Mai (Joined Cases  C‑297/10 and C‑298/10) the ECJ stated that a collective agreement 
(BundesAngestelltentarifvertrag or BAT) determining the salary of public sector employees according 
to age categories  caused a difference in treatment which, while pursuing a legitimate aim, went 
beyond what was  necessary and appropriate, therefore infringing art. 21 CFREU. The Court also 
added (referring once more to Viking and Laval)  that the fact that EU law precludes a measure 
appearing in a collective agreement does not interfere with art. 28 CFREU, since the right the right to 
negotiate and conclude collective agreements, where covered by EU law provisions (in casu Directive 
2000/78) must, within the scope of that law, be exercised in compliance with that legal framework 
(parr. 67-68)
substantial issue of the role of collective action as a workers’ protection and 
standard-setting instrument in trans-national situations.
The difficult “resurgence” of social rights in the European setting, which 
makes it difficult to identify clear corrective patterns for the VIking and Laval judicial 
course, is also testified by another recent ECJ judgment168 in which the Court gave 
precedence to the economic freedoms notwithstanding the specific “immunities” 
deriving from the Temporary Agency Work Directive169  to the sovereignty of Member 
States170  in defining national requirements with regard to registration, licensing, 
certification, financial guarantees or monitoring of temporary work agencies and 
with the exclusion of from the application of the Services Directive171; in particular 
the ECJ upheld the claim by the Commission that the requirement for a temporary 
work agency to have a specific legal form172 represented a significant restriction on 
foreign undertakings’ freedom to provide services and that the reasons  of general 
interest that could justify such a restriction were difficult to envisage173.
4.3.2 -  The right to collective action between Strasbourg and Luxembourg
As it was noted, one of the most relevant innovations contained in the Treaty 
of Lisbon is represented by the inclusion of a provision imposing a constitutional 
duty on the European Union to accede to the European Convention of Human 
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168 C-397/10 Commission v. Belgium, 30 June 2011 
169 Directive 2008/104/EC, art. 4.4
170 See Dorssemont 2011b, p. 2
171 Directive 2006/123/EC rec. 14 and art. 2.2(e)
172 According to the relevant provisions an agency must be established as  a limited liability company 
(specifically, as  société anonyme or société de personnes  à responsabilité limitée) with the exclusion 
of excluding a single-member company, or in an equivalent form under foreign law for the case of 
foreign undertakings.
173 Commission v. Belgium, par. 21
Rights174, although the letter of the paragraph warns that this accession does not 
modify the competences of the EU as are defined in the Treaties175. 
The accession of the EU to the ECHR will undoubtely produce significant 
effects upon the EU’s institutional and judicial system as a whole, but also raises 
complex coordination issues176  and, while explicitly planned, will represent the 
outcome of an extremely difficult legal and political negotiating process which 
needs, alongside the agreement with the forty-seven signatories to the Convention, 
an unanimous decision of the Council as well as the individual consent of all the 
Member States on the basis of their constitutional provisions.
With reference to the possible consequences of the accession, it must be 
underlined that once the EU has become part of the ECHR framework, it will be able 
for applicants to bring complaints before the ECtHR directly against the EU and its 
institutions for alleged violations177 of Convention rights, closing an important gap in 
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174 Art. 6.2 TEU. See also art. 218.8 TFEU, Protocol (no 8) and Declaration 2 attached to the Lisbon 
Treaty. It should be noted that, while all MS have ratified the Convention (and most have also signed 
and ratified the additional protocols), with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the EU attained a 
single legal personality and is therefore able to join international agreements (outside the scope of the 
former European Community). On the Council of Europe side, protocol 14 (Ets  194), providing that 
art. 59 ECHR shall be amended in order to include the wording “The European Union may accede to 
this  Convention” (art. 17), entered into force in June 2010. It should be noted, however, that this 
amendment, while providing a legal basis for EU accession, is  not sufficient in itself to allow 
accession because its  modalities remain to be negotiated by the EU and all Council of Europe 
Member States. 
175 It has been noted that in 6.2 TEU and in its explanatory article 2 of Protocol (no 8) the wording 
“shall not affect” is used: a possible accession may affect both the relations of the Union with its 
member states under the ECHR law and those of the Union with the Convention itself, and the term 
in question should interpreted in the sense of neither restricting, nor extending EU competences. See 
Margaritis 2011, p. 35
176 In particular, according to Protocol (no 8), the accession agreement will containg specific provision 
for preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and of EU law and specifically the legal and 
practical relations  with the ECtHR (a "possible participation” is  provided), in particular to achieve 
coherence between the CFREU and Article 52(3) of the ECHR with reference to corresponding rights, 
and to preserve the monopoly of the ECJ for the interpretation of the EU Treaties, and the criteria to 
differentiate between law suits  against the EU and those that would go against a MS (art. 1(a) and 
(b)), which could be difficult to determine for instance for the case of national execution of EU law (a 
case that should be addressed by the so called co-respondent mechanism, See Lock 2011, pp. 17 
ff.). Art. 2 of Protocol 8, furthermore, stipulates that the accession agreement "shall not affect the 
competences  of the Union or the powers of its institutions" and that it shall ensure that nothing 
affects "the situation of the Member States" in relation to the ECHR, its  Protocols, and any 
derogations or reservations  they have made. See UK Parliament European Scrutiny Committee 26 
January 2011 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmeuleg/428-xiv/
42808.htm
177 Such violations  can potentially be found in primary law, in secondary law, in executive actions  or 
omissions and in decisions of the Union’s courts. See Lock 2011, p. 13
the external control exercised by the Strasbourg Court178. For what it refers to the 
cases in which the ECJ deviates from the case law of the ECtHR, an applicant 
would have the opportunity to challenge this incompatibility179; furthermore, 
individuals who argue unsuccessfully in the ECJ that the EU has breached their 
Convention rights will be able to make the same arguments before the Strasbourg 
Court, whose decision will be binding on the EU and will ensure a consistent 
application of the Convention180. 
An extensive and detailed assessment of the ongoing negotiating process 
and of the legal interdependencies between the two different supranational regimes, 
which do not exclude the possibility for the ECtHR to review even EU primary law 
and acts in domains of exclusive competence181, while related to the broader field of 
human rights, escapes the focus of the current analysis; it should however be noted 
that the accession to the Convention should imply that this framework, dedicated to 
the protection of human rights, shall substantially occupy a hierarchically superior 
position with respect to the EU constitutional frameworks, which currently provides 
for a juxtaposition of the Treaty freedoms and the integrated Charter rights, and will 
probably be able to address and reorient the position of the EU and the 
interpretation of the ECJ with respect to conflicts between fundamental rights and 
economic freedoms182.
Furthermore, under art. 6.3 TEU, the Court of Justice and the national courts 
already have to recognize the fundamental principles guaranteed by the ECHR as 
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178 In particular, see Connolly v 15 Member States of the European Union, no 73274/01
179In particular see the position expressed by the Vice-chairperson of the Committee of Legal Affairs 
and Human Rights of the Council of Europe's  Parliamentary Assembly which stated that, while not 
referring to an issue of subordination or primacy of courts  but of guarantee of “minimum common 
standards”, after the EU accession the ECJ will be treated as just a "domestic court" over which the 
Court of Human Rights  will exercise "external restraint". See Hearing on the institutional aspects  of 
the European Union’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, 18 March 2010
180 In 2010, the ECJ concluded that in order to observe the principle of subsidiarity which is inherent 
in the ECHR and at the same time to ensure the proper functioning of the judicial system of the 
European Union, a  mechanism must be available which is capable of ensuring that the question of 
the validity of a EU act can be brought effectively before the ECJ before the ECtHR rules on the 
compatibility of that act with the ECHR. See Discussion document of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union on certain aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights  and Fundamental Freedoms (http://curia.europa.eu/
jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2010-05/convention_en_2010-05-21_12-10-16_272.pdf) and 
Skouris in CJEU 2011, p. 9
181 Lock 2011, p. 17
182 See also Bücker, Dorssemont and Warneck in Bücker and Warneck 2011, pp. 349-351
general principles of European law, alongside those deriving from the common 
traditions of the Member States and art. 52. 3 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
provides that for the case of correspondence of rights protected by the CFREU and 
guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same 
as those laid down by the said Convention183; the explanations to the Charter 
specify that the reference to the ECHR covers both the Convention and its 
Protocols, and that the meaning and scope of the guaranteed rights are determined 
not only by the text of those instruments, but also by the case-law of the ECtHR and 
ECJ184. The last sentence of the paragraph allows the Union to guarantee more 
extensive protection, but also defines that ECHR constitutes the substantive 
minimum standard also for fundamental rights of the Union which will be interpreted 
through recourse to the ECHR and to the case law of the ECtHR.
In the field of collective labour rights the judicial options undertaken by the 
ECJ in Viking and Laval must be therefore assessed in the light of the the main 
judicial developments in the area of European recognition of the right to collective 
bargaining and action, which are represented by Demir and Baykara and Enerji185, 
two rulings issued between 2008 and 2009 by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in the field of collective representation of interests; the Enerji judgment, in 
particular, represent the first time in which the right to strike was elevated to the 
status of right protected by the European human rights law, and is set in the same 
judicial course of Demir and Baykara, in which the ECtHR reviewed its out-dated 
view on the content of Article 11 of the European Convention of Human Rights, 
granting protection to the right to collective bargaining186.
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183 The Explanations offer a list of rights which may be regarded as corresponding to rights in the 
ECHR, and do not preclude its modification due to developments in the law, legislation and the 
Treaties. See Explanations to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007/C 303/02), p. 33
184 This rule of interpretation appears evidently based on the wording of Article 6.3 TEU with regards 
to common constitutional traditions; therefore, rather than following a rigid approach of “a lowest 
common denominator”, the Charter rights concerned should be interpreted in a way offering a high 
standard of protection which is  adequate for EU law and in harmony with the common constitutional 
traditions. Explanations, p. 34
185 Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, no. 34503/97 ECtHR 2008-11-12 (hereby also Demir), Enerji Yapı-Yol 
Sen v. Turkey, no. 68959/01) ECtHR 2009
186 Marguénaud and Mouly 2009, p. 499
In earlier case law the ECtHR had determined that art. 11 “presents trade 
union freedom as one form or a special aspect of freedom of association”187, 
safeguarding “freedom to protect the occupational interests of trade-union members 
by trade union action”188 within the protection of the freedom of association, treated 
as a civil and political right; the Court, however,  had also and restrictively 
interpreted Art. 11189  with reference to trade union rights, finding in various 
occasions against trade unions which had claimed the right to consultation, the right 
to collective bargaining190  and the right to strike, limiting therefore the number of 
trade union rights and freedoms that needed to be protected at national level by 
providing a wide margin of appreciation to the States191. 
In particular, while both the Commission and the Court have long since 
referred to ILO Conventions and to decisions by ILO supervisory bodies192, neither 
of the two had been inclined to recognize the essential link between freedom of 
association and right to strike and to promote collective rights within the scope of 
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187 Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden (Application no. 5589/72, ECtHR A 021 1976), par. 34
188 National Union of Belgian Police v Belgium (Application no. 4464/70, ECtHR A 019 1975), par. 39
189 Article 11 (1) ECHR guarantees  the freedom of association, subject to limitations spelt out in par. 
2.
190 Article 11 (art. 11) does not secure any particular treatment of the trade unions, or their members, 
by the State. See Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v. Sweden (Application no. 5614/72 ECHR 2 1976), 
par. 36
191 Schmidt and Dahlström v. Sweden, par. 36: “Article 11 [...] leaves each State a free choice of the 
means to be used” in order to make trade union action possible
192 See for instance X v Ireland (Application no. 4125/69, Yearbook of the European Convention of 
Human Rights 1971), in which the HCoHR stated that in interpreting the meaning and scope of Art. 
11 it should be given regard “to the meaning given to this term in the International Labour 
Organisation Convention of 1948 (no. 87) concerning Freedom of Association and the Right to 
Organise” (parr. 220-222), and the Commission’s report in the case National Union of Belgian Police, 
stressing that ILO Conventions represent “widely accepted labour standards”, in particular because 
of their ratification by almost all the ECHR Members. See also Novitz 2003, pp. 224-255
art. 11 ECHR193; the right to strike was only partially recognised as an aspect of the 
freedom of association, but was not considered indispensable for the effective 
enjoyment of trade-union freedom194.
Insofar as it was just considered to be an important means, the ECtHR was 
satisfied to detect the existence of other means to protect workers’ interests and, if 
the latter existed, the restrictions on the right to strike did not need to be scrutinized 
by the Court195; the ECtHR took however a different stance with respect to national 
regulatory framework regarding trade union rights in the Unison196  case, by 
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193 On the other hand, the ECtHR appeared keen in protecting the negative dimension of the freedom 
of association, (i.e. the individual right not to associate) and on finding a “proper balance” between 
the two aspects; in particular, when deciding on “closed shop” clauses, while determining that art. 11 
“may not guarantee the negative aspect of freedom on the same footing as the positive aspect”, and 
that such clauses may produce useful outcomes, the Court left little space to the State margin of 
appreciation, and in particular interpreted strictly the concept of “necessary in a democratic society”. 
Young, James  & Webster v. United Kingdom, 44 ECtHR 1981, parr. 55 and 63. This  case-law was 
recently confirmed and tightened by Sørensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark, where it was clearly 
stated that the fact that the applicants had been compelled to join a certain trade union violated art.
11 ECHR, as such a requirement struck at the very substance of the  freedom of association. The 
State must avoid measures violating the ‘negative right of association’, and while it enjoys a certain 
margin of appreciation, the Court noted that “there is little support [...] for the maintenance of closed-
shop agreements”, in particular because several European instruments “clearly indicate that their use 
in the labour market is  not an indispensable tool for the effective enjoyment of trade union freedoms”. 
See Sørensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark, nos. 52656 and 52620/99 ECtHR 2007, parr. 58 and 75)
194  Within the margin of discretion left to each State “the grant of a right to strike represents without 
any doubt one of the most important” means that can be utilized in order to enable trade unions  to 
strive for the protection of their members’ interests , “but there are others”. See Schmidt and 
Dahlström v. Sweden, par. 36. Similarly, in Wilson, the Court considered that even if collective 
bargaining was not indispensable for the effective enjoyment of trade-union freedom, it might be one 
of the ways by which trade unions could be enabled to protect their members' interests  and that a 
union has “to be free, in one way or another, to seek to persuade the employer to listen to what it had 
to say on behalf of its members” (See Wilson and the National Union of Journalists, Palmer, Wyeth 
and the National Union of Rail Maritime and Transport Workers and Doolan and others  v. United 
Kingdom, nos. 30668/96, 30671/96 and 30678/96, ECHR 2002 parr. 44 and 46)
195 See also, with specific reference to industrial action Gustafsson v. Sweden, (no. 15573/89 ECtHR 
67 1998-V), concerning industrial action (boycott and blockade of a restaurant) against an 
entrepreneur who had refused to join a collective bargaining agreement (for the catering sector). The 
Court recognized once more that freedom of association also presents  a negative side (namely, the 
right of an employer not to be forced into a collective bargaining agreement if he does  not belong to 
the relevant trade association) but also that while the State had to take “reasonable and appropriate 
measures to secure the effective enjoyment of the negative right to freedom of association” (par. 45), 
the restriction imposed on the applicant had not interfered significantly with the exercise of his  right 
to freedom of association (and therefore art. 11 ECHR had not been violated, see par. 52)
196  Unison v United Kingdom, no. 53574/99, ECtHR 2002
scrutinizing the restrictions in the light of art. 11.2 ECHR197, an approach that was 
confirmed in the more “progressive” Dilek judgement 198 , in which the Court 
concluded that restrictions on the right to collective action199 need to be compatible 
with the Convention.
With its decisions in Demir and Enerji, however, the ECtHR further developed 
this approach by declaring that art. 11 ECHR includes a right to collectively bargain 
and prohibits an absolute ban on the right to strike; by making reference to a wide 
variety of “integrated” sources200, the Court explicitly affirmed that collective 
bargaining represents an “essential element” of the exercise of the right to form and 
join trade unions201, and that the right to take collective action is an “indissociable 
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197 The ECtHR, in particular, determined that injunctions  can be viewed as an interference with art. 
11, and that need to be subject to a proportionality review (Unison, par. 37). It should be noted that, 
ultimately, the Court held that the specific injunction in question (a prohibition for strikes after transfer 
of employment business  provided by UK law) was  justified as  necessary in a democratic society for 
the protection of the economic interests  of the transferor (par. 42), and that the union was  however 
granted the right to take collective action against the transferee at a later date (par. 41). It has been 
noted that in the light of ILO and ESC Committees decisions  and of the ECtHR’s recent 
jurisprudence, it seems  unlikely that the ECtHR would reach the same conclusion, since the logic 
underlying the Unison decision would in effect allow any kind of restriction, since the strike invariably 
interferes with the economic freedom of the employer, See supra with reference to the ECJ judicial 
course and also Ewing and Hendy 2010, p. 12
198 in Dilek and others v. Turkey (formerly known as Satilmis)  nos. 74611/01, 26876/06 and 27628/02 
ECtHR 2007, the ECHR in particular noted that the Turkish Government had not indicated the 
existence of other means  for public servants to defend their rights  (parr. 13); furthermore, the civil 
liability of the participants to the collective action did not appear proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued, in particular given the prominent place of the freedom of peaceful assembly, and was 
therefore not not "necessary in a democratic society" (parr. 72-73)
199 In particular, the objections submitted by the Turkish government that the strike, in this case the 
refusal of some civil servants  to report to work as toll-booth cashiers, could not qualify as  a strike 
was not accepted by the Court that held that art. 11ECHR safeguards a more comprehensive right to 
take industrial action. In particular, “without speculating” as  to what extent art. 11 ECHR granted the 
right to strike and what is  the definition of this  right as  part of this  article, the Court found that the 
slowdown in job applicants  for a three hours could be considered as a collective action to be 
safeguarder in the general context of trade union rights. See Dilek, par. 57, and Dorssemont and Van 
Hoek in Ales and Novitz 2010, p. 231  
200 See Fudge in Campbell, Ewing and Tomkins 2011, p. 260
201 Demir and Baykara, par. 154. It has been noted that Demir mirrors  the Supreme Court of Canada 
decision in the Health Services v. B.C. case (Health Services  and Support-Facilities  Subsector 
Bargaining Association v British Columbia 2007 SCC 27, [2007] 2 SCR  391), in which the Supreme 
Court reviewed its case-law and found that collective bargaining was  protected under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights; such decision, seen as  showing an “international convergence” in relation to the 
rights included in freedom of association (altough not referred to by the ECtHR), recognised that 
collective bargaining reflected the values  of human dignity, equality, respect for personal autonomy 
and enhancement of democracy, and relied on the relevant international treaty material. See 
Marguénaud and Mouly 2009, p. 499, Ewing and Hendy 2010, p. 6
corollary” of the former; these fundamental rights have to be protected in an 
effective and dynamic way and can only be restricted for imperative reasons of 
general interest without affecting their core meaning.
In the Grand Chamber ruling in Demir, the ECtHR stressed the need to take 
into account, when interpreting and applying the Convention, the developments on 
the protection of human rights that can be derived for sources other than the 
Convention itself202; in particular it must consider and give prominence to the labour 
standards and rights as defined by the international instruments such as the ILO 
Conventions or the European Social Charter, their interpretation by competent 
supervisory bodies, as well as elements deriving from the practice of European 
States and reflecting their common values203; with respect to collective bargaining, 
the Court found that its previous case-law “should be reconsidered, so as to take 
account of the perceptible evolution in such matters”204.
The ECtHR determined that the position of the public employees involved, 
which were deemed as not being part of the “administration of the State”, and 
therefore capable of enjoying the right to collective bargaining205; with reference to 
the annulment of the collective agreement that the trade union had entered into 
following collective bargaining, the Court determined that, while prescribed by law206 
and pursuing a legitimate interest207, it was not “necessary in a democratic society” 
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202 In order to “render its rights practical and effective”. See Demir and Baykara, par. 66
203 Along with the “practice of European States” to recognize the right of public employees to bargain 
collectively, the instruments  referred to were ILC 98 and 151, Art. 8 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, Artt. 5 and 6 of the ESC and artt. 12.1 and 28 CFREU. Ibid., parr. 67-68 and 
147-151. See also Malmberg 2010b, pp. 10-11 and Joint Committee on Human Rights  2010, pp. 
46-47
204  The ECtHR stated that, while it should not depart, without good reason, from precedents 
established in previous cases  (in particular Swedish Engine Drivers’ Union and Schmidt and 
Dahlström, see supra), it also affirmed that “a failure by the Court to maintain a dynamic and evolutive 
approach would risk rendering it a bar to reform or improvement”. Ibid., par. 154
205 Ibid., parr. 108 and 154
206  As interpreted by the civil division of the Court of Cassation, the highest judicial body to have 
ruled on the case: the Court had also observed that the absence of the necessary legislation to give 
effect to the provisions of the international labour conventions ratified by Turkey, and the Court of 
Cassation judgment based on that absence, “with the resulting de facto annulment ex tunc of the 
collective agreement in question”, were the components of the interference with the applicants' 
trade-union freedom. Ibid., parr. 157 and 160
207 i.e. the prevention of disorder. Ibid., par. 161
and therefore in violation of art. 11 ECHR208 in respect of both the applicants' trade 
union and the applicants themselves209.
With the explicit and resolute revirement operated through Demir and Baykara 
with regards to collective bargaining, deemed as “inherent” in the trade union 
freedom210, the ECtHR introduced a body of reasoning that would apply to other 
forms of trade union activity, notably the right to take collective action211, and 
therefore paved the way for the inclusion of the right to strike under the protection of 
trade union rights by the Convention beyond the position outlined in the 
aforementioned Unison case212.
For what it refers to the Enerji case, three trade union officials had been 
struck by disciplinary sanctions for their participation in a national one day strike213 
in defiance of a circular by the Prime Minister’s Public-Service Staff Directorate 
prohibiting public sector employees from taking part to such protests214. The trade 
union, once it had exhausted the domestic remedies seeking an annulment of the 
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208 In particular, the Court (referring to considerations  expressed by the Chamber) could not accept 
that the argument based on an omission in the law was sufficient to make the annulment of a 
collective agreement “satisfy the conditions for any restriction of the freedom of association”; 
furthermore it considered that the Turkish Government had “failed to adduce evidence of any specific 
circumstances that could have justified the exclusion of the applicants” from the enjoyment of their 
trade union freedoms. Ibid., parr. 166-168
209  In parr. 110 and 116 of Demir (referred to in Enerji), the Court highlighted that although the 
essential object of art. 11 is  to protect the individual against arbitrary interference by public 
authorities  with the exercise of the rights  protected (imposing therefore a negative obligation on the 
Contracting State), there may also be in addition positive obligations on the State to secure the 
effective enjoyment of such rights. For the case at hand, the responsibility of Turkey would be 
engaged if the facts complained resulted from a failure to secure under domestic law the rights set 
forth in art. 11 ECHR. The Grand Chamber further considered that the case coul be analysed either 
as an interference with art. 11 or as  a failure by the State; given the “mixture of action an inaction” 
both approaches  were deemed as possible, and the Court, while proceeding from the “interference” 
standpoint also took into account the State's positive obligations in so doing.
210 Demir and Baykara, par. 168
211 See Ewing and Hendy 2010, p. 4
212 See Ewing and Hendy 2009, p. 41
213  Organized by the Federation of Public Sector Trade Unions  “to secure the right to a collective 
bargaining agreement” See ECtHR Press Release 330, 21/04/2009
214 The circular no. 1996/21 of 13 April 1996 was based upon the same statutory provisions that had 
been scrutinized in Dilek, and were linked in particular with the fulfillment of the requirement for 
continuity of the public service.
circular215, brought the case before the ECtHR, alleging that the ban on strikes by 
Turkish authorities interfered with their right to form and join trade unions 
guaranteed by the Convention.
The Court, by making direct reference to the interpretative path undertaken in 
Demir unanimously found a violation of Article 11; it determined once more that 
strike action, enabling a trade union to make its voice heard, constitutes “an 
important aspect in the protection of trade union members’ interests” and, by relying 
on the ILO and ESC, it established that it represented the “indissociable corollary” of 
the right of trade union association in order to effective exercise of the right to 
collective bargaining216.
Such indirect reconstruction was nonetheless sufficient to conclude that the 
Turkish ban on collective action for public employees interfered with the union’s right 
to strike, clearly reattached to art. 11 ECHR217; in determining that the adoption and 
application of the circular did not respond to “pressing social needs” and had 
disproportionately infringed the enjoyment of the union rights in question218, the 
ECtHR has undoubtedly sanctioned a violation of the right to strike.
Despite its inability to qualify the right to collective action as an essential 
means to protect workers’ interests219, the departure from the previous case law 
such as Schmidt and Dahlström  and Dilek appears evident; it was not necessary for 
the ECtHR to consider whether the other means by which the union might be heard 
on behalf of its members were sufficient: breach of the right to strike alone was a 
breach of Article 11. Furthermore, in determining the justification of the interference, 
it doubted on the existence of a legitimate aim; however, it considered unnecessary 
to decide the issue in view of the conclusion reached with reference to the necessity 
of the restrictive measure220.
243
215 Appeals lodged by Enerji Yapı-Yol Sen were dismissed, the Turkish courts considering in particular 
that the aim of the impugned circular was  to remind public servants of the legislative provisions 
governing the conduct expected of them. See ECtHR Press Release 330
216 right to strike is referred to as  “le corollaire indissociable du droit d'association syndicale” (ILO) 
and “un moyen d'assurer l'exercice effectif du droit de négociation collective” (ESC). See Enerji, par. 
24
217 Ibid., par. 20
218 Ibid., par. 33
219 See Dorssemont 2011a
220 Enerji, par. 28
The Court, therefore, assessed the prohibition by stating that legal restriction 
on the right to strike affecting certain categories should define as clearly and 
narrowly as possible the categories involved and not extend to civil servants in 
general: the Ministerial circular had been drafted in general terms, without a 
balancing of the aims listed in art. 11.2 ECHR; furthermore, the demonstration at 
issue had not been prohibited, and therefore by joining it the members of the union 
had merely exercised their freedom of peaceful assembly221.
The ECtHR concluded that the sanctions issued were likely discourage union 
members and all others wishing to participate legitimately to strike actions aiming at 
defending the interests of their members to do so, and that the Government has not 
demonstrated the necessity in a democratic society of such generic prohibition 
affecting the entire public sector222.
The departure from previous case law undertaken by the ECtHR in Demir and 
confirmed in Enerji, as well as the reliance on international instruments and common 
principles has been maintained consistently in the following cases with specific 
reference to the protection of individual workers; in Danilenkov223  the Court 
reinforced the statement that complex of the measures taken by the State 
concerned in order to secure trade-union freedom, subject to its margin of 
appreciation is taken into account, and that such measures should include 
protection against discrimination on the ground of trade union membership, allowing 
workers to challenge discriminatory treatments through claim for damages and other 
relief224; specifically, 32 members of  the Dockers’ Union of Russia that had taken 
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221 See also infra with reference to Karaçay and Urcan
222 Ibid., par. 32
223 Danilenkov and others v. Russia, no. 733/01 ECtHR 2009
224  Which “constitutes  one of the most serious violations  of freedom of association capable to 
jeopardize the very existence of a trade union”. For the case at hand, while it did not speculate on the 
deterrent potential of effective protection for the applicants  against future unfavourable actions by 
their employer, the ECtHR noted that the lack of such protection could discourage (for fear of 
discrimination) other persons from joining the trade union, which may lead to its disappearance. Ibid., 
parr. 123 and 135
industrial action 225  were discriminated against by  being assigned less work, 
receiving reduced income and being subject to discriminatory selection for 
redundancy226. The Court concluded that since the State had failed to fulfill its 
positive obligations to adopt “effective and clear judicial protection” against trade 
union discrimination227, art. 14 ECHR in conjunction with art. 11 had been 
violated228.
Similarly, with reference to State-issued sanctions deriving from participation 
to collective action, the ECtHR held in three more cases the requirement to protect 
the right to strike229, and deemed that the imposition of the criminal sanctions and 
penalties230 or the subjection to disciplinary action and issuing of warnings231 based 
on the statutory prohibition for civil servants to have recourse to collective action 
constituted breaches of Article 11, on the basis of their being disproportionate and 
not necessary in a democratic society232.
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225 A two-week strike calling for salary increases  and better working conditions and health and life 
insurance. The ECtHR noted that the Kaliningrad seaport company used “various techniques” in 
order to encourage employees  to relinquish their union membership, including their re-assignment to 
special work teams with limited opportunities, dismissals (subsequently found unlawful by the 
courts), decrease of earnings, disciplinary sanctions, refusal to reinstate following the court’s 
judgment etc. Danilenkov, par. 130
226 See Ewing and Hendy 2010, p. 16
227 While the Russian legal framework contained several provision prohibiting discrimination on the 
ground of trade union membership, these remedies had remained ineffective in the case at hand. In 
particular the domestic judicial authorities, in two sets  of proceedings, had held that the existence of 
discrimination could only be established in criminal proceedings  (and in that case only through proof 
“beyond reasonable doubts” of direct intent on the part of one of the company’s  key managers to 
discriminate against the trade-union members) and therefore that the applicants’ claims could not be 
determined via a civil action (such decisions  were subsequently overruled by the Baltiyskiy District 
Court). Ibid., parr. 132-134
228 The Court had highlighted that the wording of art. 11 refers to the right of “everybody”, and that 
this  provision “obviously” includes a right not to be discriminated against for choosing to avail oneself 
of the right to be protected by trade union, also given that Article 14 forms an integral part of each of 
the Articles laying down rights and freedoms whatever their nature. See Ibid., par. 123
229 See also infra for some critical considerations on the reasoning of the ECtHR in these cases
230  Urcan v Turkey, no. 23018/04, 23034/04, 23042/04, 23071/04, 23073/04, 23081/04, 23086/04, 
23091/04, 23094/04, 23444/04, 23676/04, ECtHR 2008 and Özcan v Turkey, no. 22943/04, ECtHR 
2009 
231 Kaya and Seyhan v Turkey, no 30946/04, ECtHR 2009, par. 12
232 Urcan, par. 36, Özcan, par. 24 and Kaya and Seyhan, par. 31. In particular, in Kaya and Seyhan, the 
Court held that also the lesser sanction constituted an attenuation of the right of freedom of 
association (par. 24)
The evolution of the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court, therefore, appears 
in stark contrast with that of the Luxembourg one233; in particular, it is possible to 
identify a clear contraposition with the ECJ’s judicial course, both with reference to 
the reconstructive methods of the rights in question and to the protection that has to 
be ensured to the latter.
In primis it should be noted that, while both courts refer to human rights 
instrument, their treatment of international law appears very different; the ECtHR 
explored international law and principles, and in particular the ILO supervisory body 
jurisprudence, in in the process of creating a core of inviolable individual and 
collective rights, extracting from these legal reasonings the elements most helpful in 
defining the features of the right of collective bargaining234, while the ECJ simply 
invoked the ILO Conventions and the ESC at the level of general principles when 
recognizing the fundamental nature of the right to strike as a part of EU law235.
Furthermore, the Courts proceeded from opposite premises when 
determining the legitimacy of the trade union collective action236; the ECtHR analysis 
started from the assumption that collective bargaining and action are protected, and 
the State has therefore to justify the measures in terms of restriction necessary to 
protection of a “imperative reasons of general interest”237. The ECJ, on the other 
hand, limited the fundamental right to strike in the case of conflict with the economic 
freedoms of companies circulating in the internal market, imposing the "general 
interest" and "proportionality" tests to the trade unions when they exercise this right 
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233 Bronzini 2009, p. 983, Marguenaud and Mouly 2009, p. 504, as well as ETUC’s  press release The 
right to strike is a human right – ECJ must change its case law, http://www.etuc.org/a/6174
234 In particular, it should be noted that Turkey’s  argument that since ESC (artt. 5 and 6) and ILC 87 
(since 2001) not been ratified, and should not therefore be used as  an interpretative aid in 
proceedings brought against it was rejected; the Court held that, in order to render the rights 
practical and effective (Demir, par. 66) it was not necessary for a  respondent state to have ratified the 
entire collection of instruments that are applicable in respect of the precise subject matter of the case 
concerned but that the relevant instruments  show a common ground in modern societies (par. 86). 
See Bronzini 2009, p. 978
235 Fudge 2011, p. 263
236 Which entail a significant difference in the application of the proportionality, to which both courts 
refer.
237  In particular, Demir and Baykara was concerned precisely with the annulment of a collective 
agreement by law, a situation apparently analogous to the denial of the application of the collective 
agreements  in Rüffert and Luxembourg. It appears difficult to envision that the ECtHR would not 
come to the same conclusion, if those ECJ decisions were subjected to its  scrutiny, in particular 
because the justification in the ECJ would not appear to be necessary in a democratic society. See 
Ewing and Hendy 2010, p. 40
in a way that interferes with the economic freedom protected by the TFEU238; in the 
light of the Strasbourg Court jurisprudence, this approach does not seems more 
appropriate, in particular consideration of the fact that the unequivocal inclusion of 
the right to collective bargaining in the scope of art. 11 ECHR entails a far more 
rigorous protection of the rights and prerogatives of a social nature than of the 
economic needs and demands, making it possible to foresee the question whether 
the ECJ jurisprudence grants in effect “manifestly insufficient” protection to the 
rights enshrined by the ECHR.239
As noted, Demir and Enerji represent undoubtedly ground-breaking cases, in 
particular for the reconstruction by the ECtHR of a “meta-regulated” right of 
collective bargaining at European and international level; this method of 
interpretation introduced in Demir, however not developed in following rulings240, 
seems to provide in particular useful tools in the European Union context, where 
ECJ cannot be considered sic et simpliciter the judge of last resort for fundamental 
rights, especially for areas, such as the one relating to the right to collective action, 
that are still excluded from the EU241.
In particular, it has been suggested242 that, on the basis of the theory of the 
plurality of legal systems, a more progressive attitude by the ECJ on the 
reconciliation of economic freedoms and collective labour rights could derive from a 
cooperative approach entailing the recourse to a non-hierarchical network of 
sources at national, European an international level recognizing trade union action, 
as well as the jurisprudence of supervisory bodies such as the ILO Committee of 
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238  It has been noted that, rather than a limitable right (as from ECtHR’s viewpoint), the strike has 
appeared to the ECJ as  a limiting right, a perspective derived from 19 TEU which referes to the 
“application of the Treaties” implying that only 49EC could have been the main object of the 
hermeneutical activity could have been, since within the Treaties  there were no such thing as the right 
to strike. It should also be considered that in the ECJ rulings the unions  are asserting fundamental 
rights against claims brought against them by the employers, while in the ECtHR framework, the 
counterpart is  represented by the State implementing restrictive actions against trade unio. See Lo 
Faro 2011a, 212 and infra in this paragraph
239  Therefore overcoming the presumption of equivalent protection defined by the ECtHR in 
Bosphorus; Marguenaud and Mouly 2009, p. 504. See infra in this paragraph with reference to the 
possible “accountability” of the ECJ before international courts and bodies
240 See infra in this paragraph for the Trofimchuk v. Ukraine judgment
241 Carabelli 2008, pp. 155-56
242 Dorssemont 2011b, pp. 4 and ff.
Experts243244  and the European Committee of Social Rights: in both cases the ECJ 
jurisprudence appears to fall short with respect to the standards upheld by such 
bodies. 
In particular, the CEACR stressed that the need to assess the proportionality 
with regards to economic freedoms has never been included among the permissible 
restriction on the right to strike245, and a similar conclusion was reached by the 
ECSR, which has maintained that using the proportionality principle with a view to 
determine the strike’s appropriateness represents a restriction of the right to strike 
going beyond those accepted under the relevant provisions of the Charter246.
As noted, the Court of Justice, in interpreting the existing Treaties and acquis, 
could take into account the renewed fundamental right context and depart from its 
decisions in the  Viking and Laval rulings247; in particular, it should be noted that the 
multi-source reconstruction of the right to collective action, while an important 
feature of the Court of Human Rights ruling would not completely represent a 
novelty in the field of social rights in the European setting: already in Bosman and 
Schmidberger the ECJ had resorted to the analysis of the relation between articles 
of the ECHR248  on one hand, and the provisions of the Treaty protecting the 
economic freedoms on the other. Furthermore, the citation in 2006 of the EU Charter 
by the ECJ while deciding a dispute among EU institutions249, underlined the nature 
of the EU Charter as a source of fundamental rights, but also asserted that its rules 
bound Member States in the application of Community rules, applying this kind of 
regulation “as far as possible” in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.
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243 As noted, while not set out explicitly by ILC 87, the right of strike, has been recognized as one of 
the principal means by which workers and their associations  may legitimately promote and defend 
their economic and social interests; furthermore the Committee on Freedom of association has  gone 
further in defining all the main features of a legitimate strike, the subjects entitled to the right in 
question and the protection granted to them, the legitimate objectives  of the collective action, the 
essential services deserving a special treatment. See supra 1.1.2
244 As  noted, the ILO’s Committee of experts has  considered that “it has  never included the need to 
assess  the proportionality of interests bearing in mind a notion of freedom of establishment or 
freedom to provide services”. The Committee considered that the “doctrine that is being articulated 
in these ECJ judgements  is likely to have a significant restrictive effect on the exercise of the right to 
strike in practice in a manner contrary to the Convention”
245 See supra par. 3.2.2 with reference to the BALPA application to ILO
246 In particular art. 31 ESC. See Dorssemont in De Vos 2009, p. 57 and also supra 2.3.2
247 Syrpis 2008, p. 235
248 i.e., artt. 10 and 11, see supra parr. 1.2.1 and 1.2.4
249 Case C-540/03 European Parliament v. Council
Therefore, while art. 28 recognizes already in its language the right to take 
collective action250, something that both ILC 87 and the ECHR fail to do, the 
reference to the various sources mentioned could lower the degree of uncertainty 
linked to the current judicial course of the ECJ, especially on the workers and trade 
unions’ side, would help in the proposing of alternative solutions to the Court or, at 
least, provide a more strict legal basis251 for addressing or questioning the outcomes 
of the ECJ reasonings on the matter; it appears however difficult to envision a 
drastic transformation in the current judicial course set by the ECJ directly linked 
with the Demir and Enerji judicial course.
It should be considered, in fact, that the right to strike recognised by the 
ECtHR is not an absolute right252; it has been noted how the peculiar features and 
the collective force of the right to collective action could potentially be regarded as 
an undesirable discontinuity in an instrument designed primarily to protect individual 
civil and political rights253, preventing the solemn recognition and direct link of the 
right to strike to art. 11 ECHR; while, as noted above, the Strasbourg Court 
established the need for a dynamic protection of the right in question254 it however 
appeared extremely reluctant to further address the issue of the right to strike and to 
assess whether the recognition of such a right was an essential element of the right 
to form and join trade unions. 
In particular, in the aforementioned Turkish judgements255  the ECtHR stated 
that the national legal framework constituted a violation of the freedom of 
association, but it addressed the issue of the legitimacy of such a restriction on the 
249
250 References to the limitations of the rights included in the Charter are provided by art. 52.1 CFRUE, 
stipulating that “any limitation on the exercise of the rights  and freedoms recognized by this  Charter 
must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights  and freedoms. Subject to the 
principle of proportionality, limitations  may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet 
objectives of general interest recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms 
of others”
251 It should not be discarded, in fact, the hypothesis that the unbalance at ECJ level between the 
right to take collective action and the economic freedoms has derived from a certain vagueness  of 
art. 28, in comparison with the high level of detail that could be derived from the long-standing 
interpretations of the economic freedoms
252 See Enerji, par. 32
253 Marguénaud and Mouly 2009, p. 501
254 With particular reference to the protection of individual workers.
255 Urcan, Özcan and Kaya and Seyhan. See supra in this paragraph
basis the freedom of peaceful assembly256, without examining any international law 
instrument related to the right to strike.
Furthermore, the formal recognition of the right to take collective action as a 
general principle of EU Law does not shed sufficient light on the possible relation 
between such a general principle and conflicting fundamental economic freedoms; 
in Demir and Enerji the Court assessed provision depriving civil servants the right to 
undertake collective action on the basis of the ECHR and on the other international 
instruments protecting workers’ right, affirming the existence of a right to strike and 
the prohibition of a generalized ban. 
However it must be considered that the ECJ had to take into account the 
existence of the rights contained in the EU treaties, such as the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services which, given their 
“constitutional” legal status and fundamental character as necessary instruments for 
the development of the internal market257, could be included in the allowed 
limitations to freedom of association aimed to ensure "the rights and freedoms of 
others”, in accordance with art. 11.2 ECHR, therefore possibly leading to recognition 
of the need to limit the strike to allow the exercise of economic freedoms of the EU, 
as stated by the ECJ.
Furthermore, the reattachment to Demir as support for reliance on the ILO 
and the ESC to establish strike action as a corollary to the essential right to 
collective bargaining protected by Article 11 operated by the ECtHR in Enerji 
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256 Notwithstanding the fact that all the applicants explicitly referred to their right to form and join a 
trade union. See Urcan parr. 33-34 and and Kaya and Seyhan par. 29, in which the Court found that 
“by joining the event, the applicants  have used their freedom of peaceful assembly”, and  Özcan, par. 
22: “[The Court] examined the criminal conviction at issue in the light of all the facts to determine in 
particular if it was necessary in a democratic society, given the prominent place of freedom of 
peaceful assembly”. It should be noted that the “Karaçay formula” (“the sanctions  at issue are likely 
to discourage union members and others wishing to participate legitimately in a strike or in action to 
defend the interests  of their members, see Karaçay v Turkey, no 6615/03, ECHR 2007 par. 37) was 
used in all the three judgments at hand. Therefore, in the field of industrial relations, it seems that has 
legal basis of the assessment of the ECJ and ECtHR might actually diverge since, while in the 
Convention the right to strike was  connected to the right of association and peaceful assembly, such 
right is protected by the CFREU in art. 12, while collective bargaining and action are granted more 
specific protection in art. 28 CFREU. See Dorssemont 2011a
257 Also, deviating from a strictly legal perspective, the peculiar role of the ECJ in the current context 
must be analyzed: The Court, in fact, while entrusted with the promotion of the social aspects of the 
EU, also has to protect the unfolding of the economic freedoms, which constitute, if not the raison 
d'être, at least the one of the paramount aims of the EU, in particular consideration of the intervened 
enlargement processes. At ECJ-level, therefore, the promotion of the economic dimension could be 
deemed as fundamental for the continuing existence of the Union
strongly suggests that the Court was accepting the right to strike insofar as it is 
exercised in furtherance of collective bargaining258, not leaving apparently any space 
for unofficial action; a confirmation of such  approach can be found in the 
Trofimchuk v. Ukraine259, relating to a dismissal of a worker for a participation into a 
“spontaneous” strike, in which the ECtHR did not rely on multi-source 
reconstruction but simply on previous case law260, and ultimately found that the 
prohibition of anti-union discrimination261  could not apply to the case at hand, 
concluding that disciplinary measure taken was not disproportionate262. 
Moreover, the “indisputable” recognition of the right to strike by the 
Strasbourg Court only refers to trade unions; the individual workers, as noted, were 
protected on the basis of their freedom of peaceful assembly and, in particular, from 
retaliatory measures from the employer: the ECtHR jurisprudence, therefore, 
arguably shows a tendency towards an “organic” reconstruction of the right to 
strike, replicating the uncertainties and the criticism raised with regards to the art. 28 
CFREU, and leading to the conclusion that, while heavily relying on ILO Convention 
87 and on the ESC, also this judicial course may result more restrictive than the 
principles elaborated by the Committee of experts and the European Committee for 
Social Rights, in particular for what it refers to the permissible aims of the right to 
collective action, from which in the jurisprudence of both supervisory bodies only 
“purely political” strikes tend to be excluded and to the exclusive trade union 
entitlement263.
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258 Ewing and Hendy 2010, p. 53
259 Trofimchuk v. Ukraine, no. 4241/03, ECtHR 2010
260 See Dorssemont 2011, p. 18
261 Ibid., par. 39. It should be noted, however, the the ECtHR stipulates that the participation to the 
picket falls within the scope of Article 11 of the Convention, and that since such action was  directed 
against the management and concerned work-related issues, “divorcing the applicant’s participation 
in the picket from its consequences, namely her two-hour absence from work, would be too 
formalistic and contrary to the principle of practical and effective application of the Convention”. The 
Court therefore held that there was  an interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and that it must be determined whether the interference was justified
262 Ibid. parr. 46-47. The circumstances that led the ECtHR to this conclusion were, in particular, that 
the notice given to the local authorities in anticipation of the collective action did not contain an 
indication of the planned duration of the picket, nor did it suggest that an absence from work 
because of her participation in the picket. Due to the nature of the applicant’s work responsibilities, 
the two-hour absence from work and the failure to provide to the direct supervisors  advance notice of 
the absence resulted in serious disruption to workplace processes
263 See supra, par. 1.1.2
4.3.2 - By way of a conclusion: ECJ accountability and dialogue between 
Courts as a temporary response to the Viking and Laval judicial course
It appears evident that complaints to the supranational bodies mentioned can 
constitute effective modules of to determine the accountability of the ECJ with 
respect to its judicial options in the area of fundamental social rights, in particular 
when it is considered that the results of these judicial course, while not producing 
binding results, are reciprocally utilized and applied, giving rise to a cross-
referencing corpus defining a set of principles potentially able to readdress the ECJ 
jurisprudence in a way to bring it closer to the perspective expressed by the ECtHR 
in Demir, effectively taking into account the “developments in labour law, both 
international and national, and to the practice of Contracting States in such 
matters”264. 
With reference to the ECtHR, it has been underlined how, irrespective of the 
accession of the EU to the Convention of Human Rights, the ECtHR would 
represents a competent forum to challenge national legislation which has been 
influenced by the ECJ case-law in Viking and Laval265. However, along with the 
highlighted doubts with reference to the Strasbourg Court’s interpretation of the 
right to strike, it must be given account of the ECtHR’s restraint in holding the 
Member States responsible for violations of the Convention deriving from the 
application of EU law266  and in particular the principle of “equivalent protection” 
defined in Bosphorus267; it appears therefore improbable to expect a ruling 
assessing the manifest insufficiency of final judgments of referring judges and 
national legislative items adopted in consequence of the ECJ’s judicial course.
Within the Council of Europe, another possible opportunity by way of a legal 
response to the ECJ decisions, notwithstanding the lack of enforceable remedies 
deriving from such instrument, would be under the Council of Europe’s 
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264 See Demir, parr. 153-154 and Novitz in Ales and Novitz, p. 272
265 Under art. 34 ECHR. See also rule 47 of the Rules of Court which sets out the information and 
documents that must be provided and Dorssemont 2011a
266 See, in particular Matthews v United Kingdom [GC], no 24833/94, ECHR 1999‐I and Bosphorus v 
Ireland [GC], no 45036/98, ECHR 2005‐VI
267 Bosphorus, parr. 155 and 156
procedures268, raising questions about the obligations of States under the European 
Social Charter of 1961 and the Revised Social Charter of 1996; also for this case, as 
noted, it is difficult to envision a compatibility of the ECJ economic restrictions to 
collective action deriving from Viking and Laval with the comprehensive protection of 
the right to association and strike derived from Articles 5 and 6 ESC.
As it was previously underlined, an ILO complaint was the solution adopted 
by trade unions in the wake of the BALPA litigation and at the outcome of the 
Swedish Labour Court judgment and legislative process adapting the internal 
frameworks to the indications deriving from the Court of Justice269. While the 
scrutiny of the Swedish situation is still undergoing, it may be underlined the twofold 
position of the Committee of Expert with regards to the BALPA Application270; in 
particular, the CEACR rejected the British Government defence disclaiming any 
responsibility for the attitude adopted by the judiciary, since the negative impact of 
Viking and Laval would be the consequence of the application of EU law “to which 
the United Kingdom is obliged to give effect”. Furthermore, while explicitly affirming 
that it is in no position to assess other courts’ reasonings, it examined the potential 
impact of the ECJ jurisprudence, finding that the latter was likely to have a 
significant restrictive effect on the exercise of the right to strike.
National adjudicating bodies should also be considered actors of a multi-level 
cooperative structure for judicial dialogue, on the basis in particular of the EU 
principle of subsidiarity271; the Courts most involved in this process should be the 
bodies of last resort and, where they exist, the Constitutional Courts; in particular, in 
absence of the possibility of a political debate on the right to strike, national judges 
253
268 It should be also noted that the system of collective complaints established by a Protocol to the 
ESC (Additional Protocol to the European Social Charter Providing for a System of Collective 
Complaints CETS No.:  158) provide the European Committee on Social Rights (ECSR) with the 
competence to examine complaints by social partner organizations  and non-governmental 
organisations See, in particular Ewing and Hendy 2009, pp. 30 and ff.
269 See parr. 3.1.1, 3.2.1 and 3.2.2
270  Report of the Committee of Experts  on the Application of Conventions  and Recommendations, 
International Labour Conference 99th Session 2010, 209.
271  Various  institutional actor can be identified as  being involved in a network of frameworks  for 
industrial relation within the EU, and in particular national civil and constitutional courts, the CJEU, 
the ECtHR, the ILO supervisory bodies and the social partners at relevant levels  autonomously 
defining and enforcing such standards. See Bücker, Dorssemont and Warneck in Bücker and 
Warneck 2011, pp. 335 ff. 
should not refrain from applying to the ECJ to induce it to provide a better 
explanation of the still uncertain elements deriving from its rulings272, or to take into 
due consideration the aforementioned developments in the ECtHR as well as in the 
jurisprudence of the supervisory bodies on which it nonetheless relies273.
However it must be underlined that in the national cases analyzed, this 
asserted dialogue has yet to occur with reference to the right to collective action and 
its recognition in European and international instruments: in the Swedish judgment 
on Laval the Court of Labour of Stockholm proceeded autonomously in the 
reconstruction of the elements of trade union liability and in determining whether the 
national provisions on damages could be applied to the dispute in object: such 
unusual “imitative” attitude274, not only produced questionable results, but 
represented a paradigmatic instance in which a new reference to the Luxembourg 
Court would have been the most appropriate response. On the other hand, in the 
Metrobus  case the Court of Appeal swiftly dispatched the possibility of applying in 
the national setting the international standards, in particular those deriving from the 
Enerji ruling, stating that the restrictions to the right of strike provided by the British 
framework on collective action were to be considered compatible with ECHR275.
It should be also considered that, while the UK and Swedish situation 
particularly highlighted the need for effective involvement of the national judicial 
authorities, in order to allow for a correct development of the fundamental rights, 
and in particular of the right to strike, with a view of ensuring that it may be 
sufficiently guaranteed with regards to the national standards while remaining 
compatible with the EU framework still giving precedence to the economic 
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272 As it was noted, in particular those relating to the issue of direct horizontal effect and trade union 
liability.
273 See Zahn and De Witte 2011, pp. 444-445
274 See Sciarra 2011, pp. 366 and ff.
275 In more general terms it must be noted that the ECtHR rulings do not require from the Member 
State any conformation effort towards a particular model, but simply prohibit to the States to be 
neutral or regressive with reference to existing collective bargaining and collective action rights. On 
the other hand, in the Nordic member states  the growing influence of supranational sources  in the 
internal systems is also producing positive effects. In Finland, for example, with a ruling issued on 22 
December 2010 the KKO (Finnish Supreme Court) has  struck as  illegitimate because discriminating, 
the loss of a part of the salary (in particular, performance-based incentives) as  an individual 
accessory sanction for the case of illegitimate strike (for violation of the peace obligation), on the the 
basis  of art. 11 ECHR  and of the ECtHR jurisprudence in Demir and Enerji. See KKO:2010:93 (for the 
reference to ECHR parr. 15-17) and also Stora Enso's strikers entitled to performance bonuses, in 
Ammattiliitto Pro 30/12/2010, available online at http://www.proliitto.fi/en/media/news/stora-ensos-
strikers-entitled-to-performance-bonuses.html
freedoms, it must be noted that the national courts may find themselves in the 
difficult situation of having to issue extremely significant decisions about legitimacy 
and proportionality of national policy choices, while at the same time  lacking the 
institutional strength needed or the necessary specific technical capacity to gather 
the relevant information, as long as the criteria set out by the ECJ do not offer any 
concrete guidance276.
Lastly, for what it refers the possible involvement of Constitutional Courts, it 
must be given note of the German Federal Constitutional Court judgment which 
decided on the constitutionality of the Act approving the Treaty of Lisbon277; the 
BVerfG did not consider the approval to be at odds with the Constitution, but it also 
stated its jurisdiction278 to review future EU Treaty changes and transfer of powers to 
the EU on the basis of an ultra vires and an identity review279, justifying its claim on 
the basis of the “democratic deficit” of the Union, in which the Member States 
remain the decisive holders of public authority, from which the Union derives its own 
power under the principle of conferral, which cannot allow the possibility the 
possibility for the European Union of taking possession of Kompetenz-Kompetenz280 
or to violate the domestic “constitutional identity”, which is not open to integration.
In the face of increasing competences and further independence of the EU 
institutions, therefore, national autonomy should prevail in areas where policy 
choices are specifically shaped by pre-existing cultural, historical and linguistic 
understandings281; furthermore the BVerfG also defined “constitutional identity” to 
require sufficient space for national policy choices shaping the economic and social 
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276 In this sense, it must be underlined once more how the Swedish Arbetsdomstolen represents a 
specialized body as  well as a court of last resort: it is a tripartite body that comprises judges  with 
legal background as well as members  representing both sides  of the labour market and, beside the 
assessment of the national ruling and of the criticism that has  drawn, it must be noted how the 
national Laval ruling highlighted a very high degree of autonomous  decision-making by the Supreme 
Court.
277 BverfG, 2 BvE 2/08, 30.6.2009
278  Deriving from the “primary responsibility for integration” assigned to the national constitutional 
bodies which act on behalf of the peoples
279  According to the ultra vires review, the BVerfG shall assess whether legal instruments of the 
European institutions and bodies, adhering to the principle of subsidiarity (art.5.2 EC and artt. 5.1 and 
5.3 TEU), respect the boundaries  of the powers accorded to them. The “identity review”, on the other 
hand, investigates whether the inviolable core content of the constitutional identity of the 
Grundgesetz is respected. BverfG, 2 BvE 2/08, 240
280 i.e., the competence to decide on matters regarding competence. Ibid., par. 233
281  Ibid., par. 249. Among these “socio-cultural” matter, the Court included issues  of language, 
religion, education or family law.
conditions affecting the lives of citizens, including fiscal and social-policy choices; in 
contrast to the former sphere, therefore, it appears difficult to argue for a general 
presumption of national autonomy in the socio-economic sphere, which is deeply 
affected by the European integration282. The Lisbon ruling, however, while defining 
the EU substantially as a secondary political area283, does not provide a solution to 
the social and democratic problems emerging from such process284, and may 
therefore considered as representing a substantially defensive reaction which, 
moreover, does not address the status quo when it affirms that no manifest 
problems of  competences can be identified285.
The pressure on the ECJ to produce more detailed and balanced rulings, 
taking in due consideration the equality between the economic freedoms and social 
rights could not be sufficient, by itself, to solve the problems and the tensions 
underlying the ECJ jurisprudence and consequent to the rulings in the “Laval 
quartet”, in particular because of the occasional nature of the judicial interventions; 
in order to be able to produce consistent results this approach should be therefore 
accompanied, notwithstanding the shortcomings of the instruments provided by the 
current EU legal framework, by a strengthening of social policies and initiatives 
aiming to restore a better balance between market rules and labour rights, and in 
particular those of the collective dimension.
Long term and “structural” solutions to address the negative consequences 
of the rulings and the reconciliation of the social and economic dimension should 
proceed towards further amendments of the EU Treaties, and in particular the 
introduction of legal prerequisites for a common economic governance; for what it 
refers the protection of fundamental rights it must be noted that, even in the 
256
282 See Scharpf 2010, p. 233
283 See Steinbach 2010, p. 415
284 Relying in particular on reciprocal cooperation duties.
285  See Höpner 2010, p. 25. It should also be noted that, the Italian Constitutional Court had 
developed a similarly cautious and conciliatory solution through the so called “counter-limits 
doctrine” set by its judgment 183/73, in which the Court stated that the ratification of the EC Treaty 
could not undermine the fundamental principles set by the Italian Constitution, while considering it 
inconceivable that the Community would adopt instruments “in a civil, ethico-social and political” 
ambit which were at odds with the fundamental principles at hand, among which are undoubtedly 
recomprised social and labour rights (in particular see §20 German GG and Article 1 of the Italian 
Constitution and ). See Bücker, Dorssemont and Warneck in Bücker and Warneck 2011, pp. 348-349 
and supra par. 1.1.1
perspective of possibly significant outcomes of the EU accession to the ECHR and 
its consequences in the EU institutional and judicial framework, the continuing 
exclusion from the competences of collective action is not bound to be touched 
upon by such an agreement which will not modify the competences of the Union.
Art. 153.5 TFUE therefore needs to be amended, and in particular it must be 
recognised in the EU setting the directly political relevance of the right to strike, 
linked with the effective development of a democratic society, rather than a 
reconstruction providing a more limited economic role of a rebalancing and 
enforcement instrument in collective bargaining and standard setting, which must be 
nonetheless ensured 286.
 Pending completion of the lengthy process towards ECHR accession and 
lacking political impetus, it is not currently possible to identify a definite and shared 
line of intervention in order to the practicable solutions with reference to the absence 
of clearly defined supranational standards on trade union action, fitting interpretative 
tools and a defined set of principles regulating the coordination and the dialogue 
between the various courts that should be involved in the dialogue at European 
level; the current situation of contrast will not be easily resolved, and for the short 
term the ECJ will probably be able to retain its interpretative primacy in the matters 
at hand, in consideration in particular of the cross-border aspects and the balancing 
issues between economic and social dimension emerging from such cases, that 
represent complexities which the ECtHR is not familiar with, but which represents 
aspects of fundamental importance in the enlarged European setting, as well as of 
its preminent institutional positioning and the far greater enforceability of its rulings.
Despite the asserted ongoing “constitutionalization” process of the European 
Union, therefore, the law governing such a Union and the policies pursued by the 
various institutional actors remain apparently dominated by the economic 
perspective of the establishment and consolidation of the common market, in 
particular in the current phase of EU interventions linked with the consequences of 
the economic and financial crisis, rather than by responses to the needs and 
demands regarding the promotion, protection and enforcement of fundamental 
social rights.
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286 See Zoppoli in Andreoni and Veneziani 2009, pp. 228-229
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